Iran: The Four Questions

Why did Netanyahu want to attack Iran?

There's no easy answer to this, especially once you realize that all of the reasons that Netanyahu has offered make so little sense one doubts that even he believes them. Each raises two questions: one is whether the problem he's complaining about is real; the other, if you play along and accept the problem at face value, is whether his proposal will fix his problem. For the most part, the "problems" aren't real, and the "solutions" usually do more harm than good. Moreover, if you dig deep enough to find some kind of rational core behind his thinking, what you find just exposes more fundamental problems with Netanyahu's own worldview.

One example is his fear that Iran is working on nuclear weapons and that when once they have them, they will use them to annihilate Israel. Netanyahu has said that bombing Iran fulfills a dream he's had for 40 years, but the timing doesn't check out. Israel had a fairly close alliance with Iran before the revolution in 1979, and maintained cordial relations into the 1990s, well past the most extreme years of the revolution. In 1979, while Khomeini strived to consolidate clerical power, he supported the occupation of the US embassy in Tehran, and threatened to export Islamic revolution to neighboring countries. They, in turn, financed Saddam Hussein's 1981-88 war against Iran, which the US helped arm. But Israel only turned on Iran after the 1990 Gulf War ended Iraq's as a threat. The war also proved that the US regarded Israel as more liability than asset: even after Iraq struck Israel with missiles, the US wouldn't allow Israel to retaliate, let alone join an alliance that depended on key Arab allies like Saudi Arabia and Syria.

Netanyahu first became Prime Minister in 1996. His goals were to break the Oslo Accords, which allowed Yasser Arafat a small measure of autonomous rule and a vague promise of a Palestinian state, and to bind the US ever closer to Israel. In the 1990s, this took some ingenious duplicity, as when he negotiated the Wye River deal, then sabotaged it. This is also when he started harping on the Iran "nuclear threat," which resonated with the US, especially after GW Bush played up the "WMD" threat as his reason for invading Iraq.

Nothing Netanyahu has said or done is particularly original. Even before American neocons formed Project for the New American Century (PNAC) in 1997 to promote war against Iraq, their first project was to advise Israel on how to break free of Oslo and other peace agreements, forming a strategic alliance with the United States, based on principles of "peace through strength and self reliance," obtained by projecting dominant power. When the World Trade Center collapsed in 2001, I recall Netanyahu and Shimon Peres grinning on TV, chortling about how good this was for Israel.

As far as I can tell, Netanyahu only has one political principle: never allow anyone to pass him on the right. As perpetual war has driven Jewish Israelis to the right, Netanyahu has moved right to maintain his leadership, all the way to embracing Kahanist settlers and genocide in Gaza. But Netanyahu's grip on power isn't just due to his relentless rightward maneuvering. It also derives from the perception of his skill in managing the "special relationship," where Israel extracts tribute and diplomatic cover from the US, and to some extent can even dictate American foreign policy.

I'm skeptical of how much power over America Netanyahu has ever had, but he's racked up some impressive wins with Trump, whether because their right-wing instincts are in harmony, or because they share some of the same donors (like the Adelsons and Elisons, who are rich enough to become nations unto themselves). While few Democrats have questioned the "special relationship," Obama, for instance, tried to listen to Netanyahu's carping about Iran's "nuclear ambitions" and actually come up with a viable solution: a negotiated agreement where Iran agreed limits that made the path to a bomb impossible. After all, Netanyahu's intimidation approach was only going to make Iran more covert, and without access and inspection a program would be impossible to stop. The only thing that stops it is getting Iran to agree to stopping it.

But Netanyahu complained anyway, tried to stop JCPOA under Obama, and finally got Trump to scuttle it, practically inviting Iran to develop nuclear weapons. That proves that Netanyahu wasn't worried that Iran would use nuclear weapons against Israel. Israel has a couple hundred nukes of its own, which is more than enough to deter an Iranian attack. What Netanyahu objected to was that if Iran developed their own deterrent, Israel would no longer be able to attack Iran (and possibly its allies like Hezbollah) any time it wanted to flex a little muscle.

But if Israel is not seriously worried about Iran attacking it, why would Netanyahu make such a stink about the remote prospect? The only reason that makes sense to me is that he thought he could sell the story to the Americans, who already held a massive grudge for throwing off the CIA-installed Shah and occupying the embassy, and were further influenced by the relentless Israel lobby, and to a lesser extent by the GCC states, which had their own reasons to oppose Iran (not least that it seemed to ally them with the US, allowing them to buy US arms and favors). Also helping to sell Israel's story was the Iran's own foreign policy, isolated from early in the revolution and more so after Israel turned on it in the 1990s, a turn that Iran attempted to counter by aligning with anti-Israeli groups and the popular Palestinian cause — another case where Israel's arguments became self-fulfilling.

