Monday, November 11, 2024
Speaking of Which
Draft file opened 2024-11-06 2:00 PM.
Finally posted 2024-11-11 10:00 PM.
Added a couple small bits on 2024-11-12.
Also added a few more bits, all the way up to 2024-11-18,
but I swear, that's the end of it.These later bits have green change bars,
as opposed to red for the earlier adds.
Sections:
Trump won.
I don't know why. I cannot fathom why anyone, much less
an outright majority of voting Americans, could stand him, or could
in any way identify with him, let alone entrust him with great power.
It is not inconceivable to me that this result was rigged, with every
voting machine in the country shaving several points in his favor --
and that all the election denial hoopla of 2020 was just misdirection,
while they worked on perfecting the software.
Or, I suppose, it's possible that a thin majority of the American
people have become so soul-deadened, demented, and/or deranged that they
wish nothing more than to inflict this guy on the rest of us. In which
case, the obvious answer is "to dissolve the people and elect another."
The phrase comes from a
Bertolt Brecht poem, a bit of Communist Party humor, not really
applicable here, but it does convey the disconnect when you realize
that the people you got are not the ones you imagined or hoped for.
We need better politicians, but we also need to become better people,
not least to stop them from the temptation to gaslight us.
Personally, I was delighted when Kamala Harris ran away with the
Democratic nomination. I didn't think of her in terms of categories
or attributes, and was always annoyed when people brought up "first
woman," etc., like some kind of milestone. She just seemed like a
generic American -- at least in the America I know, which includes
many years of living in Kansas, as well as some in New York, New
Jersey, and Massachusetts. I knew that she wasn't a leftist, that
she was a shrewd and calculating politician, and that she circulated
easily among friends in high places. But she seemed personable and
relatable, flexible, nimble, like someone who could recognize problems
and try to do things to fix them. She seemed much better to me than
her predecessors (going back at least to 1992).
Besides, I'm old enough that I'm no longer enamored of utopia, nor
patient for the long struggle, so I wasn't inclined to criticize.
Surely, I figured, she must know what she's doing? And if not, if
she blew it, we could unload on her then. But why give Trump any
comfort from division. He was such a clear and present evil -- a
word I normally abjure, but why beat around the bush here? -- that
nothing could budge my vote from Harris. And now, like Hillary
Clinton, and unlike -- no matter how little regard you have for
him, Joe Biden -- she has committed the unpardonable sin of losing
to Trump.
Still, as I'm writing this intro, I don't feel like tearing into
her campaign or other shortcomings. As I collect links, I'm sure I
will nitpick here and there. But it's still hard for me to see why
she lost, or what else she could have done about it. That wasn't the
case with Hillary Clinton: her faults, both personal and political,
were obvious from the start, and the sanctimonious scapegoating for
her loss only heightened her flaws. I could reconcile myself with
the theory that Americans had candidates they disliked, but could
only vote one of them off the island, and they chose her, because
they knew her better. Surely, this year those same voters would
dispatch Trump? Even as his polls held up, I expected a last gasp
break toward sanity.
That it didn't happen suggests a much deeper problem, which
brings us back to the voters. Or should, if I could figure it
out. The one thing I'm pretty sure of is that America has been
in some kind of moral decline since approximately when I was
born -- in 1950, the week before Chinese volunteers entered
the Korean War and reversed the American advance, forcing a
stalemate, which American sore losers still refuse to accept.
Sure, Americans committed many sins before I was born, but
we could aim for better, and teach our children to make a
better world. The Hays Office made sure that the good guys
wore white hats, and triumphed in the end. I certainly grew
up believing in all that, seriously enough that when events
proved otherwise, I protected my ideals by turning against
the actual America. But what I never lost was the notion
that in the end, it will all turn out well.
We may not be at the end yet, but Trump sure seems like a
serious turn for the worse. He's four years older than I am,
but came from a completely different class and culture, and
at each step along the way he had different reactions and made
different choices, always breaking bad, which sometimes meant
embracing deteriorating social morality, and often accelerating
it. Oddly enough, he's the one who poses as a pious patriot.
Stranger still, lots of people believe him, perhaps because he
allows them to indulge their own vile impulses.
As far as I can tell, there are two types of Trump voter. On
the one hand, there are people who actually like him, who get
off on his arrogance and nastiness, and who like to see other
people hurt. (I've previously noted two types of Christians:
those who hope to help their fellows, and those who are more
focused on consigning those they disapprove of to hell. Trump
is practically a messiah for the latter group.) The second type
are party-liners, who will always vote Republican, no matter
how much they may disapprove of the candidate. The two groups
overlap, but each group extends the other, nudging a minority
up toward 50%.
Elite Republicans may not love Trump, but they'll do anything
to win -- their whole graft depends on it -- so they go along,
figuring they can control the damage (as well as profit from it).
This is much like the conservatives in Weimar Germany figuring
they can control Hitler -- meanwhile, Trump resembles Hitler at
least in his political pitch (his ability to rouse the passions
of people for whom economic conservatism has little appeal). Such
fascism analogies resonate for some people, especially on the left,
who know the history, but are meaningless to those who don't --
most Trump voters, although he seems to have some staff who revel
in it, as they keep sending dog whistles, not least to provoke
charges that never seem to work.
There is a certain genius to Trump/Republican politics, in how
they've manage to flip attacks into accolades: charges that would
discredit any normal candidate only seem to make Trump stronger,
and that rubs off on the rest of the Republicans. The key element
here has been the extraordinary success of partisan broadcasting,
keyed to fear, flattery, and rage: the net effect has been to sow
distrust and deny credibility to anything Democrats say or do,
while championing Republicans as defenders of true America. The
result is a tribe that has come to reject facts, reason, and/or
any hint of moral purpose: all are rejected as tools of the devil.
Trump adds very little of substance to this toxic infosystem,
but he does offer some kind of charisma or style, and disinhibition
(which passes for candor if you buy it, or cluelessness if you don't),
and serves as a lightning rod for attacks that only confirm the
bond between him and his fans. This can be very confusing for all
who are immune to or wary of his charms: his appeal makes no sense
to us, and meaningful response is nearly impossible. On the other
hand, they counter with the same logic and even more fervor, making
even less sense to us. The double standards are mind-boggling. For
example, one might try making a case that Trump has been unfairly
targeted by prosecutors, but how do you square that with his threats
to do much more of the same, and the "lock her up" chants?
But it's not just that Trump Republicans are easily deluded and
controlled by their media. That feat is built on top of much deeper
social trends that go back at least to the 1940s, with the founding
of the military-industrial complex and the extension of American
hegemony to serve global capitalism, with its attendant red scares,
both foreign and domestic. Americans had an idealized picture of
themselves coming out of WWII, which made the world Trump and I
grew up in. But the task of protecting capital turned into nasty
business, and we started to divide into one camp that relished the
fight, and another appalled by it. We started seeing films where
bad guys were recruited to do dirty work for supposedly good guys,
who turned bad themselves. Before long, American presidents were
ordering assassinations, kidnapping, and torture. Trump started
out with his Nazi-symp father, his apprenticeship under Roy Cohn,
and his mobster connections. He fit right in. He only had to wait
until America became rotten enough to embrace him. Bush's Global
War on Terror made that possible.
Well, the other part of the equation is the rise of the super
rich, made possible by the ideological attack on the notion of
public interest, and by the assertion of "greed is good," and the
general belief that "might makes right" (i.e., anything you can
get away with is fine). The richer the supers got, the more they
leveraged their wealth through lobbies, PR firms, donations, and
media to turn government to do their bidding, further increasing
their wealth. They usually rented their spokesmen, but Trump,
having personified great wealth on TV, gave them a new angle: he
could have it both ways, claiming their authority while pretending
to be free of their influence.
I'm not sure how much of the election any of this explains,
although it may help explain why Democratic attack ads don't seem
to be drawing any blood. As with Republican attack ads, they may
do nothing more than confirm one's own virtues (or vices if that's
your thing). But it does make one wonder if raising money isn't
overrated.
We could, of course, look into the many ways Democrats have
contributed to their downfall. The losers are always quick with
thoughts, so a fair number of them will show up in links below.
I may have more to say on this below, but for here I'll pass,
except to point out a couple of fundamental dynamics:
There is a deep divide and conflict within Democratic ranks,
between corporate/neoliberal and populist/democratic tendencies;
they both share a fear of the right but are deeply distrustful of
each other. That produces acrimony, as you'll see below.
Democrats are subject to higher expectations than Republicans.
Democrats are expected not just to win elections, but to address
issues successfully, and are held accountable for any failures.
Republicans only have to win, and there are few strictures on
how low they can go to win. When they do win, they can readily
screw up, but are rarely held accountable.
Democrats are also held to higher ethical and moral
standards. Republicans may even embrace their own's misbehavior,
while excoriating Democrats for the same faults. (Thus, for
instance, Hillary Clinton is horribly corrupt, but Donald Trump
is just a rogueish businessman.)
Democrats believe in public service, in representing all
people, and as such they credit Republicans with legitimacy where
Republicans deny any to Democrats, and seek to cripple them wherever
possible. Republicans see politics as a zero-sum game.
The net effect is that Democrats campaign at a severe handicap.
Republicans can lie, cheat, and steal, but Democrats can't -- and
in many cases don't even know how. Democrats want to be liked, even
by Republicans (and especially by the rich), so they are careful
not to offend. (Even so, a casual reference to "garbage" gets blown
up sky high, while Republican references to "vermin" get laughed
away.) Republicans can exaggerate for effect, while Democrats pull
their punches, and that muddies their messages. Democrats cede
critical ground in arguments, seemingly legitimizing Republican
stands, which only become more extreme. The media love loud and
brusque, so they lap it up, amplify it, spread it everywhere,
dispensing with reason and nuance, and especially reality (the
most boring subject of all).
Then there are structural factors. America is divided into
states, districts, precincts, all of which can be gerrymandered,
as Republicans were quick to turn to their advantage. The Senate
is grossly undemocratic, and the filibuster there has made it
impossible for Democrats to pass meaningful reforms, even on
the rare occasions when they seem to have majority power. The
Republicans have packed the courts, which they're increasingly
using to restrict executive power by Democrats, and to increase
it by Republicans. Many judges are protected from any oversight
by lifetime appointments. Many reforms, as well as redress by
impeachment, require supermajorities, which Republicans use to
lock themselves in power, even if they lose popular support.
(Orban's system in Hungary has made extensive use of this, and
is widely cited by Republicans as a model for America -- although
in may have originated here, much like Nazi, South African, and
Israeli race laws drew on American precedents.)
But the biggest structural problem of all is money. Republicans
worship it -- even poor ones are defined by their deference or
indifference to great wealth -- and the rich thank them for their
service. The single most certain prediction for a second Trump
term is yet another round of tax cuts for the rich. Next up is
another round of regulatory loopholes, give-aways, and subsidies
to needy (or just greedy) businesses. Lobbyists took Washington
in the 1980s, and have only grown ever since. Republicans run
"revolving door" administrations where lobbyists are as likely
to work for the government as against it. The net effect is that
government is as likely to work against the public interest as
for it.
Republicans love this, because it reinforces their message
that government is inefficient, wasteful, and useless, and should
be shrunk (and ultimately "drowned in the bathtub"), except they
never actually do that, at least as long as they can use it to
feed their political machine.[*] While this is mostly done with
money, Republicans are also looking forward to using their power
in other ways: in turning the civil service into a patronage system
for political operatives; in aligning information services with
their political messaging; and in using coercive powers to suppress
heresy and dissent, to punish their enemies, and to empower (or at
least pardon) their allies.
When Democrats talk so piously and nebulously about the "death
of democracy," this is what they are actually referring to. Only
it's not a future threat, something that might be avoided if only
enough people would vote for a Harris, a Biden, a Clinton, an
Obama. It's been happening for a long time -- I used to see 1980
(Reagan) as the turning point, but now that I see it less in policy
terms than as a mental disorder, I see much more originality and
continuity in Nixon (which has the advantage of making Johnson's
Vietnam the breaking point -- it certainly was what turned my own
life upside down -- instead of the nascently-Reaganesque Carter).
Maybe with Trump redux, Democrats will finally realize that they
have to fight back, and stop trying to pass themselves off as
some kind of prophylactic, a thin barrier to limit the contagion.
Which brings us back to money. As I said, Republicans worship
it. But so do Democrats: maybe not all of them, but virtually all
of the kind that run for higher office, because the system is
rigged so that only those with access to money can run serious
campaigns. (Bernie Sanders is the exception here, and he did
come up with a novel system of small donor support, but when
he came to be viewed as a threat, big donors dumped tons of
money -- Michael Bloomberg more than $500M; compare that to
the $28M he spent this year for Harris against Trump -- to
quash his campaign.) Harris is no exception here. She raised
more money than any Democrat -- or Republican for that matter --
ever. And she lost. So maybe money isn't the answer?
I'm not going to try to tell you what Democrats should do
instead, but maybe they should start by waking up and looking
at the real world we're living in, a world that they are at
least in some substantial part responsible for creating. And
that means they need to re-examine their worship of money.
There's much more that can be said about this, but I've droned
on long enough. I should leave it here.
[*] That machine, by the way, is a thing of wonder, which I
don't think has ever been fully dissected, although there is a
lot of literature on various aspects of it. If Machiavelli were
here, he would write a letter offering advice on how an aspiring
young Republican could rise to a position of great power and
influence. (As Gramsci noted, real princes didn't need such
guidance. The point of the book was to expose their machinations
to those with no such experiences.) This would not only lay out
the topography of institutions, but the networking, the lexicon
of coded language, the spin, and ultimately the psychology of
why anyone would want to be a Republican in the first place --
something I still find incredibly alien even though I often take
great pains to try to understand others in their own terms.
As of Saturday afternoon, I have 144 links, 15438 words.
I was planning on not posting until Monday, so I have time to
make another round or two, but I have enough feedback on the
election to offer a few bits of speculation about the future.
I put little stock in them, given how poorly my predictions
have held up. But I can hedge a bit by offering a couple of
alternatives.
On several occasions, notably 1992 for the Republicans,
and 2016 for the Democrats, incumbent parties seem to have
felt permanently entitled to the presidency, and took their
defeats bitterly, lashing out blindly. The level of vitriol
Republicans directed at Bill Clinton after 1992 was almost
unprecedented in the never-very-polite lore of American
politics, and set a pattern that they repeated after 2008
and 2020 (arguably the most over-the-top, but by then their
character was expected, and the sore loser took personal
charge of the rage).
While Democrats didn't behave that atrociously after 2016,
when pretty much everyone expected Hillary Clinton to easily
defeat Donald Trump, her followers reacted with dismay and
a massive round of accusations and scapegoating -- especially
directed at Russia, although there were many other factors at
work, including how distasteful and provocative Trump was, and
that Clinton supporters still had a chip on their shoulders
over the strong Bernie Sanders challenge to what organization
Democrats expected to be a cakewalk.
Democrats' opinion of Trump has only sunk lower with four
years in power and four years plotting his comeback. But so
far, reaction has been mild, other than the inevitable shock
and sadness. Trump's margin has been sufficient that it's
hard to doubt his win. And while Harris seemed promising at
the Convention, that may have largely been relief that Biden
was out, the assumption that his administration had a good
story that was simply poorly communicated, and the pretty
conviction belief that Trump was such damaged goods that
most Americans would be glad to be rid of him. But it was
never really love for Harris, who's proved to be an easy
(and rarely defended) target for post-mortems. This also
suggests that we misread Trump -- that our loathing of him
isn't shared by enough Americans to beat him -- so maybe
this isn't a good time to go ballistic on him (as we did
in 2016).
Trump's margin opens one new possibility that we haven't
considered, which is that if he governed competently, he
could actually consolidate his power and become regarded
as a significant American president. Admittedly, we have
no reason to expect this. His first term was a disaster of
unfathomable dimensions. He's spent most of the four years
since scrambling to stay out of jail. And his campaign theme
has been redemption and revenge. If he attempts to put into
practice even a significant share of what he campaigned on,
evaluations of his legacy should sink as far below the scale
of American presidents as Caligula and Ivan the Terrible.
But will he? I wouldn't bet against it, but it's just
possible that having won, as ugly as that whole campaign has
been, he'll change course. I don't mean to suggest that he
won't be as bad as his voters want him to be on signature
issues like immigration. But now that he's president, why
should he adopt austerity budgets and demolish services,
just to prove that government doesn't work. If he does that,
he'll be blamed, and if he doesn't, he'll reap the credit.
Plus the whole Fox machine is behind him, so who's going to
complain? Certainly not the Democrats, who are always ready
to help a Republican president do a good deed. (Remember when
they foolishly thought "No Child Left Behind" would better
fund education?) He's promised a better ACA. Why not rebrand
it like he did with NAFTA, adding a couple tweaks that most
Democrats can get behind, and magically turning it into the
Republican program it always was? He'd be a hero, whereas
had he done any of Paul Ryan's plans, he'd be a goat.
The big difference between Trump now and then isn't just
that he has some experience to learn from, but that this
time he gets to pick his own staff. In 2016, he left that
mostly to Pence and Priebus, who saddled him with a bunch
of assholes even he couldn't stand, including the so-called
"adults in the room." This could, as most of us feared, be
for the worse, but Trump was always hemmed in by regular
Republicans, ranging from the Koch-controlled Ryan to the
Blob-heads in the national security racket. One big reason
he won the 2016 primaries was that he disagreed with hardcore
economic orthodoxy. But as a neophyte Republican, he got stuck
with a bunch of crooked, deranged incompetents, and their rot
killed his whole administration. Granted, he wasn't smart
enough to figure it out in real time, and he may still not
be, but the new crew were competent enough to run a winning
campaign this time. We shouldn't exclude the possibility that
they're competent enough to manage him, or to let him manage,
some level of competency. For which he'll handle the PR, as
that's his thing, and it will probably be more hideous than
the actual administration, which above all else has to keep
business booming and profits soaring.
One area where he has a mandate and some real power to act
is foreign policy, where Biden has been utterly disastrous.
It's well past time to settle the Ukraine War, which needs a
bit more art and tact than he's shown so far, but is doable
without looking like too much of a surrender to Putin (but if
the Democrats scream treason, that'll probably make it more
popular). The obvious deal there is status quo on the ground,
and dial back sanctions as stability and security is ensured.
The US actually needs a cooperative relationship with Russia,
and that means undoing the sanctions. He needs to do that
without looking like a Russian stooge, but Putin seems to be
more sensitive to how Trump looks than Trump himself.
Israel is a different matter. He'll give Israel whatever
they want, with no complaints or pretense of humanitarian
concern. At some point, he'll broker a deal with Egypt, the
Saudis, Syria (via Putin), and maybe even Iran, to send the
rest of the Palestinians Israel hasn't killed already into
permanent exile. Maybe he'll get Israel to concede Lebanon,
and that will be the end of it. It's a horrible solution,
but in some ways it'll be a blessing. The Democrats were
just going to drag it out. [*]
I could go around the world, but in foreign policy, there
is virtually nothing he can do (other than start a war, e.g.
with China) that wouldn't be an improvement over Biden. In
general, he'll depress trade and immigration, and disengage
in the internal affairs of other countries. He could easily
negotiate peace deals with North Korea, Iran, even Cuba and
Venezuela. He doesn't care about human rights in those places.
(Biden didn't either, but the pretense was killing.) BRICS
will continue to grow, Europe will go its own way, and the
American people will be just fine. (Maybe fewer cheap goods
and less cheap labor, but nowhere near the scare levels that
liberal economists like to predict.) If Democrats complain
about this, they'll only dig themselves deeper graves. The
era of American global hegemony is ending. Protracting it
will only make a bad thing worse.
By the way, Vance is a creep, but he's much smarter, and
much savvier both on foreign and domestic policy than Pence
ever was. Plus, as the heir-apparent, he has incentives not
to turn the administration into the dumpster fire that Pence
left with. I could go on and on, but you should get the idea
by now. Having shown he can win, legitimately (as these things
go), Trump has little reason to destroy democracy. He could
even build on the majority he already has. He faces two dangers:
one is his own bad instincts; the other is the idiot nihilism
of much of the Republican Party. But he owns that party now,
and the rank-and-file are basically followers, controlled by
the propaganda machine, and the apparatchiki are just hired
hands: they do what they're told.
Again, I have very little confidence that Trump will do any
of this -- even on Israel, where he will continue to do whatever
Netanyahu wants, but Netanyahu is used to and even seems to like
it being a forever war, so he may not press that hard.
So it's really just up to him. As for the Democrats, all they
can do is react. It's hopeless for me to try to advise, as none
of them are ready to listen. They first have to figure out who
they are, who they want to represent, and what they want. But
this game of conning both the donors and the voters is wearing
awfully thin.
