Sunday, September 16, 2018
Weekend Roundup
Once again, way too much to report to cover in the limited time I
left myself this weekend. Especially given that I had to take a few
hours out to attend a talk by Lawrence Wittner on
How Peace Activists Saved the World from Nuclear War. As Wittner,
author of at least three books on anti-nuke protests,
pointed out, the main factor inhibiting nuclear powers from using their
expensive weapons was fear of public reproach, something that was made
most visible by the concerted efforts of anti-war and anti-nuke activists.
Needless to say, he pointed out that this struggle is far from over, and
arguably may have lost some ground with Trump in power. Trump, indeed,
seems to be triply dangerous on this score: fascinated with the awesome
power of nuclear weapons, convinced of his instincts for holding public
opinion, and indifferent to whatever harm he might cause.
Some scattered links this week:
Scattered pieces by Matthew Yglesias:
Who's overrated and who's underrated as a 2020 Democratic presidential
prospect? The one piece I care least about, partly because I think
that it's far more important for Democrats to elect federal and state
legislators, and for that matter state and local administrators, than
the president. Most issues can be ranked on two axes: importance and
urgency. The presidential election isn't until 2020, even including
the seemingly interminable primary season, whereas there are important
elections happening real soon. But also, and one can point to at least
25 years of experience here, I'd much rather have a solid Democratic
Congress than a crippled Democratic president (which is a charitable
description of the last two, maybe three). But if you are curious, the
current betting lines (and that's really all they are) rank: Kamala
Harris, Bernie Sanders, Cory Booker, Joe Biden, Elizabeth Warren,
Kirsten Gillibrand, Amy Klobuchar, Andrew Cuomo, Opray Winrey, Tim
Kaine, Chris Murphy. Nothing but minor nits in the article: Yglesias
argues for Klobuchar vs. Gillibrand; Dylan Matthews for Michael Avenati
vs. Winfrey; Ezra Klein advises "buy [LA mayor Eric] Garcetti, sell
[CA governor Jerry] Brown." Previous editions of this article -- it
promises to stick with us like a bad cough -- aimed higher, arguing
that Harris is overrated vs. Sanders, that Biden and Kaine should be
more evenly matched, and that Cuomo has pretty clearly blown his shot
(he's since pretty definitively announced he's not running).
Andrew Cuomo has won himself another term, but his presidential aspirations
are dead: "Somewhat ironically, it was actually Cuomo's presidential
aspirations that, in retrospect, have ended up dooming his presidential
aspirations. . . Cuomo zigged [right] when the national party zagged [left]."
The good news for him was that he enjoyed a 20-to-1 fundraising advantage
over challenger Cynthia Nixon, as well as solid support from what remains
of the Democratic Party machine in New York. In short, he won his primary
the same way Clinton defeated Sanders in New York in 2016. Also see:
Matt Taibbi: Cuomo's Win: It's All About the Money.
George W. Bush is not a resistance leader -- he's part of the problem:
The best way to think about Bush-style pseudo-resistance is that it's
a hedge against the risk that the Trumpian political project collapses
disastrously.
In that case, Republicans are going to do what they've done so many
times before and keep all their main policy commitments the same but
come up with some hazy new branding.
After the Gingrich-era GOP was rejected at the polls in 1998 as too
mean-spirited, Bush came into office as a warm and fuzzy "compassionate
conservative." When he left office completely discredited, a new generation
of GOP leaders came to the fore inspired by the hard-edged libertarianism
of the Tea Party and its critique of "crony capitalism." That then gave
way to Donald Trump, a "populist" and "nationalist," who coincidentally
believes in all the same things about taxes and regulation as a Tea Party
Republican or a compassionate conservative or a Gingrich revolutionary.
For better or worse (well, okay, for worse) the elite ranks of the
American conservative movement are inspired by a fanatical belief that
low taxes on rich people constitute both cosmic justice and a surefire
way to spark economic growth. This assumption is wrong and also makes
it impossible for them to coherently govern in a way that serves the
concrete material interests of the majority of the population, leading
inevitably to a politics that emphasizes immaterial culture-war
considerations with the exact nature of the culture war changing to
fit the spirit of the times.
The disagreement over whether Trump is a jerk and the more nice-guy
approach of Bush is better is a genuine disagreement, but it's fundamentally
a tactical one. When the chips are on the table, Bush wants Trump to succeed.
He just wants the world to know that if Trump does fail, there's another
path forward for Republicans that doesn't involve rethinking any of their
main ideas.