Here we should note that Netanyahu's rhetoric against Iran escalated significantly after the Hamas revolt of Oct. 7, 2023. This may have had something to do with Iran's sympathy and alleged support for Hamas. After the revolt was suppressed (which is to say 1-3 days after it broke out), Israel set out on a program ostensibly to annihilate Hamas but effectively to systematically destroy the entire Gaza Strip. The only worry top Israelis had was that world opinion, especially in the US — which was critical for financing and rearming Israel — might turn against Israel and pressure them to limit the destruction. One tactic they had was to gin up the idea that Israel was under attack from external forces, and they traced them all back to Iran. Biden was gullible enough to buy this pitch, not only arming Israel but sending US forces into the region to deter (and possibly provoke) such attacks.

Shielded by US military might, Netanyahu continued to push his luck, including targeted assassination attacks as far as Iran and Qatar. But eventually Trump, who had replaced Biden and dispensed with even the least show of conscience, was lobbied by his wealthy Arab benefactors to propose a "15-point peace plan," which Hamas tentatively accepted, and Netanyahu finally acquiesced to — knowing, no doubt, that he could bank the hostage exchange, and then violate the ceasefire capriciously, with little trouble from the careless Trump. However, even that was too much peace for Netanyahu. That's when he went to work in earnest on convincing Trump to bomb Iran.

Still, it was a very risky thing to do: partly because whatever degradation they managed to inflict on Iran, the net effect would be to make Iran's leadership even more embittered and determined to reply in kind; but also because Israel would suffer an immense PR hit, getting blamed for all the blowback, which could ultimately even flip the US from its recent devotion to a far more critical stance. (Even Americans who remain enamored with Israel could turn on Netanyahu personally — as, indeed, many already have.)

But those are risks to Israelis in the future. Netanyahu's own concerns are much more short-term. Since 2020, he's been fighting against three corruptions cases, where his ability to stay in office has stalled the prosecutors. After the filing of charges, he faced four elections in two years, losing one to an ill-fated coalition under Yair Lapid, winning the others with coalitions with the far right parties, including the ultra-religious and ultra-nationalist parties of Itamar Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich — which he welcomed under his personal directive of never allowing anyone to pass him on the right. This last coalition's plan to break the independence of the Supreme Court drew massive protests, suggesting he was bound to lose next time out. But Hamas came to his rescue in 2023, and the current coalition, with its policies of genocide in Gaza, ethnic cleansing in the West Bank, and strategic bombing attacks far and wide, has saved him, so far.

While Netanyahu's policies have little opposition from Israel's many Jewish-identified political parties, his personal leadership reputation is flawed and fragile. It's pretty common for voters to rally behind a leader during war, then break away once the war is over. Churchill lost badly in 1945. In 1946, Republicans swept the congressional elections, which they hadn't won since 1930. Stalin didn't give voters a choice, so hardly counts as an exception. So Netanyahu's best chance of preserving his status as war leader was to expand Israel's forever war to Iran, especially as it shows off his ability to wrap Trump around his finger (and to get America to pay the cost and bear most of the blowback).

Still, this looks like a desperate gamble to salvage a worldview that believes all problems can be solved by forcing others to submit to your overwhelming power, even as you yourself become increasingly isolated and disconnected from humanity. In the long run, that seems extremely foolish. But Netanyahu only has to hold out through October's elections (or he can call elections early if the timing seems right). And however bad the war can get by then, he is relatively insulated, not least because he's put Trump in the hot spot, and can always blame Trump if he chickens out.

Why did Trump go along with the attack?

Trump's decision is easier to explain. He didn't have to think it up. He barely even had to think about it. The war plan was delivered to him on a silver platter, explained in terms that flattered him, with an urgency that foreclosed critical review — not that he or his staff were so inclined. And in his mind, it probably wasn't all that big of a deal. He had previously ordered the assassination of a senior Iranian official, and nothing terribly bad happened after that. And he had previously ordered the bombing Iranian nuclear sites, and again no big deal: just a tidy little "12-day war" followed by a painless ceasefire. He had tested Iran's "deterrence" several times, and seen they had no taste for a real fight. Now he had the opportunity to kill Iran's leader and more, and this time Israel would be a full-fledged partner. Iran had been wracked by demonstrations, so the regime appeared weak, possibly just needing a push to tumble over, while Trump's revitalized War Department has never been more awesome (or so he was led to believe). What could possibly go wrong?

