Blog Entries [0 - 9]

Monday, November 18, 2024


(Not Yet) Music Week

This week's Music Week is being held hostage until I get my initial round of Francis Davis Jazz Critics Poll ballot invites sent out (aiming for Tuesday, but probably Wednesday). Meanwhile, you can probably find some new records in the November Streamnotes archive. Not a particularly big week so far, but I'm working on it.

My main reason for posting anything at all today is that I have some links to share:

  • The 19th Annual Francis Davis Jazz Critics Poll Begins: I posted this on Saturday, after sending out initial mail to my GNU Mailman list on Thursday. I don't have much more news yet, but wanted to make sure this much got some distribution. More in a couple days, but meanwhile, check out the Poll website. Focus right now is to provide information for voters. As we're currently updating the invite list, please feel free to suggest someone (even yourself). I also have set up the poll admin/discussion group, so if you're interested in following our deliberations (even if you're not a voter), let me know.

  • Q and A: Two recent questions answered (well, sort of).

  • Speaking of Which: No new one (now or most likely ever), but I keep finding things that seem like they belong here (and I feel like saving), so this swan song has grown to 317 links, 33193 words.

  • The Best Non-Jazz Albums of 2024: Way back in July, in conjunction with my Mid-Year Jazz Critics Poll, I compiled The Best Jazz Albums of 2024, and I've been trying to update it as we go, but I put off doing the Non-Jazz complement until now. So, 47 A-list new releases (+ 3 from 2023) and 7 reissues/historic music, which rather pales in comparison to 85 A-list new jazz (+3 from 2023) and 18 reissues/historic (+1 from 2023). Most years I have a large jazz/non-jazz ratio when I initially compile the lists, but that narrows as I catch up with the EOY lists. But I don't think I've ever had this much imbalance before.

  • Metacritic Aggregate: I started working on this mid-year, but haven't done a very good job of keeping it up to date. But this week I added the first EOY lists from Uncut, Mojo, and Bleep. This is not a huge priority for me, but it does help guide me to things to check out. There is also a new compilations of old/various music file, but it is very short (44 albums, vs. 1210 for new releases).

I ran the ratings counter and so far I'm +30 on the week, but only one A- so far. Unrated is -1, but I still have some unpacking to do.

Back to work now.

Ask a question, or send a comment.

Saturday, November 16, 2024


The 19th Annual Francis Davis Jazz Critics Poll Begins

Back in 2006, Francis Davis decided to supplement his annual end-of-year top-ten at the Village Voice by running a poll of a circle of critics "currently living in New York and/or writing for New York-based publications." I qualified, not as a resident (although I had lived there in the late 1970s), but because I was writing the Voice's jazz consumer guide -- which, in an effort to fill Gary Giddins' shoes, added breadth of coverage to Davis's depth.

Davis always insisted on printing every individual ballot, but in 2009 the Voice's IT department balked, so music editor Rob Harvilla asked me to post them on one of my websites. When Davis left the Voice, he decided to continue the poll, and went looking for a new host. By then, Harvilla had left the Voice, and landed at the music streaming service Rhapsody, where he could sponsor the poll. Davis asked me to help, so I did, as I continued to do, as the poll later moved to NPR and ArtsFuse. (In 2022, I wrote a history of the poll, at least in terms of my involvement.)

Early on, Davis did everything, and just dumped whatever he had on me at the end. Which turned out, as the poll grew over 100 and up towards 150 critics -- now nationwide, plus a small contingent of international critics -- I felt the need to get organized and mechanized, eventually writing some software to count the ballots and format the web pages. By then I had made myself indispensable, and as Davis in recent years has been beset by declining health, he wound up trusting me to take his baby over. I think 2022 was the tipping point from which I took over (with him lurking).

While we're still in touch, this year it's pretty much just me, so I've started to change things a bit. My first big change was back in June, when I decided to run a Mid-Year Poll. Expecting a light turnout, I changed the point-weights for ranked ballots, compressing the range from 10-to-1 down to 3-to-1. I've never done a systematic study of it, but I've always suspected his scheme of distorting the results. This also gave me a chance to get rid of the 5.5 points for unranked ballots. Unfortunately, that didn't get rid of fractional point values, but they seem like less of an anomaly now. All of that required some hacking, but it's done now, and I'm generally happy with the new scheme (and got literally zero blowback, probably a combination of don't care and didn't notice), so I'm carrying it forward.

I also increased the Rara Avis -- Davis's preferred term, which I've never understood but am slowly getting used to -- ballot choices from 3 to 5 (with the option, as always, of fewer, even zero), which turned out to be widely welcomed. I also dispensed with the special categories (Vocal, Latin, Debut), which often seemed to me like more trouble than they were worth. Davis urged me to reconsider, so I have, but I've rethought how they work. I intend to write this up more precisely and include it in the supplementary documentation on the poll website, but the gist of it is that I want to encourage people who care most about those categories to offer more picks, so that we wind up with a better picture of the category. Davis's rules -- one pick per category, which if in your top-ten has to be the top eligible pick there -- resulted in short lists that were often totally swept by one breakout artist (e.g., Cécile McLorin Savant in Vocal, Miguel Zenón in Latin, and whoever Blue Note's rookie of the year was in Debut; those people will still win under the new system, but at least they'll have some competition).

I have several underlying considerations in making these changes. I bring two basic skills to this poll: I'm a critic (which is to say, someone who observes and deconstructs to figure out how things work), and I'm an engineer (which is someone who builds things to work better). So one big thing I try to do is to make it easier for more people to vote, while also making it easier for me to manage the process. One thing I've noticed in previous years is that we create a lot of churn when trying to enforce arbitrary rules, so I've tried to reduce this by allowing more flexibility. Some time ago, we decided that "Latin" and "Vocal" are whatever the voter thinks they are. This year, I'm further relaxing the rules on New vs. Old music, and on Debut -- I'm still providing guidelines, and I may note what appear to be anomalous choices, but I'm not into forcing things, especially when I can get good data easier.

I started calling this the Francis Davis Jazz Critics Poll a couple years back, after several voters had coined the term. It seemed like a good idea, not just to honor him but to help keep his vision for the poll front and center. He always saw the voters as colleagues, and the poll as part of the process by which we individuals come to think of ourselves as a community. In continuing this poll, I hope to serve our community, and perhaps to extend it. Jazz is good for us, and good for the world.


One constant struggle I have in running the poll is figuring out who should vote, inviting them, and getting them to respond. Davis did most of that work, even recently, and always struck me as much better connected than I am. I've inherited his lists, and added a few names along the way, and will continue to do so. You might look at last year's voter list, and see if there is anyone else you think we should extend invitations to. (We have sent invitations to several dozen more people. Turnout is usually about 75% of those invited, with the Mid-Year about half that, but the previous voter list is the only one I can share here.)

I have a mail list based on my server with most of these names on it, and I can send notices to them pretty easily, but due to the "poor reputation" of my server it seems that only about half of those messages actually reach their destination. (In many cases, the mail is flagged as "spam" and diverted to the recipient's spam folder, so it's a good practice to check yours, and do whatever you can to allow delivery of this mail.) I sent a notice out yesterday, to kick off this year's poll. For anyone who should have received it but didn't, here is the letter:

Just a brief note to get things going. Yes, we are running another (our 19th annual) Francis Davis Jazz Critics Poll. I missed my self-imposed deadline of sending ballot invitations out by November 15, but you should receive yours sometime in the next week. Meanwhile, if you're on this mailing list, consider yourself invited. You can find a rough draft of the invitation here.

If you want to get this over with now (in which case, bless you), just grab the file, follow the instructions, and email it to me. I'm making a couple tweaks to what we've done in the past. As in the Mid-Year Poll, your Rara Avis ballot can list up to 5 (instead of 3) albums (anything recorded in 2014 or before belong there; anything later in New Releases, but I'm trying to do less bickering as I get older). I'm also reusing the points scheme from the Mid-Year Poll, which allows extra points for higher-ranked records, but no so many as to produce the distortions we got under the 10-to-1 point scheme. Those changes are easy for me, because I've already done the programming.

The other tweak will be in the Vocal/Latin/Debut categories, and this I'm going to have to do some programming for. I'll explain it in more detail when I do, but I figured the idea here was to generate more album lists, so I didn't like capping the list at one album each (I'm allowing 3 now, and if anyone seriously want to argue for 5, I might allow that). Moreover, I'm dispensing with the requirement that if you vote for an album in your top-ten list, you have to vote for it in the category list. I'm going to come up with some way to count eligible albums from top-ten lists in their categories, so what you list under the category is always extra. You can, if that's your thing, pick 10 Latin albums under New Releases, and add 3 more under Latin. It would help me if you designate which New Releases picks you think belong to which categories. We've given voters a lot of leeway on Latin and Vocal in the past. I don't want to impose my definitions on you, so it helps if you help me here.

I don't have a precise definition of Debut yet, but will work on it. We've been very strict about that in the past, and I think we should be less strict. One thing I do think is that this should be an individual, and not a group (maybe if everyone in the groups is strictly a debut, but that rarely happens). So this, too, will be more your choice, with less pushback from me (although I will reject any vote that strikes me as a prank).

The website will be updated as I have more information. I will try to answer most questions there, and you can help by asking me questions. I have a way to print out a list of albums that have votes, and possibly to break them down by category, which could generate a debut list. I know of one album that was released in two physical pieces but is really intended as a single album (I hear the artist blames the label), so I'll rule on and note things like that there.

I use this mail list for announcements, so respond to me, not to the list (which won't work, but leaves me stuff to clean up). While this list is pretty comprehensive, we've been plagued in the past by spam filters that, for no reason I can fathom, just don't like me. I can get around that by mailing individual invites out, but that takes me many hours, so I only want to go through that once. I'm going to sign up for a commercial email list service, and move everyone onto it. Hopefully that will work better, which will allow me to offer updates and nagging. Don't expect (or fear) a lot of mail, but be aware that something different will be coming. I'd advise you to check you spam directories, but if you're reading this, you don't need that advice, and if you're not, it wouldn't help.

I've had a couple people offer to help with various tasks. It's enough that I should probably set up an admin discussion list. If you want to get in on that, either to help or just to lurk, let me know.

One perennial question is who else should be invited? Let me know if you have any suggestions. That, plus nitpicking on the website, are likely to be high -priority discussion items.

I don't really have any news I can share about Francis Davis's health, other than that his participation in this his Poll is greatly diminished. I've been involved in it since its inception, and have done most of the work for several years now. I appreciate the continued trust you've shown in me in taking this over. Thanks.

I should probably clarify one thing. Although everyone on the mail list this was sent to is eligible and invited to vote, not everyone who we mean to invite is on the list. Moreover, history shows that only about half of the people on the list actually see the emails (mostly due to spam filtering). I have a more robust method of sending invitations, which is to run a form letter through Thunderbird's MailMerge extension, which turns it into a separate, customized letter for each recipient. Those drafts are them stuck in an outbox queue, from which I can send them one-by-one. (My SMTP server chokes if I try to automate sending.) This process takes 3-4 hours, beyond writing the letter, so I don't like to do it. I am going to do this when I get the lists sorted out better, hopefully in 3-5 days, but rather than wait that long, I used the mail list, and now this post, to get the ball rolling. Nice that I already have four ballots waiting to be counted.


We're looking for critics with credentials: mostly writers, although we also have a pretty substantial sampling of radio journalists (Davis was much more tuned into that world than I am, but like writers they are cultivated by publicists, so they are exposed to a wider range of new music than normal consumers, and have some practice at picking out what they prefer). Nowadays, credentials can even extend down to personal blogs -- you don't have to make a living as a professional critic (which, in any case, is nearly impossible these days), but to qualify you have to pursue this public service seriously.

We've generally avoided inviting two especially knowledgeable groups of people, who seemingly have conflicts of interest: musicians, and publicists. This isn't a hard prohibition, but I have retained Davis's rule about not voting for any record you have personal involvement in (which for critics often means writing liner notes; many critics also play music, but that seems to cause few problems). I'm open to considering exceptions, but need to see some open-mindedness.

This is not a "readers poll" or "fan poll," although in my experience there are many fans who are knowledgeable and discerning enough to rank as critics. During the Mid-Year Poll, I toyed with the idea of tabulating ballots from non-critics, but in the end I got virtually none. One thing I concluded from this is that readers polls are a measure of how many readers you have. As I have very few, it's hard to get a decent sample. So even if I wanted to run a fan poll, I would be very hard pressed to do so. Still, I would be curious if anyone wants to submit an unsolicited ballot. If you do have credentials, please point them out, which may get you qualified. Even if you don't, I might just factor your list into my EOY Aggregate (which includes most publications, at least as collated by Album of the Year -- which I find most useful among its various competitors -- but also lots of personal lists, mostly from my own social media hangouts).

As noted in the letter, I still have a lot of work to do on the website, as well as ambitions to rework the whole thing to make it more complete and coherent. If you are interested in helping on this, contact me (or use the question form, and I'll consider adding you to a more technical mailing list. (I'm still shopping for mail list software. Depending on what I find, I may break out several lists.)


Since I'm posting, a couple more personal notices. As I explained last week, I've given up on writing weekly Speaking of Which posts. However, I have, added a few more items to last week's post, especially as I've found open tabs with articles I meant to mention, or marginally later "post-mortem" arguments (starting, as these things often do, in the "chatter" section). But I haven't added new news items, such as anything on Trump's post-election appointments (horrifying as they are). Part of this is cost-benefit analysis, but part of it is also post-traumatic stress desensitization. I'm already way too conscious of what's happening to feel the need to research it further.

I've gotten some very nice comments on the last post, which I appreciate. Some were included in questions, which I will in due course attempt to answer. I'm making more regular entries in my notebook, which is available but not something I publicize. I tweeted one article recommendation, and may do more as I see fit. We'll see what else it makes sense to write and post. Music Week will continue on its usual schedule, at least through the end of the year. I'll probably offer updates on the Poll both here and on X. (I was going to do one on X today, then decided it would be better to post this first, then link to it.

Ask a question, or send a comment.

Tuesday, November 12, 2024


Music Week

November archive (in progress).

Music: Current count 43153 [43118] rated (+35), 26 [36] unrated (-10).

After last Tuesday's election, I took a couple days out, basically hiding from the news, as anyone would do when faced with traumatic stress. I had written a full-throated endorsement of Harris, which was driven far less by what I saw as her virtues than with my understanding of the full horror that four more years of Trump as president would bring. Perhaps now I should edit that to say "will," as Trump won, Harris lost, and ultimately we'll be the ones paying for this very bad decision.

By the time I was ready to look at the news, I had decided that the week's Speaking of Which would be my last. My reasoning is in the wrap-up section, so no need to reiterate it here. But the decision helped free me to navigate the morass of punditry (and sometimes news). The result is the longest such column ever, weighing in at 265 links, 26798 words, even before I added a few scattered items today.

I can't swear that I'll never write political commentary again. I'm likely to respond to questions. In general, I tend to be better at responding to requests than at making my own plans. (Indeed, my entire career as a rock and jazz critic only happened because Robert Christgau asked me to write something for him. And when I decided, with my wife's blessing, to try to return to writing around 2001, I had little interest in focusing on music, but Christgau again came through with the requests I wound up spending so much time on. If someone asks me, especially if they have a reputable outlet with the promise of an audience, competent editing, and possible collaboration, I'd give any such offer some consideration. But I've concluded that spending so much time and effort self-publishing huge pieces that get virtually no feedback is no way to live.

This also means that I'm unlikely to renew the domain for the underutilized Notes on Everyday Life. I published the Harris endorsement there in hopes of getting a few comments. All I got was one disagreement (from my wife), and a couple pieces of spam.

More importantly, the long considered, often mentioned big political book is now officially dead. I briefly had the idea of rummaging through the campaign Speaking of Which posts and trying to compile a What I Learned from the 2024 Election book, but that's pretty dead, too. It's not so much that I've lost interest in the key issues of political philosophy, but my idea that we need to find a modus vivendi to work within the Democratic Party has been pretty severely shaken. It's not so much that I've changed my mind there, but I'd rather write about ideas that could actually make a difference, as opposed to pandering to people who seem unserious about either winning or solving any problems.

I'm unlikely to sort out my future writing focus until end of year/early 2025. That's because my immediate shift will be to the Francis Davis Jazz Critics Poll. We usually send out ballot invites mid-November, which is this week. Although I was thinking about this a couple months ago, I've had very little time to do anything through today (or maybe tomorrow, when the contractor returns to fix up some problems in our bedroom/closet project). I need to set up the website, and kick off a letter -- at least a notice that formal invites will be sent in another week or so. That means dealing with the usual email problems, not that they're really solvable (i.e., workarounds rather than fixes).

I'm thinking about setting up a discussion list for people who want to help out with the poll. If you want to help, let me know, and we'll see what's possible. One thing that always needs help is vetting possible new voters. Again, any ideas, let me know. The Arts Fuse will publish the results, again. I'm thinking I'll go with a mid-December deadline, publishing on or shortly after January 1.

I may write more on music in the coming period, or maybe not. One thing I will do is work on the end-of-year files for jazz (which I've been maintaining since the mid-year poll) and non-jazz (doesn't exist yet, but will before long). Also, the tracking file (currently 1919 records listed, 952 that I have heard or at least have in my queue), and the two files for tracking metacritic grades and EOY list mentions: (new music and (old/reissued music.

EOY lists start appearing about now -- UK pubs tend to get the jump here, we already have lists from Uncut, Mojo, and Decibel. The latter have only rarely been updated since mid-year, so need a lot of work.