The controversy over Bernie Sanders's proposed Stop BEZOS Act, explained:
"You need to take him seriously, not literally." The proposed act is just a
way of showing (and with Amazon personalizing) the fact that one reason many
companies can get away with paying workers less than a living wage is that
many of those workers can compensate for low wages with the public-funded
"safety net" -- food stamps, medicaid, etc. Such benefits not only help
impoverished workers; they also effectively subsidize their employers. Of
course, there are better ways to solve this problem, and indeed Sanders is
in the forefront of pushing those ways. (Also see:
James Bloodworth: I worked in an Amazon warehouse. Bernie Sanders is right
to target them.)
Jon Lee Anderson: What Donald Trump Fails to Recognize About Hurricanes --
and Leadership: Before the storm hit, Trump tried to do the right
thing and use his media prominence to make sure people were aware of the
threat Hurricane Florence posed: as he most memorably put it, the storm
"is very big and very wet." But aside from that one public service bit,
everything else he made about himself, bragging about his "A+" damage
control efforts in Texas and Florida last year, and blaming the disaster
in Puerto Rico on Democrats and "fake news." I doubt that FEMA has ever
done that great of a job, especially in an era where public spending is
shrinking in addition to being eaten up by corruption (while at the same
time disasters are becoming ever more expensive), but having the program
run by people as insensitive and deceitful as Trump only makes matters
worse.
By the way, this has been a rather weird hurricane season, with more
activity in the Pacific (including two major hurricanes impacting Hawaii,
and, currently
Typhoon Mangkhut ravages Philippines, Hong Kong, and southern China),
while most Atlantic storms have been taking unusual routes (which partly
explains why they've been relatively mild). It's not unusual for storms
to follow the East Coast from Florida up through the Carolinas, but I
can't recall any previous storm hitting North Carolina from straight east,
then moving southwest and stalling before eventually curving north and
back out to sea, as Florence is doing. (Wikipedia says Hurricane Isabel,
in 2003, "took a similar path," but actually it came in from further
south, with more impact in Virginia.) While Florence has caused a lot
of damage to the Carolinas so far, one thing you should keep in mind is
that winds there have generally been 70-80 mph less than what hit Puerto
Rico a year ago. More rain and flooding, perhaps, but much less wind.
More links on hurricanes, past and present:
Brian Resnick: Hurricane Florence catastrophic flooding, rescues, and
deaths: what we know.
Charles Bethea: Flooding from Hurricane Florence Threatens to Overwhelm
Manure Lagoons.
Michael Mann: Hurricane Florence is a climate change triple threat.
Emily Stewart: Trump doubles down on Puerto Rico death toll conspiracy,
and
Eliza Barclay: What we know about the death toll in Puerto Rico.
The key thing to understand about Puerto Rico -- a point Trump doesn't
begin to grasp -- is summed up in the title of this AP report:
Maria's death toll climbed long after rain stopped. It seems likely
that if the GWU study methodology was applied to hurricanes in Texas
and Florida, it would come up with higher death tolls than had been
reported, just because it takes more secondary factors into account.
Still, the increase in Puerto Rico was more severe precisely because
recovery efforts were inadequate and in some places invisible. The
most obvious gauge here is electric power outages. I was in Boston
when a hurricane wiped out power virtually everywhere, but power was
completely restored within a week (in my case, three days). It's
virtually certain that anywhere in the continental US power will be
restored within a week, or two weeks tops (with critical places like
hospitals operational much sooner). In Puerto Rico, it took
11 months ("except for 25 customers").
Dean Baker: The bank bailout of 2008 was unnecessary. Fed Chairman Ben
Bernanke scared Congress into it. I think Baker's basically right,
although at the time I didn't have a big problem with the $700 billion
bank bailout bill -- nor, later, using some of the bailout funds to
prop up the auto industry. I think it's appropriate for government to
step in and prevent the sort of panics and collapse that big business
is prone to, but I think it's even more appropriate to provide a strong
safety net and a firm universal foundation for all the people who work
and live in that economy. The problem is that propping up the banks
kept the people who ran them into the ground in power, and once they
were rescued, they actively worked against helping anyone else. Obama
did manage to get a stimulus spending bill passed, but it was by most
estimates less than half of what was actually needed to make up for
the recession. (Coincidentally, it was capped at $700 billion, the
same figure as the bank bailout bill. The banks, by the way, got way
more than $700 billion thanks to Fed policies that basically gave
them unlimited cash infusions, possibly as much as $3 trillion.) The
recovery was further hampered by a Republican austerity campaign,
whipped up by debt hysteria, partly on the hunch that keeping the
economy depressed would make Obama, as Mitch McConnell put it, "a
one-term president," and partly due to their ardor in shrinking
government everywhere (except the military, police, and jails).
Ten years after the collapse of Lehman, some more links:
Matthew Yglesias' third Weeds newsletter made the following claim:
President Obama's No. 1 job was to rescue the ruined economy he inherited,
and he didn't do it.