"Nothing," he was no doubt reassured. Or maybe he's simply learned to ignore the quibbling his lawyers routinely use to cover their asses. He's used to just going with his gut, and hasn't that worked out well so far? (Answer that only if you're him, and have no sense of future costs.) Trump's great talent is his ability to see how events can play out politically, if only among his base voter segment, the only one he cares about. Killing the Ayatollah could be huge for them, as well as for the Israel lobby. If Iran then surrendered, throwing out all the bad old guys and letting him run the whole country with something like his Gaza Board of Peace, well, that would be perfect. Maybe even enough to bounce back from his poll drops (should I mention the Epstein-Trump files here?), sweep the mid-terms, and arrange his preferred 2028 succession (whatever that may be).

So, his decision looks like a high stakes gamble, much like his recent abduction of Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro. It's not clear to me whether the move against Maduro helped or hurt him politically: while Maduro was widely depicted as a bad guy, and Americans seem not to mind blowing things up abroad as long as the blowback is contained, views of Trump are divided such that nearly anything he does results in the same people loving and hating him. But taking Maduro only added to Trump's confidence, which helped him overlook the ways in which Iran is different. While Iran is potentially a much more dangerous foe, the more ominous difference is Israel. In thoughtlessly going to war at Israel's behest, he fell into Netanyahu's trap.

Why didn't Iran surrender once it was attacked?

Trump's optimistic scenario assumed that Iran would collapse once the Supreme Leader and his upper echelons were decapitated. This was partly based on the idea that massive demonstrations against conditions — which were largely due to the "maximum pressure" sanctions Trump implemented when, at Netanyahu's behest, he tore up the JCPOA agreement — signified that the masses were ready to revolt against a widely hated regime. Israel, which had maintained a spy network in Iran since the 1980s, giving them a chance to feed filtered intelligence to Americans, so they were in a good position to feed Trump's fantasy.

But the fantasy had deeper roots in American hubris, some going as far back as WWII, when the US was often "greeted as liberators" — the US only entered the war after having been attacked, had minimal imperial ambitions (like the Open Door policy), and generally favored democratic self-rule for the territories they conquered. The Cold War changed America's aims and ambitions, and by the time of the War on Terror, only Americans still held any belief in their own benevolence. Rather, after the Cold War, when most people expected a "peace dividend," the shadowy bipartisan mandarins who ran US security policy let their new "sole hyperpower" status go to their head, imagining global power so awesome the whole world would have to follow America's lead.

By 2003, this worldview was summed up in the phrase "shock and awe": all it would take is an initial volley of rockets over Baghdad for Iraqis to realize that resistance would be futile, so they would surrender immediately, hoping to become the beneficiary of America's good graces. It didn't really work, perhaps because the people who weren't killed realized they had survived, and could still fight back, especially with asymmetrical tactics. Twenty years later, America's dispensers of "shock and awe" had utterly failed in Afghanistan, and fared little better in Iraq, while other high-tech ventures in Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Niger, and elsewhere had accomplished close to nothing. They were little different from Israel's cynical "mow the grass" campaigns: forever wars, because when power is your whole game, there will always be resistance.

Given that all those countries prove unconquerable, why should Iran submit to their extreme ultimatums? (Even Gaza, which has been systematically demolished so cruelly that the only historical analog has been what Nazi Germany did to the Jewish enclaves of Eastern Europe, still survives, and resists in spirit if no longer effectively with arms.) Besides, compared to any of them, Iran has some real strengths: it's three times the area and population of Iraq or Afghanistan; the geography is difficult for many reasons (not least the chokehold of the Strait of Hormuz); it has been on a war footing since the 1979 revolution, forced to provide for its own needs; the government is under conservative, religiously-sanctioned order, which even the left would prefer to America's idea of "liberation"; they have cultivated allies in the region, which have their own reasons for opposing Israel, the US, and/or US-allied Arab oligarchies, and they have diplomatic relations around the world (like China's Belt and Road Initiative, and BRICS).