I'll let this week's music speak for themselves. Good new albums by Steve Coleman and Rebecca Kilgore led me to look up some of their old albums. Two Kilgore albums I wanted to check out but couldn't find were the eponymous 1998 one on Jump (a Penguin Guide 4-star), and a Marilyn Monroe tribute from 2012.

My two recent books read on Israel are good and short. Ta-Nehisi Coates (The Message) took a while to get interesting, but paid off in the end. Ilan Pappe's A Very Short History of the Israel-Palestine Conflict seemed like stuff I already knew, but I did pick up some finer points, and appreciate the organization.

I had Gideon Levy's The Killing of Gaza: Reports on a Catastrophe on deck, but picked up Marshall Berman's All That Is Solid Melts Into Air for some emergency reading material, and was immediately struck by several things. I wanted to drop a big quote (also one from Coates) into Speaking of Which, but didn't manage. I stopped reading critical the in the mid-1970s (when I got a job, left college, and got into rock criticism), but I did pick up a copy of Berman's 1983 book (my cover is different from the one pictured left, but this is the best I could do). I'm not sure if I'll stick with it, but it seems like an important book.

Note that at least three important musicians died in recent days: Roy Haynes, Lou Donaldson, and Ella Jenkins. See Speaking of Which for obituary notices.

I've mostly ignored new stories on likely Trump appointments, but most since I wrote the second intro -- where I raised the possibility that Trump might pull some of his campaign punches to maintain popularity -- have been truly abhorent, especially Marco Rubio for Secretary of State, Kristi Noem for Secretary of DHS (meaning immigration) and (seems to be more of a rumor) Ken Paxton for Attorney General. The odds that the Trump administration will be even worse than expected seem to be growing.


New records reviewed this week:

Ashtyn Barbaree: Sent Through the Ceiling (2024, Artists 3 60): Country singer-songwriter, from Arkansas, has a 2018 EP and and a 2022 debut album which I checked a couple months ago, when I got this promo, and found "nice enough." This second album is nicer still, with some solid songwriting, good voice, and serious fiddle. B+(***) [cd]

Big Bambi: Compositions for Bass Guitar & Bassoon, Vol. I (2022 [2024], Greene Avenue Music): Duo of Maribel Alonso (bassoon) and Jochem van Dijk (bass guitar/electronics), as advertised, interesting as far as it goes. B+(**) [cd]

Steve Coleman and Five Elements: PolyTropos/Of Many Turns (2024, Pi, 2CD): Alto saxophonist, started back in the mid-1980s developing a strain of funk-fusion, especially in his M-Base Collective. I should probably revisit those albums, which I wasn't much into (excepting 1993's The Tao of Mad Phat/Fringe Zones). But his later postbop, from 2013's Functional Arrhythmias on, has been very engaging, especially this live double, with sets from Paris and Voiron. The group is a quartet, with Jonathan Finlayson interweaving on trumpet, backed by Rich Brown on bass, and Sean Rickman on drums. A- [cd]

Caleb Wheeler Curtis: The True Story of Bears and the Invention of the Battery (2024, Imani, 2CD): Leader is mostly a saxophonist (tenor, sopranino, stritch), but also plays trumpet. Title is from the first disc, with the second titled Raise Four: Monk the Minimalist. Both are trios with bass and drums -- Sean Conly and Michael Sarin up front, Eric Revis and Justin Faulkner on the bonus. Both impress. A- [cd]

Andy Haas: For the Time, Being (2023 [2024], Resonant Music): Saxophonist, originally from Toronto, where he started in the new wave Martha and the Muffins, based in New York, also worked in groups God Is My Co-Pilot and Radio I-Ching. Mixed bag of experimental releases under his own name, but I much liked 2023's Accidentals (lead credit Don Fiorino). This one is solo, his credits: "saxophone, strap-on tremolo, mm w/hazaral, vinyl LP manipulation" -- so mostly sounds like electronics, or scattered sound effects. B+(*) [cd]

Laird Jackson: Life (2024, self-released): Jazz singer-songwriter, has previous albums from 1994 and 2002, most songs here originals co-written by Jeff Haynes (percussion, bass on one track, vocals on two). This is an ambitious work, a bit slow and ponderous for my attention span, but the "Wild Is the Wind" cover is striking, and there may well be more to it. B+(*) [cd]

Ariel Kalma/Jeremiah Chiu/Marta Sofia Honer: The Closest Thing to Silence (2022-23 [2024], International Anthem): French ambient composer, many albums since 1975, collaborators here did a 2022 album I liked, Recordings From the Åland Islands. Notes on wrapper: "Ephemeral, eylsian electro-acoustic collusion birthing a realized humanized multi-generational poly-technological expression." Another of those Hassel-like "fourth world" vibes. B+(**) [sp]

Pandelis Karayorgis/George Kokkinaris: Out From Athens (2023 [2024], Driff): Piano and bass duets (one solo each), the former born in Athens but long-based in Boston, with many albums since 1989. B+(**) [bc]

Rebecca Kilgore: A Little Taste: A Tribute to Dave Frishberg (2023 [2024], Cherry Pie Music): Standards singer, b. 1949, one of her first albums (1994) had her only backed by Frishberg on piano, a formula they repeated several times since. Discogs says she "retired from performing in 2024 after being diagnosed with dementia with Lewy Bodies," so this looks like it could be her last. In between, she mostly recorded with retro swing and trad jazz artists, especially for Arbors, where she always seemed right at home. I should check out what I've missed. She gets more backing here, including some strings, and limits herself to 11 songs (38:22), but she sounds fine, and the late pianist's songs are as witty as ever, even without his sly drawl. B+(***) [cd]

Lady Gaga: Harlequin (2024, Interscope): Tie-in to the Todd Phillips movie, Joker: Folie à Deux, which she co-stars in (as Harleen "Lee" Quinzel) and wrote the soundtrack for. I don't know how much of this features in the film: one of two originals is "The Joker," but the rest are standards (some with added Stefani Germanotta credits), which suggests continuity from her Tony Bennett duet albums. They are splashy, but not especially interesting. B+(*) [sp]

Brian Lynch: 7X7BY7 (2021 [2024], Holistic MusicWorks): Trumpet player, started mainstream but moved quickly into Latin jazz, especially once he joined Eddie Palmieri. Septet here is a good example of that, with Craig Handy (tenor sax), Alex Wintz (guitar), Luis Perdomo (piano), bass, drums, and percussion. B+(***) [cd]

Lyrics Born: Goodbye, Sticky Rice (2024, Mobile Home): Rapper Tom Shimura, originally from Tokyo but grew up in Salt Lake City and Berkeley, started as half of Latyrx, has a superb string of albums going, with an exuberant beat and extra vocals that appeal to me the same way Parliament did in the 1970s. He's billed this as his "final album." At 52, he may feel he's "cooked," but even if this feels offhanded, he's still got a lot going on. A- [sp]

JD McPherson: Nite Owls (2024, New West): Singer-songwriter, guitarist from Oklahoma, country roots, favors rockabilly, fifth album since 2012, includes a Duane Eddy nod. B+(**) [sp]

Willie Nelson: Last Leaf on the Tree (2024, Legacy): Ninety now, second album this year, 76th "solo studio album" (per Wikipedia), son Micah Nelson produced and co-wrote the one new original (a cover of an older Nelson song is a hidden track). Title from one of two Tom Waits covers. Production is spare and laid back, which suits him fine (not that all the songs hold up). B+(**) [sp]

Outer Spaceways Incorporated: Kronos Quartet & Friends Meet Sun Ra (2024, Red Hot +): Discogs files under Kronos Quartet, but they don't seem to play on all of the tracks, while numerous "friends" come and go. The label has been producing various artists specials going back to their initial 1990 AIDS benefit (Red Hot + Blue), including a couple tied to the music of Sun Ra. Some interesting stuff here, including Laurie Anderson and Jlin, but it can get pretty scattered. B+(**) [sp]

Cene Resnik/Samo Salamon/Samuel Ber: The Thinkers (2023 [2024], Samo): Tenor sax/guitar/drums trio, the former from the group Siddharta (1999-2007), like Salomon from Slovenia. B+(***) [bc]

Kevin Sun: Quartets (2022-23 [2024], Endectomorph Music, 2CD): Tenor saxophonist, debut a Trio in 2018, has chops plus a deep understanding of sax lore. Two sets here, both with bassist Walter Stinson, one with Dana Saul (piano) and Matt Honor (drums), the other with Christian Li (piano) and Kayvon Gordon (drums). He's impressive here, but stretched a bit thin. B+(***) [cd]

Western Jazz Collective: The Music of Andrew Rathbun (2021 [2024], Origin): Rathbun is a tenor/soprano saxophonist who's been kicking around since his 2000 debut, and he's part of this septet (plus guest), the "Western" hailing from Western Michigan University (Kalamazoo, MI). B+(**) [cd]

Tucker Zimmerman: Dance of Love (2024, 4AD): Singer-songwriter, b. 1941 in Sonoma County, California, debut album Ten Songs in 1969, more through 1983, with a couple revivals since. I'd never heard of him, but evidently David Bowie was a fan, as is Adrienne Lenker, whose Big Thief backs him here, with perfectly unobtrusive music he can talk or sing over, with Lenker and Marie Claire backing. A- [sp]

Recent reissues, compilations, and vault discoveries:

Black Artist Group: For Peace and Liberty: In Paris, Dec 1972 (1972 [2024], WeWantSounds): Avant-jazz group from St. Louis, 1968-72, aka BAG, just one live album before this tape surfaced. Quintet with three members who later became well-known: Oliver Lake (alto sax), Baikida Carroll (trumpet), Joseph Bowie (trombone), Ron LeFlore (trumpet), Charles Shaw (percussion). B+(***) [sp]

Old music:

Steve Coleman Group: Motherland Pulse (1985, JMT): Alto saxophonist, originally from Chicago, moved to New York in 1978, worked in big bands (Thad Jones/Mel Lewis, Sam Rivers) and joined Dave Holland's Quintet, with this his first album as leader, an adventurous slab of postbop maneuvers. With Geri Allen (piano), Lonnie Plaxico (bass), and Marvin Smith (drums), plus Graham Haynes (trumpet) on two tracks, and a Cassandra Wilson vocal (possibly the album's high point). B+(***) [yt]

Steve Coleman and Five Elements: The Sonic Language of Myth: Believing, Learning, Knowing (1999, RCA Victor): "Five Elements" has been Coleman's most common group name since 1986, with 23 albums to date, but the lineups have varied -- it would be nice to have one of those Wikipedia-style timelines to plot it all out. Aside from the alto sax, the core group here is Anthony Tidd (electric bass), Sean Rickman (drums), and Miguel "Anga" Diaz (percussion), although only Coleman plays on all tracks, and many others join in on various tracks, including tenor sax (Ravi Coltrane and Craig Handy), trumpet (Ralph Alessi and Shane Endsley), piano (Vijay Iyer and Jason Moran), strings, and vocals. B+(***) [yt]

Steve Coleman and Five Elements: Drop Kick (1992, RCA/Novus): Mostly riffing over funk beats, mostly from Reggie Washington (electric bass) and Marvin "Smitty" Smith (drums), some with James Weidman (piano/keyboards) and/or Michael Wimberly (percussion), and an alternate bass/drums combo on three. Guest spots include Lance Bryant (tenor sax), Grgeg Osby (alto sax), Don Byron (clarinet/bass clarinet), and Cassandra Wilson (vocals). B+(*) [sp]

Steve Coleman and the Mystic Rhythm Society: Myths, Modes and Means (1995, Groovetown/RCA/BMG France): The first of three CDs with the same cover logo: "Recorded Live at the Hot Brass, 24-29 March, 1995." With Ralph Alessi (trumpet) for a second horn, two name keyboard players (Vijay Iyer and Andy Milne), funk rhythm and a few exotic instruments (like Miya Masaoka's koto) and dancers. B+(**) [sp]

Steve Coleman and Metrics: The Way of the Cipher (1995, Groovetown/RCA/BMG France): Same cover sticker: "Recorded Live at the Hot Brass, 24-29 March, 1995." Band is pretty much the same (just Andy Milne on keyboards), but this time features rappers (Black Indian, Kokayi, Sub Zero). B+(**) [sp]

Steve Coleman: Invisible Paths: First Scattering (2007, Tzadik): Alto saxophonist, solo album, pretty long at 71 minutes (16 pieces). B+(*) [sp]

Rebecca Kilgore and Dave Frishberg: Not a Care in the World (1995, Arbors): Standards singer, her second album with the pianist backing, this one adding Dan Faehnle on guitar for 10 (of 17) tracks (none by Frishberg, but you get "South American Way" and a Jobim), ending with a delightful version of "The Glow-Worm." B+(**) [sp]

Rebecca Kilgore & Dave Frishberg: The Starlit Hour (1997 [2001], Arbors): Just voice and piano, some applause, I'm not seeing song credits but they're pretty standard. B+(***) [r]

Rebecca Kilgore: Moments Like This (1998-99 [2001], HeavyWood Music): Standards singer, backed by Randy Porter (piano), Scott Steed (bass), and Neil Masson (drums). B+(**) [sp]

Rebecca Kilgore and the Bobby Gordon Trio: Make Someone Happy: A Further Remembrance of Maxine Sullivan, Volume Two (2004 [2005], Audiophile): Follows her 2001 album, Harlem Butterfly: A Remembrance of Maxine Sullivan, also recorded with Gordon (clarinet), Chris Dawson (piano), and Hal Smith (drums). Sullivan (1911-87) was a delightful singer, but I've only sampled her lightly, and have no sense of her repertoire, and tend to focus on the standards everybody's done. Kilgore does a superb job with them, and I really enjoy the clarinet. A- [sp]

Rebecca Kilgore: Rebecca Kilgore's Lovefest at the Pizzarelli Party (2010, Arbors): With guitarist Bucky Pizzarelli, his sone John (guitar) and Martin (bass), and some others: Larry Fuller (piano), Aaron Weinstein (violin), Harry Allen (tenor sax), and Tony Tedesco (drums). B+(**) [r]

Rebecca Kilgore: With Hal Smith's Rhythmakers (2015, Audiophile): Smith is a trad jazz drummer, from Arkansas, side credits from 1972 with many notable bands, leader of his own since 1984, with at least two previous albums featuring singer Kilgore. B+(*) [r]

Rebecca Kilgore With Hal Smith's Rhythmakers: Sings the Music of Fats Waller (2016, Audiophile): The drummer's group is well suited for a Waller program, with Chris Dawson (piano) and Clint Baker (banjo) for rhythm, and all the right horns: clarinet (Bobby Gordon), cornet (Marc Caparone), trombone (Alan Adams), and alto sax (John Otto). B+(***) [sp]


Unpacking: Found in the mail last week:

  • Michaël Attias: Quartet Music Vol. I: LuMiSong (Out of Your Head) [03-01]

Ask a question, or send a comment.

Monday, November 11, 2024


Speaking of Which

Draft file opened 2024-11-06 2:00 PM. Finally posted 2024-11-11 10:00 PM. Added a couple small bits on 2024-11-12.

Also added a few more bits, all the way up to 2024-11-18, but I swear, that's the end of it.These later bits have green change bars, as opposed to red for the earlier adds.

Sections:

Trump won. I don't know why. I cannot fathom why anyone, much less an outright majority of voting Americans, could stand him, or could in any way identify with him, let alone entrust him with great power. It is not inconceivable to me that this result was rigged, with every voting machine in the country shaving several points in his favor -- and that all the election denial hoopla of 2020 was just misdirection, while they worked on perfecting the software.

Or, I suppose, it's possible that a thin majority of the American people have become so soul-deadened, demented, and/or deranged that they wish nothing more than to inflict this guy on the rest of us. In which case, the obvious answer is "to dissolve the people and elect another." The phrase comes from a Bertolt Brecht poem, a bit of Communist Party humor, not really applicable here, but it does convey the disconnect when you realize that the people you got are not the ones you imagined or hoped for. We need better politicians, but we also need to become better people, not least to stop them from the temptation to gaslight us.

Personally, I was delighted when Kamala Harris ran away with the Democratic nomination. I didn't think of her in terms of categories or attributes, and was always annoyed when people brought up "first woman," etc., like some kind of milestone. She just seemed like a generic American -- at least in the America I know, which includes many years of living in Kansas, as well as some in New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts. I knew that she wasn't a leftist, that she was a shrewd and calculating politician, and that she circulated easily among friends in high places. But she seemed personable and relatable, flexible, nimble, like someone who could recognize problems and try to do things to fix them. She seemed much better to me than her predecessors (going back at least to 1992).

Besides, I'm old enough that I'm no longer enamored of utopia, nor patient for the long struggle, so I wasn't inclined to criticize. Surely, I figured, she must know what she's doing? And if not, if she blew it, we could unload on her then. But why give Trump any comfort from division. He was such a clear and present evil -- a word I normally abjure, but why beat around the bush here? -- that nothing could budge my vote from Harris. And now, like Hillary Clinton, and unlike -- no matter how little regard you have for him, Joe Biden -- she has committed the unpardonable sin of losing to Trump.

Still, as I'm writing this intro, I don't feel like tearing into her campaign or other shortcomings. As I collect links, I'm sure I will nitpick here and there. But it's still hard for me to see why she lost, or what else she could have done about it. That wasn't the case with Hillary Clinton: her faults, both personal and political, were obvious from the start, and the sanctimonious scapegoating for her loss only heightened her flaws. I could reconcile myself with the theory that Americans had candidates they disliked, but could only vote one of them off the island, and they chose her, because they knew her better. Surely, this year those same voters would dispatch Trump? Even as his polls held up, I expected a last gasp break toward sanity.