[*] I could add some caveats and nuance here, but the key point
is that this is what the dominant political coalition of Israel
actually wants, and that Trump, both by temperament and in light
of his donor support network, is unlikely to offer any resistance
to anything Israel demands -- even more so than Biden-Harris, who
as Democrats felt the need to express humanitarian concerns and
their commitment to democracy. Trump has no such concerns, and
may even see the mass expulsion of Palestinians as an exemplary
model for his own mass expulsion of "illegal immigrants." But
any number of things could limit this "ethnic cleansing." I'll
leave this to your imagination, assuming you have enough to see
that public opinion all around the world will increasingly shift
as Israel approaches genocide's "final solution" -- even in the
US, which should be of some concern to Trump, although his first
instinct will be to fight and suppress it. He will see it as an
opportunity to break pro-Israel donors away from the Democratic
Party, solidifying his support, but freeing Democrats from having
to toady for Israel, as Harris did and paid for. But ultimately
opinion could turn against Trump/Israel here. The tide could
even turn in Israel as the costs of war and isolation mount. And
a massive influx of Palestinian exiles will be welcome nowhere:
the US and EU go without saying, but public opinion makes this
a tough sell in the Arab autocracies, which could blow up under
the strain -- and which have their own major financial pipeline
to Trump (e.g., Kushner's billion dollar slush fund).
I think
the most likely scenario is that Gaza is totally crushed and
depopulated, but that Israel is pressured to dial back its
apartheid and ethnic cleansing measures in the occupied areas
(including parts of pre-1967 Israel, where Palestinians are
20% of the population, and have barely-nominal citizenship)
to pre-October 2023 levels. But a wide range of scenarios are
possible. While Trump's election strengthens Netanyahu, they
are fighting a perilous uphill battle (against a world which
has been inexorably decolonising ever since 1945), where they
may well wind up just retreating into their fortress-castles.
[**]
[**] MAGA is clearly such a retreat, on many fronts (e.g.,
they want to return to a world where stern fathers can spank
naughty daughters). Most of their beliefs should be resisted,
but their retreat from neoliberal/neoconservative foreign
policy is overdue. The world has changed since WWII, when
America extended its hegemony over the "free world" and set
up its quasi-holy war against the enemies of capital. Most
of the capital that American armed and propaganda forces so
fiercely defend isn't even American any more, and what is isn't
of much value to most actual Americans. (A precise accounting
of that capital may depend on how you account for Elon Musk,
who I'd argue is case proof that not all immigration is good).
Moreover, America's defense of that capital has lost much of
its effectiveness, as American soldiers have given up the fight
(why risk ruining their lives for oil moguls?), as corruption
has made the war machine prohibitively expensive, and as the
world itself has become increasingly unconquerable. (Phrase
comes from Jonathan Schell's 2003 book, The Unconquerable
World.)
Neoliberals will accuse Trump et al. of "isolationism,"
because that's the slur they deployed against a previous
generation of (mostly) Republicans, who were wary of their
schemes for one world market, dominated by American capital,
and regimented by American arms. Although the US rarely had
much of a standing army before 1939, Americans were widely
engaged in the world, mostly through trade, not insignificantly
through missionary work, but only rarely through imperialist
adventures (1898 counts, as does the subsequent "gunboat
diplomacy"). This willingness to engage the world on fairly
equitable terms, including the resistance to European imperialism
announced in the Monroe Doctrine, the pursuit of Open Door Policy
to break up imperial monopolies, and the "arsenal of democracy"
which defeated the final campaigns of Germany and Japan: all this
earned Americans considerable good will around the world, which
America's post-WWII abuse of power has only turned into a "legacy
of ashes" (to borrow the title of Tim Weiner's history of the
CIA). While the "isolationist" taunt will impress subscribers of
Foreign Policy, it's a spent term, a piece of liberal cant
that will produce more backlash than agreement.
While the "defense Democrats" have been ascendant against Trump
and for Biden, I can only hope they will be seen as bankrupt now,
and that Democrats will revert to something more like Roosevelt's
Good Neighbor Policy (a kinder, gentler redressing of Gunboat
Diplomacy, not that it changed things much), and a renewed
interest in the UN, which the neocons sought so hard to trash.
Also, I do not expect Trump to be consistent here: even if his
tendency is to withdraw, institutional support for militarism
and world dominance remains strong, at least as much in the
Republican Party as in the Democratic, and it's easy to play
on his ego as "the leader of the free world," especially when
all he has to do is to follow friendly bribes.
I woke up Monday morning with the thought that I could finally add
a third intro here, where I talk about what Democrats should do now
that they've been driven from national power. I always planned on a
final chapter to my political book where I would offer what I saw as
practical political advice to save the world. (Well, in some versions
of that book, I tacked on an extra section, which would describe the
dystopia that would ensue if Democrats fail and allow Republicans to
do all they've wanted. That much, at least, I'll spare you spoilers
for.) So I have given this subject a fair amount of thought, and if
I had the time (and were still so inclined) I could write about this
at considerable length. However, with Monday slipping away from me,
and no desire whatsoever to face this file on Tuesday, I'll try to
keep this very brief: some reflections and scattered tidbits, but no
structure, and no cheerleading. I'm not trying to sell my advice.
I'm just throwing it out there.
Monday evening, I find I haven't written this section, and no
longer have time. I think I did make many of the points I've been
thinking about under various articles, so I'll leave it to you
to ferret them out. Anything involving money, credibility, and
trust is likely to be relevant. The biggest problem Democrats
have is that lots of people don't trust them -- on lots of things,
including avoiding war. They have to figure out how to fix that.
And funny thing, beating the Republicans at fundraising and at
advertising and celebrity endorsements and "ground game" isn't
doing the trick.
Why so many of those people trust Republicans instead is way
beyond me, but there is considerable evidence that they do. There
is also ample evidence that trust in Republicans is foolish and
sometimes plain stupid, but until Democrats get their house in
order, distrust in them takes precedence. One saving grace may be that
most Americans really hate corruption, and they don't much care
for incompetence either. Republicans are up to their necks in
both. Now if you can just show them, you should be able to score
points. But it's hard to do when you're corrupt and incompetent
as well.
One thought I'm pretty sure I didn't get to yet concerns "woke."
I think of it as something like satori, a state of mind that if
you're lucky, you find yourself in through no discernible effort
of your own. It's good to be woke, but only you can know that.
What it is not is a license for an inquisition, which is how
most of the anti-woke have been trained to view it. And it's
not that they disapprove of inquisitions in general. It's just
that they prefer their own.
Top story threads:
Election notes: Some general pieces here,
then more specific ones on Trump (why he won, and how horrible that
is) and Harris (why she lost, and who cares) following, then sections
on the Senate (flipped R), House (undecided, but probably still R),
and other issues below.
Washington Post:
2024 turnout is near the 2020 record. See how each state compares.
I've seen references to a drop in voter turnout in 2024, especially
relative to 2020, but this data shows a pretty close match, with 9
states posting new highs (44 year window). Trump won those states
5-4, with all of his wins in battleground states. Of 5 states with
turnout under 55%, 4 were among Trump's biggest margin states (WV,
AR, MS, OK), while the lowest one anywhere was Hawaii.
Zack Beauchamp:
[11-06]
Donald Trump has won -- and American democracy is now in grave danger:
"Trump's second term poses an existential threat to the republic. But
there's still good reason for hope."
[11-06]
The global trend that pushed Donald Trump to victory: "Incumbents
everywhere are doing poorly. America just proved it's not exceptional."
I still have, and haven't read, his book, so I know that this is his
turf, and he likely has something interesting to say about the rest
of the world -- something I, like most people, don't know a hell of
a lot about -- but I don't see how this could possibly work: it just
seems like another correlation pretending to be a cause. No need to
deal with this now, but I will note one line: "Three different exit
polls found that at least 70 percent of Americans were dissatisfied
with the country's current direction, and they took it out on the
current ruling party." Links in that line to the following:
William Bruno: [10-23]
Why foreign policy is the biggest issue this November: "From
Gaza to Ukraine, this election will have world-spanning consequences.
Now more than ever, we need to push for an anti-war, anti-imperial
foreign policy." This came out before the election, so its tactical
advice, like "hold Harris accountable," is moot, but the core issues
are certainly important.
Thomas Frank: [11-09]
The elites had it coming. Of course, he's mostly talking about
Democrats, although fellow traveler Dick Cheney gets as many nods
as Barack Obama.
Liberals had nine years to decipher Mr. Trump's appeal -- and they
failed. The Democrats are a party of college graduates, as the whole
world understands by now, of Ph.D.s and genius-grant winners and the
best consultants money can buy. Mr. Trump is a con man straight out
of Mark Twain; he will say anything, promise anything, do nothing.
But his movement baffled the party of education and innovation.
Their most brilliant minds couldn't figure him out.
Michelle Goldberg: [11-06]
This is who we are now.
Trump's first election felt like a fluke, a sick accident enabled
by Democratic complacency. But this year, the forces of liberal
pluralism and basic civic decency poured everything they could
into the fight, and they lost not just the Electoral College but
also quite likely the popular vote. The American electorate,
knowing exactly who Trump is, chose him. This is, it turns out,
who we are.
So I expect the next few months to be a period of mourning
rather than defiance. . . . But eventually, mourning either
starts to fade or curdles into depression and despair. When and
if it does, whatever resistance emerges to the new MAGA will
differ from what came before. Gone will be the hope of vindicating
the country from Trumpism, of rendering him an aberration. What's
left is the more modest work of trying to ameliorate the suffering
his government is going to visit on us. . . .
Ultimately, Trump's one redeeming feature is his incompetence.
If history is any guide, many of those he brings into government
will come to despise him. He will not give people the economic
relief they're craving. . . . We saw, with Covid, how Trump handled
a major crisis, and there is not the slightest reason to believe he
will perform any better in handling another. I have little doubt
that many of those who voted for him will come to regret it. He
could even end up discrediting bombastic right-wing nationalism
the way George W. Bush -- whose re-election also broke my heart --
discredited neoconservatism.
The question, if and when that happens, is how much of our system
will still be standing, and whether Trump's opponents have built an
alternative that can restore to people a sense of dignity and optimism.
That will be the work of the next four years -- saving what we can
and trying to imagine a tolerable future.
One nit here is that no matter how discredited she thought
neoconservatism was when Bush-Cheney departed, it still rules
the roost, as Biden showed us with his disastrous cultivation
of wars, and Harris underscored by welcoming Dick Cheney to
her campaign. Even as some especially notorious individuals
were put to pasture, the institutions supporting them remain
unchecked and unexamined. I'm also less certain of Trump's
incompetence. Much will depend on whether he hires competent
people who can keep his trust without blundering. Sure, he
did a very bad job of that during his first term.
Tyler Austin Harper: [11-06]
What we just went through wasn't an election. It was a hostage
situation. This seems about right:
Heading into Tuesday's vote, a large majority of voters said that
the country was on the wrong track and that they were disappointed
with the candidates on offer. A plurality of voters said that
regardless of who was elected, the next president would make things
worse. Nearly 80 percent said the presidential campaigns did not
make them proud of America.
The blame for this grievous state of affairs lies with the
Democratic and Republican Parties, both of which played a game of
chicken with the electorate, relying on apocalyptic threats about
the end of democracy to convince people that they had no choice
but to vote as instructed. Both candidates offered up policies
that were unpopular even among their supporters, serving a banquet
for their donor classes while doling out junk food to their bases.
For one candidate, that contemptuous strategy succeeded. But it
fails the American people.
For all his populist posturing, Mr. Trump put forward tax breaks
that favor the wealthy, championed tariffs that would almost certainly
raise grocery prices, bad-mouthed overtime pay, praised firing striking
workers and largely stayed mum while his allies discussed destroying
the Affordable Care Act. He insisted abortion be left up to the states
even though most Americans, including many Republicans, think it should
be legal everywhere, and pledged to oppose any new gun restrictions
even though an overwhelming majority of Americans say they should be
stricter.
And what were Trump acolytes to be given in return for greenlighting
this unpopular agenda? Elon Musk promised a period of economic pain.
Tucker Carlson said Mr. Trump would bend the country over his knee and
give it a "spanking." Why would any sign on? Because it was either that,
they were told, or nuclear war under Ms. Harris. Some choice. . . .
What we just went through was not an election; it was a hostage
situation. Our major parties represent the interests of streaming
magnates, the arms industry, oil barons, Bitcoin ghouls and Big
Tobacco, often without even pretending to heed the needs of voters.
A political system like that is fundamentally broken.
I skipped over the corresponding list of indictments against
Biden and Harris, which struck me as (relatively speaking) small
potatoes, but most show that the inordinate influence of money
isn't limited to Republicans. The first paragraph cites two
pieces on the threat to "end democracy":
Doug Henwood: [11-08]
It was always about inflation: "Simply put, Donald Trump owes
his reelection to inflation and to the fact that the Biden administration
did little to address the problem in a way that helped working-class
families."
I often say that the Democrats' political problem is that they're a
party of capital that has to pretend otherwise for electoral purposes.
This time they hardly even pretended. Kamala Harris preferred
campaigning with the inexplicably famous mogul Mark Cuban and the
ghoulish Liz Cheney to Shawn Fain, who led the United Auto Workers
to the greatest strike victory in decades. Those associations
telegraphed both her policy instincts and her demographic
targeting: Silicon Valley and upscale suburbs.
Like Hillary Clinton's 2016 campaign, the strategy failed, only
worse. At least Clinton won the popular vote by almost three million.
Harris even lost among suburban white women, a principal target of
this twice-failed strategy.
Ed Kilgore:
[11-06]
Americans wanted change and that meant Trump. There is something
to this, but also several loads of bullshit:
The simplest explanation, though, may be the most compelling: This
was a classic "change" election in which the "out" party had an
advantage that the governing party could not overcome. Yes, the
outcome was in doubt because Democrats managed to replace a very
unpopular incumbent with an interesting if untested successor, and
also because the GOP chose a rival whose constant demonstration of
his own unpopular traits threatened to take over the whole contest.
In the end Trump normalized his crude and erratic character by
endless repetition; reduced scrutiny of his lawless misconduct by
denouncing critics and prosecutors alike as politically motivated;
and convinced an awful lot of unhappy voters that he hated the same
people and institutions they did.
Nobody for a moment doubted that Trump would bring change. And
indeed, his signature Make America Great Again slogan and message
came to have a double meaning. Yes, for some it meant (as it did
in 2016) a return to the allegedly all-American culture of the 20th
century, with its traditional hierarchies; moral certainties and
(for some) white male leadership. But for others MAGA meant very
specifically referred to the perceived peace and prosperity of the
pre-pandemic economy and society presided over, however turbulently,
Trump. When Republicans gleefully asked swing voters if they were
better off before Joe Biden became president, a veritable coalition
of voters with recent and long-standing grievances over conditions
in the country had as simple an answer as they did when Ronald
Reagan used it to depose Jimmy Carter more than a half-century ago.
The "better off" question is close to meaningless, as most
people can't really tell, but as we've seen, are inclined to
accept whatever their political orientation dictates. Unlike, say,
the pandemic of 2020, or the financial meltdown of 2008, or the
deflationary recession of 1980, or the great one of 1929-32 (is
that what MAGA means?), there is little objective reason driving
voters to change. Granted, there may be unease driven by slower,
almost tectonic forces (like climate change), but few people think
them through, and those who do tend to prefer orderly change over
the kind of disruption Trump promises.
[11-09]
Democrats lost because of their bad policies, not their bad
attitude. I beg to differ, but both could have been better.
[11-12]
Kamala Harris came much closer to winning than you think.
The argument here is that the shift to Trump was less in the highly
contested swing states than anywhere else (Harris topped Biden only
in Colorado).
David Sirota: [11-07]
Election 2024: How billionaires torpedoed democracy: "Both parties'
2024 campaigns claimed to be about 'saving democracy.' Yet both parties
ended up bought and paid for by billionaires."
Jeffrey St Clair:
[11-06]
Chronicle of a defeat foretold: "What does history repeat itself
after it does farce?" He's very harsh on Harris here. One thing I
find curious is an uncredited chart, which if I'm reading it right
says that 24% of respondents think Democracy in the US is secure,
vs. 74% threatened. Harris leads secure 59% to 39%, but trails in
the larger threatened group, 46% to 53%. But isn't securing democracy
supposed to be her issue? As an issue, it's nebulous enough that
Trump was able to deflect it by claiming that Democrats were the
real threat to democracy (after all, they're the ones rigging the
polling and the voting!). Democrats could bring up fascism, but
the response is simply, you're the real fascists, and who
else really knows any better?
This is an aside, but fits here as well as anywhere. I haven't
found an article making this point so far, but could Kelly's fascism
comments have been a plant? (Like one of Roger Stone's dirty tricks?)
If Trump's operatives know that being charged with fascism will only
solidify their support -- not because their supporters identify with
fascism, but because they see it as stereotypically leftist infantile
name-calling (unlike "libtard," which they know is just a joke). But
mainstream Democrats generally shy away from such a loaded term, so
how do you get someone like Harris to use it? You give her permission,
by allowing her to quote someone like Kelly. This whole notion of
"permission" is sick and pernicious. There's a quote somewhere about
how the Cheney endorsements of Harris give Republicans permission
to vote against Trump: it becomes something real Republicans can do
without surrendering their identify. Harris may have had some doubt
about "fascism," but she couldn't resist the Cheney honey trap, as
she saw it as a way to steal some significant slice of Republican
votes, putting her over the top. I have no reason to believe that
Kelly and the Cheneys were plants, other than that they precisely
had that effect. That they did, of course, was Harris's gaffe (and
yeah, I'm following
Kinsley rules here, otherwise I would have said "blunder").
[11-08]
The crack-up. Title from F Scott Fitzgerald. Selected bits:
This "white wave" electorate didn't reject progressive ideas;
they rejected the candidate who failed to advocate them for fear of
alienating Big Tech execs and Wall Street financiers. Voters in both
Alaska and Missouri approve increasing the minimum wage to $15.
Voters approved paid sick leave in Alaska, Missouri and Nebraska.
Voters in Oregon approved a measure protecting marijuana workers'
right to unionize. Alaska voters banned anti-union captive audience
meetings. Arizona voters rejected a measure that lowered the minimum
wage for tipped workers. Massachusetts approved the right of rideshare
workers to organize for collective bargaining. New Orleans voters
approved a Workers Bill of Rights. Voters in Arizona, Colorado,
Maryland, Missouri, Montana, Nevada and New York approved measures
granting a state constitutional right to abortion.
Harris lost the popular vote by five million votes. Jill
Stein only garnered 642,000 votes, just 25,000 more than RFK, Jr.,
who'd long since withdrawn. In no state did Stein get enough votes
to cost Harris the state. Good luck blaming the Greens (which says
much about the politically emaciated condition of the Greens). Even
in Wisconsin (where Harris lost by only 31,000 votes), Stein, who
captured only 12,666 votes, didn't fare well enough to be blamed
(or credited) for costing Harris the state. In Pennsylvania, Harris
lost by 165,000 votes. Stein collected only 33,591 votes. In Michigan,
where Stein had her best showing in a battleground state, winning
44,648 votes (0.8%), Harris lost to Trump by 82,000 votes.
Murtaza Hussain: "Suppressing the Bernie movement in 2016
effectively destroyed the Democratic Party. That was a turning
point year GOP also had an insurgency with Trump but they ultimately
worked with him to some new kind of synthesis. The Democrats never
got past their decrepit ancien regime."
Some of you may remember that it was the Obama brain trust,
irritated at Trump's role in promoting the birther conspiracy, who
worked feverishly in 2011 to make Trump the face of the post-Tea
Party GOP. Obama's former campaign manager and policy guru, David
Plouffe later explained the thinking: "Let's lean into Trump here.
That'll be good for us." That worked out about as well for the
Democratic base as the bank bailouts.
By the way, St Clair also wrote
The wolf at the door, which is a fund drive piece, but also a
history of a publication that's still bristling with anger 30 years
after inception. There's not just a lot to be angry about today,
but much more coming down the pike. Be sure of that.
Freddy Brewster: [11-05]
Leonard Leo's dark money web is sowing election day chaos.
Israel/Palestine considerations:
Raja Abdulhaq: {11-07]
Instead of looking inwards, white liberals are blaming Arab Americans
for Trump's victory. My impression is that there is less deflection
and scapegoating now than in 2016, when Hillary Clinton and her fans
felt more entitled, were less inclined to admit their own errors, or
to credit that Trump had tapped into something they had missed. But
anti-genocide voters made the point of being conspicuous, setting
themselves up for just this kind of reaction.
Sami Al-Arian: [11-08]
Trump did not win this election. Harris was defeated by a Gaza-inspired
boycott. I think the author is taking too much credit for something
that no one should be proud of. That the boycott existed at all is a
blight on Harris's campaign. She could have done a few simple things
to neutralize it, like listening to them, and explaining how much worse
a Trump win would be for Palestinians. Showing concretely how Trump
would be worse could have worked on virtually every issue, but she
very rarely did it, opting instead for generic slanders (like "fascist")
that were easily deflected.
Hamed Aleaziz: [11-06]
For many Arab Americans in Dearborn, Trump made the case for their
votes. Unofficial results for the city showed Trump 42%, Harris 36%,
Jill Stein 18%.
Michael Arria:
Samer Badawi: [11-07]
After Trump's victory, Palestinians cannot afford to wait until the
next US election: "Palestinians and their allies must build on
down-ballot wins, while recognizing the limitations of electoral
politics in the face of Israel's genocidal campaign."
Peter Beinart: [11-07]
Democrats ignored Gaza and brought down their party.
Nada Elia: [11-07]
We warned you that Gaza would define the US elections.
Axel Foley: [11-06]
Karma for Kamala: Ignoring Gaza has lost Harris the US election.