None of this should have caught anyone more conscious than Trump unawares. While Americans never got over the "hostage crisis" of 1979, Iran's own major trauma was the 1981-88 war, started by Iraq and largely financed by the Gulf Arab sheikdoms, who feared that their Shi'ite minorities (or majorities in some cases) might join the revolution. While Iran never reciprocated Iraq's use of poison gas, this was when and why they developed their missile industry, which played a major part in the war. (Russia, and ultimately the US, provided missiles for Iraq, but Iran had to fend for themselves.) While Israel was more anti-Iraq than anti-Iran in this period, once Saddam Hussein had been defeated, Israel decided that Iran should be the "existential threat" that justifies further American aid, and that kicked off an arms race which Iran hoped would suffice as a deterrent. This allowed Israel to portray Hezbollah and Hamas, its own resistance movements, as Iranian "proxies," implying that Iran was pulling their strings as part of some sinister plot: a fanciful story Americans were gullible enough to buy.

More notoriously, Iran revived the Shah's nuclear program in 1996, ostensibly to be able to build nuclear power plants (thereby saving oil for foreign markets). Given their US-enforced isolation, Iran had to develop its own enrichment capabilities, which could also provide a straightforward path to nuclear weapons. Iran's leaders realized that such weapons would be useless, and given Israel's insistence on being the only nuclear-armed power in the region, provocative. They took pains to disavow such ambitions: the Supreme Leader issued a fatwa against developing nuclear weapons, Iran signed and honored the NPT, and eventually agreed to further limit and render transparent its program under the JCPOA. None of this satisfied Netanyahu, who harped endlessly on the imagined threat, until he found an American president gullible and careless enough to follow his lead: Donald Trump.

One more thing that should be noted here is that while Netanyahu talked about the desirability of regime change, there is no reason to think that Netanyahu actually believes that any possible Iranian leaders will ever submit to the degrading loss of sovereignty that Trump is demanding in his "15-point plan." For Israel, war is life, and war is meaning, something they've remained committed to at least since 1948. Even their goal of reducing Palestinians to "an utterly defeated people"[1] is not enough, as they keep seeking out "monsters to destroy." (Some, assuming Iran's demise is fait accompli, have already designated Turkey as next. And as military expansion invites settlement, some are plotting to annex southern Lebanon.)

Americans, on the other hand, want their wars to end, which is why they tired of the Terror Wars, even though they learned little along the way. (Sure, they didn't end, but they're out of the news, which is good enough for most people.) Trump might hope for some quick, cheap and cosmetic resolution, like he lucked into with Venezuela: all Maduro's VP had to do was to make some conciliatory gestures (which Maduro would probably have done on his own, had he been given a chance), while leaving the regime intact. Trump took the win, and moved on (unfortunately not just to Iran, but to Ecuador, while snorting fire and blowing smoke at Cuba). No such deal was possible with Iran, but even if one was, would Israel allow it? Israel has already violated the Trump-dictated ceasefire in Gaza hundreds of times. And Iran's leaders know that they won't get out of this by sucking up to Trump. They see Netanyahu as the director here, and Trump as his unreliable stooge.

And how and when and under what conditions is this war likely to end?

While the first three questions are historical, which means they have simple answers — muddied, of course, by the lies and excuses political leaders live and die by, which is why I had to digress — this one is open-ended, and speculative. All I can really do here is to guess at some parameters, each being a presently undetermined variable. One way to do this is to pose each parameter as a question, then assess the range of possible outcomes. I'll try to focus on the more obvious ones, but some outliers are too significant to ignore.

1. After decapitation, how resilient and stable is Iran's regime? The answer appears to be "very." After the "12-Day War" Iran expected to be attacked again. They put together a "succession plan," expecting the next attack would begin as it did, with a decapitation strike. There are reports that Ayatollah Khamenei said he expected "to be martyred." New leaders have been advanced quickly. The command structure has been decentralized, which makes it harder to disrupt. They've had months to prepare to hit back after the strike, and they appear to be methodical. This unity could degrade over time, given further pounding, but in general that draws an embattled people closer together. The bigger risk with decentralized resistance groups is that they make it harder to negotiate an exit from the war.

2. Is there a faction within the Iranian power structure that could stage a coup and sue for peace? Probably not. The war has allowed the IRGC to consolidate its power, subordinating everyone else. And the IRGC are mostly selected for militance, all the more so as US/Israel culls their top leadership.

3. The Iranian people are unhappy with the regime. Can they rise up and overthrow it? It's very myopic to think that the unhappiness of recent demonstrations will be galvanized into an uprising for subjugation to the US and Israel. The bombing is much more likely to rally support for the regime, but it's also likely to make policing against "traitors" more vigilant. People will only rise up when the state is weak and conflicted. That isn't now or soon, but could happen eventually.

