On the founder of the Wahabbi doctrine, Muhammad Ibn 'Abdul-Wahab (1703-92) (pp. 53-54):

In Medina, a center of great learning before it fell under the control of the anti-intellectual clerics of Wahhabiyyah, he was introduced to the works of Ibn Taymiyyah (A.D. 1263-1328), who influenced him a great deal, and who shared with him "a delight in polemics." He is reported to have said, "I know of nobody who approximates In Taymiyyah in his science of hadith (the posthumous collected words and deeds attributed to the Prophet) and interpretation save Ahmad Ibn Hanbal." Ibn Taymiyyah was also a man of the sword: he fought the Crusaders and others in his lifetime, and observed that the foundation of religion is "Qur'an and sword."

Hanbal was the founder of "the strictest and most conservative" of the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence (sharia). Taymiyyah also had to deal with the Mongol invasion and sacking of Baghdad. His fatwa on the permissability of killing other Muslims is often cited by Al-Qaeda ideologues.

(p. 56):

Furthermore, Wahhabiyyah's doctrine of anti-Shi'ism can also be traced to Ibn Taymiyyah's attribution of the first fitnah (literally, "sedition," but it means here civil strife) in Islam to Shi'ism. He was also an influence on the puritanism and prudishness that characterized the thought and practice of modern Wahhabiyyah. He led an ascetic lifestyle, which is alien to the life of the Prophet and the teachings of Islam. Islam, unlike the ascetic ideal of Christianity that Nietzsche so detested, called on the believers to enjoy the pleasures of the earth. Ibn Taymiyyah did not marry and abstained from even enjoying the beauty of nature. In this regard he was closer to Saint Augustine than to mainstream Islamic jurists.

The major Wahabbi cleric of the post-WWII period has been Abdul-Aziz Bin Abdulah Bin Baz (1912-99) (pp. 68-70):

However, Ibn Baz is responsible for the reactionary religion -- or version of religion -- that has been consolidated in Saudi Arabia. He is responsible for the promotion and propagation of an extremely exclusivist and conservative interpretation of Islam through the standpoint of Wahhabiyyah. His writings constitute an elaboration on the thought of 'Abdul-Wahab, with a defiant resistance to accommodate the changes of the modern world. He is still remembered for issuing a fatwa in which he disputed the story of the landing on the moon, although, in fairness to him, he argued that it should be possible for people to land on the moon someday because "jinns [floating spirits or demons] were able to ascend to the skies until they touched it." His rulings included the declaration of infidelity (takfir) of Muslims who do not believe those stories about the Prophet that defy logic; the ban on pictures, statues, and archaeological relics; the ban on prayer behind a man dressed in a suit and tie; the rejection of the rotation of the earth; the ban on perfume; and the ban on singing and music. Saudi Arabia throughout the last century, and beyond, has been facilitated and rationalized by Ibn Baz.

His legacy is still particularly felt in the laws and regulations pertaining to women in Saudi Arabia. He had resisted all efforts of reform and was adamant not to compromise Wahhabiyyah's sexist and misogynist standards; in fact, he may be responsible for firmly reinforcing the ban against women driving in the kingdom. Regarding this issue, he has said, "It is known that it leads to misdeeds known by its advocates, like the prohibited seclusion with a woman, and the incautious mixing with men, and including the perpetration of taboos for which these things are banned. . . ." He was consistent on imposing conditions and restraints on women's ability to move freely in space: he was opposed to the wife leaving the house without the husband's permission. He, along with the other members of the authoritative Permanent Committee for [Religious] Scientific Research and Ifta', stated clearly: "If a woman wants to leave the house of her husband, she is to tell him of herdestination,and he would authorize her to leave provided that no harm is done in this regard, and he is better aware of her interests." He also urged a husband, who is entitled to hit his wife (in cases of her disobedience), to do so but without hitting her "harshly" (ghayra mubarrahin). But Ibn Baz was lenient enough to permit women to wear watches during periods of mourning, although he personally preferred that they avoid wearing them. Muslim women, he stated, have to be seen by fellow female Muslim physicians. If one is not available, a Muslim male physician may examine her but in the presence of her husband or a male guardian, "for fear of fitnah [sedition] or that which cannot be praised." Ibn Baz also prohibited women from wearing high heels (he did not issue an edict on its permissibility for men). He, in the authority of the aforementioned Permanent Committee, stated: "The wearing of high heels is impermissible because it may lead the woman to fall, and a human being is ordered by Islamic laws to avoid risks . . . and it shows the stature of the woman and her behind more prominently, and there is in this deception and display of some ornaments that believing women were prohibited from. . . ."