Yglesias, following an article by Jason Furman, argues that Obama
failed because he didn't get Congress to pass an adequate stimulus bill.
Congress did pass a $700 billion bill, but much of that was in the form
of tax breaks, which turned out to have little effect. The size of the
package was almost identical to the bank bailout bill passed under Bush,
as if that was some sort of ceiling as to how much the government could
spend on any given thing. (It's also very similar in size to the Defense
budget, not counting supplemental funding for war operations.) I think
it's more accurate to say that Obama did a perfectly adequate job of
rescuing the banking industry, but once that was done it was impossible
to get sufficient political support to rescue anyone else. Moreover, any
hope that the banks, once restored to profitability, would somehow lift
the rest of the economy out of the abyss, have been disproven. We might
have known that much before, given the extent to which financial profits,
even before the recession, were driven by predatory scams. There's no
better example of the influence of money on politics, as well as its
"I've got mine, so screw yours" ethics.
Zack Beauchamp: It happened there: how democracy died in Hungary.
In 2010, Viktor Orbán's Fidesz party won a sufficient landslide to
not only control Hungary's parliament but to rewrite its constitution,
which they proceeded to do in such a way as to rig future elections
in their favor, and make it nearly impossible for future governments
to undo their policies. When I first read about this, I immediately
realized that this would be the model for the Republicans should they
ever achieve comparable power in the US. These days, Hungary looks
like the model for a whole wave of illiberal despots, with Putin and
Trump merely the most prominent.
James Fallows: The Passionless Presidency: Fairly long critique of
Jimmy Carter's management style by a journalist who spent a couple years
as one of Carter's speechwriters: mostly a catalog of idiosyncrasies he
never felt the need to reconsider let alone learn from. Carter was one
of the smartest and most personally decent people ever elected president,
but few people regard him as a particularly good president, either based
on results or popularity. It's long been recognized that he voluntarily
sacrificed popularity with, for example, his recession-inducing battle
against inflation, his appeal for conserving energy, and his Panama Canal
treaty (to pick three backlashes Reagan's campaign jumped on. And lately
we've had reason to question some of his goals and intentions, like his
deregulation efforts, his undermining of trade unions, and his escalation
of American "security interests" in the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan.
Fallows dances around these issues, partly by never really concerning
himself with the substance of Carter's presidency, or for that matter
its historical context. One thing that struck me at the time was that
Carter started out wanting to find a moral center for US foreign policy,
but somehow that quickly decayed into a more intensely moralistic gloss
on the policy he inherited (mostly Kissinger's realpolitik with
some high-sounding Kennedy-esque catch phrases). The immediate result
was a revival of the Cold War in ever more uncompromising terms.
Sean Illing: The biggest lie we still teach in American history class:
Interview with James Loewen, author of Lies My Teacher Told Me: Everything
Your American History Textbook Got Wrong, which came out in 1995 and has
sold some two million copies. He says: "The idea that we're always getting
better keeps us from seeing those times when we're getting worse." Also:
For example, if we want to make our society less racist, there are certain
things we'll have to do, like we did between 1954 and 1974. During this
time, you could actually see our society become less racist both in
attitudes and in terms of our social structures.
If we want to make society more racist, then we can do some of the
things we did between 1890 and 1940, because we can actually see our
society becoming more racist both in practices and in attitudes. So by
not teaching causation, we disempower people from doing anything.
By teaching that things are pretty much good and getting better
automatically, we remove any reason for citizens to be citizens, to
exercise the powers of citizenship. But that's not how progress happens.
Nothing good happens without the collective efforts of dedicated
people. History, the way it's commonly taught, has a way of obscuring
this fact.
Also, when asked about "the age of Trump":
I actually think our situation is far worse than it was in the past.
For example, our federal government, under Nixon and Johnson, lied to
us about the Vietnam War, but they never made the case that facts don't
matter or that my facts are as good as your facts.
They assumed something had to be seen as true in order to matter,
so they lied in order to further their agenda.
Trump has basically introduced the idea that there is no such thing
as facts, no such thing as truth -- and that is fundamentally different.
He is attacking the very idea of truth and thereby giving his opponents
no ground to stand on at all. That's a very dangerous road to go down,
but that's where we are.
Illing also has a good interview with David Graeber:
Bullshit jobs: why they exist and why you might have one.