4. What about ethnic minorities? Could they rise up and break away from Iran? This strikes me as very unlikely, at least in the short run. After the war ends, if the central state is very weak, perhaps. Israel may regard this as a nice outcome, but even if you shear off all the minorities, the rump Persian state will still be substantial, only now much more nationalist than before. Think of Turkey after the Ottoman Empire collapsed.

5. How long before Iran runs out of missiles, drones, etc.? I have no idea, but they've had time to stockpile them before the war, and presumably still have some hidden. It's likely they also planned to move some of their production underground. With satellite imaging and complete air superiority, you'd think the US would be in a good position to degrade whatever capability has survived, but Iran is a big country with rugged terrain. Then there is the question of whether they can be resupplied from outside. Russia could ship arms and other materiel straight across the Caspian Sea. China could move its wares through Pakistan. I doubt that either of those will be so explicit about it as the US was in arming Ukraine or the Afghan mujahideen in the 1980s. But if they do, even surrepetitiously, the answer could be a long time.

6. How long before the US and Israel run out of missiles, drones, etc.? Probably never, but some sort of slowdown seems likely, and the costs could be steep, especially for missile interceptors. The US initially reported costs of $1 billion per day (I've also seen reports of $2 billion), and these figures don't include economic harm and other costs. As raising taxes for an unpopular war is difficult, Americans would pay for this with debt and inflation.

7. How long can Trump sustain this war politically? He has nearly three years left on his term, before US voters get a chance to replace him (if indeed they do get a chance). There is no real chance of removing him early, although elections in November could cost Republicans control of Congress, which could hamper his ability to fight the war, or do much of anything else. Still, the real question is how long can Trump fight, but how much is he willing to risk if/when the war turns even more unpopular than it already is? In other words, how important is this war to him? I suspect the answer is "not very." He entered the war on a lark, looking for a quick win. He's got all he's going to get in that regard. From here on in, it's damage control, and the sooner he gets out, without losing too much face, the better.

8. How long can Netanyahu sustain this war politically? He's getting 80% support for his war at the moment (probably only among Jewish Israelis), vs. 40% for Trump, so he should be in a stronger position than Trump. But he's up for reelection in October, for the first time since 2022, and Israel has absorbed a lot of trauma under his leadership. His popularity has waxed and waned, and there are a lot of people who like his policies but hate him personally. But his real ace in the hole has long been his skill at manipulating American presidents. If Trump decides to blame him for the war fiasco, he could be finished. And while everyone else currently supports his war, who else is going to stick their neck out that far?

9. What is the minimum outcome that Iran can agree to that will allow Trump to save face? Not clear, as Trump wasn't satisfied with the state of negotiations before the war, which he could have claimed as a win (if Netanyahu had let him), and Iran is in no mood to let him off that easily again. Trump is clearly clueless when it comes to "the art of the deal." But real negotiators would look for win-win scenarios, where the region gets better security from Iran than it had before the revolution, and Iran gets real autonomy and integration on its own terms into the world economy, as well as iron clad security to make sure no one ever threatens them again. I could sketch out what I think that would entail, but the obvious sticking point is that Israel needs to agree to coexist with the Palestinians (and vice versa, of course, but Israel is the problem here). Short of that, all sides need to agree on some deterrence parameters and some penalties for aggression.

10. Can Trump rein in Netanyahu? Trump is likely to want to end the war quicker than Netanyahu. But to end the war, he is going to have to offer Iran security against Israeli attack, so he needs Netanyahu's agreement. Netanyahu has always been steady in his aims, but flexible in his tactics, so he will bend to pressure, but snap back as soon as possible. We saw this early on with Wye River. We saw it recently when Netanyahu agreed to Trump's Gaza plan. So Trump probably can pressure Netanyahu to acquiesce to whatever deal he comes up with Iran, but getting him to stick to it is another story. But if Trump is serious, he could put some guard rails in: limits to aid, no access to Gulf resources, no intelligence on Iran. Trump has yet to show that he has the backbone (let alone the brains) to stand up to Netanyahu, but he holds the institutional clout to do so. And he could just blame the whole misbegotten affair on Netanyahu, which would damage the latter's standing in Israel.