That it didn't happen suggests a much deeper problem, which brings us back to the voters. Or should, if I could figure it out. The one thing I'm pretty sure of is that America has been in some kind of moral decline since approximately when I was born -- in 1950, the week before Chinese volunteers entered the Korean War and reversed the American advance, forcing a stalemate, which American sore losers still refuse to accept. Sure, Americans committed many sins before I was born, but we could aim for better, and teach our children to make a better world. The Hays Office made sure that the good guys wore white hats, and triumphed in the end. I certainly grew up believing in all that, seriously enough that when events proved otherwise, I protected my ideals by turning against the actual America. But what I never lost was the notion that in the end, it will all turn out well.

We may not be at the end yet, but Trump sure seems like a serious turn for the worse. He's four years older than I am, but came from a completely different class and culture, and at each step along the way he had different reactions and made different choices, always breaking bad, which sometimes meant embracing deteriorating social morality, and often accelerating it. Oddly enough, he's the one who poses as a pious patriot. Stranger still, lots of people believe him, perhaps because he allows them to indulge their own vile impulses.

As far as I can tell, there are two types of Trump voter. On the one hand, there are people who actually like him, who get off on his arrogance and nastiness, and who like to see other people hurt. (I've previously noted two types of Christians: those who hope to help their fellows, and those who are more focused on consigning those they disapprove of to hell. Trump is practically a messiah for the latter group.) The second type are party-liners, who will always vote Republican, no matter how much they may disapprove of the candidate. The two groups overlap, but each group extends the other, nudging a minority up toward 50%.

Elite Republicans may not love Trump, but they'll do anything to win -- their whole graft depends on it -- so they go along, figuring they can control the damage (as well as profit from it). This is much like the conservatives in Weimar Germany figuring they can control Hitler -- meanwhile, Trump resembles Hitler at least in his political pitch (his ability to rouse the passions of people for whom economic conservatism has little appeal). Such fascism analogies resonate for some people, especially on the left, who know the history, but are meaningless to those who don't -- most Trump voters, although he seems to have some staff who revel in it, as they keep sending dog whistles, not least to provoke charges that never seem to work.

There is a certain genius to Trump/Republican politics, in how they've manage to flip attacks into accolades: charges that would discredit any normal candidate only seem to make Trump stronger, and that rubs off on the rest of the Republicans. The key element here has been the extraordinary success of partisan broadcasting, keyed to fear, flattery, and rage: the net effect has been to sow distrust and deny credibility to anything Democrats say or do, while championing Republicans as defenders of true America. The result is a tribe that has come to reject facts, reason, and/or any hint of moral purpose: all are rejected as tools of the devil.

Trump adds very little of substance to this toxic infosystem, but he does offer some kind of charisma or style, and disinhibition (which passes for candor if you buy it, or cluelessness if you don't), and serves as a lightning rod for attacks that only confirm the bond between him and his fans. This can be very confusing for all who are immune to or wary of his charms: his appeal makes no sense to us, and meaningful response is nearly impossible. On the other hand, they counter with the same logic and even more fervor, making even less sense to us. The double standards are mind-boggling. For example, one might try making a case that Trump has been unfairly targeted by prosecutors, but how do you square that with his threats to do much more of the same, and the "lock her up" chants?

But it's not just that Trump Republicans are easily deluded and controlled by their media. That feat is built on top of much deeper social trends that go back at least to the 1940s, with the founding of the military-industrial complex and the extension of American hegemony to serve global capitalism, with its attendant red scares, both foreign and domestic. Americans had an idealized picture of themselves coming out of WWII, which made the world Trump and I grew up in. But the task of protecting capital turned into nasty business, and we started to divide into one camp that relished the fight, and another appalled by it. We started seeing films where bad guys were recruited to do dirty work for supposedly good guys, who turned bad themselves. Before long, American presidents were ordering assassinations, kidnapping, and torture. Trump started out with his Nazi-symp father, his apprenticeship under Roy Cohn, and his mobster connections. He fit right in. He only had to wait until America became rotten enough to embrace him. Bush's Global War on Terror made that possible.

Well, the other part of the equation is the rise of the super rich, made possible by the ideological attack on the notion of public interest, and by the assertion of "greed is good," and the general belief that "might makes right" (i.e., anything you can get away with is fine). The richer the supers got, the more they leveraged their wealth through lobbies, PR firms, donations, and media to turn government to do their bidding, further increasing their wealth. They usually rented their spokesmen, but Trump, having personified great wealth on TV, gave them a new angle: he could have it both ways, claiming their authority while pretending to be free of their influence.

I'm not sure how much of the election any of this explains, although it may help explain why Democratic attack ads don't seem to be drawing any blood. As with Republican attack ads, they may do nothing more than confirm one's own virtues (or vices if that's your thing). But it does make one wonder if raising money isn't overrated.

We could, of course, look into the many ways Democrats have contributed to their downfall. The losers are always quick with thoughts, so a fair number of them will show up in links below. I may have more to say on this below, but for here I'll pass, except to point out a couple of fundamental dynamics:

  1. There is a deep divide and conflict within Democratic ranks, between corporate/neoliberal and populist/democratic tendencies; they both share a fear of the right but are deeply distrustful of each other. That produces acrimony, as you'll see below.

  2. Democrats are subject to higher expectations than Republicans. Democrats are expected not just to win elections, but to address issues successfully, and are held accountable for any failures. Republicans only have to win, and there are few strictures on how low they can go to win. When they do win, they can readily screw up, but are rarely held accountable.

  3. Democrats are also held to higher ethical and moral standards. Republicans may even embrace their own's misbehavior, while excoriating Democrats for the same faults. (Thus, for instance, Hillary Clinton is horribly corrupt, but Donald Trump is just a rogueish businessman.)

  4. Democrats believe in public service, in representing all people, and as such they credit Republicans with legitimacy where Republicans deny any to Democrats, and seek to cripple them wherever possible. Republicans see politics as a zero-sum game.

The net effect is that Democrats campaign at a severe handicap. Republicans can lie, cheat, and steal, but Democrats can't -- and in many cases don't even know how. Democrats want to be liked, even by Republicans (and especially by the rich), so they are careful not to offend. (Even so, a casual reference to "garbage" gets blown up sky high, while Republican references to "vermin" get laughed away.) Republicans can exaggerate for effect, while Democrats pull their punches, and that muddies their messages. Democrats cede critical ground in arguments, seemingly legitimizing Republican stands, which only become more extreme. The media love loud and brusque, so they lap it up, amplify it, spread it everywhere, dispensing with reason and nuance, and especially reality (the most boring subject of all).

Then there are structural factors. America is divided into states, districts, precincts, all of which can be gerrymandered, as Republicans were quick to turn to their advantage. The Senate is grossly undemocratic, and the filibuster there has made it impossible for Democrats to pass meaningful reforms, even on the rare occasions when they seem to have majority power. The Republicans have packed the courts, which they're increasingly using to restrict executive power by Democrats, and to increase it by Republicans. Many judges are protected from any oversight by lifetime appointments. Many reforms, as well as redress by impeachment, require supermajorities, which Republicans use to lock themselves in power, even if they lose popular support. (Orban's system in Hungary has made extensive use of this, and is widely cited by Republicans as a model for America -- although in may have originated here, much like Nazi, South African, and Israeli race laws drew on American precedents.)

But the biggest structural problem of all is money. Republicans worship it -- even poor ones are defined by their deference or indifference to great wealth -- and the rich thank them for their service. The single most certain prediction for a second Trump term is yet another round of tax cuts for the rich. Next up is another round of regulatory loopholes, give-aways, and subsidies to needy (or just greedy) businesses. Lobbyists took Washington in the 1980s, and have only grown ever since. Republicans run "revolving door" administrations where lobbyists are as likely to work for the government as against it. The net effect is that government is as likely to work against the public interest as for it.

Republicans love this, because it reinforces their message that government is inefficient, wasteful, and useless, and should be shrunk (and ultimately "drowned in the bathtub"), except they never actually do that, at least as long as they can use it to feed their political machine.[*] While this is mostly done with money, Republicans are also looking forward to using their power in other ways: in turning the civil service into a patronage system for political operatives; in aligning information services with their political messaging; and in using coercive powers to suppress heresy and dissent, to punish their enemies, and to empower (or at least pardon) their allies.

When Democrats talk so piously and nebulously about the "death of democracy," this is what they are actually referring to. Only it's not a future threat, something that might be avoided if only enough people would vote for a Harris, a Biden, a Clinton, an Obama. It's been happening for a long time -- I used to see 1980 (Reagan) as the turning point, but now that I see it less in policy terms than as a mental disorder, I see much more originality and continuity in Nixon (which has the advantage of making Johnson's Vietnam the breaking point -- it certainly was what turned my own life upside down -- instead of the nascently-Reaganesque Carter). Maybe with Trump redux, Democrats will finally realize that they have to fight back, and stop trying to pass themselves off as some kind of prophylactic, a thin barrier to limit the contagion.

Which brings us back to money. As I said, Republicans worship it. But so do Democrats: maybe not all of them, but virtually all of the kind that run for higher office, because the system is rigged so that only those with access to money can run serious campaigns. (Bernie Sanders is the exception here, and he did come up with a novel system of small donor support, but when he came to be viewed as a threat, big donors dumped tons of money -- Michael Bloomberg more than $500M; compare that to the $28M he spent this year for Harris against Trump -- to quash his campaign.) Harris is no exception here. She raised more money than any Democrat -- or Republican for that matter -- ever. And she lost. So maybe money isn't the answer?

I'm not going to try to tell you what Democrats should do instead, but maybe they should start by waking up and looking at the real world we're living in, a world that they are at least in some substantial part responsible for creating. And that means they need to re-examine their worship of money. There's much more that can be said about this, but I've droned on long enough. I should leave it here.

[*] That machine, by the way, is a thing of wonder, which I don't think has ever been fully dissected, although there is a lot of literature on various aspects of it. If Machiavelli were here, he would write a letter offering advice on how an aspiring young Republican could rise to a position of great power and influence. (As Gramsci noted, real princes didn't need such guidance. The point of the book was to expose their machinations to those with no such experiences.) This would not only lay out the topography of institutions, but the networking, the lexicon of coded language, the spin, and ultimately the psychology of why anyone would want to be a Republican in the first place -- something I still find incredibly alien even though I often take great pains to try to understand others in their own terms.


As of Saturday afternoon, I have 144 links, 15438 words. I was planning on not posting until Monday, so I have time to make another round or two, but I have enough feedback on the election to offer a few bits of speculation about the future. I put little stock in them, given how poorly my predictions have held up. But I can hedge a bit by offering a couple of alternatives.

On several occasions, notably 1992 for the Republicans, and 2016 for the Democrats, incumbent parties seem to have felt permanently entitled to the presidency, and took their defeats bitterly, lashing out blindly. The level of vitriol Republicans directed at Bill Clinton after 1992 was almost unprecedented in the never-very-polite lore of American politics, and set a pattern that they repeated after 2008 and 2020 (arguably the most over-the-top, but by then their character was expected, and the sore loser took personal charge of the rage).

While Democrats didn't behave that atrociously after 2016, when pretty much everyone expected Hillary Clinton to easily defeat Donald Trump, her followers reacted with dismay and a massive round of accusations and scapegoating -- especially directed at Russia, although there were many other factors at work, including how distasteful and provocative Trump was, and that Clinton supporters still had a chip on their shoulders over the strong Bernie Sanders challenge to what organization Democrats expected to be a cakewalk.

Democrats' opinion of Trump has only sunk lower with four years in power and four years plotting his comeback. But so far, reaction has been mild, other than the inevitable shock and sadness. Trump's margin has been sufficient that it's hard to doubt his win. And while Harris seemed promising at the Convention, that may have largely been relief that Biden was out, the assumption that his administration had a good story that was simply poorly communicated, and the pretty conviction belief that Trump was such damaged goods that most Americans would be glad to be rid of him. But it was never really love for Harris, who's proved to be an easy (and rarely defended) target for post-mortems. This also suggests that we misread Trump -- that our loathing of him isn't shared by enough Americans to beat him -- so maybe this isn't a good time to go ballistic on him (as we did in 2016).

Trump's margin opens one new possibility that we haven't considered, which is that if he governed competently, he could actually consolidate his power and become regarded as a significant American president. Admittedly, we have no reason to expect this. His first term was a disaster of unfathomable dimensions. He's spent most of the four years since scrambling to stay out of jail. And his campaign theme has been redemption and revenge. If he attempts to put into practice even a significant share of what he campaigned on, evaluations of his legacy should sink as far below the scale of American presidents as Caligula and Ivan the Terrible.

But will he? I wouldn't bet against it, but it's just possible that having won, as ugly as that whole campaign has been, he'll change course. I don't mean to suggest that he won't be as bad as his voters want him to be on signature issues like immigration. But now that he's president, why should he adopt austerity budgets and demolish services, just to prove that government doesn't work. If he does that, he'll be blamed, and if he doesn't, he'll reap the credit. Plus the whole Fox machine is behind him, so who's going to complain? Certainly not the Democrats, who are always ready to help a Republican president do a good deed. (Remember when they foolishly thought "No Child Left Behind" would better fund education?) He's promised a better ACA. Why not rebrand it like he did with NAFTA, adding a couple tweaks that most Democrats can get behind, and magically turning it into the Republican program it always was? He'd be a hero, whereas had he done any of Paul Ryan's plans, he'd be a goat.

The big difference between Trump now and then isn't just that he has some experience to learn from, but that this time he gets to pick his own staff. In 2016, he left that mostly to Pence and Priebus, who saddled him with a bunch of assholes even he couldn't stand, including the so-called "adults in the room." This could, as most of us feared, be for the worse, but Trump was always hemmed in by regular Republicans, ranging from the Koch-controlled Ryan to the Blob-heads in the national security racket. One big reason he won the 2016 primaries was that he disagreed with hardcore economic orthodoxy. But as a neophyte Republican, he got stuck with a bunch of crooked, deranged incompetents, and their rot killed his whole administration. Granted, he wasn't smart enough to figure it out in real time, and he may still not be, but the new crew were competent enough to run a winning campaign this time. We shouldn't exclude the possibility that they're competent enough to manage him, or to let him manage, some level of competency. For which he'll handle the PR, as that's his thing, and it will probably be more hideous than the actual administration, which above all else has to keep business booming and profits soaring.

One area where he has a mandate and some real power to act is foreign policy, where Biden has been utterly disastrous. It's well past time to settle the Ukraine War, which needs a bit more art and tact than he's shown so far, but is doable without looking like too much of a surrender to Putin (but if the Democrats scream treason, that'll probably make it more popular). The obvious deal there is status quo on the ground, and dial back sanctions as stability and security is ensured. The US actually needs a cooperative relationship with Russia, and that means undoing the sanctions. He needs to do that without looking like a Russian stooge, but Putin seems to be more sensitive to how Trump looks than Trump himself.

Israel is a different matter. He'll give Israel whatever they want, with no complaints or pretense of humanitarian concern. At some point, he'll broker a deal with Egypt, the Saudis, Syria (via Putin), and maybe even Iran, to send the rest of the Palestinians Israel hasn't killed already into permanent exile. Maybe he'll get Israel to concede Lebanon, and that will be the end of it. It's a horrible solution, but in some ways it'll be a blessing. The Democrats were just going to drag it out. [*]

I could go around the world, but in foreign policy, there is virtually nothing he can do (other than start a war, e.g. with China) that wouldn't be an improvement over Biden. In general, he'll depress trade and immigration, and disengage in the internal affairs of other countries. He could easily negotiate peace deals with North Korea, Iran, even Cuba and Venezuela. He doesn't care about human rights in those places. (Biden didn't either, but the pretense was killing.) BRICS will continue to grow, Europe will go its own way, and the American people will be just fine. (Maybe fewer cheap goods and less cheap labor, but nowhere near the scare levels that liberal economists like to predict.) If Democrats complain about this, they'll only dig themselves deeper graves. The era of American global hegemony is ending. Protracting it will only make a bad thing worse.

By the way, Vance is a creep, but he's much smarter, and much savvier both on foreign and domestic policy than Pence ever was. Plus, as the heir-apparent, he has incentives not to turn the administration into the dumpster fire that Pence left with. I could go on and on, but you should get the idea by now. Having shown he can win, legitimately (as these things go), Trump has little reason to destroy democracy. He could even build on the majority he already has. He faces two dangers: one is his own bad instincts; the other is the idiot nihilism of much of the Republican Party. But he owns that party now, and the rank-and-file are basically followers, controlled by the propaganda machine, and the apparatchiki are just hired hands: they do what they're told.

Again, I have very little confidence that Trump will do any of this -- even on Israel, where he will continue to do whatever Netanyahu wants, but Netanyahu is used to and even seems to like it being a forever war, so he may not press that hard.

So it's really just up to him. As for the Democrats, all they can do is react. It's hopeless for me to try to advise, as none of them are ready to listen. They first have to figure out who they are, who they want to represent, and what they want. But this game of conning both the donors and the voters is wearing awfully thin.