Joe Gill: [11-08]
How liberals react to Kamala Harris' defeat -- blame the voters:
"American voters tired of Biden's endless wars and backing for genocide,
but their supporters refuse to reflect on the reasons for this defeat."
Shamai Leibowitz: [11-08]
Harris lost because her party represented war mongering, q.e.d.
Jacob Magid: [11-01]
On campaign trail for Harris in Michigan, Bill Clinton defends Israel's
war in Gaza: "Recalling efforts to broker peace during his own
presidency, Clinton urges voters in crucial swing state to think
'what you would do it if was your family' killed on October 7."
So he went to one of the cloest swing states, the one with the
highest share of Arab-American voters in the nation, and this was
his pitch? The likelihood of anyone there having relation suddenly
killed was about 100 times greater by Israel since October 7 than
by Hamas on that day. But at least his speech got reported on . . .
in Israel. What can matter more than that?
Ziyad Motala: [11-06]
The US at a crossroads after Trump's return.
Mitchell Plitnick: [11-09]
The role of the Gaza genocide in Kamala Harris's loss: "The cause
of Kamala Harris' disastrous failure in the 2024 presidential election
will forever be debated, but there are good reasons to believe the
Israeli genocide in Gaza played a significant role." This misses what
I've always suspected of being the most important one, which is that
Gaza is the sort of bad news that makes people, especially ones who
don't really know much about the subject, recoil against incumbents.
Arno Rosenfeld: [11-06]
Gaza didn't cost Harris the election. But her approach pointed to a
broader problem: "Pro-Palestinian organizers say the problem was
her focus on courting moderates, including Republicans, rather than
motivating the party's left flank."
Richard Silverstein: [11-11]
Harris and Gaza: why she lost.
Harris had an opportunity to set out a more independent policy.
Instead she doubled down. In every speech which addressed these
issues, she emphasized her unshakable support for Israel. She
offered little for the Palestinians being slaughtered there,
aside from bromides about being heartbroken at the suffering.
She claimed she was "doing everything possible" to end the war
and free the Israeli hostages. While she refused to do anything
concrete.
Matt Sledge: [11-06]
In Dearborn, Rashida Tlaib did nearly twice as well as Kamala
Harris.
Alfred Soto:
[11-05]
Election Day 2024: awful but cheerful. I had this in an open tab,
discovered too late to make even the first update, but as next week's
not coming, I figured I should go ahead and file it.
More disappointing is Harris' mush-mouthed foreign policy. First, on
the genocide in Gaza. Certainly she and Bibi will never hug like he
and Joe did, but not once has she suggested the radical demolition
of State Department dogma, not merely received and Methuselan but
venomous. Next, she supports "border security" and "tighter"
immigration. If she has explained in any public address how the
forcible removal of illegal immigrants from jobs, schools, churches,
and putting them in camps, as the Trump campaign has vowed, will,
apart from its grotesque moral horror, devastate the economy that
Trump vows to heal. The depressing part is how Harris might point
to the Democratic polity's hardening position on immigration; in
times of economic doubt, blame foreigners.
[11-07]
What now?
[11-24]
Among the reasons we lost in 2024. Long quote from the Shahid
piece I've already cited. Let this be my last add to this file.
Megan K Stack: [11-05]
I voted for Harris, but Gaza's horrors weigh on my conscience.
Kelley Beaucar Vlahos: [11-06]
Did Israel hurt the Harris vote in Michigan? "Foreign policy was
low on voters minds, but in these critical counties, Harris was
underperforming."
International reaction:
Ellen Ioanes: [11-07]
From Bibi to Putin, here's how the world leaders reacted to Trump's
win. Aside from Netanyahu, they've mostly kept silent (Putin
included).
Isabel Kershner: [11-06]
In Trump, Netanyahu sees a more favorable US president.
Only a few hours had passed since Donald J. Trump was elected president,
when Benjamin Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of Israel, announced that
he had already spoken to the U.S. president-elect, noting he was "among
the first" to call him.
It was further evidence of the enthusiasm Mr. Netanyahu's right-wing
government feels -- it had already been celebrating Mr. Trump's victory
since breakfast local time on Wednesday as if it had just won the
American election itself.
Itamar Ben-Gvir, Israel's ultranationalist minister of national
security, posted a festive "Yesssss" on social media, along with
emojis of a flexed biceps muscle and the Israeli and American flags,
even before the last polls had closed in Alaska.
H Scott Prosterman: [11-08]
Netanyahu, delirious at Trump's return, dumps his Defense Minister
to pursue complete occupation of Gaza.
Trump:
Peter Baker: [11-06]
'Trump's America': Comeback victory signals a different kind of
country: "In the end, Donald J. Trump is not the historical
aberration some thought he was, but instead a transformational
force reshaping the modern United States in his own image."
This piece came out immediately after the election was called,
showing once again that no one beats the New York Times when it
comes to sucking up to those in power.
Walden Bello: [11-07]
How did I "predict" that Trump, despite his repulsive persona and
politics, would prevail? "Democratic Party leadership has been
discredited and there's room for new progressive leaders to take
the helm."
Jamelle Bouie: [11-09]
What do Trump voters know about the future he has planned for them?
Not much, partly because they don't believe what he says, and they
believe even less what Democrats say he says. At some point in this
post I should quote something Jeffrey St Clair
wrote recently: [10-25]
More than half of Trump's supporters don't believe he'll
actually do many of the things he claims he'll do (mass deportations,
siccing the military on domestic protesters and political rivals),
while more than half of Harris's supporters hope she'll implement
many of the policies (end the genocide/single-payer) she claims she
won't. And that pretty much sums up this election.
What we should add to St Clair's observation is that the Trump
understanding was much more credible than the Harris take. Trump
lies all the time, sometimes just to provoke a reaction. Harris,
well, doesn't have Trump's track record, but she's a politician,
and how far do you trust politicians, especially to do the right
thing?
John Cassidy: [11-11]
Donald Trump's victory and the politics of inflation: "Joe
Biden's strong record on jobs and Kamala Harris's vow to reduce
the cost of living couldn't prevent the Democrats from succumbing
to a global anti-incumbency wave." One thing that bothers me in
virtually every article this week that even mentions inflation
is that no one seems to have a clear understanding of what it
is, of how it works, of what is bad (and in some cases good)
about it, of what can and should be done about it. I can't do
it justice here, but I do want to stress one point: it creates
both winners and losers. Good government policy would try to
limit the winners (perhaps by taxing off their windfall) and
to compensate the losers (the "cola" in Social Security is one
example of this). The press seem to buy the notion that it is
an always bad, which mostly means that they are carrying water
for the side that wants less inflation (e.g., for bankers, which
is largely why the Fed is so hawkish against inflation). I
wouldn't say that there was no real inflation coming out of
the pandemic: I suspect that some inflation was inevitable,
but the winners and losers (and therefore who felt the pain,
and who needed help) were largely determined by pricing power,
which has been tilted against workers and consumers for some
time, but became more acute when inflation was added to the
mix. Policies limiting monopolies and price gouging would have
helped, but Biden and Harris got little credit for them, even
from supposedly liberal economists. Trump offered nothing but
an outlet for rage. Why anyone thought that might be any kind
of solution is way beyond me, but according to polls, many
people did. They were deceived. Whether they ever learn from
such mistakes remains to be seen.
Jelani Cobb: [11-07]
2016 and 2024: "We will be a fundamentally different country
by the end of the next Administration." Indeed, we already are.
Ed Coper: [11-08]
White noise: why hatred of Donald Trump fuels his success as much
as his supporters' love: "A network of organised disinformation
sows doubt, kills policy reform and keep us ad adds as we debate
Trump-mania." Some misdirection in his first paragraph:
Historians will long scratch their heads that a Republican candidate
who -- despite an inability to string a coherent sentence together,
being grossly underqualified and rife with extramarital affairs --
would go on to not only win election but become one of the most
popular presidents in US history.
Turns out the subject here was Warren Harding, elected president
in a 1920 landslide. How it advances an understanding of Trump isn't
clear, but even stranger stories ensue.
David Corn:
[11-04]
Trump and his voters: they like the lying: "He's a con man whose
deceptions and hypocrisies are easy to detect. The question won't fade:
How does he get away with it?" "Trump is demonstrating that he does
not play by the rules of the establishment that these people perceive
(for an assortment of reasons) as the enemy."
[11-06]
America meets its judgment day: "Trump's victory signals a
national embrace of the politics of hate and a possible fascist
future."
Ben Davis: [11-09]
None of the conventional explanations for Trump's victory stand up
to scrutiny: "This election has blown a hole in the worldviews
of both leftists and centrists. The pandemic may be a more important
factor." This piece covers a lot of ground, quite sensibly. The
section on Covid is really about something else:
I propose a different explanation than inflation qua inflation:
the Covid welfare state and its collapse. The massive, almost
overnight expansion of the social safety net and its rapid,
almost overnight rollback are materially one of the biggest
policy changes in American history. For a brief period, and
for the first time in history, Americans had a robust safety
net: strong protections for workers and tenants, extremely
generous unemployment benefits, rent control and direct cash
transfers from the American government.
Despite the trauma and death of Covid and the isolation of
lockdowns, from late 2020 to early 2021, Americans briefly
experienced the freedom of social democracy. They had enough
liquid money to plan long term and make spending decisions for
their own pleasure rather than just to survive. They had the
labor protections to look for the jobs they wanted rather than
feel stuck in the jobs they had. At the end of Trump's term, the
American standard of living and the amount of economic security
and freedom Americans had was higher than when it started, and,
with the loss of this expanded welfare state, it was worse when
Biden left office, despite his real policy wins for workers and
unions. This is why voters view Trump as a better shepherd of
the economy.
I've often thought that the Democrats took way too little credit
for the first big pandemic relief bill, which Pelosi and Schumer
largely wrote and pushed through, while Trump had to acquiesce
because he was mostly worried about the falling stock market.
The sunsetting made it palatable to Republicans, and made sense
given that it was relief for an emergency. Democrats figured
they could run on extending key parts of it, but did they? Not
really. Worse than that, Trump claimed credit for the immediate
effects, then blamed inflation on the act's largesse. Democrats
were, once again, screwed coming and going, mostly for not
following McConnell's formula of just letting the country go
to hell, just so voters would blame the incumbent president.
David Dayen: [11-08]
The triumphant return of corruption: "A look at the biggest stock
gainers since Trump's election shows that paying tribute to the next
president will have its benefits." He identifies several especially
large gains, from outfits like MoneyLion (up 61%, "investors believe,
correctly, that consumer protection, which made a comeback in the
past four years, will be destroyed again"), CoreCivic (up 72%, a
"private prison" company), GEO Group (up 61%, another "private prison"
contractor), and Coinbase (up 41%, "the crypto exchange"). "We can
get ready for four years of pay-to-play deals, corporate back-scratching,
and a public unprotected from scam artists."
John Harris: [11-10]
From Trump's victory, a simple, inescapable message: many people
despise the left: "The tumult of social media and rightwing
propaganda has successfully cast progressives as one judgmental,
'woke' mass." I don't doubt his point, but the examples mostly
make me think that most of the people who "hate the left" have
little if any idea what or whom the left is. That suggests some
kind of communication problem, which makes most sense in the US,
where we don't have our own party, and are often stuck under the
dead carcass of a Democratic Party, whose leaders hate us as much
as the right thinks it does. But there must be more to the story
than that: some deep, dark psychological factors that are never
really acknowledged and near impossible to dislodge There must
be a literature researching this. We certainly have research on
why people become fascists, which overlaps significantly with
hating the left. On the other hand, my own study of history has
shown that everything decent and valuable that has ever happened
in America has its origin in the left. Why can't anyone else see
that?
David Hearst: [11-07]
Trump has a choice: Obliterate Palestine or end the war:
Most likely he won't even think of it as a choice, but simply
following the directions of his donors. The question is whether
he can see the many downsides of doing so. He has several odd
talents, but clear thinking and foresight aren't among them.
Conventional wisdom has it that Trump 2.0 will be a disaster for
Palestinians, because Trump 1.0 all but buried the Palestinian
national cause.
And it is indeed true that under Donald Trump's first term as
president, the US was wholly guided by the Zionist religious right --
the real voice in his ear, either as donors or policymakers.
Under Trump and his son-in-law adviser, Jared Kushner, Washington
became a policy playground for the settler movement, with which the
former US ambassador to Israel, David Friedman, was unashamedly
aligned.
Consequently, in his first term, Trump upended decades of policy
by recognising Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and moving the US
embassy there; he disenfranchised the Palestinian Authority by closing
down the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) office in Washington;
he allowed Israel to annex the Golan Heights; he pulled out of the
nuclear accords with Iran; and he assassinated Qassem Soleimani, the
most powerful Iranian general and diplomat in the region.
Even more damaging for the Palestinian struggle for freedom was
Trump's sponsorship of the Abraham Accords.
This was -- and still is -- a serious attempt to pour concrete
over the grave of the Palestinian cause, constructing in its place
a superhighway of trade and contracts from the Gulf that would make
Israel not just a regional superpower, but a vital portal to the
wealth of the Gulf.
This led directly to the Hamas revolt, and the Israeli reprisal,
not just collect punishment but a systematic plan to render Gaza
uninhabitable, so credit him there, too. As I noted in my intro,
I expect he will simply cheer Netanyahu on to "finish the job."
I don't think he has any idea what that entails, how it will look,
and how it will reflect back on America, and on him personally.
Nor do I think he cares. He's one of those guys who strictly lives
in the present, trusting his instincts will never fail him.
There is much more to this piece, including a concluding section
on "Hope for the future," where he notes: "It may be that as Biden
departs, we have seen the party's last Zionist leader. That in itself
is of immense significance for Israel."
Murtaza Hussain: [11-06]
Trump is eyeing Iran hawk Brian Hook as first foreign policy
pick.
Lauren Markoe: [11-07]
Who is Howard Lutnick? Trump transition team leader is a billionaire
supporter of Jewish causes and Israel.
Michael Mechanic: [11-07]
Why did Trump really win? It's simple, actually. "When the economy
thrives while half of America struggles, something has got to give."
Lorrie Moore: [11-07]
A fourth-rate entertainer, a third-rate businessman, and a two-time
president: "The 2024 election, like the one in 2016, had the
same nutty and vapid Donald Trump, the same retrograde gender
politics, and the same result."
He is a third-rate businessman and fourth-rate entertainer, a husband
to fashion models, a wannabe standup comedian who cannot land a punch
line but floats language out into the air, hoping it will cohere, then
flare, though it usually wanders into vapor and fog. As with much
current standup, it can get raunchy and crass, but the MAGA people
accept this lack of dignity. I was struck with puzzled admiration at
his forty minutes of quiet swaying to "Ave Maria." It was like
performance art. He also did a skit at McDonald's and one in a
garbage truck. He will do most anything to avoid talking about
actual governing, which he does not know that much about. He perhaps
understands that most voters don't want to discuss that and want to
just leave it to their elected officials. We are a country that is
about money and entertainment. Trump was running as the embodiment
of these. One PBS commentator used a Hollywood metaphor to explain
him: Trump is a franchise blockbuster, familiar and splashy; Harris
is an independent art-house film with subtitles.
Elie Mystal: [11-07]
There's no denying it anymore: Trump is not a fluke -- he's America:
"The United States chose Donald Trump in all his ugliness and cruelty,
and the country will get what it deserves." This is certainly one
viewpoint. Still, I have to ask, how many people didn't understand
the choice this clearly? And for those who did not, why not?
We had a chance to stand united against fascism, authoritarianism,
racism, and bigotry, but we did not. We had a chance to create a
better world for not just ourselves but our sisters and brothers
in at least some of the communities most vulnerable to unchecked
white rule, but we did not. We had a chance to pass down a better,
safer, and cleaner world to our children, but we did not. Instead,
we chose Trump, JD Vance, and a few white South African billionaires
who know a thing or two about instituting apartheid. . . .
Everyone who hates Trump is asking how America can be "saved"
from him, again. Nobody is asking the more relevant question: Is
America worth saving? Like I said, Trump is the sum of our failures.
A country that allows its environment to be ravaged, its children
to be shot, its wealth to be hoarded, its workers to be exploited,
its poor to starve, its cops to murder, and its minorities to be
hunted doesn't really deserve to be "saved." It deserves to fail.
Trump is not our "retribution." He is our reckoning.
Rick Perlstein:
[11-05]
Garbagegate, with a twist: "The media's penchant to balance the
two parties and control the narrative didn't quite work when it came
to a Trump insult comic's comments about Puerto Rico."
[11-13]
How to hear a fascist: "Trump was supposed to be in decline, losing
it. He lost it all the way to the White House."
Kelefa Sanneh: [11-07]
How Donald Trump, the leader of white grievance, gained among
Hispanic voters.
Timothy Snyder: [11-08]
What does it mean that Donald Trump is a fascist? "Trump takes
the tools of dictators and adapts them for the Internet. We should
expect him to try to cling to power until death, and create a cult
of January 6th martyrs." This is an article that we must admit,
he's competent to write, but hardly anyone else is competent to
read. I bookmarked it because it's an issue I take some perverse
interest in. I haven't read it yet, because I doubt that I'll
learn much -- e.g., I already knew the Marinetti story, and
that's pretty obscure -- and the rest will probably just be
annoying.
Rebecca Solnit:
Elizabeth Spiers: [11-06]
Trump offered men something that Democrats never could.
Asawin Suebsaeng/Tim Dickinson: [10-03]
'American death squads': inside Trump's push to make police more
violent: "Trump's recent call for a 'violent day' of policing
is part of his plan to push cops to be as brutal as possible and
shield them from accountability." Pre-election piece I should have
noticed earlier (or should have been better reported).
Michael Tomasky: [11-08]
Why does no one understand the real reason Trump won? "It wasn't
the economy. It wasn't inflation, or anything else. It was how people
perceive those things, which points to one overpowering answer."
The answer is the right-wing media. Today, the right-wing media --
Fox News (and the entire News Corp.), Newsmax, One America News
Network, the Sinclair network of radio and TV stations and newspapers,
iHeart Media (formerly Clear Channel), the Bott Radio Network
(Christian radio), Elon Musk's X, the huge podcasts like Joe Rogan's,
and much more -- sets the news agenda in this country. And they fed
their audiences a diet of slanted and distorted information that made
it possible for Trump to win.
Let me say that again, in case it got lost: Today, the right-wing
media sets the news agenda in this country. Not The New York Times.
Not The Washington Post (which bent over backwards to exert no
influence when Jeff Bezos pulled the paper's Harris endorsement).
Not CBS, NBC, and ABC. The agenda is set by all the outlets I listed
in the above paragraph. Even the mighty New York Times follows in its
wake, aping the tone they set disturbingly often. . . .
I think a lot of people who don't watch Fox or listen to Sinclair
radio don't understand this crucial chicken-and-egg point. They assume
that Trump says something, and the right-wing media amplify it. That
happens sometimes. But more often, it's the other way around. These
memes start in the media sphere, then they become part of the Trump
agenda.
I haven't even gotten to the economy, about which there is so much
to say. Yes -- inflation is real. But the Biden economy has been great
in many ways. The U.S. economy, wrote The Economist in mid-October,
is "the envy of the world." But in the right-wing media, the horror
stories were relentless. And mainstream economic reporting too often
followed that lead. Allow me to make the world's easiest prediction:
After 12:00 noon next January 20, it won't take Fox News and Fox
Business even a full hour to start locating every positive economic
indicator they can find and start touting those. Within weeks, the
"roaring Trump economy" will be conventional wisdom. (Eventually, as
some of the fruits from the long tail of Bidenomics start growing on
the vine, Trump may become the beneficiary of some real-world facts
as well, taking credit for that which he opposed and regularly
denounced.)
Back to the campaign. I asked Gertz what I call my "Ulan Bator
question." If someone moved to America from Ulan Bator, Mongolia in
the summer and watched only Fox News, what would that person learn
about Kamala Harris? "You would know that she is a very stupid person,"
Gertz said. "You'd know that she orchestrated a coup against Joe Biden.
That she's a crazed extremist. And that she very much does not care
about you."
Same Ulan Bator question about Trump? That he's been "the target
of a vicious witch-hunt for years and years," that he is under constant
assault; and most importantly, that he is "doing it all for you."
To much of America, by the way, this is not understood as one side's
view of things. It's simply "the news." This is what people -- white
people, chiefly -- watch in about two-thirds of the country. I trust
that you've seen in your travels, as I have in mine, that in red or
even some purple parts of the country, when you walk into a hotel
lobby or a hospital waiting room or even a bar, where the TVs ought
to be offering us some peace and just showing ESPN, at least one
television is tuned to Fox. That's reach, and that's power. And then
people get in their cars to drive home and listen to an iHeart,
right-wing talk radio station. And then they get home and watch
their local news and it's owned by Sinclair, and it, too, has a
clear right-wing slant. And then they pick up their local paper,
if it still exists, and the oped page features Cal Thomas and Ben
Shapiro.
Liberals, rich and otherwise, live in a bubble where they never
see this stuff.
Also, this ends with another key point/example:
The Democratic brand is garbage in wide swaths of the country, and
this is the reason. Consider this point. In Missouri on Tuesday,
voters passed a pro-abortion rights initiative, and another that
raised the minimum wage and mandated paid leave. These are all
Democratic positions. But as far as electing someone to high office,
the Man-Boy Love Party could probably come closer than the Democrats.