Ibn Baz, however, could be always counted on to support the considered desires of the Saudi regime (pp. 71-73):

Ibn Baz's credibility suffered a great deal among fundamentalists and Wahhabi ranks when he sanctioned the invitation of U.S. troops to the kingdom in 1990. He had a history of fanatical hostility to Jews and Christians -- all Jews and Christians. Before the deployment of U.S. troops during "Operation Desert Shield," if not earlier, Ibn Baz had urged in sermons and fatwas the hatred of all Jews and Christians. [ . . . ]

However, Ibn Baz may not have been as principled in his hostility to Jews an d Christians as his earlier edicts may have led us to believe: when prompted by the royal family -- which was facing a crisis of political legitimacy the likes of which had not been seen since the 1979 Mecca rebellion -- Ibn Baz delivered. He issued a fatwa permitting the government to seek aid from the United States and other countries. He said, in justification, that what "occurred from the standpoint of the Saudi government due to the events produced by the injustice at the hand of the president of Iraq vis-à-vis Kuwait, regarding its resort to a group of armies from different peoples of Muslims and others [my italics] to deter aggression and to defend the homeland, is permissible and even conditioned by necessity, and necessity leads the kingdom to undertake this obligation because defending peace and Muslims and the sanctity of homeland and its people is necessary." The Committee of Senior Clerics did the same, and praised the king for inviting "qualified forces."

(p. 94):

During the 1950s and 1960s, the impact of radical Arab politics on the kingdom was profound. Dissidence took shape in nationalist, socialist, and liberal forms, and the new professional class sought a voice in a country dominated by the elite of the elite of the royal family. Fear of dissent and coups was so intense that the king issued an order in 1956 prohibiting Saudis from traveling abroad for study. Two groups of officers were executed in 1956 and 1958 on grounds of plotting coups. Faysal was worried, and he threatened to use the tribally based National Guard against the king [Saud]. As a result, the king was forced to abdicate power in 1964, and King Faysal took over. Yet only seventy-two princes out of fifteen hundred wee lined up against the king. Al-Qahtani (a far more knowledgeable observer of such matters) counts twenty-six sons of 'Abdul-'Aziz, out of thirty-three alive at the time, voting against Saud.

(p. 97):

Some oil surplus revenues were deposited in European banks, but most went to U.S. banks. Even when Faysal had to grudgingly join an Arab consensus, as when he joined the 1973 oil embargo to protest U.S. support for Israel in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, he cooperated with the United States behind the scenes to soften the impact on Western economies. He also used the vast oil revenues at his disposal to pour money into pro-Western regimes in Lebanon and Jordan and to finance military campaigns against leftist and Arab nationalist insurgents in the region. Internally, Faysal was too strong politically to allow for the factionalism within the royal family to affect his rule; the famous Sudayri wing had to wait until after his assassination in 1975 to gather its momentum and start building a power base in the government.

(pp. 98-99):

Faysal's enmity with Nasser, and his uncompromising hostility toward communism and Judaism (not just to Zionism as a political movement), characterized his aggressive foreign policy in the region. His collision course with Nasser was finalized after the 1962 civil war in Yemen (supported by Egypt and Saudi Arabia on opposite sides), and his assumption to the throne increased his commitment to battle Nasser's influence in the Arab world. He tried, partly at the behest of the United States, to create a regional security alliance aimed against communism and nationalism. Thus was created the international Islamic fundamentalist movement, over which a hue and cry is now raised. It was the brainchild of Faysal and his American benefactors.

(pp. 138-140):

The new revenues of the oil boom -- crude oil prices skyrocketed from around $3 per barrel in 1970 to more than $35 in 1980 -- placed at the disposal of the ruling family huge amounts of money that were utilized to consolidate state power and to expand state welfare benefits and programs throughout the kingdom. It was also used, as was said earlier, to enhance the regional position of the kingdom by influencing the behavior of other states through financial aid. All this coincided with the era of King Khalid, the puritanical Wahhabi, and the hedonist King Fahd. That Fahd's lifestyle did not adhere to Wahhabi standards, or even to the standards of any recognized religion, did not diminish the impetus for state control and propagation of Da'wah (Islamic call, or the effort to win converts and adherents). Fahd, knowing that he lacked any religio-moral credentials or virtues, had to zealously support the global propagation of Wahhabi Islam in order to enhance his stature with the religious establishment, vis-à-vis domestic opinion in general. King Khalid did not need to be convined. He was a true believer. Fahd had another reason to throw money into globalizing Islamic propaganda: his close association with the United States and his increased involvement in U.S. covert operations around the world required Islamic steps on behalf of the kingdom to offset the Western orientations of the kingdom's foreign policies. [ . . . ]

Those efforts can be seen as signs of political and moral insecurity. The Saudi government had to do something in the face of Iranian challenge and in the face of internal challenge to its authority after the 1979 Mecca rebellion.