[*] I could add some caveats and nuance here, but the key point is that this is what the dominant political coalition of Israel actually wants, and that Trump, both by temperament and in light of his donor support network, is unlikely to offer any resistance to anything Israel demands -- even more so than Biden-Harris, who as Democrats felt the need to express humanitarian concerns and their commitment to democracy. Trump has no such concerns, and may even see the mass expulsion of Palestinians as an exemplary model for his own mass expulsion of "illegal immigrants." But any number of things could limit this "ethnic cleansing." I'll leave this to your imagination, assuming you have enough to see that public opinion all around the world will increasingly shift as Israel approaches genocide's "final solution" -- even in the US, which should be of some concern to Trump, although his first instinct will be to fight and suppress it. He will see it as an opportunity to break pro-Israel donors away from the Democratic Party, solidifying his support, but freeing Democrats from having to toady for Israel, as Harris did and paid for. But ultimately opinion could turn against Trump/Israel here. The tide could even turn in Israel as the costs of war and isolation mount. And a massive influx of Palestinian exiles will be welcome nowhere: the US and EU go without saying, but public opinion makes this a tough sell in the Arab autocracies, which could blow up under the strain -- and which have their own major financial pipeline to Trump (e.g., Kushner's billion dollar slush fund).

I think the most likely scenario is that Gaza is totally crushed and depopulated, but that Israel is pressured to dial back its apartheid and ethnic cleansing measures in the occupied areas (including parts of pre-1967 Israel, where Palestinians are 20% of the population, and have barely-nominal citizenship) to pre-October 2023 levels. But a wide range of scenarios are possible. While Trump's election strengthens Netanyahu, they are fighting a perilous uphill battle (against a world which has been inexorably decolonising ever since 1945), where they may well wind up just retreating into their fortress-castles. [**]

[**] MAGA is clearly such a retreat, on many fronts (e.g., they want to return to a world where stern fathers can spank naughty daughters). Most of their beliefs should be resisted, but their retreat from neoliberal/neoconservative foreign policy is overdue. The world has changed since WWII, when America extended its hegemony over the "free world" and set up its quasi-holy war against the enemies of capital. Most of the capital that American armed and propaganda forces so fiercely defend isn't even American any more, and what is isn't of much value to most actual Americans. (A precise accounting of that capital may depend on how you account for Elon Musk, who I'd argue is case proof that not all immigration is good). Moreover, America's defense of that capital has lost much of its effectiveness, as American soldiers have given up the fight (why risk ruining their lives for oil moguls?), as corruption has made the war machine prohibitively expensive, and as the world itself has become increasingly unconquerable. (Phrase comes from Jonathan Schell's 2003 book, The Unconquerable World.)

Neoliberals will accuse Trump et al. of "isolationism," because that's the slur they deployed against a previous generation of (mostly) Republicans, who were wary of their schemes for one world market, dominated by American capital, and regimented by American arms. Although the US rarely had much of a standing army before 1939, Americans were widely engaged in the world, mostly through trade, not insignificantly through missionary work, but only rarely through imperialist adventures (1898 counts, as does the subsequent "gunboat diplomacy"). This willingness to engage the world on fairly equitable terms, including the resistance to European imperialism announced in the Monroe Doctrine, the pursuit of Open Door Policy to break up imperial monopolies, and the "arsenal of democracy" which defeated the final campaigns of Germany and Japan: all this earned Americans considerable good will around the world, which America's post-WWII abuse of power has only turned into a "legacy of ashes" (to borrow the title of Tim Weiner's history of the CIA). While the "isolationist" taunt will impress subscribers of Foreign Policy, it's a spent term, a piece of liberal cant that will produce more backlash than agreement.

While the "defense Democrats" have been ascendant against Trump and for Biden, I can only hope they will be seen as bankrupt now, and that Democrats will revert to something more like Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy (a kinder, gentler redressing of Gunboat Diplomacy, not that it changed things much), and a renewed interest in the UN, which the neocons sought so hard to trash. Also, I do not expect Trump to be consistent here: even if his tendency is to withdraw, institutional support for militarism and world dominance remains strong, at least as much in the Republican Party as in the Democratic, and it's easy to play on his ego as "the leader of the free world," especially when all he has to do is to follow friendly bribes.


I woke up Monday morning with the thought that I could finally add a third intro here, where I talk about what Democrats should do now that they've been driven from national power. I always planned on a final chapter to my political book where I would offer what I saw as practical political advice to save the world. (Well, in some versions of that book, I tacked on an extra section, which would describe the dystopia that would ensue if Democrats fail and allow Republicans to do all they've wanted. That much, at least, I'll spare you spoilers for.) So I have given this subject a fair amount of thought, and if I had the time (and were still so inclined) I could write about this at considerable length. However, with Monday slipping away from me, and no desire whatsoever to face this file on Tuesday, I'll try to keep this very brief: some reflections and scattered tidbits, but no structure, and no cheerleading. I'm not trying to sell my advice. I'm just throwing it out there.

Monday evening, I find I haven't written this section, and no longer have time. I think I did make many of the points I've been thinking about under various articles, so I'll leave it to you to ferret them out. Anything involving money, credibility, and trust is likely to be relevant. The biggest problem Democrats have is that lots of people don't trust them -- on lots of things, including avoiding war. They have to figure out how to fix that. And funny thing, beating the Republicans at fundraising and at advertising and celebrity endorsements and "ground game" isn't doing the trick.

Why so many of those people trust Republicans instead is way beyond me, but there is considerable evidence that they do. There is also ample evidence that trust in Republicans is foolish and sometimes plain stupid, but until Democrats get their house in order, distrust in them takes precedence. One saving grace may be that most Americans really hate corruption, and they don't much care for incompetence either. Republicans are up to their necks in both. Now if you can just show them, you should be able to score points. But it's hard to do when you're corrupt and incompetent as well.

One thought I'm pretty sure I didn't get to yet concerns "woke." I think of it as something like satori, a state of mind that if you're lucky, you find yourself in through no discernible effort of your own. It's good to be woke, but only you can know that. What it is not is a license for an inquisition, which is how most of the anti-woke have been trained to view it. And it's not that they disapprove of inquisitions in general. It's just that they prefer their own.


Top story threads:

Election notes: Some general pieces here, then more specific ones on Trump (why he won, and how horrible that is) and Harris (why she lost, and who cares) following, then sections on the Senate (flipped R), House (undecided, but probably still R), and other issues below.

  • Washington Post: 2024 turnout is near the 2020 record. See how each state compares. I've seen references to a drop in voter turnout in 2024, especially relative to 2020, but this data shows a pretty close match, with 9 states posting new highs (44 year window). Trump won those states 5-4, with all of his wins in battleground states. Of 5 states with turnout under 55%, 4 were among Trump's biggest margin states (WV, AR, MS, OK), while the lowest one anywhere was Hawaii.

  • Zack Beauchamp:

    • [11-06] Donald Trump has won -- and American democracy is now in grave danger: "Trump's second term poses an existential threat to the republic. But there's still good reason for hope."

    • [11-06] The global trend that pushed Donald Trump to victory: "Incumbents everywhere are doing poorly. America just proved it's not exceptional." I still have, and haven't read, his book, so I know that this is his turf, and he likely has something interesting to say about the rest of the world -- something I, like most people, don't know a hell of a lot about -- but I don't see how this could possibly work: it just seems like another correlation pretending to be a cause. No need to deal with this now, but I will note one line: "Three different exit polls found that at least 70 percent of Americans were dissatisfied with the country's current direction, and they took it out on the current ruling party." Links in that line to the following:

  • William Bruno: [10-23] Why foreign policy is the biggest issue this November: "From Gaza to Ukraine, this election will have world-spanning consequences. Now more than ever, we need to push for an anti-war, anti-imperial foreign policy." This came out before the election, so its tactical advice, like "hold Harris accountable," is moot, but the core issues are certainly important.

  • Thomas Frank: [11-09] The elites had it coming. Of course, he's mostly talking about Democrats, although fellow traveler Dick Cheney gets as many nods as Barack Obama.

    Liberals had nine years to decipher Mr. Trump's appeal -- and they failed. The Democrats are a party of college graduates, as the whole world understands by now, of Ph.D.s and genius-grant winners and the best consultants money can buy. Mr. Trump is a con man straight out of Mark Twain; he will say anything, promise anything, do nothing. But his movement baffled the party of education and innovation. Their most brilliant minds couldn't figure him out.

  • Michelle Goldberg: [11-06] This is who we are now.

    Trump's first election felt like a fluke, a sick accident enabled by Democratic complacency. But this year, the forces of liberal pluralism and basic civic decency poured everything they could into the fight, and they lost not just the Electoral College but also quite likely the popular vote. The American electorate, knowing exactly who Trump is, chose him. This is, it turns out, who we are.

    So I expect the next few months to be a period of mourning rather than defiance. . . . But eventually, mourning either starts to fade or curdles into depression and despair. When and if it does, whatever resistance emerges to the new MAGA will differ from what came before. Gone will be the hope of vindicating the country from Trumpism, of rendering him an aberration. What's left is the more modest work of trying to ameliorate the suffering his government is going to visit on us. . . .

    Ultimately, Trump's one redeeming feature is his incompetence. If history is any guide, many of those he brings into government will come to despise him. He will not give people the economic relief they're craving. . . . We saw, with Covid, how Trump handled a major crisis, and there is not the slightest reason to believe he will perform any better in handling another. I have little doubt that many of those who voted for him will come to regret it. He could even end up discrediting bombastic right-wing nationalism the way George W. Bush -- whose re-election also broke my heart -- discredited neoconservatism.

    The question, if and when that happens, is how much of our system will still be standing, and whether Trump's opponents have built an alternative that can restore to people a sense of dignity and optimism. That will be the work of the next four years -- saving what we can and trying to imagine a tolerable future.

    One nit here is that no matter how discredited she thought neoconservatism was when Bush-Cheney departed, it still rules the roost, as Biden showed us with his disastrous cultivation of wars, and Harris underscored by welcoming Dick Cheney to her campaign. Even as some especially notorious individuals were put to pasture, the institutions supporting them remain unchecked and unexamined. I'm also less certain of Trump's incompetence. Much will depend on whether he hires competent people who can keep his trust without blundering. Sure, he did a very bad job of that during his first term.

  • Tyler Austin Harper: [11-06] What we just went through wasn't an election. It was a hostage situation. This seems about right:

    Heading into Tuesday's vote, a large majority of voters said that the country was on the wrong track and that they were disappointed with the candidates on offer. A plurality of voters said that regardless of who was elected, the next president would make things worse. Nearly 80 percent said the presidential campaigns did not make them proud of America.

    The blame for this grievous state of affairs lies with the Democratic and Republican Parties, both of which played a game of chicken with the electorate, relying on apocalyptic threats about the end of democracy to convince people that they had no choice but to vote as instructed. Both candidates offered up policies that were unpopular even among their supporters, serving a banquet for their donor classes while doling out junk food to their bases. For one candidate, that contemptuous strategy succeeded. But it fails the American people.

    For all his populist posturing, Mr. Trump put forward tax breaks that favor the wealthy, championed tariffs that would almost certainly raise grocery prices, bad-mouthed overtime pay, praised firing striking workers and largely stayed mum while his allies discussed destroying the Affordable Care Act. He insisted abortion be left up to the states even though most Americans, including many Republicans, think it should be legal everywhere, and pledged to oppose any new gun restrictions even though an overwhelming majority of Americans say they should be stricter.

    And what were Trump acolytes to be given in return for greenlighting this unpopular agenda? Elon Musk promised a period of economic pain. Tucker Carlson said Mr. Trump would bend the country over his knee and give it a "spanking." Why would any sign on? Because it was either that, they were told, or nuclear war under Ms. Harris. Some choice. . . .

    What we just went through was not an election; it was a hostage situation. Our major parties represent the interests of streaming magnates, the arms industry, oil barons, Bitcoin ghouls and Big Tobacco, often without even pretending to heed the needs of voters. A political system like that is fundamentally broken.

    I skipped over the corresponding list of indictments against Biden and Harris, which struck me as (relatively speaking) small potatoes, but most show that the inordinate influence of money isn't limited to Republicans. The first paragraph cites two pieces on the threat to "end democracy":

  • Doug Henwood: [11-08] It was always about inflation: "Simply put, Donald Trump owes his reelection to inflation and to the fact that the Biden administration did little to address the problem in a way that helped working-class families."

    I often say that the Democrats' political problem is that they're a party of capital that has to pretend otherwise for electoral purposes. This time they hardly even pretended. Kamala Harris preferred campaigning with the inexplicably famous mogul Mark Cuban and the ghoulish Liz Cheney to Shawn Fain, who led the United Auto Workers to the greatest strike victory in decades. Those associations telegraphed both her policy instincts and her demographic targeting: Silicon Valley and upscale suburbs.

    Like Hillary Clinton's 2016 campaign, the strategy failed, only worse. At least Clinton won the popular vote by almost three million. Harris even lost among suburban white women, a principal target of this twice-failed strategy.

  • Ed Kilgore:

    • [11-06] Americans wanted change and that meant Trump. There is something to this, but also several loads of bullshit:

      The simplest explanation, though, may be the most compelling: This was a classic "change" election in which the "out" party had an advantage that the governing party could not overcome. Yes, the outcome was in doubt because Democrats managed to replace a very unpopular incumbent with an interesting if untested successor, and also because the GOP chose a rival whose constant demonstration of his own unpopular traits threatened to take over the whole contest. In the end Trump normalized his crude and erratic character by endless repetition; reduced scrutiny of his lawless misconduct by denouncing critics and prosecutors alike as politically motivated; and convinced an awful lot of unhappy voters that he hated the same people and institutions they did.

      Nobody for a moment doubted that Trump would bring change. And indeed, his signature Make America Great Again slogan and message came to have a double meaning. Yes, for some it meant (as it did in 2016) a return to the allegedly all-American culture of the 20th century, with its traditional hierarchies; moral certainties and (for some) white male leadership. But for others MAGA meant very specifically referred to the perceived peace and prosperity of the pre-pandemic economy and society presided over, however turbulently, Trump. When Republicans gleefully asked swing voters if they were better off before Joe Biden became president, a veritable coalition of voters with recent and long-standing grievances over conditions in the country had as simple an answer as they did when Ronald Reagan used it to depose Jimmy Carter more than a half-century ago.

      The "better off" question is close to meaningless, as most people can't really tell, but as we've seen, are inclined to accept whatever their political orientation dictates. Unlike, say, the pandemic of 2020, or the financial meltdown of 2008, or the deflationary recession of 1980, or the great one of 1929-32 (is that what MAGA means?), there is little objective reason driving voters to change. Granted, there may be unease driven by slower, almost tectonic forces (like climate change), but few people think them through, and those who do tend to prefer orderly change over the kind of disruption Trump promises.

    • [11-09] Democrats lost because of their bad policies, not their bad attitude. I beg to differ, but both could have been better.

    • [11-12] Kamala Harris came much closer to winning than you think. The argument here is that the shift to Trump was less in the highly contested swing states than anywhere else (Harris topped Biden only in Colorado).

  • David Sirota: [11-07] Election 2024: How billionaires torpedoed democracy: "Both parties' 2024 campaigns claimed to be about 'saving democracy.' Yet both parties ended up bought and paid for by billionaires."

  • Jeffrey St Clair:

    • [11-06] Chronicle of a defeat foretold: "What does history repeat itself after it does farce?" He's very harsh on Harris here. One thing I find curious is an uncredited chart, which if I'm reading it right says that 24% of respondents think Democracy in the US is secure, vs. 74% threatened. Harris leads secure 59% to 39%, but trails in the larger threatened group, 46% to 53%. But isn't securing democracy supposed to be her issue? As an issue, it's nebulous enough that Trump was able to deflect it by claiming that Democrats were the real threat to democracy (after all, they're the ones rigging the polling and the voting!). Democrats could bring up fascism, but the response is simply, you're the real fascists, and who else really knows any better?

      This is an aside, but fits here as well as anywhere. I haven't found an article making this point so far, but could Kelly's fascism comments have been a plant? (Like one of Roger Stone's dirty tricks?) If Trump's operatives know that being charged with fascism will only solidify their support -- not because their supporters identify with fascism, but because they see it as stereotypically leftist infantile name-calling (unlike "libtard," which they know is just a joke). But mainstream Democrats generally shy away from such a loaded term, so how do you get someone like Harris to use it? You give her permission, by allowing her to quote someone like Kelly. This whole notion of "permission" is sick and pernicious. There's a quote somewhere about how the Cheney endorsements of Harris give Republicans permission to vote against Trump: it becomes something real Republicans can do without surrendering their identify. Harris may have had some doubt about "fascism," but she couldn't resist the Cheney honey trap, as she saw it as a way to steal some significant slice of Republican votes, putting her over the top. I have no reason to believe that Kelly and the Cheneys were plants, other than that they precisely had that effect. That they did, of course, was Harris's gaffe (and yeah, I'm following Kinsley rules here, otherwise I would have said "blunder").

    • [11-08] The crack-up. Title from F Scott Fitzgerald. Selected bits:

      • This "white wave" electorate didn't reject progressive ideas; they rejected the candidate who failed to advocate them for fear of alienating Big Tech execs and Wall Street financiers. Voters in both Alaska and Missouri approve increasing the minimum wage to $15. Voters approved paid sick leave in Alaska, Missouri and Nebraska. Voters in Oregon approved a measure protecting marijuana workers' right to unionize. Alaska voters banned anti-union captive audience meetings. Arizona voters rejected a measure that lowered the minimum wage for tipped workers. Massachusetts approved the right of rideshare workers to organize for collective bargaining. New Orleans voters approved a Workers Bill of Rights. Voters in Arizona, Colorado, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, Nevada and New York approved measures granting a state constitutional right to abortion.