Trump beat Harris there by 18 points, and Senator Josh Hawley beat
Lucas Kunce, who ran a good race and pasted Hawley in their debate,
by 14 points.
The reason? The right-wing media. And it's only growing and growing.
And I haven't even gotten to social media and Tik Tok and the other
platforms from which far more people are getting their news these days.
The right is way ahead on those fronts too. Liberals must wake up and
understand this and do something about it before it's too late, which
it almost is.
Katrina vanden Heuvel: [11-07]
Americans are desperate for change. Electing Trump was a misguided
message: "The causes of Donald Trump's victory will be endlessly
debated, but misdirected discontent is clearly a major factor."
Julio Ricardo Varela: [11-08]
Trump broke a record with Latino voters. History can tell us why.
"Trump exploited an 'us versus them' mentality that has long existed
among Latinos living in the US and those outside this country."
Also, some more speculative pieces on what a second Trump term
might do (some issue-specific, some more general). Most of these
assume Trump will try to do what he campaigned on, but I suggested
an alternative scenario in the second section of the intro (but
even it doesn't argue against most of the forebodings here):
Matt Bruenig: [11-07]
What does Trump's win mean for the NLRB? "Donald Trump will
probably sack National Labor Relations Board general counsel
Jennifer Abruzzo, who has been friendly to unions, on day one
of his presidency."
Jonathan Chait: [11-08]
Trump can prosecute anybody he wants, transition leader says:
"Department of Justice is now Department of Trump Justice."
Rachel M Cohen: [11-06]
Trump won. So what does that mean for abortion? "It will be
easier to restrict reproductive rights in the president-elect's
second term."
Tim Dickinson:
'You can't despair. Because that's what they want.' "Experts tell
Rolling Stone what resisting authoritarianism in America will
look like in Trump's second term." And if you have a subscription,
you can find out what they have to say.
Abdallah Fayyad: [11-06]
This one chart foreshadows Trump's immigration crackdown:
"Investors in private prisons think they've hit the jackpot with a
second Trump presidency."
Jonathan Freedland: [11-08]
Think you know how bad Trump unleashed will be? Look at the evidence:
it will be even worse. I can think of many risks, but I'd hardly
put "the end of Nato" second (or anywhere) on my list. It's not going
to happen, because NATO is really just an arms sales cartel, and
Trump loves a good racket. His threats to withdraw from NATO were
just meant to shake down more tribute. He won't back out, not least
because that would only incentivize Europe to build up their own
arms cartel.
M Gessen: [11-15]
This is the dark, unspoken promise of Trump's return: An
expert on Russia, learned the hard way, looks back there for
insight.
For those bewildered by why so many Americans apparently voted against
the values of liberal democracy, Balint Magyar has a useful formulation.
"Liberal democracy," he says, "offers moral constraints without
problem-solving" -- a lot of rules, not a lot of change -- while
"populism offers problem-solving without moral constraints." Magyar,
a scholar of autocracy, isn't interested in calling Donald Trump a
fascist. He sees the president-elect's appeal in terms of something
more primal: "Trump promises that you don't have to think about
other people."
Around the world, populist autocrats have leveraged the thrilling
power of that promise to transform their countries into vehicles for
their own singular will. Vladimir Putin and Viktor Orban vowed to
restore a simpler, more orderly past, in which men were men and in
charge. What they delivered was permission to abandon societal
inhibitions, to amplify the grievances of one's own group and heap
hate on assorted others, particularly on groups that cannot speak
up for themselves. Magyar calls this "morally unconstrained collective
egoism."
While there are people in Trump's circle who look to Orban as a
guide to how to lock into power, Trump has many other sources of
inspiration, even without cracking open his copy of Mein Kampf.
For instance, the crypto-creep in El Salvador,
Nayib Bukele, who was reelected with 84% of the vote, his
popularity largely credited to his war on gangs. That's the sort
of publicity Trump would gladly kill for.
Andrea González-Ramirez: [11-08]
What to know about Susie Wiles, Trump's next Chief of Staff.
Karen J Greenberg: [11-07]
It's not just about the president: "It's about the presidency."
Indeed, the first Trump presidency vastly accelerated the claims of
expanded presidential power. Jack Goldsmith and Bob Bauer . . .
in their 2020 book, After Trump: Reconstructing the Presidency,
they contended that "Donald Trump operated the presidency in ways that
reveal its vulnerability to dangerous excesses of authority and
dangerous weaknesses in accountability."
And as they make all too clear, the stakes were (and remain) high.
"The often-feckless Trump," they wrote, "also revealed deeper fissures
in the structure of the presidency that, we worry, a future president
might choose to exploit in a fashion similar to Trump -- but much more
skillfully, and to even greater effect." . . .
A second Trump presidency will undoubtedly take unilateral
presidential powers to a new level. . . . New York Times reporters
Jonathan Swan, Charlie Savage, and Maggie Haberman
reported that Trump "and his associates" plan to "increase the
president's authority over every part of the federal government that
now operates, by either law or tradition, with any measure of
independence from political interference by the White House."
Ken Klippenstein: [11-12]
Read the leaked Rubio dossier: "Trump camp details 'lightweight'
Marco Rubio's liabilities." I restrained myself from noting
reports that Rubio is in line to become Secretary of State, but
couldn't resist reporting this.
Paul Krugman: [11-11]
Why Trump's deportations will drive up your grocery bill:
Seriously, a week after the election, and this is the best he can
do? Alternate title: "Did you know that the pennies you saved on
groceries were paid for by exploiting undocumented immigrant labor?"
At least he paid off the "tarrifs will drive inflation" story he's
already done a dozen times.
Avery Lotz: [11-10]
Trump rules out Haley, Pompeo admin posts: No surprise with
Haley, who still has a lot of sucking up to do. Pompeo, however,
was always so good at it. The mark against him, beyond his very
brief presidential campaign, could be policy. He is remembered as
one of Trump's stealthiest hawks, and was especially influential
in sabotaging Trump's North Korea diplomacy. Suppose Trump
remembers that?
Rachel Maddow: [11-10]
Dead last: "Authoritarian rule always entails corruption. With
Donald Trump in office, watch your wallet." More than you, or I at
least, need to read right now about Huey Long, Spiro Agnew, and
anti-corruption hero Viktor Navalny (who is inconveniently dead).
This sounds like an AI distillation of her recent books, which
sound like they were written by someone else -- not that, by this
point, we have any idea what her authentic self might sound like.
Branko Marcetic:
[11-02]
Trump is planning a third red scare: "Donald Trump and his allies
aren't making a secret of it: if they win, they're going to launch a
campaign of repression to destroy the pro-Palestinian movement and
the organized left."
[11-08]
Trump is planning a presidency of, by, and for the rich: "Now
that the 'pro-worker' GOP led by Donald Trump holds the reins of
government, what does it plan to do? A program of handouts for big
business and austerity for the rest of us."
Dylan Matthews: [11-06]
Trump proposed big Medicaid and food stamp cuts. Can he pass them?
"What Trump's return means for America's poor people."
Jane Mayer: [11-08]
Donald Trump's Supreme Court majority could easily rule through
2045: "Democrats failed to make the Court itself a major campaign
issue, but what comes after the Dobbs decision could very well be
worse, and more far-reaching."
Julianne McShane: [11-06]
After win, Trump fans admit "Project 2025 is the agenda".
George Monbiot: [11-07]
Trump has pledged to wage war on planet Earth -- and it will take
a progressive revolution to stop him.
David Remnick: [11-09]
It can happen here: "Everyone who realizes with proper alarm
that Trump's reëlection is a deeply dangerous moment in American
life must think hard about where we are."
Tony Romm: [11-11]
Trump eyes pro-crypto candidates for key federal financial
agencies: "The incoming administration has explored new personnel
and policy that can deliver on Trump's campaign promise to turn the
United States into the 'crypto capital of the planet.'" Something
else that Trump is going to do that is going to be really horrible,
although in this case not without an element of farce.
Jennifer Rubin: [11-11]
Trump can keep campaign promises or be popular. Not both. This
is pretty much what I said in my second intro. The problem here is
that Republicans don't see the need to be popular, or even want to.
They want to rule. They want to be feared. And they think that they
can extort and/or terrorize enough people to vote for them that,
with their other dirty tricks, they can stay in power, and do all
the sick and demented things they've been dreaming of. Remember
the 2000 election? Lots of pundits thought that Bush, with his
"compassionate conservatism" spiel, and coming off a relatively
moderate record as governor of Texas, would show some modesty --
he had, after all, lost the popular vote, and only won when the
Supreme Court prevented a recount in Florida -- and tack to the
center. But as soon as Bush was inaugurated, Cheney took over
and declared that Republicans had come to power with a purpose,
and they were going to do everything they wanted, just the way
they wanted it. Getting re-elected wasn't his department. He was
there to break things, and that's exactly what he did. (Then,
somehow, Rove managed to wangle Bush a second term anyway, despite
the fact that nearly everything he had done in his first was
massively unpopular.)
Matt Sledge: [11-07]
Crypto sweep puts Congress on notice: vote with us or we'll come
after you with millions: "In all likelihood, crypto deregulation
is coming."
Peter Wade: [11-10]
Trump tells GOP to bypass Senate confirmation process, block Biden
judicial appointments: "Despite an incoming Republican majority,
Trump wants new party leadership to agree to recess appointments."
That way he can appoint people even Republicans could object to.
(Obviously, RFK Jr. jumps to mind.) Here's another report:
Joel Warner: [11-07]
What can we expect from a second Trump presidency? "From unleashing
more dark money in politics to expanding fossil fuel production and
assaulting reproductive rights, here's some of what we can expect from
a second Donald Trump administration.
PS: Trying to wind up on Monday, I'm starting to see a
number of early appointments (e.g.,
Trump picks Rep. Elise Stefanik as ambassador to the United Nations),
which are beyond the scope of this post and section, as well as damn
near impossible for me to keep up with. I will say that they do show
that he's actually thought about transition and administration this
time (unlike in 2016), he has a plan, and is executing it quickly.
This certainly argues against the notion that he might not govern
as viciously as he campaigned. I should also note that the Wade
story above shows that he intends to dominate Congress (or bypass
them wherever possible), rather than have to negotiate with anyone
(even mainstream Republicans). He is basically confirming the fears
of all those who predicted that Trump would turn the presidency
into a dictatorship.
PPS: I know I said I wouldn't do this, but here's a brief
general survey of the first two weeks of Trump appointments:
Alex Skopic/Stephen Prager: [11-21]
Hell is empty, and all the devils are here: "Trump's staff picks
are a rogue's gallery of cranks, oligarchs, religious fanatics, and
alleged sexual abusers. He's not 'draining the swamp,' he's deepening
it and adding more snakes." Section heads: The Warmongers (start with
Rubio); The Oligarchs (start with Musk); the Quacks (start with RFK
Jr.); The Climate Vandals (less famous, with fracking Chris Wright,
Lee Zeldin, and Doug Burgum); and Miscellaneous Depravity (picture
of Kristi Noem, but she's not the only one).
At the last count, more than 76 million Americans voted for Donald
Trump to be president. Some of them are probably your friends,
relatives, classmates, neighbors, and co-workers. But when you
cast an eye over the list of his appointees, you have to wonder:
is this truly what they thought they were voting for? A government
composed of billionaires and lobbyists, crackpots who think the
concept of medical science is suspect, and foreign policy hawks
who are just itching to go to war with Iran or China? Tabloid
celebrities like Dr. Oz and Linda McMahon being placed in charge
of whether you get healthcare and education or not? It seems
unlikely. Rather, it seems Trump -- who's built his entire career
on lies, scams, and fraud -- has scammed the American people again,
promising to sweep into Washington and clean it out when really
he's going to do the opposite.
Harris:
Kat Abughazaleh: [11-08]
Democrats need to clean house before they screw up again: "It
wasn't just the people running Kamala Harris's campaign who failed.
The leadership of the entire party is at fault."
Dean Baker: [11-13]
Did bad economic reporting doom Harris?
This is the time for everyone to do their election autopsy, where
everyone pushes their preferred story of what went wrong for the
Harris campaign. Mine will focus on what I consider the simplest
and most obvious, the media painted a picture of a bad economy
which was virtually impossible for the Harris campaign to overcome.
And just to be clear, I'm not talking about the alternative reality
folks at Fox, I mean the New York Times, Washington Post, and other
bastions of the establishment media.
Just to provide context, there is little doubt that people's views
of the economy were hugely important in determining the vote. Exit
polls consistently put the economy as the
number 1 or
number 2 issue in people's minds as they went to vote. And those
rating the economy as a top issue voted for Trump by a huge margin.
I find it completely unfathomable why anyone worried about the
economy would look to Republicans (especially Trump) for relief.
History, as far back as Herbert Hoover, is unanimous on this point,
at least for most (working/middle class) people -- higher-income
people may have done relatively better with Republicans, but with
the possible exception of the top 1% (at most), they too have fared
better with Democrats. Or you could look at policy preferences, which
again favor Democrats by a huge margin. As Baker points out, a big
part of people's evaluation of the economy is simply partisan, but
that doesn't explain why a majority (actually well above the actual
vote) thought better of Republicans.
Baker continues:
At the most basic level, the media have continually chosen to highlight
the negative about the economy. University of Wisconsin political
science professor Mark Copelovitch did an
analysis last year showing that mentions of "inflation" and
"recession" dwarfed mentions of unemployment, even as the latter
was hitting record lows and we never had a recession.
The inflation we did see was part of a worldwide burst of inflation
related to the pandemic, where the US rate was little different than
the inflation seen in countries like France and Germany. We were told
people don't blame the pandemic, they blame Biden. That is undoubtedly
true, but that is because the media didn't remind people that the
inflation was due to the pandemic in the same way they always reminded
people that the withdrawal from Afghanistan was "disastrous." . . .
Most people are not getting their news from the New York Times or
Washington Post, but the information presented in these outlets does
spread to other news outlets and to social media. When people hear the
bad economy story in the elite media they help its spread elsewhere.
It's true that most regular consumers of these outlets supported
Harris, but that misses the point. . . . They helped to advance a bad
economy story that was at odds with reality. Given the importance of
perceptions of the economy in people's voting, it would have been all
but impossible for Harris to overcome this negative economy story, and
she didn't.
Josh Barro: [11-09]
This is all Biden's fault. He starts with Biden picking Harris
as his VP in 2020.
Chris Bohner: [11-02]
Kamala Harris is not doing well with union voters.
Jonathan Chait: [11-06]
Why America rejected the Biden-Harris administration: "It's not
that people love Trump. Democrats simply failed." As usual, Chait
swims in his own tide:
The seeds of Harris's failure were planted eight years ago, when the
Democratic Party responded to Trump's 2016 victory not by moving
toward the center, as defeated parties often do, but by moving away
from it. This decision was fueled by a series of reality-distorting
blinders on the Democrats' decision-making elite.
So, after Hillary Clinton failed, they should have moved further
to the right? How was that even possible? No mention of what the
Democrats did in 2018, after moving so far into left-wing peril.
(They won both houses of Congress.) But Chait then claims Biden
in 2020, who "won because he abstained from that rush to the left,
keeping him closer to where the party's voters had remained" --
maybe he should recheck his old columns complaining about Biden
getting hoodwinked trying to appease Sanders voters?
Aida Chavez: [11-07[
Harris ran to Trump's right on immigration -- and gained absolutely
nothing for it: "Harris could have focused on how US foreign
policy pushes immigrants to leave their homes. Instead, she ran on
border security."
Maureen Dowd: [11-09]
Democrats and the case of mistaken identity politics: Inevitable
that someone would bring this up. Who are these "normal people"? And
when does one ever get a chance to really talk with them? Yet
somehow, they always show up to second guess you.
Liza Featherstone:
Malcolm Ferguson: [11-08]
Democrats say Kamala Harris ignored their dire warnings on Liz
Cheney.
Daniel Finn: [11-07]
Corporate donors guided Kamala Harris to defeat: E.g., Mark
Cuban.
Oliver Hall: [11-09]
I spent hours trying to persuade US voters to choose Harris not Trump.
I know why she lost.
You should know what I didn't hear during the hours speaking to US
voters. I can only think of one occasion when someone mentioned
stricter taxes on billionaires or any similar policies. The atrocities
being committed by Israel in Gaza only came up six times in more than
1,000 calls. The idea that Harris was not leftwing enough seems false:
the majority of the country just voted for the complete opposite.
After all those conversations, I think the main reason that Harris
and Walz lost this campaign is simple: Trump. Ultimately, he was simply
too much of a pull again. Despite the gaffes, despite his views on women,
despite his distaste for democracy and despite an insurrection, voters
just didn't care.
For reasons that I'm sure will be studied for decades, when he speaks,
people listen. When he speaks, people believe him. After all those calls,
I can be shocked at this result, but hardly surprised.
Benjamin Hart: [11-09]
Why Kamala Harris's campaign was doomed from the start:
Interview with Amy Walter, publisher/editor of Cook Political
Report.
Bob Hennellyk: [11-11]
Progressives aren't the problem in the Democratic coalition:
"Ignoring low-wage and low-wealth voters cost Kamala Harris big."
Sarah Jones:
[11-06]
Kamala Harris squandered her opportunity to win.
Donald Trump had bet on a sense of aggrieved masculinity as the
return path to power, and while there's much we don't know about
who turned out to vote and why, his strategy did not alienate
white women in the numbers Harris needed to win. Misogyny and
racism should receive due attention in postmortems to come, but
they can't explain Tuesday on their own. The story is more
complicated, and dire. Though she spoke of freedom, of forward
motion, of change, voters did not trust her to deliver. Some
will blame the left for this, but Harris tried centrism as did
Biden and Clinton before her, and that didn't work, either.
Leftists do not control the Democratic Party and never have;
only consider the party's intransigence on Gaza. If the Democratic
brand is poison now, blame its grifter consultants, who never fail
out of politics no matter how many pivotal races they lose. Blame
Harris, too, whose message was simply too anemic to overcome decades
of Democratic failure.
[11-12]
Bigotry is not the answer to Donald Trump: There's a Seth Moulton
quote in here that is horrible not because he's slandering trans
people (maybe he wanted to, but I doubt he's referring any actual
people) but because it shows how clueless some Democrats can be
when it comes to facing Republican talking points. Democrats have
to get much smarter at that. Some decent humane principles wouldn't
hurt, either.
Even so, the Democratic Party's problems did not start with Harris
or with her economic policy, or with a few pro-trans remarks that
she made before she ran for president. The party's inconsistency --
its refusal to reliably champion working Americans -- left trans
people vulnerable to attacks from the right. Had voters believed
that Democrats would lower the costs of housing or health care or
other basic necessities, perhaps Harris would have won, or at least
run a closer race. Instead she courted elites, as generations of
Democrats have done before her, and handed the country to an
aspiring tyrant.
Now some Democrats and their liberal supporters would rather
help Trump divide the working class against itself than admit the
party failed. Liberals project their own intellectual and moral
failings onto the left, which they accuse of rigidity and a certain
wishful thinking. When Maureen Dowd
wrote that "woke is broke" in her post-election diatribe, she
imagined a country that is nothing more than a mirror of herself.
When the hosts of Morning Joe
read her column on air in its tedious entirety, they revealed
themselves, not some hidden truth in the national soul. Their
conclusions are far too convenient to be realistic. How lucky for
Dowd that voters share her exact biases, that their enemies are
her enemies and their fears her fears.
Democrats need to deal with the electorate they have, but they
can and should do so without denigrating trans and nonbinary people.
Liberals and electeds who say the party should move further to the
right do so because they aren't interested in serving the working
class. They'd rather absolve themselves while avoiding the hard
work of introspection. That way lies a political dead end. If the
Democratic Party is to be fit for purpose, it will have to offer
voters real answers, not technocracy or elitism or scapegoats.
Trans people didn't cost Democrats the election. Liberals did
that all by themselves.
Tim Jonze: [11-06]
'George Clooney - who cares?' Did celebrity endorsements actually
harm Kamala Harris?
- Eric Levitz:
[11-08]
The debate over what Democrats do now hinges on one question:
"There are two ways of interpreting Harris's loss." Actually, there
are lots of ways to interpret the loss. The question isn't which one
is right. (Even if you could do that, what good would it do you? A
book? A posh job in academia, or at some think tank?) The only real
question is: what, given the new reality, do you do about it? And
no single Democrat is going to answer that. As Will Rogers explained
back in the 1930s: "I am not a member of any organized political
party. I am a Democrat." Today's Democrats aren't more organized
or ideologically coherent than they were in Rogers' day. Ever since
the Civil War, the Republicans have been the core party -- calling
themselves the G.O.P. was brilliant, shape-shifting PR -- and the
Democrats were whatever fell off the margins: tariff-adverse traders
and bankers, big city immigrant machines, neo-Confederates, rural
populists, any stray Catholics or Jews. Under FDR, they picked up
labor support, and briefly became the majority, but Republicans
never lost their conceit that they are the one true American party,
and as they became more conservative, they evened up the balance by
welcoming white racists (while Democrats attracted blacks and other
estranged minorities, while losing their older ethnic groups to the
Republican melting pot).