Abukhalil goes on to provide a series of charts showing increases in Saudi financial aid and funding of religious propaganda (pp. 141-143): Arms Imports; Funding for Pro-Saudi Religions Propagandists and Qur'an Memorizers (in Arab Countries); same in United States; same in Asia; same Worldwide. As is by now well known, the Saudis also pumped a lot of money into the war in Afghanistan, matching US funding dollar for dollar. (pp. 140-144):

Those efforts can be seen as signs of political and moral insecurity. The Saudi government had to do something in the face of Iranian challenge and in the face of internal challenge to its authority after the 1979 Mecca rebellion. One can see the increase in the size of Saudi financial aid in Table 5.1.

One also sees this pattern of dramatic increases in expenditure in funding of religious propagandists and Qur'an memorizers, as seen in Table 5.2. The drastic increases in funding for U.S. activities can be seen in Table 5.3.

And this increase in expenditure on religious propaganda took place under certain financial constraints during the period, which included decline of oil prices, expenditure on covert operations in Afghanistan and Latin America (and probably elsewhere), huge expenditure on arms sales, and funding in support of Saddam Husayn's side in the Iran-Iraq war. The same pattern of funding priorities is evident in the works of the Al-Haramain Foundation, which recently came under scrutiny by the U.S. government for suspicions of ties to terrorism. In 2004 the Saudi government announced that the Foundation's activities would henceforth be confined to Saudi Arabia itself. Al-Haramain, ostensibly a charitable foundation, spent much of its budget on religious propaganda on behalf of the Wahhabi Saudi government. In its 2003 annual fiscal report, the foundation stated that 35 percent of its expenditure for that year was devoted to "religious propagation and education" and a mere 14 percent was devoted to relief works.

Saudi Arabia, as a government and as a center for unpopular Wahhabi Islam, invested in its religious propaganda in part to cover King Fahd's weak moral credentials and reputation for indulgences in "sins." Unless one considered the former Taliban government in Afghanistan a successful model, the Saudi government failed miserably in winning converts to Wahhabiyyah. Mullah 'Umar and other Taliban colleages were clearly influenced by Wahhabiyyah teachings, knowing that Saudi Arabia sunk millions of dollars into the religious schools in Pakistan during the Afghanistan war. The Taliban government's destruction of the Buddhist statues in Bamiyan in 2000 had the Wahhabi signature all over it. Those statues, after all, survived centuries of Islamic history, which certainly included some intolerant and dogmatic periods, but perhaps none as strict in theological interpretation as the Wahhabis.

(pp. 195-197):

The presidency of Ronald Reagan and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan created the golden opportunity for those in the Saudi government (Crown Prince Fahd; Prince Turki Bin Faysal, head of foreign intelligence; Prince Sultan Bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, minister of defense; and Prince Bandar Bin Sultan, later Saudi ambassador to the United States) who had been pushing for the transformation of U.S.-Saudi relations to broaden their basis from energy to include such matters as covert operations and strategic cooperation. Prince Bandar was favored by his Uncle Fahd and set up shop in the United States. He led the fight for the sale of F-15 fighter jets to the Kingdom in 1978 and the sale of AWACs in 1981. He was appointed ambassador in Washington, D.C., in 1983 and promoted to the rank of minister in 1995. He is currently dean of the Diplomatic Corps in the American capital.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan opened a new chapter in U.S.-Saudi relations and joint covert operations. [ . . . ] The only credentials that were required were bitter anticommunism. The more anticommunist the better, they believed. The ones who fit the bill were the hardened Islamic fundamentalist rejects and roving fanatic revolutionaries who wanted to prove that Islam could defeat powerful enemies. They were also pragmatic enough to accept CIA money, weapons, and training. This was the time when Bin Ladin came into prominence; he seems to have met every senior prince. Even Crown Prince 'Abdullah now admits to having met him. "I met him once. He came to my house. . . . This was a long time ago, at the time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s," he told celebrity interviewer Barbara Walters. Prince Turki had a more intimate knowledge of Bin Ladin. [ . . . ]

The pro-American camp also wanted to help the American war on communism in places outside the Middle East. The public learned about the Saudi financing of the Contras, to the tune of millions of dollars, only because the Iran-Contra investigations revealed the Saudi role despite the Reagan administration's energetic effort to cover it up. Throughout, the Reagan administration would publicly refer to Saudi Arabia as an unnamed country. Bob Woodward also refers to Saudi funding of U.S. covert operations in Lebanon.