      • Harris lost the popular vote by five million votes. Jill Stein only garnered 642,000 votes, just 25,000 more than RFK, Jr., who'd long since withdrawn. In no state did Stein get enough votes to cost Harris the state. Good luck blaming the Greens (which says much about the politically emaciated condition of the Greens). Even in Wisconsin (where Harris lost by only 31,000 votes), Stein, who captured only 12,666 votes, didn't fare well enough to be blamed (or credited) for costing Harris the state. In Pennsylvania, Harris lost by 165,000 votes. Stein collected only 33,591 votes. In Michigan, where Stein had her best showing in a battleground state, winning 44,648 votes (0.8%), Harris lost to Trump by 82,000 votes.

      • Murtaza Hussain: "Suppressing the Bernie movement in 2016 effectively destroyed the Democratic Party. That was a turning point year GOP also had an insurgency with Trump but they ultimately worked with him to some new kind of synthesis. The Democrats never got past their decrepit ancien regime."

      • Some of you may remember that it was the Obama brain trust, irritated at Trump's role in promoting the birther conspiracy, who worked feverishly in 2011 to make Trump the face of the post-Tea Party GOP. Obama's former campaign manager and policy guru, David Plouffe later explained the thinking: "Let's lean into Trump here. That'll be good for us." That worked out about as well for the Democratic base as the bank bailouts.

    • By the way, St Clair also wrote The wolf at the door, which is a fund drive piece, but also a history of a publication that's still bristling with anger 30 years after inception. There's not just a lot to be angry about today, but much more coming down the pike. Be sure of that.

  • Freddy Brewster: [11-05] Leonard Leo's dark money web is sowing election day chaos.

  • Israel/Palestine considerations:

  • International reaction:

Trump:

  • Peter Baker: [11-06] 'Trump's America': Comeback victory signals a different kind of country: "In the end, Donald J. Trump is not the historical aberration some thought he was, but instead a transformational force reshaping the modern United States in his own image." This piece came out immediately after the election was called, showing once again that no one beats the New York Times when it comes to sucking up to those in power.

  • Walden Bello: [11-07] How did I "predict" that Trump, despite his repulsive persona and politics, would prevail? "Democratic Party leadership has been discredited and there's room for new progressive leaders to take the helm."

  • Jamelle Bouie: [11-09] What do Trump voters know about the future he has planned for them? Not much, partly because they don't believe what he says, and they believe even less what Democrats say he says. At some point in this post I should quote something Jeffrey St Clair wrote recently: [10-25]

    More than half of Trump's supporters don't believe he'll actually do many of the things he claims he'll do (mass deportations, siccing the military on domestic protesters and political rivals), while more than half of Harris's supporters hope she'll implement many of the policies (end the genocide/single-payer) she claims she won't. And that pretty much sums up this election.

    What we should add to St Clair's observation is that the Trump understanding was much more credible than the Harris take. Trump lies all the time, sometimes just to provoke a reaction. Harris, well, doesn't have Trump's track record, but she's a politician, and how far do you trust politicians, especially to do the right thing?

  • John Cassidy: [11-11] Donald Trump's victory and the politics of inflation: "Joe Biden's strong record on jobs and Kamala Harris's vow to reduce the cost of living couldn't prevent the Democrats from succumbing to a global anti-incumbency wave." One thing that bothers me in virtually every article this week that even mentions inflation is that no one seems to have a clear understanding of what it is, of how it works, of what is bad (and in some cases good) about it, of what can and should be done about it. I can't do it justice here, but I do want to stress one point: it creates both winners and losers. Good government policy would try to limit the winners (perhaps by taxing off their windfall) and to compensate the losers (the "cola" in Social Security is one example of this). The press seem to buy the notion that it is an always bad, which mostly means that they are carrying water for the side that wants less inflation (e.g., for bankers, which is largely why the Fed is so hawkish against inflation). I wouldn't say that there was no real inflation coming out of the pandemic: I suspect that some inflation was inevitable, but the winners and losers (and therefore who felt the pain, and who needed help) were largely determined by pricing power, which has been tilted against workers and consumers for some time, but became more acute when inflation was added to the mix. Policies limiting monopolies and price gouging would have helped, but Biden and Harris got little credit for them, even from supposedly liberal economists. Trump offered nothing but an outlet for rage. Why anyone thought that might be any kind of solution is way beyond me, but according to polls, many people did. They were deceived. Whether they ever learn from such mistakes remains to be seen.

  • Jelani Cobb: [11-07] 2016 and 2024: "We will be a fundamentally different country by the end of the next Administration." Indeed, we already are.

  • Ed Coper: [11-08] White noise: why hatred of Donald Trump fuels his success as much as his supporters' love: "A network of organised disinformation sows doubt, kills policy reform and keep us ad adds as we debate Trump-mania." Some misdirection in his first paragraph:

    Historians will long scratch their heads that a Republican candidate who -- despite an inability to string a coherent sentence together, being grossly underqualified and rife with extramarital affairs -- would go on to not only win election but become one of the most popular presidents in US history.

    Turns out the subject here was Warren Harding, elected president in a 1920 landslide. How it advances an understanding of Trump isn't clear, but even stranger stories ensue.

  • David Corn:

    • [11-04] Trump and his voters: they like the lying: "He's a con man whose deceptions and hypocrisies are easy to detect. The question won't fade: How does he get away with it?" "Trump is demonstrating that he does not play by the rules of the establishment that these people perceive (for an assortment of reasons) as the enemy."

    • [11-06] America meets its judgment day: "Trump's victory signals a national embrace of the politics of hate and a possible fascist future."

  • Ben Davis: [11-09] None of the conventional explanations for Trump's victory stand up to scrutiny: "This election has blown a hole in the worldviews of both leftists and centrists. The pandemic may be a more important factor." This piece covers a lot of ground, quite sensibly. The section on Covid is really about something else:

    I propose a different explanation than inflation qua inflation: the Covid welfare state and its collapse. The massive, almost overnight expansion of the social safety net and its rapid, almost overnight rollback are materially one of the biggest policy changes in American history. For a brief period, and for the first time in history, Americans had a robust safety net: strong protections for workers and tenants, extremely generous unemployment benefits, rent control and direct cash transfers from the American government.

    Despite the trauma and death of Covid and the isolation of lockdowns, from late 2020 to early 2021, Americans briefly experienced the freedom of social democracy. They had enough liquid money to plan long term and make spending decisions for their own pleasure rather than just to survive. They had the labor protections to look for the jobs they wanted rather than feel stuck in the jobs they had. At the end of Trump's term, the American standard of living and the amount of economic security and freedom Americans had was higher than when it started, and, with the loss of this expanded welfare state, it was worse when Biden left office, despite his real policy wins for workers and unions. This is why voters view Trump as a better shepherd of the economy.

    I've often thought that the Democrats took way too little credit for the first big pandemic relief bill, which Pelosi and Schumer largely wrote and pushed through, while Trump had to acquiesce because he was mostly worried about the falling stock market. The sunsetting made it palatable to Republicans, and made sense given that it was relief for an emergency. Democrats figured they could run on extending key parts of it, but did they? Not really. Worse than that, Trump claimed credit for the immediate effects, then blamed inflation on the act's largesse. Democrats were, once again, screwed coming and going, mostly for not following McConnell's formula of just letting the country go to hell, just so voters would blame the incumbent president.

  • David Dayen: [11-08] The triumphant return of corruption: "A look at the biggest stock gainers since Trump's election shows that paying tribute to the next president will have its benefits." He identifies several especially large gains, from outfits like MoneyLion (up 61%, "investors believe, correctly, that consumer protection, which made a comeback in the past four years, will be destroyed again"), CoreCivic (up 72%, a "private prison" company), GEO Group (up 61%, another "private prison" contractor), and Coinbase (up 41%, "the crypto exchange"). "We can get ready for four years of pay-to-play deals, corporate back-scratching, and a public unprotected from scam artists."

  • John Harris: [11-10] From Trump's victory, a simple, inescapable message: many people despise the left: "The tumult of social media and rightwing propaganda has successfully cast progressives as one judgmental, 'woke' mass." I don't doubt his point, but the examples mostly make me think that most of the people who "hate the left" have little if any idea what or whom the left is. That suggests some kind of communication problem, which makes most sense in the US, where we don't have our own party, and are often stuck under the dead carcass of a Democratic Party, whose leaders hate us as much as the right thinks it does. But there must be more to the story than that: some deep, dark psychological factors that are never really acknowledged and near impossible to dislodge There must be a literature researching this. We certainly have research on why people become fascists, which overlaps significantly with hating the left. On the other hand, my own study of history has shown that everything decent and valuable that has ever happened in America has its origin in the left. Why can't anyone else see that?

  • David Hearst: [11-07] Trump has a choice: Obliterate Palestine or end the war: Most likely he won't even think of it as a choice, but simply following the directions of his donors. The question is whether he can see the many downsides of doing so. He has several odd talents, but clear thinking and foresight aren't among them.

    Conventional wisdom has it that Trump 2.0 will be a disaster for Palestinians, because Trump 1.0 all but buried the Palestinian national cause.

    And it is indeed true that under Donald Trump's first term as president, the US was wholly guided by the Zionist religious right -- the real voice in his ear, either as donors or policymakers.

    Under Trump and his son-in-law adviser, Jared Kushner, Washington became a policy playground for the settler movement, with which the former US ambassador to Israel, David Friedman, was unashamedly aligned.

    Consequently, in his first term, Trump upended decades of policy by recognising Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and moving the US embassy there; he disenfranchised the Palestinian Authority by closing down the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) office in Washington; he allowed Israel to annex the Golan Heights; he pulled out of the nuclear accords with Iran; and he assassinated Qassem Soleimani, the most powerful Iranian general and diplomat in the region.

    Even more damaging for the Palestinian struggle for freedom was Trump's sponsorship of the Abraham Accords.

    This was -- and still is -- a serious attempt to pour concrete over the grave of the Palestinian cause, constructing in its place a superhighway of trade and contracts from the Gulf that would make Israel not just a regional superpower, but a vital portal to the wealth of the Gulf.

    This led directly to the Hamas revolt, and the Israeli reprisal, not just collect punishment but a systematic plan to render Gaza uninhabitable, so credit him there, too. As I noted in my intro, I expect he will simply cheer Netanyahu on to "finish the job." I don't think he has any idea what that entails, how it will look, and how it will reflect back on America, and on him personally. Nor do I think he cares. He's one of those guys who strictly lives in the present, trusting his instincts will never fail him.

    There is much more to this piece, including a concluding section on "Hope for the future," where he notes: "It may be that as Biden departs, we have seen the party's last Zionist leader. That in itself is of immense significance for Israel."

  • Murtaza Hussain: [11-06] Trump is eyeing Iran hawk Brian Hook as first foreign policy pick.

  • Lauren Markoe: [11-07] Who is Howard Lutnick? Trump transition team leader is a billionaire supporter of Jewish causes and Israel.

  • Michael Mechanic: [11-07] Why did Trump really win? It's simple, actually. "When the economy thrives while half of America struggles, something has got to give."

  • Lorrie Moore: [11-07] A fourth-rate entertainer, a third-rate businessman, and a two-time president: "The 2024 election, like the one in 2016, had the same nutty and vapid Donald Trump, the same retrograde gender politics, and the same result."

    He is a third-rate businessman and fourth-rate entertainer, a husband to fashion models, a wannabe standup comedian who cannot land a punch line but floats language out into the air, hoping it will cohere, then flare, though it usually wanders into vapor and fog. As with much current standup, it can get raunchy and crass, but the MAGA people accept this lack of dignity. I was struck with puzzled admiration at his forty minutes of quiet swaying to "Ave Maria." It was like performance art. He also did a skit at McDonald's and one in a garbage truck. He will do most anything to avoid talking about actual governing, which he does not know that much about. He perhaps understands that most voters don't want to discuss that and want to just leave it to their elected officials. We are a country that is about money and entertainment. Trump was running as the embodiment of these. One PBS commentator used a Hollywood metaphor to explain him: Trump is a franchise blockbuster, familiar and splashy; Harris is an independent art-house film with subtitles.

  • Elie Mystal: [11-07] There's no denying it anymore: Trump is not a fluke -- he's America: "The United States chose Donald Trump in all his ugliness and cruelty, and the country will get what it deserves." This is certainly one viewpoint. Still, I have to ask, how many people didn't understand the choice this clearly? And for those who did not, why not?

    We had a chance to stand united against fascism, authoritarianism, racism, and bigotry, but we did not. We had a chance to create a better world for not just ourselves but our sisters and brothers in at least some of the communities most vulnerable to unchecked white rule, but we did not. We had a chance to pass down a better, safer, and cleaner world to our children, but we did not. Instead, we chose Trump, JD Vance, and a few white South African billionaires who know a thing or two about instituting apartheid. . . .

    Everyone who hates Trump is asking how America can be "saved" from him, again. Nobody is asking the more relevant question: Is America worth saving? Like I said, Trump is the sum of our failures. A country that allows its environment to be ravaged, its children to be shot, its wealth to be hoarded, its workers to be exploited, its poor to starve, its cops to murder, and its minorities to be hunted doesn't really deserve to be "saved." It deserves to fail.

    Trump is not our "retribution." He is our reckoning.

  • Rick Perlstein:

    • [11-05] Garbagegate, with a twist: "The media's penchant to balance the two parties and control the narrative didn't quite work when it came to a Trump insult comic's comments about Puerto Rico."

    • [11-13] How to hear a fascist: "Trump was supposed to be in decline, losing it. He lost it all the way to the White House."

  • Kelefa Sanneh: [11-07] How Donald Trump, the leader of white grievance, gained among Hispanic voters.

  • Timothy Snyder: [11-08] What does it mean that Donald Trump is a fascist? "Trump takes the tools of dictators and adapts them for the Internet. We should expect him to try to cling to power until death, and create a cult of January 6th martyrs." This is an article that we must admit, he's competent to write, but hardly anyone else is competent to read. I bookmarked it because it's an issue I take some perverse interest in. I haven't read it yet, because I doubt that I'll learn much -- e.g., I already knew the Marinetti story, and that's pretty obscure -- and the rest will probably just be annoying.

  • Rebecca Solnit:

  • Elizabeth Spiers: [11-06] Trump offered men something that Democrats never could.

  • b>Asawin Suebsaeng/Tim Dickinson: [10-03] 'American death squads': inside Trump's push to make police more violent: "Trump's recent call for a 'violent day' of policing is part of his plan to push cops to be as brutal as possible and shield them from accountability." Pre-election piece I should have noticed earlier (or should have been better reported).

  • Michael Tomasky: [11-08] Why does no one understand the real reason Trump won? "It wasn't the economy. It wasn't inflation, or anything else. It was how people perceive those things, which points to one overpowering answer."

    The answer is the right-wing media. Today, the right-wing media -- Fox News (and the entire News Corp.), Newsmax, One America News Network, the Sinclair network of radio and TV stations and newspapers, iHeart Media (formerly Clear Channel), the Bott Radio Network (Christian radio), Elon Musk's X, the huge podcasts like Joe Rogan's, and much more -- sets the news agenda in this country. And they fed their audiences a diet of slanted and distorted information that made it possible for Trump to win.

    Let me say that again, in case it got lost: Today, the right-wing media sets the news agenda in this country. Not The New York Times. Not The Washington Post (which bent over backwards to exert no influence when Jeff Bezos pulled the paper's Harris endorsement). Not CBS, NBC, and ABC. The agenda is set by all the outlets I listed in the above paragraph. Even the mighty New York Times follows in its wake, aping the tone they set disturbingly often. . . .

    I think a lot of people who don't watch Fox or listen to Sinclair radio don't understand this crucial chicken-and-egg point. They assume that Trump says something, and the right-wing media amplify it. That happens sometimes. But more often, it's the other way around. These memes start in the media sphere, then they become part of the Trump agenda.

    I haven't even gotten to the economy, about which there is so much to say. Yes -- inflation is real. But the Biden economy has been great in many ways. The U.S. economy, wrote The Economist in mid-October, is "the envy of the world." But in the right-wing media, the horror stories were relentless. And mainstream economic reporting too often followed that lead. Allow me to make the world's easiest prediction: After 12:00 noon next January 20, it won't take Fox News and Fox Business even a full hour to start locating every positive economic indicator they can find and start touting those. Within weeks, the "roaring Trump economy" will be conventional wisdom. (Eventually, as some of the fruits from the long tail of Bidenomics start growing on the vine, Trump may become the beneficiary of some real-world facts as well, taking credit for that which he opposed and regularly denounced.)

    Back to the campaign. I asked Gertz what I call my "Ulan Bator question." If someone moved to America from Ulan Bator, Mongolia in the summer and watched only Fox News, what would that person learn about Kamala Harris? "You would know that she is a very stupid person," Gertz said. "You'd know that she orchestrated a coup against Joe Biden. That she's a crazed extremist. And that she very much does not care about you."

    Same Ulan Bator question about Trump? That he's been "the target of a vicious witch-hunt for years and years," that he is under constant assault; and most importantly, that he is "doing it all for you."

    To much of America, by the way, this is not understood as one side's view of things. It's simply "the news." This is what people -- white people, chiefly -- watch in about two-thirds of the country. I trust that you've seen in your travels, as I have in mine, that in red or even some purple parts of the country, when you walk into a hotel lobby or a hospital waiting room or even a bar, where the TVs ought to be offering us some peace and just showing ESPN, at least one television is tuned to Fox. That's reach, and that's power. And then people get in their cars to drive home and listen to an iHeart, right-wing talk radio station. And then they get home and watch their local news and it's owned by Sinclair, and it, too, has a clear right-wing slant. And then they pick up their local paper, if it still exists, and the oped page features Cal Thomas and Ben Shapiro.