After losing Congress in 1994 and 2010, Democratic presidents
could consolidate their control over what was left of the Party,
and respond to the losses in a coherent manner -- which guided
both Clinton and Obama to second terms, but offered damn little
help for other Democrats (either politicians or the party base).
But this loss, like the McCain loss in 2008, leaves the Party with
no leadership. Harris has liquidated her political capital, as
have her predecessors (Biden, Obama, the Clintons), who were all
very much (in retrospect, much too much) of her campaign.
Which basically sets up a free-for-all to see who can rise
up and lead a revived Democratic Party. Sure, some pundits and
consultants are going to advise accommodation to the right winds,
but who among the rank-and-file really wants to compromise on
abortion bans, book burning, or genocide arming? At some point,
you have to decide that enough is enough, that the right and
the rich already have much more than they deserve, and that we
have to fight back. And as that happens, new leaders will rise
from the ranks. Meanwhile, Bernie Sanders is once again setting
an example of a politician who intends to defend us -- from Trump,
of course, but also from the defeatists in our own ranks.
After the utter disaster of the Bush-Cheney regime in 2008,
the Republican grandees were left aimless and speechless. Then
the Tea Party broke out, and moved the Party radically to the
right. The Tea Party didn't take over the Party, but the Party
revived, largely on their energy, and bounced back remarkably
fast. This will be harder for Democrats, because everything is
harder for Democrats, but it won't be for lack of issues and
critical analysis. And if the money powers get in the way, we
need to learn to live without them, and show them to be the
villains they actually are.
[11-15]
The left's comforting myth about why Harris lost: "Progressives
need an accurate autopsy of Kamala Harris's campaign, not an
ideologically convenient one." Too late to mount a critique of
this one, but that may be a worthy future project, especially
as Levitz expands on his ideas in his new
The Rebuild newsletter. I shouldn't get too defensive about
Levitz's seeming turn against "the left," as the real bottom
line here is how to make the Democratic Party more viable in
general elections. The left needs an effective Democratic Party
to implement our preferred policies (which are the best policies
for everyone -- that's why we prefer them). But the Democratic
Party also needs a strong left to keep them focused on real
problems, steering away from the temptations of donors and
their special interests.
Answering those questions will require Democrats to analyze their
predicament with open minds. If we seek ideologically comforting
explanations for the party's problems -- rather than empirically
sound ones -- the coalition will march deeper into the wilderness.
Unfortunately, in the wake of Vice President Kamala Harris's
loss, virtually
every
Democratic faction has produced its share of motivated reasoning.
In future newsletters, I plan to take issue with some centrists'
analysis of the party's difficulties. But today, I want to explain
why I worry that the left is allowing wishful thinking to cloud its
vision of political reality.
Since November 5, some progressives have drawn a sweeping lesson
from Trump's second victory: Harris's loss proves Democrats gain
little from
"moderation"
or
"centrism"
and must
"embrace
radical policies" in order to compete. I admire many of the
writers making this argument. But their confidence in this
narrative strikes me as wildly unfounded.
It is true that Harris
pivoted to the center on border security, crime, and, to a
lesser extent, economics. There are plenty of sound arguments --
both moral and political -- against Democrats moderating on
specific issues. Yet it's hard to see how anyone could be
confident that Harris lost because she moderated, much less
that her loss proved that moderation is electorally
counterproductive as a rule.
I habitually respond to world events by imaging the kind
of book I'd like to write about them. I've had a practical
political book in mind at least since the 2004 election where
I would methodically detail how Republicans are evil-hearted,
lame-brained bastards leading us to ruin, and try to convince
Democrats that they could not only win elections but actually
solve problems by drawing on left ideas. While my faith in
the healing power of those ideas remains, the 2024 election
has demolished my faith that better ideas can win elections.
So that kills off the old book concept, and intrdouces a new
one: What We Learned From the 2024 Elections. I don't
know the answer to that yet, but I what I suspect is that it
has very little to do with issues and policies, and even less
with the left-right axis, but turns around credibility and
trust, on how you talk to people.
Jill Lepore: [11-10]
Democrats tried to counter Donald Trump's viciousness toward
women with condescension: "The Harris campaign felt the
need to remind women voters that they can vote for whomever
they want. Women understood this. The campaign failed to."
Damon Linker: [11-07]
Kamala Harris failed to read the room.
Milan Loewer: [11-05]
If Harris loses today, this is why: "To win working-class voters --
and possibly today's election -- Democrats need to attack economic
elites. But the Kamala Harris campaign hasn't consistently offered
an anti-elite counter to Donald Trump's right-wing populism." On
the other hand, Republicans are very adept at channeling rage
against elite Democrats. Why can't Democrats turn the tables on
the some of the most entitled, selfish, greedy people in America?
Martin Longman: [11-07]
I'm not sure the race was ever winnable. A big chunk of this is
based on a pre-election piece:
Nate Cohn: [11-02]
Why are Democrats having such a hard time beating Trump? "The
national political environment just isn't as conducive to a Harris
victory as many might imagine." I don't really buy the argument for
a global tide toward conservatism, and there's much else I'd nitpick
in his left-and-right momentum survey, but he's certainly right that
Harris leaned against progressive policies that just four years ago
Biden leaned into, and that undermined both the Democrats' credibility
and the message that Trump and the Republicans are nihilist lunatics
with no plans that could actually solve anything.
Branko Marcetic: [11-06]
Democratic Party elites brought us this disaster. I'm tempted
to quote lots of this rant, but can't quite hone in on any single
section. I also rather doubt that the Trump vote is being driven
by economic hardship -- not least because Trump's offering nothing
to help, whereas Harris actually is. The problem there seems to be
that mass of people who believe Trump on everything and Harris (or
any other Democrats) on nothing.
As a general rule, politicians campaign for donors early on, and
make amends to donors after the election, but during the closing
stretch, they focus on trying to appeal to voters. That's the point
when, for Democrats at least, their messaging leans left, toward
things that might actually help people. Voters have good reason to
be skeptical, and I can think of cases where it didn't work well,
but at least the politician is showing them some respect. I can't
say as I was paying a lot of attention, but I didn't notice Harris
doing that this campaign. Rather, they were raising money like crazy,
and she doesn't seem to have taken the necessary step of changing
that money into votes. I think that goes back to credibility, which
has been in short supply since Clinton started triangulating. Even
if it seemed to be working, as with Clinton and Obama, you look
back years later, and see what the donors got out of the process,
but can't remember what you got.
Clinton like to quote Harry Truman as saying, "if you want to
live like a Republican, you have to vote Democratic." Problem
there is that when folk start living like Republicans, they start
voting Republican, so you lose them -- especially the snots who
will kick the ladder out so no one else can follow them (which,
by the way, seems to be part of the problem why Democrats are
losing Latino voters). Meanwhile, the people who didn't make it
up start blaming you, and some of them vote Republican (or just
don't vote) just to spite you, so it's lose-lose.
Nicholas Nehamas/Andrew Duehren: [11-09]
Harris had a Wall Street-approved economic pitch. It fell flat.
"The vice president vacillated on how to talk about the economy,
and ended up adopting marginal pro-business tweaks that both
corporate and progressive allies agreed made for a muddled message."
I wonder if her late start didn't have something to do with this.
She wound up spending way too much time talking to donors, and not
enough to voters. She adopted much of what the former told her,
and little from the latter. Most campaigns shift from one focus
to the other (then the donors get a second shot after the votes
are counted), but she was relentlessly, obsessively fundraising
up to the very end. That worked to raise a lot of funds, but
they never managed to turn those funds into votes -- possibly
because the interests aren't the same. Or maybe she had enough
time and help to figure things out, but just liked the donors
more. And wanted more to impress them, perhaps because that's
where her personal future lies (now more than ever).
Lydia Polgreen/Tressie McMillan Cottom: [11-07]
Democrats had a theory of the election. They were wrong.
Transcript of a conversation between two of their non-right opinion
columnists:
Polgreen: On Tuesday we found out that the nation really,
really wanted a change. Not only did Donald Trump take the presidency,
but Republicans took the Senate and made gains in blue states like my
home state of New York and big gains in New York City, too. . . .
McMillan Cottom: I don't live in New York full time, I live
in the South. I spent a lot of time with working-class people, people
living in the mountains and rural parts of the country. And I also saw
a sort of acceptance and integration of Donald Trump's vision of an
America where no one has to give up anything to win. And it appeals
a lot to Hispanic voters, to working-class voters, especially
working-class men. It appealed a lot to people in rural parts of
the state of all races. That concerned me and concerned me the
entire campaign.
Polgreen: I think I was a bit more optimistic, in part
because, to me, this election really turned on this question of
who has a stake in the system as it currently exists and who feels
that they could benefit from just blowing it all up. . . .
I think I felt hopeful that here we had a generic Democrat who
had these plain vanilla policies that were not that exciting. They
tried to address around the edges some of the issues that people
needed from government.
I thought maybe that could work. Maybe there's just enough chaos,
just enough of a sense that this is too dangerous. That gamble was
just wrong, and ultimately you were right.
McMillan Cottom: Again, I take no pleasure in that because
if I am right, I am right because I thought -- and now have evidence --
that the anger that Americans feel cannot be directed toward the truth.
More interesting things in here, including:
Polgreen: The other thing is that we are living in this
zero-sum moment where people think giving something to someone else
means taking something away from me.
There was that moment where JD Vance was talking about how if
immigrants made countries rich, then Springfield, Ohio, would be
the richest city in the world, and the United States would be the
richest country in the world. Well, news flash, the United States
is the richest country in the world. . . .
McMillan Cottom: One of the things that JD Vance is
actually very good at that Donald Trump is not good at, is he
figured out how to take something that is a problem about
relative differences and make it feel like an absolute loss.
The point here isn't that Vance is really clever, but that he
finds a way to get back to his basic campaign proposition. He's
not unique -- I've seen Bernie Sanders do this many times, but
the secret here is not dogged repetition, but having a point to
get back to. Continuing:
McMillan Cottom:
But that relative loss, despite the fact that objectively, they
are still doing OK, is enough when turned into anxiety and fear
and aggression, which Donald Trump is very good at doing, feels
like an emotional catharsis. And then JD Vance comes behind and
says, "Not only are you losing, but yes, your loss is coming
because someone else is gaining."
What we do not have on the other side, to your point, is either
a center or center-left and, I'd even argue, a Democratic center-right
story that captures that emotion in the same kind of way.
Also:
Polgreen: Yeah. And I think that the idea that the Democratic
Party has to work within a set of defined rules of the existing order
is just a brain disease.
I had initially skipped over all the New York Times pundits, until
I was pointed here by:
Steve M.: [11-07]
Voters think every party is the leopards eating people's faces
party:
What this suggests to me is that millions of voters didn't think
they were voting on a choice between chaos and stability. They
think both parties destabilize the country. So they chose Trump's
promise of a form of destabilization they found appealing over the
status quo, which they see as an unappealing destabilization.
In the famous
meme, a supporter of the Leopards Eating People's Faces Party
says, "I never thought leopards would eat MY face." Donald Trump
won because millions of voters think Democratic policies lead
leopards to eat their faces, and Trump's policies will make leopards
eat the faces of people they don't like.
In particular, young men of all ethnicities think liberal culture
has created a pro-queer gynocracy that's eating the faces of straight
males. They want leopards to eat the faces of people they think are
benefiting in this culture. . . .
A majority of Hispanic men
appear to have voted for Trump despite the fact that some will be
caught up in his crackdown on undocumented immigrants. These Trump
voters believe that only the undocumented will have their faces eaten,
and they're fine with that. (Harris campaigned on a border crackdown,
so she didn't talk much about how heavy-handed Trump's immigration
policies are likely to be.)
Trump chose popular victims of the leopards -- women, trans people,
immigrants, criminals. Democrats could have chosen the rich, but
bashing the rich reportedly scares some moderates. It sets off alarm
bells in the "liberal" commentariat and reduces the big-money
contributions that are necessary for Democrats to run one of our
country's staggeringly expensive presidential campaigns.
A day earlier, M. also wrote:
[11-06]
Trump is a toxically masculine Andy Kaufman, and other unorganized
thoughts: "A few thoughts on one of the worst days in American
history." Section heads (some with a bit of quote):
- Eeyore: I was right to be pessimistic, and it's clear
that I should have remained pessimistic even after Kamala Harris
entered the race.
- Democrats and Republicans agree that Democrats are bad
[longer quote to follow]
- Maybe ground game is meaningless
- But didn't voters think Trump is crazy?
- Which brings me to Biden: But the race might have been
different for her or Biden if Biden had been able to persuade
voters that he cared and was working hard to make their lives
better [but he couldn't, and she wouldn't].
- And also, America is massively sexist: I don't think
I'll live to see a female president. There are too many trad
Christians and too many whiny boy-men -- and they just elected
the biggest whiny boy-man of them all.
The point about Democrats cited a comment from
Frank Wilhoit that is worth quoting here:
People vote their emotional compulsions, which, by definition, are
purely destructive; that is why all voting is negative-partisan.
Trump will get one vote: his own. The votes that are recorded as
his will be votes against, not Kamala Harris, but the Democratic
Party and its constituencies. Comparably, Harris will get no votes at
all; the votes that are recorded as hers will be votes against,
not Trump, but the Republican Party and its constituencies.
History is on the side of the Republicans here, because they
understand what is going on; that is why they focus exclusively
upon degrading the Democratic brand. We do not understand. . . . We
should have spent every moment of the past forty-five years screaming
total rejection of the "conservative" pseudophilosophy, and nothing
else. . . .
It is too late now; one cannot suddenly "discover" a problem that
has been in being for decades and try to whip up any urgency around it.
Patrick Healy/David French: [11-06]
It's time to admit America has changed: Two more conservative
New York Times pundits discuss the election.
- Stephen Prager: [11-15]
Don't you dare blame Harris's loss on the left: "Some prominent
pundits are trying to blame 'woke' for the Democrats' embarrassing
defeat. It won't work."
- Waleed Shahid: [11-18]
The left didn't sink Kamala Harris. Here's what did. "It's easier
to blame activists, but far more powerful forces have led Democrats
to neglect the real crises facing Americans." Much of this is to be
expected, but the ending is stirring:
History reveals that oversimplified approaches often sidestep the
harder questions. Success doesn't come from rejecting the complexity
of a diverse coalition but from learning to navigate it. To win,
Democrats must inspire the public in a fractured information age,
engage meaningfully with the cultural shifts around race, gender,
family, and migration, make democracy work despite obstructionists
like Manchin and Sinema, and -- most critically -- deliver tangible
results that improve people's lives. And if the corporate, status
quo -- loving forces within the party are standing in the way of
that mission, they must be moved aside.
Success will come not by pointing fingers but by telling a story
of transformation -- with clear villains, bold vision, and conviction
that democracy can, indeed, make a difference.
The first part of the last line could use some editing: you do
need to point fingers, but at the clear villains that are essential
to your story. The one thing you have to grant Republicans is that
they're good at identifying villains. It shouldn't be hard to name
our own:
- Greedy, arrogant billionaire donors (or more broadly but also
more succinctly, the 1%). These are the people who feel entitled
to run the world.
- Right-wing media. These are the people who will lie and cheat
and play any imaginable games to control your minds.
- The theocrats who want a new inquisition, to force you to live
as they think you should. These are the people who will take away
your rights and freedom.
- The scammers, scoundrels, crooks and frauds. These are the
people who will steal whatever else you have left.
That's not a lot of people, but they have a big impact on very
many lives. And bear in mind that the goal in identifying these
villains isn't the all-too-popular wish to "lock them up" or to
"take them out." The goal is to significantly reduce their power
over and impact on everyone else.
Norman Solomon: [11-07]
Democrats ignored every warning and the results are catastrophic:
"Now that a fascistic party has won the presidency along with the
Senate and apparently the House as well, the stakes for people and
planet are truly beyond comprehension."
Andrew Prokop:
[11-06]
One striking pattern hidden in the election results: "Were voters
rejecting Democrats -- or just the Biden-Harris administration?" Or,
I have to ask, just Harris? I haven't entertained the possibility,
at least in print, that they simply don't trust a person with any/all
of her attributes, which most obviously include: woman, color, from
California, both parents immigrants. None of that bothers me, nor
does it bother most people, and nearly all of the people who think
of such things were going to vote Trump anyway, but if you can't
win the kind of landslide you deserve on issues alone, maybe think
about that. As for the pattern:
But when you zoom in on the details of that result, there's a striking
pattern: Democratic Senate candidates are outperforming Harris. Or,
put another way, Republican Senate candidates are doing worse than
Trump.
[11-06]
Why Kamala Harris lost: "Trump won because Harris inherited a
tough situation from Joe Biden -- and ultimately could not overcome
it." I'll nominate this piece for a bracket elimination tournament
to find the most intellectually lazy explanation for the loss. He
offers three reasons: a global trend ("in the years since the pandemic,
incumbent parties have been struggling in wealthy democracies across
the world"); "Biden's unpopularity" (which Harris "had to figure out
what to do about that"); and "Harris's own record," by which he means
Harris's 2019 presidential campaign, when she "embraced progressive
policy positions that Democrats now view as politically toxic."
As I've said, I don't know what the answer is, but it's got to be
something more than that. As for the "tough situation" Biden left
Harris in, his only detail was that Israel-Gaza had "divided
Democrats' coalition." (I'd submit that it didn't divide the
coalition that actually identified as Democrats, but it turned
off a lot of other voters that Harris needed.)
[11-11]
The debate over why Harris lost is in full swing. Here's a guide.
"Was she a weak candidate? Was it Joe Biden's fault? Did Trump have
unexpected strength? Or was it a global trend?" This appeared too
late for me to explore, but I have one suggestion: instead of looking
for things that might have moved the needle a point or two, start
from the assumption that Trump (and most Republicans) were be any
objective criteria so bad they should have lost by at least 10,
possibly 20 points, and see if you can identify any problems at
that scale? I'd start with money and media structure, and then
consider the difficulties of establishing trust against those
odds. Harris wasn't a weak candidate so much as one not strong
enough to overcome those bigger obstacles. Same for Biden, who
had some additional weaknesses that Harris only partly made up
for. We can go on down the list, but we keep coming back to what
happened to the world to make Trump seem credible, while Harris
was ultimately judged by many to be some kind of phony.
Nathan J Robinson: [11-06]
Once again, the Democratic leadership has failed us all:
"In 2016, we warned that Hillary Clinton's campaign was not resonating
with Americans. In 2024, we warned about Kamala Harris, and we were
ignored again. Now, the worst has happened. So, what do we do? A
leftist analysis can help us chart a path forward."
Since we're here, let's file some "I told you so" links cited in
the article:
Andrew Duehren/Lauren Hirsch: [10-14]
How Wall St. is subtly shaping the Harris economic agenda: "The
vice president has repeatedly incorporated suggestions from business
executives into her economic agenda."
Dan Friedman: [09-13]
Harris' embrace of Dick Cheney was just one way she courted national
security hawks: "On Gaza, Ukraine, and Afghanistan, the VP signaled
she won't ditch DC's interventionists."
Yasmin Nair: [08-23]
Kamala Harris will lose.
Nathan J Robinson:
[10-23]
Is Kamala blowing it? "Her campaign began with huge fanfare.
Now she's slipping in the polls and making seemingly obvious
mistakes. What's going on?"
[08-21]
Politics should not be parasocial: "We are electing a head of
state who will wield immense power and control a massive nuclear
arsenal. 'Policy' is not peripheral or dispensable, it's the only
thing that really matters."
[04-02]
What Trump understands about war: "Donald Trump's militarism
is even worse than Biden's. But he's keeping relatively quiet on
Israel-Palestine, probably because he knows the public doesn't
like war."
[2022-07-02]
The ACA marketplace is a scam covered with a veneer of "choice":
"Purchasing health insurance on the marketplace is so confusing that
it is impossible for consumers to make rational choices."
Ken Silverstein: [11-07]
While Harris torched at least $2 billion during humiliating defeat
to Trump, former top staffers and advisors for the Veep, Biden,
Obama, Hillary Clinton, Sanders, and Warren got rich: "Ten
political consulting firms with close ties to the Democratic
establishment raked in more than $100 million from Harris's
campaign coffers."
Alex Skopic/Nathan J Robinson: [08-06]
It's a bad idea for Harris to abandon progressive policies:
"In recent days the Vice President has quickly ditched some of
her boldest initiatives, needlessly making herself look unprincipled."
Bret Stephens: [11-06]
A party of prigs and pontificators suffers a humiliating defeat:
I can't stand Stephens, who even spoils his conversations with Gail
Collins -- their latest,
The Trump era never really ended, has a title that could develop
into interesting analysis, but doesn't. This piece, too, is mostly
crap, but he gives you a good taste of how the Republican mindset
caricatures Democrats. (Do you suppose his Harris endorsement was
another plant? He doesn't seem to have the faculties to have based
it on reason -- well, as he explains later in the piece, his first
reason for voting for Harris was Ukraine, followed by trade policy.
The only time Republicans ever go bipartisan is when they suspect
an opportunity to make Democrats look bad to their voters.)
Here's a sample:
The dismissiveness with which liberals treated these concerns was
part of something else: dismissiveness toward the moral objections
many Americans have to various progressive causes. [bogus examples
follow, starting with trans athletics]
The Democratic Party at its best stands for fairness and freedom.