Anna North: The striking parallels between Brett Kavanaugh and Clarence
Thomas: People tend to forget that the main reason Thomas' offenses
were so shocking at the time was that he was actually in charge of the
government department that was responsible for policing sexual harassment
in the workplace. He should, in short, have been uniquely positioned to
know the law, and personally bound to follow it. Of course, as a partisan
Republican hack, he could care less about such things, but the example
gave us a fair glimpse not just into his personal character but into his
future legacy as a jurist. Kavanaugh's"#MeToo" problem (see
Bonan Farrow/Jane Mayer: A Sexual-Misconduct Allegation Against the
Supreme Court Nominee Brett Kavanaugh Stirs Tension Among Democrats
in Congress) doesn't strike
me as of quite the same order, but there is a real parallel between how
Thomas and Kavanaugh were groomed as political cadres infiltrating the
Supreme Court. And confirming Kavanaugh will give him the opportunity
to do something vastly more destructive to American women than he could
ever have done in person. My main caveat is: don't think that all these
guys care about is sexual domination; they're also really into money.
Nomi Prins: Cooking the Books in the Trump Universe. Or, as The
Nation retitled this piece, "Is Donald Trump's Downfall Hidden in His
Tax Returns?"
Jim Tankersley/Keith Bradsher: Trump Hits China With Tariffs on $200
Billion in Goods, Escalating Trade War.
Sandy Tolan: Was Oslo Doomed From the Start? I would like to think
it could have worked, and maybe in Rabin hadn't been killed, and had
Clinton taken seriously his role as honest broker, and had the UN (with
US consent) weighed in on the illegality of the settler movement, but
in retrospect it's clear that Oslo was a weak footing that faced very
formidable opposition -- virtually all on the Israeli side (not that
the deal lacked for Arab critics). The reason Oslo happened was Israel
desperately needed a break and a breather from the Intifada. Rabin's
vow to "break the bones" of the Palestinians had turned into a public
relations disaster, at the same time as the Bush-Baker administration
was exceptionally concerned with building up its Arab alliances. But
also, Rabin recognized that Arafat was very weak -- partly because the
Intifada had gotten along well without him, partly because his siding
with Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War undercut his support from other
Arab leaders -- and was desperate to cut any kind of deal that would
bring him back from exile. Rabin realized that bringing Arafat back
was the sort of ploy that would look like a lot while giving up next
to nothing. In particular, Rabin could still placate the Israeli right
by accelerating the settlement project. Meanwhile, the security services,
the settlers, and the right-wing political parties plotted how to kill
the deal, and any future prospect for peaceful coexistence. As Nolan
notes:
For me, each successive trip has revealed a political situation grimmer
and less hopeful than the time before.
What's made the situation so grim isn't the demise of "the two-state
solution," which only made sense as a way as a stop-gap way to extract
most Palestinians from the occupation without demanding any change from
Israeli nationalism. What's grim is that more and more Israelis have
become convinced that they can maintain a vastly inequal and unjust
two-caste hierarchy indefinitely. They have no qualms about violence,
which they rationalize with increasingly blatant racism, and for now
at least they have few worries about world public opinion -- least of
all about the US since Donald Trump, who's been totally submissive to
Netanyahu, took office.
Also see:
Max Ajl: Trump's decision to close the PLO Embassy says more about the
future of the US than the future of Palestine.
Avi Shlaim: Palestinians still live under apartheid in Israel, 25 years
after the Oslo accord.
Edward Wong: US Is Ending Final Source of Aid for Palestinian Civilians.
Jon Schwarz/Alice Speri: No One Will Be Celebrating the 25th Anniversary
of the Oslo Accords.
James Vincent: EU approves controversial Copyright Directive, including
internet 'link tax' and 'upload filter': "Those in favor say they're
fighting for content creators, but critics say the new laws will be
'catastrophic.'" For more of the latter position, see
Sarah Jeong: New EU copyright filtering law threatens the internet as we
knew it. This sounds just extraordinarily awful. In a nutshell, the
idea is to force all content on the internet to be monetized, with a clear
accounting mechanism so that every actor pays an appropriate amount for
every bit of content. In theory this should provide financial incentives
for creative people to produce content, confident their efforts will be
rewarded. In practice, this will fail on virtually every conceivable level.
The most obvious one is that only large media companies will be able to
manage the process, and even they will find it difficult and fraught with
risk. Conversely, content creators will find it next to impossible to
enforce their rights, so in most cases they will sell them cheap to a
whole new layer of parasitic copyright trolls. The metadata required to
manage this whole process will rival actual content data in mass, and
lend itself to all sorts of hacking and fraud. And most likely, all the
headaches will drive people away from generating content -- even ones
formerly willing to do so gratis -- so the overall universe of content
will shrink. It would be much simpler to do away with copyright and try
to come up with incentives for creators that don't depend on taxing
distribution. That could be combined with funding of alternatives to
the current rash of media monopolies, reducing the ability of companies
to convert private information into cash.
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