    Liberals, rich and otherwise, live in a bubble where they never see this stuff.

    Also, this ends with another key point/example:

    The Democratic brand is garbage in wide swaths of the country, and this is the reason. Consider this point. In Missouri on Tuesday, voters passed a pro-abortion rights initiative, and another that raised the minimum wage and mandated paid leave. These are all Democratic positions. But as far as electing someone to high office, the Man-Boy Love Party could probably come closer than the Democrats. Trump beat Harris there by 18 points, and Senator Josh Hawley beat Lucas Kunce, who ran a good race and pasted Hawley in their debate, by 14 points.

    The reason? The right-wing media. And it's only growing and growing. And I haven't even gotten to social media and Tik Tok and the other platforms from which far more people are getting their news these days. The right is way ahead on those fronts too. Liberals must wake up and understand this and do something about it before it's too late, which it almost is.

  • Katrina vanden Heuvel: [11-07] Americans are desperate for change. Electing Trump was a misguided message: "The causes of Donald Trump's victory will be endlessly debated, but misdirected discontent is clearly a major factor."

  • Julio Ricardo Varela: [11-08] Trump broke a record with Latino voters. History can tell us why. "Trump exploited an 'us versus them' mentality that has long existed among Latinos living in the US and those outside this country."

Also, some more speculative pieces on what a second Trump term might do (some issue-specific, some more general). Most of these assume Trump will try to do what he campaigned on, but I suggested an alternative scenario in the second section of the intro (but even it doesn't argue against most of the forebodings here):

  • Matt Bruenig: [11-07] What does Trump's win mean for the NLRB? "Donald Trump will probably sack National Labor Relations Board general counsel Jennifer Abruzzo, who has been friendly to unions, on day one of his presidency."

  • Jonathan Chait: [11-08] Trump can prosecute anybody he wants, transition leader says: "Department of Justice is now Department of Trump Justice."

  • Rachel M Cohen: [11-06] Trump won. So what does that mean for abortion? "It will be easier to restrict reproductive rights in the president-elect's second term."

  • Tim Dickinson: 'You can't despair. Because that's what they want.' "Experts tell Rolling Stone what resisting authoritarianism in America will look like in Trump's second term." And if you have a subscription, you can find out what they have to say.

  • Abdallah Fayyad: [11-06] This one chart foreshadows Trump's immigration crackdown: "Investors in private prisons think they've hit the jackpot with a second Trump presidency."

  • Jonathan Freedland: [11-08] Think you know how bad Trump unleashed will be? Look at the evidence: it will be even worse. I can think of many risks, but I'd hardly put "the end of Nato" second (or anywhere) on my list. It's not going to happen, because NATO is really just an arms sales cartel, and Trump loves a good racket. His threats to withdraw from NATO were just meant to shake down more tribute. He won't back out, not least because that would only incentivize Europe to build up their own arms cartel.

  • M Gessen: [11-15] This is the dark, unspoken promise of Trump's return: An expert on Russia, learned the hard way, looks back there for insight.

    For those bewildered by why so many Americans apparently voted against the values of liberal democracy, Balint Magyar has a useful formulation. "Liberal democracy," he says, "offers moral constraints without problem-solving" -- a lot of rules, not a lot of change -- while "populism offers problem-solving without moral constraints." Magyar, a scholar of autocracy, isn't interested in calling Donald Trump a fascist. He sees the president-elect's appeal in terms of something more primal: "Trump promises that you don't have to think about other people."

    Around the world, populist autocrats have leveraged the thrilling power of that promise to transform their countries into vehicles for their own singular will. Vladimir Putin and Viktor Orban vowed to restore a simpler, more orderly past, in which men were men and in charge. What they delivered was permission to abandon societal inhibitions, to amplify the grievances of one's own group and heap hate on assorted others, particularly on groups that cannot speak up for themselves. Magyar calls this "morally unconstrained collective egoism."

    While there are people in Trump's circle who look to Orban as a guide to how to lock into power, Trump has many other sources of inspiration, even without cracking open his copy of Mein Kampf. For instance, the crypto-creep in El Salvador, Nayib Bukele, who was reelected with 84% of the vote, his popularity largely credited to his war on gangs. That's the sort of publicity Trump would gladly kill for.

  • Andrea González-Ramirez: [11-08] What to know about Susie Wiles, Trump's next Chief of Staff.

  • Karen J Greenberg: [11-07] It's not just about the president: "It's about the presidency."

    Indeed, the first Trump presidency vastly accelerated the claims of expanded presidential power. Jack Goldsmith and Bob Bauer . . . in their 2020 book, After Trump: Reconstructing the Presidency, they contended that "Donald Trump operated the presidency in ways that reveal its vulnerability to dangerous excesses of authority and dangerous weaknesses in accountability."

    And as they make all too clear, the stakes were (and remain) high. "The often-feckless Trump," they wrote, "also revealed deeper fissures in the structure of the presidency that, we worry, a future president might choose to exploit in a fashion similar to Trump -- but much more skillfully, and to even greater effect." . . .

    A second Trump presidency will undoubtedly take unilateral presidential powers to a new level. . . . New York Times reporters Jonathan Swan, Charlie Savage, and Maggie Haberman reported that Trump "and his associates" plan to "increase the president's authority over every part of the federal government that now operates, by either law or tradition, with any measure of independence from political interference by the White House."

  • Ken Klippenstein: [11-12] Read the leaked Rubio dossier: "Trump camp details 'lightweight' Marco Rubio's liabilities." I restrained myself from noting reports that Rubio is in line to become Secretary of State, but couldn't resist reporting this.

  • Paul Krugman: [11-11] Why Trump's deportations will drive up your grocery bill: Seriously, a week after the election, and this is the best he can do? Alternate title: "Did you know that the pennies you saved on groceries were paid for by exploiting undocumented immigrant labor?" At least he paid off the "tarrifs will drive inflation" story he's already done a dozen times.

  • Avery Lotz: [11-10] Trump rules out Haley, Pompeo admin posts: No surprise with Haley, who still has a lot of sucking up to do. Pompeo, however, was always so good at it. The mark against him, beyond his very brief presidential campaign, could be policy. He is remembered as one of Trump's stealthiest hawks, and was especially influential in sabotaging Trump's North Korea diplomacy. Suppose Trump remembers that?

  • Rachel Maddow: [11-10] Dead last: "Authoritarian rule always entails corruption. With Donald Trump in office, watch your wallet." More than you, or I at least, need to read right now about Huey Long, Spiro Agnew, and anti-corruption hero Viktor Navalny (who is inconveniently dead). This sounds like an AI distillation of her recent books, which sound like they were written by someone else.

  • Branko Marcetic:

    • [11-02] Trump is planning a third red scare: "Donald Trump and his allies aren't making a secret of it: if they win, they're going to launch a campaign of repression to destroy the pro-Palestinian movement and the organized left."

    • [11-08] Trump is planning a presidency of, by, and for the rich: "Now that the 'pro-worker' GOP led by Donald Trump holds the reins of government, what does it plan to do? A program of handouts for big business and austerity for the rest of us."

  • Dylan Matthews: [11-06] Trump proposed big Medicaid and food stamp cuts. Can he pass them? "What Trump's return means for America's poor people."

  • Jane Mayer: [11-08] Donald Trump's Supreme Court majority could easily rule through 2045: "Democrats failed to make the Court itself a major campaign issue, but what comes after the Dobbs decision could very well be worse, and more far-reaching."

  • Julianne McShane: [11-06] After win, Trump fans admit "Project 2025 is the agenda".

  • George Monbiot: [11-07] Trump has pledged to wage war on planet Earth -- and it will take a progressive revolution to stop him.

  • David Remnick: [11-09] It can happen here: "Everyone who realizes with proper alarm that Trump's reëlection is a deeply dangerous moment in American life must think hard about where we are."

  • Tony Romm: [11-11] Trump eyes pro-crypto candidates for key federal financial agencies: "The incoming administration has explored new personnel and policy that can deliver on Trump's campaign promise to turn the United States into the 'crypto capital of the planet.'" Something else that Trump is going to do that is going to be really horrible, although in this case not without an element of farce.

  • Jennifer Rubin: [11-11] Trump can keep campaign promises or be popular. Not both. This is pretty much what I said in my second intro. The problem here is that Republicans don't see the need to be popular, or even want to. They want to rule. They want to be feared. And they think that they can extort and/or terrorize enough people to vote for them that, with their other dirty tricks, they can stay in power, and do all the sick and demented things they've been dreaming of. Remember the 2000 election? Lots of pundits thought that Bush, with his "compassionate conservatism" spiel, and coming off a relatively moderate record as governor of Texas, would show some modesty -- he had, after all, lost the popular vote, and only won when the Supreme Court prevented a recount in Florida -- and tack to the center. But as soon as Bush was inaugurated, Cheney took over and declared that Republicans had come to power with a purpose, and they were going to do everything they wanted, just the way they wanted it. Getting re-elected wasn't his department. He was there to break things, and that's exactly what he did. (Then, somehow, Rove managed to wangle Bush a second term anyway, despite the fact that nearly everything he had done in his first was massively unpopular.)

  • Matt Sledge: [11-07] Crypto sweep puts Congress on notice: vote with us or we'll come after you with millions: "In all likelihood, crypto deregulation is coming."

  • Peter Wade: [11-10] Trump tells GOP to bypass Senate confirmation process, block Biden judicial appointments: "Despite an incoming Republican majority, Trump wants new party leadership to agree to recess appointments." That way he can appoint people even Republicans could object to. (Obviously, RFK Jr. jumps to mind.) Here's another report:

  • Joel Warner: [11-07] What can we expect from a second Trump presidency? "From unleashing more dark money in politics to expanding fossil fuel production and assaulting reproductive rights, here's some of what we can expect from a second Donald Trump administration.

PS: Trying to wind up on Monday, I'm starting to see a number of early appointments (e.g., Trump picks Rep. Elise Stefanik as ambassador to the United Nations), which are beyond the scope of this post and section, as well as damn near impossible for me to keep up with. I will say that they do show that he's actually thought about transition and administration this time (unlike in 2016), he has a plan, and is executing it quickly. This certainly argues against the notion that he might not govern as viciously as he campaigned. I should also note that the Wade story above shows that he intends to dominate Congress (or bypass them wherever possible), rather than have to negotiate with anyone (even mainstream Republicans). He is basically confirming the fears of all those who predicted that Trump would turn the presidency into a dictatorship.

Harris:

  • Kat Abughazaleh: [11-08] Democrats need to clean house before they screw up again: "It wasn't just the people running Kamala Harris's campaign who failed. The leadership of the entire party is at fault."

  • Dean Baker: [11-13] Did bad economic reporting doom Harris?

    This is the time for everyone to do their election autopsy, where everyone pushes their preferred story of what went wrong for the Harris campaign. Mine will focus on what I consider the simplest and most obvious, the media painted a picture of a bad economy which was virtually impossible for the Harris campaign to overcome. And just to be clear, I'm not talking about the alternative reality folks at Fox, I mean the New York Times, Washington Post, and other bastions of the establishment media.

    Just to provide context, there is little doubt that people's views of the economy were hugely important in determining the vote. Exit polls consistently put the economy as the number 1 or number 2 issue in people's minds as they went to vote. And those rating the economy as a top issue voted for Trump by a huge margin.

    I find it completely unfathomable why anyone worried about the economy would look to Republicans (especially Trump) for relief. History, as far back as Herbert Hoover, is unanimous on this point, at least for most (working/middle class) people -- higher-income people may have done relatively better with Republicans, but with the possible exception of the top 1% (at most), they too have fared better with Democrats. Or you could look at policy preferences, which again favor Democrats by a huge margin. As Baker points out, a big part of people's evaluation of the economy is simply partisan, but that doesn't explain why a majority (actually well above the actual vote) thought better of Republicans.

    Baker continues:

    At the most basic level, the media have continually chosen to highlight the negative about the economy. University of Wisconsin political science professor Mark Copelovitch did an analysis last year showing that mentions of "inflation" and "recession" dwarfed mentions of unemployment, even as the latter was hitting record lows and we never had a recession.

    The inflation we did see was part of a worldwide burst of inflation related to the pandemic, where the US rate was little different than the inflation seen in countries like France and Germany. We were told people don't blame the pandemic, they blame Biden. That is undoubtedly true, but that is because the media didn't remind people that the inflation was due to the pandemic in the same way they always reminded people that the withdrawal from Afghanistan was "disastrous." . . .

    Most people are not getting their news from the New York Times or Washington Post, but the information presented in these outlets does spread to other news outlets and to social media. When people hear the bad economy story in the elite media they help its spread elsewhere.

    It's true that most regular consumers of these outlets supported Harris, but that misses the point. . . . They helped to advance a bad economy story that was at odds with reality. Given the importance of perceptions of the economy in people's voting, it would have been all but impossible for Harris to overcome this negative economy story, and she didn't.

  • Josh Barro: [11-09] This is all Biden's fault. He starts with Biden picking Harris as his VP in 2020.

  • Chris Bohner: [11-02] Kamala Harris is not doing well with union voters.

  • Jonathan Chait: [11-06] Why America rejected the Biden-Harris administration: "It's not that people love Trump. Democrats simply failed." As usual, Chait swims in his own tide:

    The seeds of Harris's failure were planted eight years ago, when the Democratic Party responded to Trump's 2016 victory not by moving toward the center, as defeated parties often do, but by moving away from it. This decision was fueled by a series of reality-distorting blinders on the Democrats' decision-making elite.

    So, after Hillary Clinton failed, they should have moved further to the right? How was that even possible? No mention of what the Democrats did in 2018, after moving so far into left-wing peril. (They won both houses of Congress.) But Chait then claims Biden in 2020, who "won because he abstained from that rush to the left, keeping him closer to where the party's voters had remained" -- maybe he should recheck his old columns complaining about Biden getting hoodwinked trying to appease Sanders voters?

  • Aida Chavez: [11-07[ Harris ran to Trump's right on immigration -- and gained absolutely nothing for it: "Harris could have focused on how US foreign policy pushes immigrants to leave their homes. Instead, she ran on border security."

  • Maureen Dowd: [11-09] Democrats and the case of mistaken identity politics: Inevitable that someone would bring this up. Who are these "normal people"? And when does one ever get a chance to really talk with them? Yet somehow, they always show up to second guess you.

  • Liza Featherstone:

  • Malcolm Ferguson: [11-08] Democrats say Kamala Harris ignored their dire warnings on Liz Cheney.

  • Daniel Finn: [11-07] Corporate donors guided Kamala Harris to defeat: E.g., Mark Cuban.

  • Oliver Hall: [11-09] I spent hours trying to persuade US voters to choose Harris not Trump. I know why she lost.

    You should know what I didn't hear during the hours speaking to US voters. I can only think of one occasion when someone mentioned stricter taxes on billionaires or any similar policies. The atrocities being committed by Israel in Gaza only came up six times in more than 1,000 calls. The idea that Harris was not leftwing enough seems false: the majority of the country just voted for the complete opposite.

    After all those conversations, I think the main reason that Harris and Walz lost this campaign is simple: Trump. Ultimately, he was simply too much of a pull again. Despite the gaffes, despite his views on women, despite his distaste for democracy and despite an insurrection, voters just didn't care.

    For reasons that I'm sure will be studied for decades, when he speaks, people listen. When he speaks, people believe him. After all those calls, I can be shocked at this result, but hardly surprised.

  • Benjamin Hart: [11-09] Why Kamala Harris's campaign was doomed from the start: Interview with Amy Walter, publisher/editor of Cook Political Report.

  • Bob Hennellyk: [11-11] Progressives aren't the problem in the Democratic coalition: "Ignoring low-wage and low-wealth voters cost Kamala Harris big."

  • Sarah Jones:

    • [11-06] Kamala Harris squandered her opportunity to win.

      Donald Trump had bet on a sense of aggrieved masculinity as the return path to power, and while there's much we don't know about who turned out to vote and why, his strategy did not alienate white women in the numbers Harris needed to win. Misogyny and racism should receive due attention in postmortems to come, but they can't explain Tuesday on their own. The story is more complicated, and dire. Though she spoke of freedom, of forward motion, of change, voters did not trust her to deliver. Some will blame the left for this, but Harris tried centrism as did Biden and Clinton before her, and that didn't work, either. Leftists do not control the Democratic Party and never have; only consider the party's intransigence on Gaza. If the Democratic brand is poison now, blame its grifter consultants, who never fail out of politics no matter how many pivotal races they lose. Blame Harris, too, whose message was simply too anemic to overcome decades of Democratic failure.

    • [11-12] Bigotry is not the answer to Donald Trump: There's a Seth Moulton quote in here that is horrible not because he's slandering trans people (maybe he wanted to, but I doubt he's referring any actual people) but because it shows how clueless some Democrats can be when it comes to facing Republican talking points. Democrats have to get much smarter at that. Some decent humane principles wouldn't hurt, either.

      Even so, the Democratic Party's problems did not start with Harris or with her economic policy, or with a few pro-trans remarks that she made before she ran for president. The party's inconsistency -- its refusal to reliably champion working Americans -- left trans people vulnerable to attacks from the right. Had voters believed that Democrats would lower the costs of housing or health care or other basic necessities, perhaps Harris would have won, or at least run a closer race. Instead she courted elites, as generations of Democrats have done before her, and handed the country to an aspiring tyrant.