But the politics of today's left is heavy on social engineering
according to group identity. It also, increasingly, stands for the
forcible imposition of bizarre cultural norms on hundreds of millions
of Americans who want to live and let live but don't like being told
how to speak or what to think. Too many liberals forgot this, which
explains how a figure like Trump, with his boisterous and transgressive
disdain for liberal pieties, could be re-elected to the presidency.
Last, liberals thought that the best way to stop Trump was to treat
him not as a normal, if obnoxious, political figure with bad policy
ideas but as a mortal threat to democracy itself. [more bogus examples]
And it made liberals seem hyperbolic, if not hysterical, particularly
since the country had already survived one Trump presidency more or
less intact.
Today, the Democrats have become the party of priggishness,
pontification and pomposity. It may make them feel righteous, but
how's that ever going to be a winning electoral look?
This is massively unfair, but it's the bread and butter of
right-wing media, so Democrats have to get better at handling
it. That doesn't mean inching closer to Republicans, not least
because that never works, but better framing is possible, and
trust-building is essential. I don't see that working with a
hack like Stephens, but most people are more open-minded than
him (or minded, for that matter).
Bhaskar Sunkara: [11-08]
The Democrats lost because they ran a weak and out of touch
campaign: "The party, increasingly divorced from workers,
leaned too much on an activist base instead of a voting base."
Michael Tomasky: [11-06]
Latino men were the big defectors -- but they weren't the only ones:
"Here's how Harris failed to replicate Biden's 2020 victory over Trump."
Bernie Sanders: Sanders
endorsed and campaigned for Harris. After the election he
posted this:
It should come as no great surprise that a Democratic Party which has
abandoned working class people would find that the working class has
abandoned them. First, it was the white working class, and now it is
Latino and Black workers as well. While the Democratic leadership
defends the status quo, the American people are angry and want change.
And they're right.
Today, while the very rich are doing phenomenally well, 60% of
Americans live paycheck to paycheck and we have more income and wealth
inequality than ever before. Unbelievably, real, inflation-accounted-for
weekly wages for the average American worker are actually lower now
than they were 50 years ago.
I don't have the links handy, but right after Sanders
made his statement about Democrats abandoning the working class, I saw
a bunch of flak on Twitter charging Sanders with hypocrisy because
during the campaign he praised Biden's record for labor (most pro-labor
president since . . . ?). Pretty low bar, but during a campaign you
take what you can get. Afterwards, you go back to what you want, which
is a candidate who is more effective for working people. Sanders wants
that. His detractors don't seem to.
Other articles that focused on Sanders:
Jessica Corbett: [11-07]
Sanders slams 'big money interests' that control Democratic Party
after loss to Trump.
Krystal Kyle: [11-06]
Bernie would have won: "The Democratic smothering of the Bernie
coalition reaped its reward today."
Branko Marcetic: [11-07]
Bernie Sanders is right to be incensed at the Democrats.
- Natalie Shure: [11-12]
Bernie would have won. Seriously. "Trump keeps winning because
the Democratic party refuses to be the party of the working class."
Sanders has one thing that few Democrats have, which is credibility.
The counterpoint is that if the Democratic Party had nominated Sanders,
rich Democrats like Michael Bloomberg would have bagged the election,
throwing it to Trump -- much like previous generations of Democratic
elites did to Bryan (1896) and McGovern (1972).
- Jared Ryan Sears:
[reply to a
tweet that featured Sanders' post-election statement, the one
with charging the Democrats with abandoning the working class]:
- Unions are the strongest they've been in decades.
- Wages among the lowest earners grew the fastest.
- The child tax credit was expanded.
- A minimum corporate tax was enacted.
- A tax on stock buybacks was added.
- High inflation was brought down to normal levels without a recession.
- Millions of jobs were created.
- Unemployment has remained low.
- Manufacturing returned to the US.
- Prescription prices were lowered.
- More Americans have healthcare than ever before.
- -Billions were given to student debt relief.
- -The American Rescue Plan got Americans back to work, covered
Cobra payments, and even directly gave Americans money.
Let's stop pretending that nothing was done by this administration
when it inherited a pandemic, a migrant crisis, and high inflation and
managed not only to address all of those issues through Republican
obstruction but accomplished much more as well.
There's always more to do, and mistakes happen, but to act like
Democrats abandoned the working class is ridiculous.
Lots of comments follow, some agreeing with Sanders, but most
attacking him, the vitriol especially strong from points farther
left -- attacks on his endorsements of Clinton/Biden/Harris (I
always filed those under "go along to get along," a game he's
played rather skillfully) and charging him with genocide (he did
reflexively support Israel after the Oct. 7 revolt, but as it
became clear that Netanyahu's game plan was genocide, he has
shown exceptional clarity and bravery in opposing US arms to
further that genocide). I've generally insisted that people of
the left are good-hearted, well-meaning, and thoughtful, but
by evidence here, at least a dozen are simple-minded assholes,
not unlike thousands (or millions?) on the right.
PS: On second thought, I think these comments were to
Sanders' original thread, not to the Zachary Carter tweet that
led me to it. It is quite possible that he is heckled like this
all the time, and that the "extreme left" attacks are deceptive
trolls. Sorry for opening that can of worms.
Resisting and coping:
I've generally put
the "what comes next" pieces under Trump (second section), but the
corresponding "what do we do now" pieces are likely to have nothing
to do with Harris (not that the idea doesn't crop up in the various
pieces critical of the Harris campaign). I wasn't really expecting
to do this section, but found one piece, and thought there may be
more (e.g., I moved the Ganz piece in from elsewhere).
John Ganz: [11-06]
I hope I'm wrong: "About Trump and other things." Many
worthy thoughts in this post:
There's a political lesson there, too, though, that applies to the
present moment: having a clear vision of things, even if it is
unpleasant or dark, beats no vision or an unclear one. Trump's
campaigns had a clear mythos: a story about what America is and
was and where it is going. No Democratic candidate that's run
against him has been able to articulate an opposing vision. This
is not particular to this or that candidate, although all of them
had individual weaknesses. We can litigate that forever. But it's
really a problem of American liberalism: liberalism is unsure of
itself and ameliorative, it's not a bold vision of the future as
it once was in its heyday under LBJ or FDR. Trumpism may be reactionary,
but liberalism too, has become too backward-looking -- look at my
references in the previous sentence. It longs for an old age of
consensus instead of gamely going to war to win a new one. American
liberalism has also become a land of smug statisticians and wonks
who want to test every proposition and shrink from striking out in
a new direction, from testing rhetorical appeals in the public arena
rather than the statistical survey. Trump and his campaigns were
willing to venture boldly and that's part of what appealed to people.
He said, "Follow me and make history," a dubious claim made by others
before him, but it excites people.
He also admits that his command of the history of fascism may
not have helped:
Antifascism is a century-old tradition now and the critics of who see
in it a longing to recreate an old order are on to something. It's a
politics of memory and meaning that are fading from this world. But
it at least has a certain imaginative dimension, it's an ethos: its
mythical core contains a struggle between good and evil. Unfortunately,
it doesn't resonate at this moment. For voters for whom "democracy"
was an issue Harris was the obvious choice, but that wasn't enough
people. It's perhaps too idealistic, too abstract and airy, and not
focused enough on practical issues, although for me it's a social
democratic impulse, uniting the struggle for democracy and people's
day-to-day needs. In any case, it's not a story that the American
people get anymore.
He also points out that "resistance" has its legacy rooted in the
struggle against fascism, which may not be the best model right now.
In particular, Trump's popular margin has given him a clear path to
power, unlike Hitler and Mussolini, who used their demagoguery to
gain a power base, but in the end resorted to force to seize power.
Natasha Lennard: [11-06]
The answer to Trump's victory is radical action: "As ever, don't
expect the Democratic Party to save us. Now is the time for grassroots
action."
Nicole Narea: [11-16]
Democrats got wiped out in 2004. This is what they did next.
"The last time Democrats lost the popular vote spurred a reckoning."
Both times the presidential race was close, but was combined with
Republicans winning both sides of Congress, leaving a leadership
vacuum in the Party. Howard Dean campaigned to run the DNC, and
worked hard to rebuild it from the grass roots up, leading to a
major success in 2006. After that success, Hillary Clinton and
Barack Obama seized the throne, turning the party back into an
extension of their personal campaigns, and left the rest of the
party for dead, but that's another story.
Sub-sections here:
- They pursued a 50-state strategy
- Democrats reevaluated their messaging
- Democrats sought to become a party of ideas
Last section is "the limits of political strategy," so some
caveats.
Nathan J Robinson: [11-14]
Here's the silver lining: "Horrible Republican policies are
inevitably unpopular and will generate backlash. As Trump's presidency
becomes a chaotic failure, a new left movement can rise." While it
is a near certainty that Republican policies will fail to solve the
problems they target (even by their own measures), and that they will
generate backlash that will propel a Democratic resurgence (assuming
we still get to vote -- a risk Republicans are all too aware of). But
his "the dog that caught the car" metaphor is dead wrong. Republicans
know exactly what they want to do with the car once they've caught it.
And while Bush in 2000, Reagan in 1980, and Nixon in 1968 offer some
precedents, Trump is moving much more aggressively than any previous
president-elect.
Robinson further
tweeted: "this is not to diminish the terrible harm that will be
done. It's going to be utterly awful, but it may spark unexpected
popular uprising that lead to a transformative political movement."
I responded:
The "dog that catches the car" metaphor doesn't work here. Trump may
seem clueless -- I've quipped that he doesn't know how to devise "dog
whistles"; he's just a dog who responds to them -- but his crew know
exactly what they want to do, and are doing it at record speed.
Another commenter, perhaps facetiously: "Thank you for your role
in giving the American people this convenient accelerant. When you
think about it, in the end it was Hitler who brought lasting democracy
to Germany after the war."
Timothy Shenk: [11-08]
It's time to resist the resistance: "Resistance" in the sense of
reflexive opposition that focuses on Trump personally:
The origins of Resistance politics go back over a decade, even before
Mr. Trump entered politics. In 2011, with Mr. Trump making headlines
as the leading spokesman for birtherism, Barack Obama's team seized
the opportunity to cast him as the face of the entire Republican
opposition. Years later, David Plouffe, an Obama campaign manager
turned presidential adviser, explained the strategy. "Let's really
lean into Trump here," Mr. Plouffe remembered thinking. "That'll be
good for us."
And it was, for a while -- so good that when Mr. Plouffe joined
Kamala Harris's campaign over the summer, it still seemed like the
basis for a winning coalition. . . .
But there was a price to be paid. No matter how progressive the
rhetoric, Resistance politics inevitably feels conservative. It's
reactionary in a literal sense: The other side decides the terms
of debate, and it usually ends with finding yet another norm under
assault, a new outrage to be tutted over or another institution that
needs protecting.
Robert Wright: [11-08]
How to fight Trump mindfully. This is good, but that he's actually
quoting himself from seven years ago is a bit inauspicious:
The premise of the Mindful Resistance Project is that understanding
and addressing the root causes of Trumpism is important -- so
important that we shouldn't let Trump's antics and outrages get in
the way of this mission. To put a finer point on it: 1) We need to
respond to each day's news about Trump wisely -- with moral clarity
and forceful conviction but with awareness of the way overreactions
to his provocations can play into his hands. 2) Meanwhile, we need
to get a deeper understanding of the forces that led so many people
to vote for Trump. These forces include globalization, demographic
change, the loss of jobs through automation, and a political
polarization that is grounded partly in the tribalizing tendencies
of social media. This polarization is also grounded in what you might
call the psychology of tribalism, in cognitive biases that afflict
us all -- so fostering an understanding of how our minds work will
be among the goals of this project.
Senate:
Nia Prater: [10-07]
Where does control of the US Senate stand? As of Thursday,
Republicans defeated Democratic incumbents in Ohio and Montana,
and picked up the seat in West Virginia (not reported here), with
races in Pennsylvania, Arizona, and Nevada still undecided (with
Pennsylvania looking like another Republican gain).
House of Representatives:
I thought I'd
have more in this section, including specific races, but I never
even got around to looking at the numbers.
Other election matters:
Gerry Condon: [11-10]
November 11 was originally Armistice Day, a peace holiday:
I didn't realize the holiday until I got a bunch of email this
morning offering special deals to veterans -- reminding me that
my "service," which mostly consisted of trying to get and keep
us out of bullshit wars, is still very much unappreciated.
Condon's a member of Veterans for Peace, so he deserves
thanks on both counts.
Ed Kilgore: [11-07]
The pro-choice ballot winning streak ends: "Voters in Florida,
Nebraska, and South Dakota rejected constitutional amendments
protecting abortion rights." In Florida, the amendment got 57% of
the vote, but 60% was required to pass.
On the other hand, abortion-rights initiatives won in seven states,
including four carried by Trump. Margins of victory in these red
states ranged from 4 percent in Missouri to 16 percent in Montana,
22 percent in Arizona, and 28 percent in Nevada.
Three blue states predictably passed sweeping abortion-rights
measures by comfortable margins. In Colorado (62 percent "yes") and
Maryland (74 percent "yes"), state constitutional amendments were
approved providing for unconditional abortion rights. In New York,
abortion rights were advanced via a much broader "equal-rights
amendment" that won 62 percent (despite earlier fears it was in
trouble).
Charles P Pierce:
Jordan Smith:
Missouri voters overturn abortion ban in decisive win for reproductive
rights.
Jessica Washington: [11-06]
Voters overwhelmingly chose to protect abortion -- even when they
didn't choose Harris: "In every state it was on the ballot,
reproductive care was more popular than Kamala Harris."
Other Republicans:
Griffin Eckstein: [11-09]
Jones calls for "Nuremberg Two" against Democrats following Trump
win: "The conspiracy theorist and radio host said the Trump DOJ
had a mandate from God to prosecute Dems." The subhed is no surprise,
but the invocation of "Nuremberg" shows a mind-boggling level of
ignorance (specifically, about Nazi Germany) and contempt for truth,
and indeed for everyone. Of course, that's hardly news with this
guy.
Adam Clark Estes: [11-07]
We're all living inside Elon Musk's misinformation machine now:
"As Musk gains even more power, X gains more influence."
More on Musk and Big Tech:
John Herrman: [11-08]
Big Tech's loyalty era: "Elon Musk's big bet paid off. Tech
leaders are adjusting -- and warming -- to a new reality."
Timothy Noah: [11-08]
Dump Twitter: "If you stick with Elon Musk, you're complicit."
Whatever you call it, the social media site was Musk's primary tool
to elect Trump. In Bloomberg's Tech Daily newsletter for November 7,
Kurt Wagner writes that Musk "turned his feed into a Trump-inspired
billboard for his more than 200 million followers," that it "became
a major source of anti-immigrant conspiracy theories," that Musk
"re-shared posts from the former president's supporters, not all
of them accurate," and that Musk turned X into "a much more powerful
version of Truth Social."
Still, hard for me to see how shutting down my account, with
3000 posts, 650 followers, and 49 following, is going to make a
dent in Musk's bottom line, much less his brain.
John Feffer: [10-30]
The cruelty of crowds: "The far right has weaponized the
Internet."
Casey Wetherbee: [11-03]
The GOP playbook for sabotaging environmental regulations.
Other Democrats:
Kate Aronoff:
Ryan Cooper: [11-07]
Time for Democrats to abandon the mainstream media: "The 'liberal
media' was in the tank for Trump. Democrats should take their subscription
dollars elsewhere."
Nicole Narea: [11-07]
Why Democrats couldn't sell a strong economy, in 3 charts: "Top-line
indicators pointed to cooling inflation and a strong economy. What did
Democrats miss?" Section heads:
- There was a real inflation backlash (even though chart shows
that "overall wage growth has outpaced inflation")
- The job market is tougher (chart shows: "more people are
facing long-term unemployment")
- Americans have less money and are taking on more debt
(chart: "Americans are saving less after the pandemic"; doesn't
look like much less, after a big spike during the pandemic, but
credit card debt and delinquency rates are up)
By the way, here's more on the credit card thing:
Steve M: [11-08]
The election explained, in two charts. I probably missed the
significance of this because I don't have any credit card debt,
and had no idea the interest rates were this high (21.9%, up
from a little over 14% just a year ago?). Part of the problem
has to do with Biden reappointing Trump's Fed Chair pick, but
the larger part is that we got rid of the anti-usury laws that
used to provide a cap on this kind of loansharking. Harris could
have came out with an anti-usury platform, and when questioned
about it, told folk to look it up in the Bible. That, plus
writing off most student debt -- which only exists due to
political malfeasance, and which while Biden attempted some
remedies, Harris hardly ever talked about -- would have had
much broader and more tangible appeal than the silly notion
of exempting tip income (a Trump idea that Harris adopted
and helped legitimize -- every time you create a haven for
untaxable income, you undermine our ability to tax the rich.
How hard would it have been to point out that if we taxed
rich folk at levels they had to pay before they paid off
politicians for their tax cuts, people who depend on tips
to make up for subminimal wages, as well as everyone else
who is underpaid in America, could be taxed less, and get
better benefits in the bargain?
By the way, M. points out (and I can relate, not least
by being a bit older):
Ordinary people were already struggling more than their parents,
then inflation struck in 2021. It hurt incumbent parties all over
the world.
Yes, it has receded in America. Yes, we now have the
strongest economy in the world.
But the two charts at the top of this post show how the economy
looks to people who were already struggling to pay their bills
every month when inflation hit. In all likelihood, they pulled
out credit cards to buy necessities, and now they can't pay those
credit cards off.
My wife and I can afford to pay our credit card bills in full
every month, but I don't look down on people who can't. If your
family is bigger than ours, if you're younger (we're in our sixties),
if you've ever had a stretch of unemployment or big medical bills,
you have it harder than we did. If you went to college or grad
school in the past twenty years, you'd be shocked at how small
our student loan burden was in the 1970s.
By economists' criteria, this is a booming economy. It's pretty
sweet for people who can afford it. But I completely understand
that it doesn't look so sweet if you're living paycheck to paycheck.
I tried to run a one-person business for a while in my twenties
and early thirties and got myself in debt. It sucks. It sucks to pay
a partial bill and see no decrease in the debt because the interest
keeps compounding and compounding. I managed to get out of that debt
and never looked back, but when you're in the thick of it, it's
miserable.
If you've never been in that situation, count your blessings. If
you think everyone who gets into debt is a bad person, well, I guess
I was a bad person.
Wiley Nickel: [11-11]
What should Democrats do now? Form a shadow cabinet. "The venerable
British institution of the opposition would serve America well today."
I've loved this idea ever since I first found out about it. It's more
natural in a parliamentary democracy than it would be in America, but
it could be done here, and it would give Democrats some leadership
visibility in each specific area of government. Nickel is proposing
drawing the cabinet from Congress members, which would make it a lot
like the committee minority members. I think it would be better for
the DNC to organize and raise money for a shadow government, mostly
of technical experts (which could include some notables, like Pete
Buttigieg in Transportation, or Robert Reich in Labor, or former
members of Congress), selected by the Democratic caucus in Congress,
possibly adding Democratic governors, maybe even party chairs in the
underrepresented-but-still-important red states.
Osita Nwanevu: [11-08]
The long Obama era is over: "The democrats must learn to speak
to voters who don't believe in the politics of old and aren't
interested in returning to it." I never thought of there being
any "Obama era," probably because he made so little effort at
delineating it from the "Clinton era," which he jumped the line
on to little if any practical effect. The more customary term
for them both, on through Biden and Harris, is "neoliberalism,"
except that one already lost its cachet before Biden.
The long Obama era is over. The familiar homilies -- about how there
are no red states or blue states and Americans share a set of common
values and working institutions novelly and externally threatened by
agents of chaos like Trump -- never described political reality. They
now no longer work reliably even as political messaging. The hunt
should be on for alternatives.
The word "homilies" is striking here. Obama specialized in them,
as if he had to constantly remind us that he was utterly conventional,
someone who could be counted on to always say the correct thing. I
remember my surprise at one point when Trump made fun of Obama for
always ending his speeches with "God bless America." It's the most
anodyne statement ever for an American politician, and yet it gives
these yokels, who claim to put God and America above all else, an
excuse to laugh at him.
Stephen Semler:
[09-10]
US child poverty nearly tripled between 2021 and 2023: This
seems like a possibly big deal, not just on the headline topic
but on a wide range of economic issues. The key here is a chart
of "several key US anti-poverty measures expired or were eliminated
after 2021." As the chart makes clear, most of them started with
the pandemic of 2020, while Trump was president, and ended 2021-23,
while Biden was president. Only the last two items started after
Biden became president (child care provider grants, WIC increase).
One might read this chart and think Trump was the champion of
welfare expansion, and Biden its nemesis. The truth is different:
all of the items were pushed by Democrats, mostly by Pelosi and
Schumer when they crafted Trump's first pandemic relief bill. To
mollify Republicans, they were sold as emergency measures and they
included sunset clauses. Democrats tried to extend some of them
(things like the eviction and foreclosure bans were never going
to be extended), but were frustrated by Republicans plus the
sandbagging of a few Democrats (notably Manchin and Sinema, who
held the deciding votes on many issues). Biden's support for
the measures was less clear, but it's grossly simplistic to
blame him for not being able to extend such useful programs.