11. What will the Gulf states do? They are oil-based oligarchies, and typically they solve their problems by paying people off. They've avoided class conflict by building generous welfare states for their own citizens, and by using easily controlled guest workers for more menial tasks. They've bought arms from the US, partly for security, but mostly to shore up an alliance they need for commerce and finance. That's forced them into making allowances for Israel, which remains very unpopular on the street. They've kept their radical clergy inside the tent, and in some cases have exported jihadis, at least where the US has allowed it. Much of this makes them wary of Iran, and some have tried to tout their antipathy to curry favor with the US (and Israel). On the other hand, do they really want to fight a knock down, drag out war against Iran? They have a lot more to lose than to gain. Nobody has ever lived more conspicuously in glass houses than the rich folk in Dubai and Abu Dhabi. Iran could inflict a lot of damage real quick if they align too closely to the US and Israel. My guess is that they should want to mediate. They might even decide that US bases are superfluous if they can negotiate joint control of the Gulf with Iran. Moving the US bases out of the region would help reassure Iran. Of course, the other possibility no one talks about is that those oligarchies are fragile states that could be overthrown, either by an inside coup or by popular revolt.

12. What sort of pressures will oil and fertilizer shortages cause, both on the US and on "allies" in Europe and Asia? Due to some peculiar political choices, Trump already seems to be squirming on this count. Other countries in Europe and Asia are likely to be hit even harder. In those cases, the question is how they can turn popular (and business) discontent into pressure against the war. Spain, for instance, started by denying the US use of its base there to supply the war, and wound up with free passage through the Strait of Hormuz. Could NATO crack up? I can imagine all sorts of far-fetched but not impossible scenarios.

13. Will the war crash the world economy? I doubt it, but recessions occur in several scenarios of how this war will play out, and I don't have a very good handle on them. But some combination of price spikes and supply disruptions could stress otherwise vulnerable economies, like America's Trump-addled one. But while, for instance, Ukraine produced some dislocation early in the war, the world adjusted to where you rarely hear about such things any more.

14. Will Trump and/or Netanyahu threaten to use nuclear weapons against Iran? Trump's already made several ultimatums against Iran. If the war is stuck with no face-saving exit, this would be the ultimate one, the one that Iran would finally have to take seriously. Seems unlikely, but lesser officials argued for using nuclear weapons in Korea and Vietnam, and Putin has suggested that he has red lines that could trigger his use. Trump has a bad habit of going for the craziest idea in the room, and he seems to have a perverse fascination with nukes (as in his suggestion of using one against a hurricane). Iran could very well develop deep underground facilities, possibly for uranium enrichment. The US has developed nukes specifically as "bunker busters," so that could be a way to use them while still denying that you're a madman hellbent on killing everyone.

15. Will Iran eventually develop nuclear weapons? The strategic argument against them doing so died with Ayatollah Khamenei. At this point, few in Iran would argue against doing so, given that not doing so failed to deter the present war. They probably have the know how to do so, although nukes are still useless except as a deterrent, and even then only against countries that are willing to settle for peace. One of the more likely scenarios is a Korea-style armistice, where the US/Israel can't afford to continue fighting, but aren't willing to settle for peace. That would almost certainly lead to Iran developing nuclear weapons (not that they would be any more useful than North Korea's, which deter an attack the US has no desire for.)

Looking through all of these parameters, the most important questions are:

1. Can Trump and/or Netanyahu admit that attacking Iran was a mistake that should never be repeated?

2. Can Iran hold out long enough, while inflicting sufficient pain, to get that concession?

3. Once they have the concession, can Iran back pedal to allay Israel's existential fears?

The first and third points would be highly uncharacteristic, tough pills for each side to follow. The first would probably be the end of Netanyahu's political career. Trump's could be cripled either way. Neither is particularly known for putting the public welfare above their own political careers, so it is quite possible that the nations will move only after their leaders are removed.

[1] This phrase, "an utterly defeated people," was cited as the goal of Israeli forces suppressing the second intifada (c. 2001). Whenever I hear this phrase, I think of the surrenders of the ragged tatters of the tribes of Sitting Bull and Geronimo to the wastelands America offered as reservations. Despite extraordinary efforts, until Gaza Palestinians were never reduced to such a state. What's unclear now is whether Israelis will be satisfied with their opponents "utter defeat," or whether they will keep whittling them down to nothing. The triumphant Americans eventually eased up, allowing some degree of autonomy on the reservations, and citizenship for Native Americans in the country at large. Israel still has a long ways to go toward becoming an open society, and given demographic fears may never get there. But the main obstacle remains the perpetual war machine.