      Now some Democrats and their liberal supporters would rather help Trump divide the working class against itself than admit the party failed. Liberals project their own intellectual and moral failings onto the left, which they accuse of rigidity and a certain wishful thinking. When Maureen Dowd wrote that "woke is broke" in her post-election diatribe, she imagined a country that is nothing more than a mirror of herself. When the hosts of Morning Joe read her column on air in its tedious entirety, they revealed themselves, not some hidden truth in the national soul. Their conclusions are far too convenient to be realistic. How lucky for Dowd that voters share her exact biases, that their enemies are her enemies and their fears her fears.

      Democrats need to deal with the electorate they have, but they can and should do so without denigrating trans and nonbinary people. Liberals and electeds who say the party should move further to the right do so because they aren't interested in serving the working class. They'd rather absolve themselves while avoiding the hard work of introspection. That way lies a political dead end. If the Democratic Party is to be fit for purpose, it will have to offer voters real answers, not technocracy or elitism or scapegoats. Trans people didn't cost Democrats the election. Liberals did that all by themselves.

  • Tim Jonze: [11-06] 'George Clooney - who cares?' Did celebrity endorsements actually harm Kamala Harris?

  • Eric Levitz:

    • [11-08] The debate over what Democrats do now hinges on one question: "There are two ways of interpreting Harris's loss." Actually, there are lots of ways to interpret the loss. The question isn't which one is right. (Even if you could do that, what good would it do you? A book? A posh job in academia, or at some think tank?) The only real question is: what, given the new reality, do you do about it? And no single Democrat is going to answer that. As Will Rogers explained back in the 1930s: "I am not a member of any organized political party. I am a Democrat." Today's Democrats aren't more organized or ideologically coherent than they were in Rogers' day. Ever since the Civil War, the Republicans have been the core party -- calling themselves the G.O.P. was brilliant, shape-shifting PR -- and the Democrats were whatever fell off the margins: tariff-adverse traders and bankers, big city immigrant machines, neo-Confederates, rural populists, any stray Catholics or Jews. Under FDR, they picked up labor support, and briefly became the majority, but Republicans never lost their conceit that they are the one true American party, and as they became more conservative, they evened up the balance by welcoming white racists (while Democrats attracted blacks and other estranged minorities, while losing their older ethnic groups to the Republican melting pot).

      After losing Congress in 1994 and 2010, Democratic presidents could consolidate their control over what was left of the Party, and respond to the losses in a coherent manner -- which guided both Clinton and Obama to second terms, but offered damn little help for other Democrats (either politicians or the party base). But this loss, like the McCain loss in 2008, leaves the Party with no leadership. Harris has liquidated her political capital, as have her predecessors (Biden, Obama, the Clintons), who were all very much (in retrospect, much too much) of her campaign.

      Which basically sets up a free-for-all to see who can rise up and lead a revived Democratic Party. Sure, some pundits and consultants are going to advise accommodation to the right winds, but who among the rank-and-file really wants to compromise on abortion bans, book burning, or genocide arming? At some point, you have to decide that enough is enough, that the right and the rich already have much more than they deserve, and that we have to fight back. And as that happens, new leaders will rise from the ranks. Meanwhile, Bernie Sanders is once again setting an example of a politician who intends to defend us -- from Trump, of course, but also from the defeatists in our own ranks.

      After the utter disaster of the Bush-Cheney regime in 2008, the Republican grandees were left aimless and speechless. Then the Tea Party broke out, and moved the Party radically to the right. The Tea Party didn't take over the Party, but the Party revived, largely on their energy, and bounced back remarkably fast. This will be harder for Democrats, because everything is harder for Democrats, but it won't be for lack of issues and critical analysis. And if the money powers get in the way, we need to learn to live without them, and show them to be the villains they actually are.

    • [11-15] The left's comforting myth about why Harris lost: "Progressives need an accurate autopsy of Kamala Harris's campaign, not an ideologically convenient one." Too late to mount a critique of this one, but that may be a worthy future project, especially as Levitz expands on his ideas in his new The Rebuild newsletter. I shouldn't get too defensive about Levitz's seeming turn against "the left," as the real bottom line here is how to make the Democratic Party more viable in general elections. The left needs an effective Democratic Party to implement our preferred policies (which are the best policies for everyone -- that's why we prefer them). But the Democratic Party also needs a strong left to keep them focused on real problems, steering away from the temptations of donors and their special interests.

      Answering those questions will require Democrats to analyze their predicament with open minds. If we seek ideologically comforting explanations for the party's problems -- rather than empirically sound ones -- the coalition will march deeper into the wilderness.

      Unfortunately, in the wake of Vice President Kamala Harris's loss, virtually every Democratic faction has produced its share of motivated reasoning. In future newsletters, I plan to take issue with some centrists' analysis of the party's difficulties. But today, I want to explain why I worry that the left is allowing wishful thinking to cloud its vision of political reality.

      Since November 5, some progressives have drawn a sweeping lesson from Trump's second victory: Harris's loss proves Democrats gain little from "moderation" or "centrism" and must "embrace radical policies" in order to compete. I admire many of the writers making this argument. But their confidence in this narrative strikes me as wildly unfounded.

      It is true that Harris pivoted to the center on border security, crime, and, to a lesser extent, economics. There are plenty of sound arguments -- both moral and political -- against Democrats moderating on specific issues. Yet it's hard to see how anyone could be confident that Harris lost because she moderated, much less that her loss proved that moderation is electorally counterproductive as a rule.

      I habitually respond to world events by imaging the kind of book I'd like to write about them. I've had a practical political book in mind at least since the 2004 election where I would methodically detail how Republicans are evil-hearted, lame-brained bastards leading us to ruin, and try to convince Democrats that they could not only win elections but actually solve problems by drawing on left ideas. While my faith in the healing power of those ideas remains, the 2024 election has demolished my faith that better ideas can win elections.

      So that kills off the old book concept, and intrdouces a new one: What We Learned From the 2024 Elections. I don't know the answer to that yet, but I what I suspect is that it has very little to do with issues and policies, and even less with the left-right axis, but turns around credibility and trust, on how you talk to people.

  • Jill Lepore: [11-10] Democrats tried to counter Donald Trump's viciousness toward women with condescension: "The Harris campaign felt the need to remind women voters that they can vote for whomever they want. Women understood this. The campaign failed to."

  • Damon Linker: [11-07] Kamala Harris failed to read the room.

  • Milan Loewer: [11-05] If Harris loses today, this is why: "To win working-class voters -- and possibly today's election -- Democrats need to attack economic elites. But the Kamala Harris campaign hasn't consistently offered an anti-elite counter to Donald Trump's right-wing populism." On the other hand, Republicans are very adept at channeling rage against elite Democrats. Why can't Democrats turn the tables on the some of the most entitled, selfish, greedy people in America?

  • Martin Longman: [11-07] I'm not sure the race was ever winnable. A big chunk of this is based on a pre-election piece:

    • Nate Cohn: [11-02] Why are Democrats having such a hard time beating Trump? "The national political environment just isn't as conducive to a Harris victory as many might imagine." I don't really buy the argument for a global tide toward conservatism, and there's much else I'd nitpick in his left-and-right momentum survey, but he's certainly right that Harris leaned against progressive policies that just four years ago Biden leaned into, and that undermined both the Democrats' credibility and the message that Trump and the Republicans are nihilist lunatics with no plans that could actually solve anything.

  • Branko Marcetic: [11-06] Democratic Party elites brought us this disaster. I'm tempted to quote lots of this rant, but can't quite hone in on any single section. I also rather doubt that the Trump vote is being driven by economic hardship -- not least because Trump's offering nothing to help, whereas Harris actually is. The problem there seems to be that mass of people who believe Trump on everything and Harris (or any other Democrats) on nothing.

    As a general rule, politicians campaign for donors early on, and make amends to donors after the election, but during the closing stretch, they focus on trying to appeal to voters. That's the point when, for Democrats at least, their messaging leans left, toward things that might actually help people. Voters have good reason to be skeptical, and I can think of cases where it didn't work well, but at least the politician is showing them some respect. I can't say as I was paying a lot of attention, but I didn't notice Harris doing that this campaign. Rather, they were raising money like crazy, and she doesn't seem to have taken the necessary step of changing that money into votes. I think that goes back to credibility, which has been in short supply since Clinton started triangulating. Even if it seemed to be working, as with Clinton and Obama, you look back years later, and see what the donors got out of the process, but can't remember what you got.

    Clinton like to quote Harry Truman as saying, "if you want to live like a Republican, you have to vote Democratic." Problem there is that when folk start living like Republicans, they start voting Republican, so you lose them -- especially the snots who will kick the ladder out so no one else can follow them (which, by the way, seems to be part of the problem why Democrats are losing Latino voters). Meanwhile, the people who didn't make it up start blaming you, and some of them vote Republican (or just don't vote) just to spite you, so it's lose-lose.

  • Nicholas Nehamas/Andrew Duehren: [11-09] Harris had a Wall Street-approved economic pitch. It fell flat. "The vice president vacillated on how to talk about the economy, and ended up adopting marginal pro-business tweaks that both corporate and progressive allies agreed made for a muddled message." I wonder if her late start didn't have something to do with this. She wound up spending way too much time talking to donors, and not enough to voters. She adopted much of what the former told her, and little from the latter. Most campaigns shift from one focus to the other (then the donors get a second shot after the votes are counted), but she was relentlessly, obsessively fundraising up to the very end. That worked to raise a lot of funds, but they never managed to turn those funds into votes -- possibly because the interests aren't the same. Or maybe she had enough time and help to figure things out, but just liked the donors more. And wanted more to impress them, perhaps because that's where her personal future lies (now more than ever).

  • Lydia Polgreen/Tressie McMillan Cottom: [11-07] Democrats had a theory of the election. They were wrong. Transcript of a conversation between two of their non-right opinion columnists:

    Polgreen: On Tuesday we found out that the nation really, really wanted a change. Not only did Donald Trump take the presidency, but Republicans took the Senate and made gains in blue states like my home state of New York and big gains in New York City, too. . . .

    McMillan Cottom: I don't live in New York full time, I live in the South. I spent a lot of time with working-class people, people living in the mountains and rural parts of the country. And I also saw a sort of acceptance and integration of Donald Trump's vision of an America where no one has to give up anything to win. And it appeals a lot to Hispanic voters, to working-class voters, especially working-class men. It appealed a lot to people in rural parts of the state of all races. That concerned me and concerned me the entire campaign.

    Polgreen: I think I was a bit more optimistic, in part because, to me, this election really turned on this question of who has a stake in the system as it currently exists and who feels that they could benefit from just blowing it all up. . . .

    I think I felt hopeful that here we had a generic Democrat who had these plain vanilla policies that were not that exciting. They tried to address around the edges some of the issues that people needed from government.

    I thought maybe that could work. Maybe there's just enough chaos, just enough of a sense that this is too dangerous. That gamble was just wrong, and ultimately you were right.

    McMillan Cottom: Again, I take no pleasure in that because if I am right, I am right because I thought -- and now have evidence -- that the anger that Americans feel cannot be directed toward the truth.

    More interesting things in here, including:

    Polgreen: The other thing is that we are living in this zero-sum moment where people think giving something to someone else means taking something away from me.

    There was that moment where JD Vance was talking about how if immigrants made countries rich, then Springfield, Ohio, would be the richest city in the world, and the United States would be the richest country in the world. Well, news flash, the United States is the richest country in the world. . . .

    McMillan Cottom: One of the things that JD Vance is actually very good at that Donald Trump is not good at, is he figured out how to take something that is a problem about relative differences and make it feel like an absolute loss.

    The point here isn't that Vance is really clever, but that he finds a way to get back to his basic campaign proposition. He's not unique -- I've seen Bernie Sanders do this many times, but the secret here is not dogged repetition, but having a point to get back to. Continuing:

    McMillan Cottom: But that relative loss, despite the fact that objectively, they are still doing OK, is enough when turned into anxiety and fear and aggression, which Donald Trump is very good at doing, feels like an emotional catharsis. And then JD Vance comes behind and says, "Not only are you losing, but yes, your loss is coming because someone else is gaining."

    What we do not have on the other side, to your point, is either a center or center-left and, I'd even argue, a Democratic center-right story that captures that emotion in the same kind of way.

    Also:

    Polgreen: Yeah. And I think that the idea that the Democratic Party has to work within a set of defined rules of the existing order is just a brain disease.

    I had initially skipped over all the New York Times pundits, until I was pointed here by:

    • Steve M.: [11-07] Voters think every party is the leopards eating people's faces party:

      What this suggests to me is that millions of voters didn't think they were voting on a choice between chaos and stability. They think both parties destabilize the country. So they chose Trump's promise of a form of destabilization they found appealing over the status quo, which they see as an unappealing destabilization.

      In the famous meme, a supporter of the Leopards Eating People's Faces Party says, "I never thought leopards would eat MY face." Donald Trump won because millions of voters think Democratic policies lead leopards to eat their faces, and Trump's policies will make leopards eat the faces of people they don't like.

      In particular, young men of all ethnicities think liberal culture has created a pro-queer gynocracy that's eating the faces of straight males. They want leopards to eat the faces of people they think are benefiting in this culture. . . .

      A majority of Hispanic men appear to have voted for Trump despite the fact that some will be caught up in his crackdown on undocumented immigrants. These Trump voters believe that only the undocumented will have their faces eaten, and they're fine with that. (Harris campaigned on a border crackdown, so she didn't talk much about how heavy-handed Trump's immigration policies are likely to be.)

      Trump chose popular victims of the leopards -- women, trans people, immigrants, criminals. Democrats could have chosen the rich, but bashing the rich reportedly scares some moderates. It sets off alarm bells in the "liberal" commentariat and reduces the big-money contributions that are necessary for Democrats to run one of our country's staggeringly expensive presidential campaigns.

      A day earlier, M. also wrote:

    • [11-06] Trump is a toxically masculine Andy Kaufman, and other unorganized thoughts: "A few thoughts on one of the worst days in American history." Section heads (some with a bit of quote):

      • Eeyore: I was right to be pessimistic, and it's clear that I should have remained pessimistic even after Kamala Harris entered the race.
      • Democrats and Republicans agree that Democrats are bad [longer quote to follow]
      • Maybe ground game is meaningless
      • But didn't voters think Trump is crazy?
      • Which brings me to Biden: But the race might have been different for her or Biden if Biden had been able to persuade voters that he cared and was working hard to make their lives better [but he couldn't, and she wouldn't].
      • And also, America is massively sexist: I don't think I'll live to see a female president. There are too many trad Christians and too many whiny boy-men -- and they just elected the biggest whiny boy-man of them all.

      The point about Democrats cited a comment from Frank Wilhoit that is worth quoting here:

      People vote their emotional compulsions, which, by definition, are purely destructive; that is why all voting is negative-partisan. Trump will get one vote: his own. The votes that are recorded as his will be votes against, not Kamala Harris, but the Democratic Party and its constituencies. Comparably, Harris will get no votes at all; the votes that are recorded as hers will be votes against, not Trump, but the Republican Party and its constituencies.

      History is on the side of the Republicans here, because they understand what is going on; that is why they focus exclusively upon degrading the Democratic brand. We do not understand. . . . We should have spent every moment of the past forty-five years screaming total rejection of the "conservative" pseudophilosophy, and nothing else. . . .

      It is too late now; one cannot suddenly "discover" a problem that has been in being for decades and try to whip up any urgency around it.

    • Patrick Healy/David French: [11-06] It's time to admit America has changed: Two more conservative New York Times pundits discuss the election.

  • Norman Solomon: [11-07] Democrats ignored every warning and the results are catastrophic: "Now that a fascistic party has won the presidency along with the Senate and apparently the House as well, the stakes for people and planet are truly beyond comprehension."

  • Andrew Prokop:

    • [11-06] One striking pattern hidden in the election results: "Were voters rejecting Democrats -- or just the Biden-Harris administration?" Or, I have to ask, just Harris? I haven't entertained the possibility, at least in print, that they simply don't trust a person with any/all of her attributes, which most obviously include: woman, color, from California, both parents immigrants. None of that bothers me, nor does it bother most people, and nearly all of the people who think of such things were going to vote Trump anyway, but if you can't win the kind of landslide you deserve on issues alone, maybe think about that. As for the pattern:

      But when you zoom in on the details of that result, there's a striking pattern: Democratic Senate candidates are outperforming Harris. Or, put another way, Republican Senate candidates are doing worse than Trump.

    • [11-06] Why Kamala Harris lost: "Trump won because Harris inherited a tough situation from Joe Biden -- and ultimately could not overcome it." I'll nominate this piece for a bracket elimination tournament to find the most intellectually lazy explanation for the loss. He offers three reasons: a global trend ("in the years since the pandemic, incumbent parties have been struggling in wealthy democracies across the world"); "Biden's unpopularity" (which Harris "had to figure out what to do about that"); and "Harris's own record," by which he means Harris's 2019 presidential campaign, when she "embraced progressive policy positions that Democrats now view as politically toxic." As I've said, I don't know what the answer is, but it's got to be something more than that. As for the "tough situation" Biden left Harris in, his only detail was that Israel-Gaza had "divided Democrats' coalition." (I'd submit that it didn't divide the coalition that actually identified as Democrats, but it turned off a lot of other voters that Harris needed.)