The child poverty figures are especially striking, dropping
from 12.6% to 5.2% from 2019 to 2021, then rebounding to 12.4%
immediately after ending the child tax credit. The lower figure
shows what could easily be done with a bit of political will,
but that's just one of many metrics here. Few people appreciated
that it was the Democrats who made these remarkable changes happen,
in part because Democrats who wanted to work with Trump shied away
from taking credit. (Trump's subsequent bills were much weaker and
less effective.) But also because Democrats didn't want to see them
as a first start toward a massive expansion of social benefits, as
something to build the future on. The pandemic was a very unusual
period in American history -- one that deviated so far from the
expectations of both political parties that neither seems to be
able to deal with it. Republican delusions are expected, but seems
like the Democrats can't wait to forget either, even though if
they could, they might discover that they by and large behaved
with the care and concern we hope for from the political system,
but rarely get. Why couldn't they campaign on that?
[11-06]
A couple charts to explain a Harris loss: The two charts are:
"US food insecurity increased 40% since 2021" ("number of people
living in food insecure housholds" increased from 33.8M to 47.4M),
and "Poverty in the US increased 67% since 2021" ("number of people
living below the poverty line" increased from 25.6M to 42.8M).
Both of these charts, which measure pretty much the same thing,
show 2020-21 dips before the 2022 rebound. The 2021 columns show
the effects of pandemic relief programs, which had sunset clauses
and were allowed to lapse, mostly due to Republican opposition
(plus a couple bad Democrats). As I noted above, Democrats didn't
claim much credit for the improvement, nor blame Republicans for
the later pain, which allowed people who didn't know any better
to flip the roles. As Semler notes:
Why did I consider her defeat likely? Because Harris ran on an
anti-populist economic agenda and an anti-antiwar foreign policy
platform, and neither of those things poll well.
Paul Waldman: [11-10]
Voters punished Biden for problems he didn't cause and effectively
addressed: But for some reason couldn't talk coherently about,
some of which can be attributed to age, some to his usual awkwardness,
but also also to the problem that Democrats have to speak both to
donors and to voters, two groups that want to hear different things,
a task that even the most eloquent of Democrats have trouble pulling
off. Alternate title, which I clicked on before arriving here, is
"Trump is about to take credit for Biden's accomplishments."
Stephen Wertheim: [11-11]
The Cheney-loving Democratic party needs a reckoning about war:
"Election outcomes have multiple causes, of course. Yet foreign
polilcy was one of the reasons Americans gave Trump the largest
Republican victory in decades."
Matthew Yglesias: [11-12]
A Common Sense Democrat manifesto: This seemed monumental enough to
sneak in the day after. I was pointed here by Jonathan Chait, who
tweeted: "I think (or at least hope) this will be an important
reference document going forward." (Nathan Robinson heckled back:
"shouldn't you probably shut up for a while," with a link to Chait's
October 8 article:
The race is close because Harris is running a brilliant campaign:
"Stop complaining; the centrism is working.") Chait probably likes
it because Yglesias's neoliberalism is showing, and because it's
written in ways that signal anti-left bias. But the "principles"
aren't so bad:
Different people have different views and different priorities, and
principles need to be loose enough to accommodate some differences.
But I also don't want these to be total platitudes; I want some
people to read them and think, "Fuck this, I don't agree." Over the
next few weeks, I'll share posts elaborating on each one individually,
but in the meantime, these are the principles I'd like to see the
Democratic party embrace:
Economic self-interest for the working class includes both
robust economic growth and a robust social safety net.
The government should prioritize maintaining functional
public systems and spaces over tolerating anti-social behavior.
Climate change -- and pollution more broadly -- is a reality
to manage, not a hard limit to obey.
We should, in fact, judge people by the content of their
character rather than by the color of their skin, rejecting
discrimination and racial profiling without embracing views that
elevate anyone's identity groups over their individuality.
Race is a social construct, but biological sex is not. Policy
must acknowledge that reality and uphold people's basic
freedom to live as they choose.
Academic and nonprofit work does not occupy a unique position
of virtue relative to private business or any other jobs.
Politeness is a virtue, but obsessive language policing
alienates most people and degrades the quality of thinking.
Public services and institutions like schools deserve adequate
funding, and they must prioritize the interests of their users, not
their workforce or abstract ideological projects.
All people have equal moral worth, but democratic self-government
requires the American government to prioritize the interests of American
citizens.
Before getting to his list, Yglesias explains (and here I'll add
my comments in brackets):
Being a Democrat should mean caring more than Republicans about the
lives of poor people, about equal rights and non-discrimination,
about restraining big business in matters related to pollution and
fraudulent practices, and about protecting social insurance for the
elderly and disabled. [I'd add everyone else to "poor people," but
you could just say 99% if villains are politically useful. Proper,
not means-tested, social insurance becomes more valuable as you go
up the income scale.]
These are important progressive ideas, and because they are
important progressive ideas, I think that anyone who identifies as
a leftist or a progressive should vote for Democrats. [So why try so
hard to drive us away? The charge that leftists are all-or-nothing
is easily disproven.]
But that doesn't mean that Democrats' agenda should be driven by
those on the far left [or the right, or corporate neoliberalism, or
identity groups, or any faction; it should be driven by problems and
practical solutions]. A big-tent Democratic coalition needs leftists.
But left-wing candidates are rarely winning tough elections, and too
often, they're not improving governance of the solidly blue places
where they're elected. [Leftists face many obstacles from entrenched
forces, including donor-seeking Democrats, but even so, is this really
a valid generalization?] . . .
Most elected Democrats are not, themselves, actually that far left,
and when faced with acute electoral peril, they swiftly ditch ideas
like defund the police or openness to unlimited asylum claims [which
are effectively caricaturs of leftist ideas, propagated to militate
against the left]. But what they haven't generally done is publicly
disavow the kind of simplistic disparate impact analysis that leads
to conclusions like policing is bad. Similarly, the Democrats are not
a degrowth party. [Degrowth is an idea that deserves consideration,
but isn't a left political position.] When good GDP numbers come in,
Joe Biden and his team celebrate them -- they believe in taking credit
for strong growth. But even without being a degrowth party, Democrats
are heavily influenced by the views of major environmentalist
organizations that do have a degrowth ideology at their core.
Critics on the right charge that Democrats are in the grips of
radical ideology, but the truth is more boring: Many elected officials
are just not particularly rigorous thinkers (think of how much
backbench Republicans have shifted on various policies since Trump
took over). Most only really understand a few issues and do a lot
of going along to get along. . . .
Winning elections is important, because if you don't win, you
can't govern. [But if you win on the basis of bad ideas that don't
work, your governing will have accomplished nothing, and you'll
lose again -- at least until the other party reminds people of
their own incompetence.]
The Republican Party is basically just a racket: they lie, cheat,
and steal, whatever it takes to ascend to power, so they can lie,
cheat, and steal some more. Democrats have to run against Republicans,
but they are also expected to tell the truth, to work earnestly for
the public good, and to deliver tangible results. Democrats need the
left, not just as reliable votes against Republicans, but because
the left has useful ideas to solve or at least ameliorate problems
that bedevil us. This repeated cycle of "centrist" or "neoliberal" --
Chait prefers the former term, while Yglesias is one of the few who
actually embraces the latter -- blaming the left for many failures
of the high-roller Democrats they favor needs to stop. Democrats
need to figure out how to sell viable solutions to the people,
and to deliver them once they are elected. Since most of those
solutions come from the left, they need to stop demonizing the
left, and start treating us as respectable and honorable.
PS: Chait just wrote
A farewell to New York, so with his new gig at The Atlantic,
I guess I won't have him to kick around any more. One more reason not
to subscribe.
Israel: This has been my top section
ever since Oct. 7, 2023, only pushed down due to the election.
America's Israel (and Israel's America):
Israel vs. world opinion:
Ukraine and Russia:
Elsewhere in the world and/or/in spite of America's empire:
Van Jackson: [10-02]
Liberalism has a Heather Cox Richardson problem: I've had this tab
open for more than month, and just found it as I was preparing to reboot.
Had I noticed earlier, I would have included it here, so how [11-24],
why not? It's pretty good, at least up to the point where we slam into
the paywall. It centers on a Richardson tweet:
Important to remember that U.S. alliances and partnerships underpin
the rules-based international order. Weaken the U.S. and you destabilize
that order, opening the door for dictators with imperial ambitions.
Everywhere.
I'm not going to tear this apart, or just laugh at it. Too late
for that. Let's just quote Jackson:
I don't doubt that she believes what she's saying. Her first book,
after all, was called The Greatest Nation of the Earth.
But this is ruling-class propaganda -- not true at all. She's
very much out of her depth pontificating about America in the world.
And she has, under the veil of opposing Trump, made herself the
voice of the powerful, which is why she gets to go on the talk
shows and get paid all the while.
I try to be sympathetic toward shitlib/cringe lib sentiments
because 1) I don't want to live in an illiberal society,
and 2) they represent the largest share of the Popular Front for
democracy that I'm trying to will into existence. No shitlibs,
no antifascist coalition.
And I'm not mad that she supports Ukraine, or that she wants
to critique Republicans for opposing support for Ukraine. Those
are both reasonable -- almost commonsense -- positions.
But her rationale for both supporting Ukraine and condemning
Republicans lacks self-awareness, and not in a harmless way but
in a way that threatens the democracy that she's dedicated her
pen to protecting against Trumpism.
I'd be interested in reading what comes after "Let me explain,"
I can't see myself ever using "shitlib" again, but I do recognize
the type: to quote from
Urban Dictionary:
Shitlibs are self-serving rich elite politicians who are subscribers
of neoliberal economics and governance. The support more deregulation
for big business and corporations, but more regulation and inceased
taxes for smaller businesses and workers. They support outsourcing,
illegal immigrant labor, lower wages, more free trade and privatization
(when it benefits them). They often lie about their support of
egalitarian and socially liberal ideas but never really enact them.
They are often side with tech and media corporations and receive
donations from them regularly. They also support more war and
interventionism abroad.
I don't like "neoliberal" either, but that's the more common
term.
Lukas Scholle: [11-09]
Germany's coalition collapsed, but recession is here to stay:
"German chancellor Olaf Scholz has dismissed his finance minister,
Christian Lindner, pitching the country toward elections. Economic
woes will be at the center of the campaign -- yet proposals for a
break with austerity are are conspicuously absent."
Supreme Court, legal matters, and other crimes:
Climate and environment:
Other stories:
Kyle Chayka: [10-30]
The banality of online recommendation culture: "A recent surge
of human-curated guidance is both a reaction against and an extension
of the tyranny of algorithmic recommendations." I didn't have time
to write about this piece last week, and don't have time now, but
being a guy who both writes and consumers self-styled "consumer
guides," this is obviously up my alley. Also as a software engineer,
I might note that I was thinking about algorithmic approaches to
sharing preference information before many of the better known
systems for aggregating such data became available -- none of
which, needless to say, I find particularly useful.
Ruby Justice Thelot: [09-11]
In praise of gatekeeping: "Why we need gatekeepers to resist cultural
hyper-optimization." I found this in an open tab next to the Chayka
article, so thought I should keep it. I'm not sure that the specifics
matter to me. Also, the phrase is a bit loaded. The people I know (or
at least the ones I follow) are more likely to be door-openers than
gatekeepers.
Obituaries
Lou Donaldson:
Roy Haynes:
Ella Jenkins:
Books
Osamah F Khalil: A World of Enemies: America's Wars at Home and
Abroad From Kennedy to Biden:
Current Affairs: [11-08]
How America imagines a 'world of enemies': "Osamah Khalil on
how, both domestically and abroad, American elites have conjured
existential nemeses who must be dealt with through never-ending
militarization."
Jonathan Kozol: An End to Inequality: Breaking Down the Walls
of Apartheid Education in America:
Patrick Ruffini: Party of the People: Inside the Multiracial
Populist Coalition Remaking the GOP:
Ezra Klein: [11-09]
The book that predicted the 2024 election: I noticed this book
in one of my
roundups, but didn't
believe it enough to even comment. Interview with Ruffini, in
light of the election, where there appears to have been a black
and (larger) hispanic shift toward Trump, at least among males.
The implication here is that shift swung the election. I'm not
sure of the numbers, nor how that works, but I do think that
racism has changed significantly over my lifetime, including
a shift in who gets respect and who doesn't. I always recall
the book title, How the Irish Became White, as showing
that racism is more about power than pigmentation. As we've
seen many times, starting perhaps with Clarence Thomas's Supreme
Court confirmation, even the most racist Republicans will vote
for a black person with the right credentials. I recall Lyndsey
Graham saying just that. On the other hand, it's hard to tell
any difference between how Republicans regard black Democrats
vs. how they used to regard all blacks.
Chatter
Joshua Frank: [10-24]
I wrote a book on how John Kerry blew the 2004 election by catering
to the right, ignoring the antiwar vote, and outhawking Bush. Twenty
years later, Kamala Harris is following the same losing playbook.
Aaron Maté: [10-27]
If I were the Harris campaign I'd be playing this clip of Trump
refusing to support a minimum wage hike on loop. Instead they're
palling around with the Cheneys and yelling "fascist" at every
turn.
David Sirota: [10-29]
This is so far beyond parody that you could convince me it's a bit.
[Response to Hillary Clinton: New Yorkers: Donald Trump may
have Madison Square Garden, but we have Carnegie Hall.]
David Klion: [10-31]
I'm confused why the Harris campaign thinks it's a good idea to send
Bill Clinton to Michigan days before the election to lecture Arab and
Muslim voters on the ancient Jewish claim to "Judea and Samaria."
Matt Duss: [10-31]
It's ridiculous for Trump to claim to be the anti-war candidate and
it's also ridiculous that that lane has been left wide open for him.
Eric Levitz: [11-96]
Interesting how much rightwing propaganda outperforms leftwing
propaganda across formats. It's not just that Fox beats MSNBC and
the right dominates radio: As Dave Rubin, Tim Pool, and Rogan
illustrate, podcasters tend to discover they can maximize their
audience by moving right.
The Onion: Breaking News: The Onion on the verge of collapse
after not being able to make up stuff that is more idiotic than
the current reality in our political lives in these United States!
Rick Perlstein: [11-12]
Don't quit Twitter. Ignoring fascist spaces is bad. Silence impliles
assent, shuts down witness of the lies they're devising & the
plans they're hatching. Don't initiate threads; the algo will just
bury them. Tell the truth in threads, like leafletting an occupied
French village.
Jeet Heer: [11-12]
[Comment in response to Wally Nowinski, who offered a chart I can't
read, and said: "Old white folks moved toward Kamala. Every other
group moved towards Trump."]
This is exactly the result you would get if you ran a pro-system,
pro-status quo, hug-the-Cheneys campaign: improvement from those
most invested in the system, alienating everyone else.
[Actually, I find this interesting, perhaps because I belong to
the "old white folks" demographic. Could it be that we weren't
tuned into social media, so missed a lot of the lies, while we
relied on more conventional news sources? Or maybe his point is
to lambast us, while blaming the groups with the largest shifts
to Trump (topped by black men) on the Harris campaign?]
db: [11-13] [illustration is House map, showing Republicans
with 218 seats, clinching the majority, vs. 208 for Democrats]
We did it! Worst possible world. thank you Kamala, thank you Joe,
thank you Barack, and thank you to the DNC for strangling left
populism in the crib and all but assuring this outcome! Couldn't
have done it without you!
Rick Perlstein: [11-14]
I have decided that I hate the adjective "unserious" as shorthand
for "evil person who is stupid and dangerous and wrong about
everything." The people it is purported to describe are plenty
serious.
Dean Baker: [11-15]
It's pretty funny to hear Trump boasting about his huge mandate. No
Democrats has ever been elected president with a smaller mandate.
I guess we can't expect a reality TV show star to be very good with
numbers.
[Later amended: "sorry, forgot about John Kennedy."]
David Sirota: [11-24]
In retrospect, the campaign was effectively over when Democrats
decided that their final October Surprise was touting Liz Cheney
and aggressively attacking rather than just ignoring Jill Stein.
Looking back, everyone shoulda realized this was Dems surrendering.
Ken Klippenstein [11-23]
Bill Clinton: "in demonizing all establishments and all people who
wear a tie like you and me to work and have a good education, we
are breaking down the legitimacy of . . . people who actually know
things that are very important for us today and very important for
our continued growth and prosperity and harmony."
Nathan J Robinson commented: "[I] wrote a 300 page book
on why Bill Clinton is awful and I can assure you that 'wearing a
tie' is not one of the listed offenses."
Nathan J Robinson: [11-22]
I'm grateful that The Atlantic and New York magazine have paywalls
because they function as a kind of quarantine for bad opinions,
making sure they don't escape and infect those not already affected
by them.
[Further down, I found an
Atlantic tweet quoting Elizabeth Bruenig: "Trump is in touch
with the impulses and desires that run counter to social norms,
and he invites his audience to put aside the usual internal
barriers to acting on or voicing them. This moment is an
opportunt one for a revival of Freud, whose work, with its
signature focus on subterranean inner worlds, helps make sense
of these tendencies and their implications for politics."
First line seems true, and worth thinking about. Second line
is an example of what passes for thinking in intellectual
circles, but isn't really. I can't say that Freud never had
an interesting idea, but his hit/miss ratio was about random,
and his misses inadvertently self-revealing.]
Matt Duss: [11-23]
It should be noted that the policy area where progressive groups
were able to have arguably the least influence, Israel-Palestine,
is the one that ultimately destroyed Biden's legacy.
Jon Schwarz: [11-26]
The 35% jump in Tesla's stock price immediartely after the election
shows that investors believe the US government will soon be completely
corrupt.
Allen Lowe [11-07]
Facebook post that somehow I managed to see on [11-15], but worth
keeping for later:
One of the most annoying results of the election are those who are
now standing up and saying the Democrats are gone and corrupt and
that's it. Well, I'm not going to join the party of Jill Stein. And
the Democrats still have a demographic advantage and still won a
large percentage of the votes, and I don't care what you think,
they are the only hope. Even Bernie Sanders agrees.
So I don't want to hear about how the billionaires would've won
either way. I want to hear about how Biden basically eliminated 50%
of child poverty only to be rebuffed by the Republicans when the law
wasn't renewed. I want to hear about this huge infrastructure bill
which is employing so many people and helping to make unemployment
incredibly low. I want to hear about social welfare which flourishes
under the Democrats because the agencies make appointments staffed by
good people who take care of poor and disabled people. The Republicans
staff them with people bent on destroying them and harming people like
my disabled son.
I thought we learned our lessons during the prior Trump administration,
when those who had told us that Hillary and Trump were the same slunk
into the corner with their tails between their legs. Now they're coming
out to try to tell us this is what they predicted all along.
Ridiculous, but it does show that many of them secretly hope the
United States will sink into oblivion so a revolution will rise from
the ashes. More people have to suffer so they can justify their own
hallucinatory politics.The only thing that will rise from the ashes
is more death and destruction.
Some good comments, like this one by Brian Simontacchi:
I think this is relevant to our conversation yesterday, so I'll just
chime in and rebut a couple of your points:
- Biden did some very good things, shockingly. My expectations weren't
high initially. He exceeded them easily
- As long as they try to prevent this outcome, I'll be supportive of
Democrats and hold their feet to the fire at the same time. I can walk
and chew gum
- Billionaires always win. Why spend all that money for no return?
- I think it's clear no lessons have been learned at all
I feel like you're working backwards from the conclusion that the
outcome determines the causality. I don't think that. I think people,
highly susceptible to misinformation and visceral tribalism, are
easily manipulated, and Trump and his echo chamber are quite good
at pressing those buttons. I think people change their minds with
what they think is happening in the news and to them, and they don't
care as much about a global or local responsibility to stability, if
they ever did. When the billionaires make the global economic trends,
they determine which professions and trades are most distressed and
how those people will likely respond in an election. Its all
coordinated; things will get worse before they get worse.
I'm just here to diagnose trends and be honest. I have no soft
spot for billionaires or politicians. I want peace for my neighbors
but I have to understand what's happening. Frankly, I have no loyalty
to either party, only to harm reduction which I can't even impact
from a blue state. If we can't have consistent progress, I'll settle
for harm reduction, even though that is not my ultimate goal, or my
responsibility to successive generations.
I hope we can talk about this amicably. If we can't, I'll cease
and desist.
Robert Christgau: [11-20]
Xgau Sez: Very late addition here, his answer to Carola Dibbell's
question: "Any takes on the election, Robert? PS: I'd rather you
not include your ongoing mea culpa for admiring Harris's articulateness,
which you now recognize might have lost voters who thought she sounded
too educated."
First of all, Harris was one of the most fluent prose stylists ever to
run as a plausible presidential candidate--which despite her own
considerable oratorical skills doesn't mean she was as impressive a
speaker as Lincoln, Obama, Washington it says here, or the fireside
FDR or as purely brilliant intellectually as at the very least
Madison, who did after all play a major role in conceiving the
Constitution we say we fight for and the Trumpers hope to wreck. She
was also arguably the handsomest, especially if dumb-ass Warren
Harding's square-jawed thing didn't turn you on. But what both
impressed me and led me astray was what the polls told us was the
50-50 race it clearly wasn't--at least not in the electoral college. I
was confident ordinary voters saw her brains and looks as an
attractive positive, which they clearly didn't. On the contrary, let's
specify the obvious. She was Black and female and both cost
her. Sexism and racism. Definitive? Maybe not, and we'll never know
how big they were for sure. (It is also worth bearing in mind, just as
a quirky oddity if you prefer, that what I'd estimate were the two
most intelligent plausible presidential candidates of my and your
lifetimes were both of part-African heritage.)
But in addition I'll note that my biggest personal political gaffe
is that I never glimpsed the economic factors I have no doubt cost
Harris big because that seems to be how it worked all over the
pan-Covid world. About that I was ignorant, to my and so many of my
allies' disgrace. I've also been paying more mind than I ever thought
I would to what is now, evocatively, labeled bro culture. As someone
who would always rather read, listen to music, or both than resort to
YouTube and/or the podcast world, I ignore both the way I avoid Rush
and Kansas reissues, living without that market share, which for me is
negligible economically--but not, it would seem, electorally. Now those
motherfuckers scare me.
Although I've long followed electoral politics in considerable
detail, I don't have the expertise or vanity to make any
prognostications here. I'm glad MSNBC is operative because I find it
comforting--especially for the nonce Lawrence O'Donnell, whose detailed
firsthand knowledge of DC in particular I've been finding informative
and on occasion comforting.
I can imagine three or four different responses to this, with
the big one possibly, albeit slowly, evolving into a full-fledged
book project on What We Learned From the 2024 Election,
but even though I have a few ideas, I don't think we can say we've
learned much yet. I do think it helps to realize that we really
need to ask two different questions: what could Harris have done
differently to swing a
1.6% election margin the other way? and
what could Democrats have done to win the landslide that should
have been possible given Trump's
historic low favorability: 44.7% (-8.6) on Nov. 2; as low as
38.0% (-17.5) on Jan. 10, 2023? I'd be the first to admit that to
get the landslide they deserve, Democrats need to tell a better
story: one that make it clear to most people (and here we're
talking 60-70%, not 50.01%) how horrible Republicans are --
that part should be pretty easy -- and how Democrats can be
believed and trusted to do much better things (ok, that's the
hard part).
Harris didn't have that story, and couldn't, because Democrats
haven't been aiming for landslides (much less to be the party of
the 99%) for, well, donkey's years. They've been chasing donor
money with promises of growth satisfying everyone, while using
the Republican threat to keep their base in line (while wooing
supposedly moderate suburbia): a delicate balancing act, and
one that risks exposing themselves as two-faced. Harris's story
was what the Democrats bequeathed her with. We can debate about
how well she sold it, and whether small shifts in emphasis and
focus could have helped. (I think she had a big problem with
Biden's wars. Others point to economics and/or cultural issues,
which could have been handled better, but I regard as much less
decisive.) But all the way to the end, I was happy with her as
a candidate, and I expected her to win.
That she didn't, I blame on the people (and the media, but
let's not go there). But in a democracy, you can't blame the
people. You can't, in Brecht's phrase, "dissolve them and elect
another." You have to figure out how to deal with them, to break
through the highly polarized media bubble that insulates them
from such obvious truths as that Trump is a greedy liar who has
no practical understanding of how the world works and who is
ultimately only concerned with his own vanity. You have to ask:
why can't at least half of the people see that? You can't seriously
think that the people who voted for him did so because they knew
all that and still liked him?
Conversely, how can a large segment of Trump's voters think of
Harris as a "low IQ" tramp who slept her way to the top and/or is
trying to pass herself off as black because she thinks that makes
her cool? There's something seriously wrong with these people,
but you shouldn't say that, because they're every bit as much of
"the people" as you are, and because attacking them just backfires
on you -- e.g., "deplorables" or "trash," nor does it help to
point out that they routinely say much worse things about you.
Nor does it help to try to cozy up to them by feigning agreement
on marginal issues (like Kerry's goose hunting photo-op, or Harris
waving her gun).
I think this can be done, both personally -- I know a fair
number of these people and get along with them reasonably well,
although even in Kansas, and even in my family, most of my time
is spent in a social bubble that extends to my left as well as
to my right - and politically (which is not my job, and safe to
say, never will be). But self-hating is always a bad look. And
it's not necessary, even if it worked, which it doesn't. We
shouldn't have to, or expect to, change to escape a political
trap. But we do need to stop taking our prejudices and neuroses
out on other people.
A couple things about Christgau's letter still bother me.
His assumption that being "Black and female and both cost her"
suggests a race-and-sex consciousness that most Republicans
seem to have moved beyond (perhaps symbolically or cynicly,
and with no real concessions to equality). Even if it is still
a factor -- one might argue that race had some impact on the KY
and NC gubernatorial elections, where black Republicans in red
states ran and lost to white Democrats, but the margins were
thin, so the effect couldn't have been large -- it's not one
that does us any good to dwell on (not just because doing so
attacks people can also turn people off as condescending).
I have less of an idea what to say about
bro culture -- I had to look it up to get a definition,
and even so I can't say that it applies to anything I've ever
been part of. Still, unless it's meant to excuse assault or
rape, or you try to translate it into the realm of politics,
I don't see problem. "Different strokes," you know? Isn't that
something we support? Maybe if we were less terrified of other
people, they'd learn to cut us some slack, too?
As for MSNBC, I wouldn't know, as I never watch it, but my
wife tells me that "O'Donnell is the worst" ("even worse than
Maddow"), and that the whole place is a den of Clinton-Obama
DNC orthodoxy ("Hillary-bot," "anti-Bernie" über alles), i.e.,
the same ideas and elitist strategies that keep letting the
Republicans back in the door -- after Bush and Trump showed
conclusively that they really have no clue how to govern, even
to preserve the status quo.
But I understand the "comforting" feeling. For the last eight
years I've taken much comfort from watching the anti-Trump late
shows (Kimmel, Colbert, Meyers: monologues, not celebrity guest
talk), not so much because of what they said -- which could be
problematical -- as because their audiences were at least as
partisan, and it felt good to be in the company of ordinary
people who react to these outrages the same way I do. As a
leftist from way back -- my initiation was a mid-1960s tabloid
called The Minority of One -- I'm used to losing and
lonely isolation, with my ideas rejected not on their merits
but as a kneejerk reaction to the direction they're coming
from (generally, like all leftists, a commitment to peace,
justice, and equality). So it was nice not to feel so totally
isolated for once.
Since the election, I've given up on watching those shows, as
well as giving up on network news, my local paper, and even most
of the center-to-left-leaning sources I faithfully collated for the
Speaking of Which years. But I'm still here, and we're still
here, and we're just a couple points short of inching back into
majority power, which should be easy enough to make up as people
increasingly realize what a complete train wreck of a political
juggernaut they've handed power to. But what's driving all this
has nothing to do with that I did or did not write over the past
20 years -- words that are still
online, very few of which I have any
regrets about (most errors were on the optimistic side, where
I'm more inclined to blame the world than to admit my own fault).
But right now, I have no optimism whatsoever that people (let
alone Democrats) will start reading me and learn some new tricks.
But if they want to survive the Trump debacle[*], they're going
to have to look at the real problems, then come up with solutions
and credible ways of talking about them; they're going to have to
find ways to talk to everyone, to appeal to their better natures,
and to their various hopes; they're going to have to win elections,
deliver results, and make this a better world for as many people
as possible.
One thing I've learned over recent years is that there are a
lot of smart and good people already working on this. I've noted
some of them, especially in my
Books posts, and I have no doubt but there is much more I
haven't noticed -- needless to say, there is also no shortfall
of nonsense in the Books posts. On the other hand, as much of the
post-mortem analysis cited above shows, learning the hard way is
often even harder than you expect. Especially given that the
lessons that should have been learned from the 2016 loss and
the 2020 win have thus far only produced a second, even more
heartbreaking, loss.
[*] I thought I'd be witty here and use "Trumpocalypse," but
that turns out to be the title of two books, both dated: one
scathing from neocon never-Trumper
David Frum (2020), another a delirious prophecy by
Paul McGuire and Troy Anderson (2018). John Nichols also used
the term in the title of his 2017 book on the initial Trump cabinet
picks:
Horsemen of the Trumpocalypse: A Field Guide to the Most Dangerous
People in America, which he could well be writing a sequel to
right now. C.J. Hopkins also published a collection of "brave,
original, enlightening, and hilarious" (sez Matt Taibbi) essays,
Trumpocalypse: Consent Factory Essays, Vol. I (2016-2017).
PS: A couple days after writing this, I woke up feeling I should
say something more about "comfort" in such times. I've never been one
to beat myself up over what the world does, especially in spite of my
best efforts. And I've always striven to make my own life as comfortable
as possible. But I'm finding little comfort in familiar political haunts
right now. It was easy after 2016 to blame the loss on the candidate,
because I had many of the same misgivings -- just more sense than to
think that Trump might be the answer. Biden's 2020 win allowed us to
overlook Trump's stronger-than-expected performance, but that too was
easily rationalized. But none of those explanations really work here.
Harris wasn't a bad candidate. History hasn't vindicated Trump. The
usual metrics did not suggest a Trump win (even a close one). But
something happened, which calls into question some of our fundamental
assumptions about how politics works. And until we figure that out,
we should be uncomfortable. That's the only thing that keeps us from
falling back into the same old rut.
My new problem with the late shows is that I suspect that their
style of talking about Trump is counterproductive. I've slowly grown
more aware of how attacking Trump only seems to validate him in the
hearts and minds of his fans. But I never imagined the effect would
be as strong as it evidently is. We need to regroup, and recalculate.
As best I recall, I've been pretty consistent in
believing that
Biden, and later Harris, would defeat Trump, but I saw one scenario
as particularly ominous: if the wars in Ukraine and Israel drag on
through election day (as they have now done), I predicted that many
voters would desperately search for an alternative, which could tip
the election to Trump. I relaxed my prediction a bit when Harris
replaced Biden, figuring she would be seen as less culpable, but she
was in Biden's administration, was involved in much of its disastrous
foreign policy, and made little if any effort to distance herself
from its failures. Worse still, she started campaigning with hawks
like Liz Cheney.
I figured I should go back and find the quotes. I've found several
bits I wrote on a possible Trump win, so I'll include them here.
The main one was from July 24 (actually quoting a July 18 letter),
but we'll keep them in order, starting with this one (I'm adding
bold in a couple spots):
June 22, 2024:
I find it impossible to
believe that most Americans, when they are finally faced with the
cold moment of decision, will endorse the increasingly transparent
psychopathology of Donald Trump. Sure, the American people have
been seduced by right-wing fantasy before, but Reagan and the
Bushes tried to disguise their aims by spinning sunny yarns of
a kinder, gentler conservatism.
Even Nixon, who still outranks Trump as a vindictive, cynical
bastard, claimed to be preserving some plausible, old-fashioned
normality. All Trump promises is "taking back" the nation and
"making America great again": empty rhetoric lent gravity (if
not plausibility) by his unbridled malice toward most Americans.
Sure, he got away with it in 2016, partly because many people
gave him the benefit of doubt but also because the Clinton spell
wore off, leaving "crooked Hillary" exposed as a shill for the
money-grubbing metro elites. But given Trump's media exposure,
both as president and after, the 2024 election should mostly be
a referendum on Trump. I still can't see most Americans voting
for him.
That doesn't mean Trump cannot win, but in order to do so, two
things have to happen: he has to make the election be all about
Biden, and Biden has to come up seriously short. One can ponder
a lot of possible issues that Biden might be faulted for, and
come up with lots of reasons why they might but probably won't
matter. (For example, the US may experience a record bad hurricane
season, but will voters blame Biden for that and see Trump
as better?) But we needn't speculate, because Biden already has
his albatross issue: genocide in Gaza. I'm not going to relitigate
his failures here, but in terms of my "optimistic view," I will
simply state that if Biden loses -- and such an outcome should be
viewed not as a Trump win but as a Biden loss -- it will be well
deserved, as no president so involved in senseless war, let alone
genocide, deserves another term.
So it looks like the net effect of my optimism is to turn what
may look like a lose-lose presidential proposition into a win-win.
We are currently faced with two perilous prospects: on the one
hand, Biden's penchant for sinking into foreign wars, which he
tries to compensate for by being occasionally helpful or often
just less miserable on various domestic policies; on the other,
Republicans so universally horrible we scarcely need to list out
the comparisons. Given that choice, one might fervently hope for
Biden to win, not because we owe him any blanket support, but
because post-election opposition to Biden can be more focused
on a few key issues, whereas with Trump we're back to square
one on almost everything.
But if Biden loses, his loss will further discredit the centrist
style that has dominated the Democratic Party at least since Carter.
There are many problems with that style, most deriving from the need
to serve donors in order to attract them, which lends them an air of
corruption, destroying their credibility. Sure, Republicans are
corrupt too, even more so, but their corruption is consistent with
their values -- dog-eat-dog individualism, accepting gross inequality,
using government to discipline rather than ameliorate the losers --
so it comes off as honest, maybe even courageous. But Democrats are
supposed to believe in public service, government for the people,
and that's hard to square with their individual pursuit of power
in the service of wealth.
So, sure, a Trump win would be a disaster, but it would free the
Democrats from having to defend their compromised, half-assed status
quo, and it would give them a chance to pose a genuine alternative,
and a really credible one at that. I'd like to think that Democrats
could get their act together, and build that credible alternative
on top of Biden's half-hearted accomplishments. It would be nice
to not have to start with the sort of wreckage Trump left in 2021,
or Bush left in 2009, or that other Bush left in 1993 (and one can
only shudder at the thought of what Trump might leave us in 2029).
But people rarely make major changes based on reasoned analysis.
It usually takes a great shock to force that kind of change --
like what the Great Depression did to a nation previously in love
with Herbert Hoover, or like utter defeat did to Germany and Japan
in WWII.
If there was any chance that a Trump win in 2024 would result
in a stable and prosperous America, even if only for the 51% or
so it would take for Republicans to continue winning elections,
we might have something to be truly fearful of. But nothing they
want to do works. The only thing they know how to do is to worsen
problems, which are largely driven by forces beyond their control --
business, culture, climate, war, migration -- and all their lying,
cheating, and outright repression only rub salt into the wounds.
When people see how bad Republican rule really is, their support
will wither rapidly.
The question is what Democrats have to do to pick up the support
of disaffected Trumpers. One theory is to embrace the bigotry they
showed in embracing Trump. A better one would be promise the grit,
integrity, independence, and vision that Trump promised by couldn't
deliver on, partly because he's a crook and con man who never cared,
but largely because he surrounded himself by Republicans who had
their own corrupt and/or deranged agendas.
July 18, 2024:
For what little it's worth, here's my nutshell take on Biden:
If he can't get control of the wars in Ukraine and Gaza by
early October, he's going to lose, no matter what else happens.
For people who don't understand them, they're bad vibes, so why
not blame the guy who was in position to do something about them.
That may be unfair, but that's what uninformed voters do. And if
you do understand them (which I think I do), Biden doesn't look
so good either. He sees Ukraine as a test of resolve, and Israel
as a test of loyalty, and those views are not just wrong, they
kick in his most primitive instincts.
Otherwise, the election will go to whichever side is most
effective at making the election into a referendum on the other
side. That should be easy when the other side is Trump, but it
gets real hard when most media cycles focus on your age and/or
decrepitude. That story is locked in, and isn't going away. When
your "good news" is "Biden reads from teleprompter and doesn't
fumble," you've lost.
Even if Trump's negatives are so overwhelming that even Biden,
incapacitated as he is, beats him (and surely it wouldn't be by enough
to shut Trump up), do we really want four more years of this?
September 1, 2024:
Nia Prater: [08-27]
RFK Jr. and Tulsi Gabbard are joining the Trump transition team:
I noted this story last week, dismissing it with "sounds like something,
but probably isn't." Here I should note that while it probably isn't,
it could actually be something. Kennedy and Gabbard have a lot of traits
that discredit them as presidential candidates, but the one thing they
do have is pretty consistent antiwar track records, which they are not
just committed to, but are eager to use against Biden and Harris, who
are not exactly invulnerable to such charges. Moreover, they can say
that they left the Democratic Party because they opposed how hawkish
the Party had become -- so hawkish that even Trump would be a safer
and more sensible foreign policy option. It remains to be seen how
credible they'll be, because, well, on most other issues they're nuts,
but on this one, they could be more credible than Trump himself to
people with real concerns. I've said all along that if Biden doesn't
get his wars under control, he will lose in November. The switch to
Harris gives Democrats a partial reprieve, but the one thing she is
most seriously vulnerable on is the suspicion that Democrats are
going to continue saddling us with senseless and hopeless foreign
wars. Kennedy and Gabbard could be effective at driving that point
home -- sure, not to rank-and-file Democrats, who are generally
much more dovish than their leaders, and who are even more wary of
Republicans on that count, but to the "undecideds," who know little,
even of what little they know.
September 9, 2024:
Robert Wright: [09-26]
Is Trump a peacenik? No, but if you're worried that Biden
(now Harris) is a bit too fond of war, he says a vote for him
will save you from WWIII. And given that American politicians
of both parties have long and ignominious histories of lying
about wanting peace while blundering into war, and given how
little reliable information there is about either, there may
be enough gullible but concerned people to tilt the election.
Wright reviews some of the contradictions here, and there are
much more that could be considered.
I've been worried about just this prospect all along, and
I remain worried. I don't have time to explain all the nuances,
but very briefly, Biden has done a very bad job of managing US
foreign affairs, failing to make any progress dealing with a
number of very manageable hostilities (North Korea, Venezuela,
Iran, many others) while letting two crises (Ukraine, Gaza)
drag into prolonged wars that he seemingly has no interest in
ever resolving (at least he doesn't seem to be putting in any
effort). The only good thing you can say about his handling of
Afghanistan is that he dodged the worst possible option, which
was to stick around and keep losing. And while he's made money
for the arms and oil industries, both have made the world a
much more dangerous place. And then there's China -- do we
really need to go there?
One might reasonably think that anyone could have done a
better job than Biden has done, but we actually know one person
who had every same opportunity, and made them all worse: Donald
Trump, the president before Biden. Is there any reason to think
that Trump might do better with a second chance? The plus side
is that he may be more wary this time of relying on the "deep
state" advisers who steered him so badly. (Biden, too, was
plagued by their advice, but he seemed to be more in tune with
it -- the only changes Biden made in US foreign policy were to
reverse Trump's occasional unorthodox lapses, especially what he
viewed as softness on Russia.)
On the other hand, Trump brings
a unique set of disturbing personal characteristics to the job:
he cares more about perception than reality; he wants to be seen
as very tough, but he's really just a whiney bitch; he's majorly
ignorant, and incoherent on top of that; he's impetuous (but he
can usually be talked down, because he rarely has any reasons
for what he wants to do); he's vain and narcissistic; he has
no empathy with people he meets, so has no idea how to relate
with them (e.g., to negotiate any kind of agreement); he has
no sympathy for other people, so he has no cares for anything
wrong that could happen; he has a weird fascination with using
nuclear weapons, so that's one of the things he often has to
be talked down from; I know I already said that he's ignorant
and implied that he's clueless, but he's also pretty stupid
about how most things in the modern world actually work. He
does, however, have a keen interest in graft, and a passing
admiration for other right-wing demagogues, if only because
he admires their art and sees them as his peers. About the
only thing I can see as a positive is that he doesn't seem
to feel any personal need for war to prove his masculinity --
for that he's satisfied abusing women.
I'm sure there are more, but these at least make the point.
After Harris took over, I hoped that she might be held less
responsible, and other factors would give her a chance. I also
resisted all the hectoring from the left, figuring that's just
what we normally do, even if it's not helpful at the moment.
Besides, I knew that I couldn't really do anything about it:
that the forces in motion were way too powerful for whatever
I think to make any difference at all. So I just went with it.
But now I'm left with all these doubts: about my own judgment
and understanding, about other people, about the whole notion of
sides. I'm getting old, and tired, and frustrated. And while it's
premature to say that we have no future, I can't see any viable
path for me to continue working like this.
Therefore, this is my last Speaking of Which post.
Probably ever, at least not for quite some well. I have a
Jazz Poll to
run, and that's going to be enough of a time sink to last me
to January. I'll keep posting
Music Week,
probably as long as I'm able, possibly with a new burst of
energy but more likely with diminishing returns. The political
book I've contemplated for twenty-some years now is definitely
dead. Much of it would have been practical advice on how Left
Democrats might more effectively frame issues. Clearly, I'm in
no position to do that.
I may consider writing up more "blue sky" policy ideas. I've
always been very fond of Paul Goodman's Utopian Essays and
Practical Proposals, which gives me the perfect subtitle.
But each chunk of that would take considerable work to research
and whip into shape, and I have little confidence of doing that.
The more serious writing project would be to return (or restart)
the memoir. I don't know that will be of any interest, but it's
a subject I know, have thought about, and often find myself
slipping into, and it could be a springboard for anything else
I wanted to slip in.
The other obvious project would be to go back and review the
several million words I've written (most collected
here, from the founding of the
notebook and/or
blog up to some point in 2022) and
see what can be packaged into something useful. A couple people
have looked at this, and thrown their hands up in the air. When
I look, I see lots of things that still strike me as worthwhile,
but I, too, have little idea what to do with them. My ideal
solution would be to find an editor willing to work on spec,
but I can't imagine why anyone would want to do that.
If anyone is interested in nattering on about this life
decision, you can contact me through the little-used
question form.
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