    • [11-11] The debate over why Harris lost is in full swing. Here's a guide. "Was she a weak candidate? Was it Joe Biden's fault? Did Trump have unexpected strength? Or was it a global trend?" This appeared too late for me to explore, but I have one suggestion: instead of looking for things that might have moved the needle a point or two, start from the assumption that Trump (and most Republicans) were be any objective criteria so bad they should have lost by at least 10, possibly 20 points, and see if you can identify any problems at that scale? I'd start with money and media structure, and then consider the difficulties of establishing trust against those odds. Harris wasn't a weak candidate so much as one not strong enough to overcome those bigger obstacles. Same for Biden, who had some additional weaknesses that Harris only partly made up for. We can go on down the list, but we keep coming back to what happened to the world to make Trump seem credible, while Harris was ultimately judged by many to be some kind of phony.

  • Nathan J Robinson: [11-06] Once again, the Democratic leadership has failed us all: "In 2016, we warned that Hillary Clinton's campaign was not resonating with Americans. In 2024, we warned about Kamala Harris, and we were ignored again. Now, the worst has happened. So, what do we do? A leftist analysis can help us chart a path forward."

    Since we're here, let's file some "I told you so" links cited in the article:

  • Bret Stephens: [11-06] A party of prigs and pontificators suffers a humiliating defeat: I can't stand Stephens, who even spoils his conversations with Gail Collins -- their latest, The Trump era never really ended, has a title that could develop into interesting analysis, but doesn't. This piece, too, is mostly crap, but he gives you a good taste of how the Republican mindset caricatures Democrats. (Do you suppose his Harris endorsement was another plant? He doesn't seem to have the faculties to have based it on reason -- well, as he explains later in the piece, his first reason for voting for Harris was Ukraine, followed by trade policy. The only time Republicans ever go bipartisan is when they suspect an opportunity to make Democrats look bad to their voters.) Here's a sample:

    The dismissiveness with which liberals treated these concerns was part of something else: dismissiveness toward the moral objections many Americans have to various progressive causes. [bogus examples follow, starting with trans athletics]

    The Democratic Party at its best stands for fairness and freedom. But the politics of today's left is heavy on social engineering according to group identity. It also, increasingly, stands for the forcible imposition of bizarre cultural norms on hundreds of millions of Americans who want to live and let live but don't like being told how to speak or what to think. Too many liberals forgot this, which explains how a figure like Trump, with his boisterous and transgressive disdain for liberal pieties, could be re-elected to the presidency.

    Last, liberals thought that the best way to stop Trump was to treat him not as a normal, if obnoxious, political figure with bad policy ideas but as a mortal threat to democracy itself. [more bogus examples] And it made liberals seem hyperbolic, if not hysterical, particularly since the country had already survived one Trump presidency more or less intact.

    Today, the Democrats have become the party of priggishness, pontification and pomposity. It may make them feel righteous, but how's that ever going to be a winning electoral look?

    This is massively unfair, but it's the bread and butter of right-wing media, so Democrats have to get better at handling it. That doesn't mean inching closer to Republicans, not least because that never works, but better framing is possible, and trust-building is essential. I don't see that working with a hack like Stephens, but most people are more open-minded than him (or minded, for that matter).

  • Bhaskar Sunkara: [11-08] The Democrats lost because they ran a weak and out of touch campaign: "The party, increasingly divorced from workers, leaned too much on an activist base instead of a voting base."

  • Michael Tomasky: [11-06] Latino men were the big defectors -- but they weren't the only ones: "Here's how Harris failed to replicate Biden's 2020 victory over Trump."

  • Bernie Sanders: Sanders endorsed and campaigned for Harris. After the election he posted this:

    It should come as no great surprise that a Democratic Party which has abandoned working class people would find that the working class has abandoned them. First, it was the white working class, and now it is Latino and Black workers as well. While the Democratic leadership defends the status quo, the American people are angry and want change. And they're right.

    Today, while the very rich are doing phenomenally well, 60% of Americans live paycheck to paycheck and we have more income and wealth inequality than ever before. Unbelievably, real, inflation-accounted-for weekly wages for the average American worker are actually lower now than they were 50 years ago.

    I don't have the links handy, but right after Sanders made his statement about Democrats abandoning the working class, I saw a bunch of flak on Twitter charging Sanders with hypocrisy because during the campaign he praised Biden's record for labor (most pro-labor president since . . . ?). Pretty low bar, but during a campaign you take what you can get. Afterwards, you go back to what you want, which is a candidate who is more effective for working people. Sanders wants that. His detractors don't seem to.

    Other articles that focused on Sanders:

    • Jessica Corbett: [11-07] Sanders slams 'big money interests' that control Democratic Party after loss to Trump.

    • Krystal Kyle: [11-06] Bernie would have won: "The Democratic smothering of the Bernie coalition reaped its reward today."

    • Branko Marcetic: [11-07] Bernie Sanders is right to be incensed at the Democrats.

    • Natalie Shure: [11-12] Bernie would have won. Seriously. "Trump keeps winning because the Democratic party refuses to be the party of the working class." Sanders has one thing that few Democrats have, which is credibility. The counterpoint is that if the Democratic Party had nominated Sanders, rich Democrats like Michael Bloomberg would have bagged the election, throwing it to Trump -- much like previous generations of Democratic elites did to Bryan (1896) and McGovern (1972).

    • Jared Ryan Sears: [reply to a tweet that featured Sanders' post-election statement, the one with charging the Democrats with abandoning the working class]:

      • Unions are the strongest they've been in decades.
      • Wages among the lowest earners grew the fastest.
      • The child tax credit was expanded.
      • A minimum corporate tax was enacted.
      • A tax on stock buybacks was added.
      • High inflation was brought down to normal levels without a recession.
      • Millions of jobs were created.
      • Unemployment has remained low.
      • Manufacturing returned to the US.
      • Prescription prices were lowered.
      • More Americans have healthcare than ever before.
      • -Billions were given to student debt relief.
      • -The American Rescue Plan got Americans back to work, covered Cobra payments, and even directly gave Americans money.

      Let's stop pretending that nothing was done by this administration when it inherited a pandemic, a migrant crisis, and high inflation and managed not only to address all of those issues through Republican obstruction but accomplished much more as well.

      There's always more to do, and mistakes happen, but to act like Democrats abandoned the working class is ridiculous.

      Lots of comments follow, some agreeing with Sanders, but most attacking him, the vitriol especially strong from points farther left -- attacks on his endorsements of Clinton/Biden/Harris (I always filed those under "go along to get along," a game he's played rather skillfully) and charging him with genocide (he did reflexively support Israel after the Oct. 7 revolt, but as it became clear that Netanyahu's game plan was genocide, he has shown exceptional clarity and bravery in opposing US arms to further that genocide). I've generally insisted that people of the left are good-hearted, well-meaning, and thoughtful, but by evidence here, at least a dozen are simple-minded assholes, not unlike thousands (or millions?) on the right.

      PS: On second thought, I think these comments were to Sanders' original thread, not to the Zachary Carter tweet that led me to it. It is quite possible that he is heckled like this all the time, and that the "extreme left" attacks are deceptive trolls. Sorry for opening that can of worms.

Resisting and coping: I've generally put the "what comes next" pieces under Trump (second section), but the corresponding "what do we do now" pieces are likely to have nothing to do with Harris (not that the idea doesn't crop up in the various pieces critical of the Harris campaign). I wasn't really expecting to do this section, but found one piece, and thought there may be more (e.g., I moved the Ganz piece in from elsewhere).

  • John Ganz: [11-06] I hope I'm wrong: "About Trump and other things." Many worthy thoughts in this post:

    There's a political lesson there, too, though, that applies to the present moment: having a clear vision of things, even if it is unpleasant or dark, beats no vision or an unclear one. Trump's campaigns had a clear mythos: a story about what America is and was and where it is going. No Democratic candidate that's run against him has been able to articulate an opposing vision. This is not particular to this or that candidate, although all of them had individual weaknesses. We can litigate that forever. But it's really a problem of American liberalism: liberalism is unsure of itself and ameliorative, it's not a bold vision of the future as it once was in its heyday under LBJ or FDR. Trumpism may be reactionary, but liberalism too, has become too backward-looking -- look at my references in the previous sentence. It longs for an old age of consensus instead of gamely going to war to win a new one. American liberalism has also become a land of smug statisticians and wonks who want to test every proposition and shrink from striking out in a new direction, from testing rhetorical appeals in the public arena rather than the statistical survey. Trump and his campaigns were willing to venture boldly and that's part of what appealed to people. He said, "Follow me and make history," a dubious claim made by others before him, but it excites people.

    He also admits that his command of the history of fascism may not have helped:

    Antifascism is a century-old tradition now and the critics of who see in it a longing to recreate an old order are on to something. It's a politics of memory and meaning that are fading from this world. But it at least has a certain imaginative dimension, it's an ethos: its mythical core contains a struggle between good and evil. Unfortunately, it doesn't resonate at this moment. For voters for whom "democracy" was an issue Harris was the obvious choice, but that wasn't enough people. It's perhaps too idealistic, too abstract and airy, and not focused enough on practical issues, although for me it's a social democratic impulse, uniting the struggle for democracy and people's day-to-day needs. In any case, it's not a story that the American people get anymore.

    He also points out that "resistance" has its legacy rooted in the struggle against fascism, which may not be the best model right now. In particular, Trump's popular margin has given him a clear path to power, unlike Hitler and Mussolini, who used their demagoguery to gain a power base, but in the end resorted to force to seize power.

  • Natasha Lennard: [11-06] The answer to Trump's victory is radical action: "As ever, don't expect the Democratic Party to save us. Now is the time for grassroots action."

  • Nicole Narea: [11-16] Democrats got wiped out in 2004. This is what they did next. "The last time Democrats lost the popular vote spurred a reckoning." Both times the presidential race was close, but was combined with Republicans winning both sides of Congress, leaving a leadership vacuum in the Party. Howard Dean campaigned to run the DNC, and worked hard to rebuild it from the grass roots up, leading to a major success in 2006. After that success, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama seized the throne, turning the party back into an extension of their personal campaigns, and left the rest of the party for dead, but that's another story. Sub-sections here:

    1. They pursued a 50-state strategy
    2. Democrats reevaluated their messaging
    3. Democrats sought to become a party of ideas

    Last section is "the limits of political strategy," so some caveats.

  • Nathan J Robinson: [11-14] Here's the silver lining: "Horrible Republican policies are inevitably unpopular and will generate backlash. As Trump's presidency becomes a chaotic failure, a new left movement can rise." While it is a near certainty that Republican policies will fail to solve the problems they target (even by their own measures), and that they will generate backlash that will propel a Democratic resurgence (assuming we still get to vote -- a risk Republicans are all too aware of). But his "the dog that caught the car" metaphor is dead wrong. Republicans know exactly what they want to do with the car once they've caught it. And while Bush in 2000, Reagan in 1980, and Nixon in 1968 offer some precedents, Trump is moving much more aggressively than any previous president-elect.

    Robinson further tweeted: "this is not to diminish the terrible harm that will be done. It's going to be utterly awful, but it may spark unexpected popular uprising that lead to a transformative political movement." I responded:

    The "dog that catches the car" metaphor doesn't work here. Trump may seem clueless -- I've quipped that he doesn't know how to devise "dog whistles"; he's just a dog who responds to them -- but his crew know exactly what they want to do, and are doing it at record speed.

    Another commenter, perhaps facetiously: "Thank you for your role in giving the American people this convenient accelerant. When you think about it, in the end it was Hitler who brought lasting democracy to Germany after the war."

  • Timothy Shenk: [11-08] It's time to resist the resistance: "Resistance" in the sense of reflexive opposition that focuses on Trump personally:

    The origins of Resistance politics go back over a decade, even before Mr. Trump entered politics. In 2011, with Mr. Trump making headlines as the leading spokesman for birtherism, Barack Obama's team seized the opportunity to cast him as the face of the entire Republican opposition. Years later, David Plouffe, an Obama campaign manager turned presidential adviser, explained the strategy. "Let's really lean into Trump here," Mr. Plouffe remembered thinking. "That'll be good for us."

    And it was, for a while -- so good that when Mr. Plouffe joined Kamala Harris's campaign over the summer, it still seemed like the basis for a winning coalition. . . .

    But there was a price to be paid. No matter how progressive the rhetoric, Resistance politics inevitably feels conservative. It's reactionary in a literal sense: The other side decides the terms of debate, and it usually ends with finding yet another norm under assault, a new outrage to be tutted over or another institution that needs protecting.

  • Robert Wright: [11-08] How to fight Trump mindfully. This is good, but that he's actually quoting himself from seven years ago is a bit inauspicious:

    The premise of the Mindful Resistance Project is that understanding and addressing the root causes of Trumpism is important -- so important that we shouldn't let Trump's antics and outrages get in the way of this mission. To put a finer point on it: 1) We need to respond to each day's news about Trump wisely -- with moral clarity and forceful conviction but with awareness of the way overreactions to his provocations can play into his hands. 2) Meanwhile, we need to get a deeper understanding of the forces that led so many people to vote for Trump. These forces include globalization, demographic change, the loss of jobs through automation, and a political polarization that is grounded partly in the tribalizing tendencies of social media. This polarization is also grounded in what you might call the psychology of tribalism, in cognitive biases that afflict us all -- so fostering an understanding of how our minds work will be among the goals of this project.

Senate:

  • Nia Prater: [10-07] Where does control of the US Senate stand? As of Thursday, Republicans defeated Democratic incumbents in Ohio and Montana, and picked up the seat in West Virginia (not reported here), with races in Pennsylvania, Arizona, and Nevada still undecided (with Pennsylvania looking like another Republican gain).

House of Representatives: I thought I'd have more in this section, including specific races, but I never even got around to looking at the numbers.

Other election matters:

Other Republicans:

  • Griffin Eckstein: [11-09] Jones calls for "Nuremberg Two" against Democrats following Trump win: "The conspiracy theorist and radio host said the Trump DOJ had a mandate from God to prosecute Dems." The subhed is no surprise, but the invocation of "Nuremberg" shows a mind-boggling level of ignorance (specifically, about Nazi Germany) and contempt for truth, and indeed for everyone. Of course, that's hardly news with this guy.

  • Adam Clark Estes: [11-07] We're all living inside Elon Musk's misinformation machine now: "As Musk gains even more power, X gains more influence." More on Musk and Big Tech:

    • John Herrman: [11-08] Big Tech's loyalty era: "Elon Musk's big bet paid off. Tech leaders are adjusting -- and warming -- to a new reality."

    • Timothy Noah: [11-08] Dump Twitter: "If you stick with Elon Musk, you're complicit."

      Whatever you call it, the social media site was Musk's primary tool to elect Trump. In Bloomberg's Tech Daily newsletter for November 7, Kurt Wagner writes that Musk "turned his feed into a Trump-inspired billboard for his more than 200 million followers," that it "became a major source of anti-immigrant conspiracy theories," that Musk "re-shared posts from the former president's supporters, not all of them accurate," and that Musk turned X into "a much more powerful version of Truth Social."

      Still, hard for me to see how shutting down my account, with 3000 posts, 650 followers, and 49 following, is going to make a dent in Musk's bottom line, much less his brain.

  • John Feffer: [10-30] The cruelty of crowds: "The far right has weaponized the Internet."

  • Casey Wetherbee: [11-03] The GOP playbook for sabotaging environmental regulations.

Other Democrats:

  • Kate Aronoff:

  • Ryan Cooper: [11-07] Time for Democrats to abandon the mainstream media: "The 'liberal media' was in the tank for Trump. Democrats should take their subscription dollars elsewhere."

  • Nicole Narea: [11-07] Why Democrats couldn't sell a strong economy, in 3 charts: "Top-line indicators pointed to cooling inflation and a strong economy. What did Democrats miss?" Section heads:

    • There was a real inflation backlash (even though chart shows that "overall wage growth has outpaced inflation")
    • The job market is tougher (chart shows: "more people are facing long-term unemployment")
    • Americans have less money and are taking on more debt (chart: "Americans are saving less after the pandemic"; doesn't look like much less, after a big spike during the pandemic, but credit card debt and delinquency rates are up)

    By the way, here's more on the credit card thing:

    • Steve M: [11-08] The election explained, in two charts. I probably missed the significance of this because I don't have any credit card debt, and had no idea the interest rates were this high (21.9%, up from a little over 14% just a year ago?). Part of the problem has to do with Biden reappointing Trump's Fed Chair pick, but the larger part is that we got rid of the anti-usury laws that used to provide a cap on this kind of loansharking. Harris could have came out with an anti-usury platform, and when questioned about it, told folk to look it up in the Bible. That, plus writing off most student debt -- which only exists due to political malfeasance, and which while Biden attempted some remedies, Harris hardly ever talked about -- would have had much broader and more tangible appeal than the silly notion of exempting tip income (a Trump idea that Harris adopted and helped legitimize -- every time you create a haven for untaxable income, you undermine our ability to tax the rich. How hard would it have been to point out that if we taxed rich folk at levels they had to pay before they paid off politicians for their tax cuts, people who depend on tips to make up for subminimal wages, as well as everyone else who is underpaid in America, could be taxed less, and get better benefits in the bargain?

      By the way, M. points out (and I can relate, not least by being a bit older):

      Ordinary people were already struggling more than their parents, then inflation struck in 2021. It hurt incumbent parties all over the world.

      Yes, it has receded in America. Yes, we now have the strongest economy in the world.

      But the two charts at the top of this post show how the economy looks to people who were already struggling to pay their bills every month when inflation hit. In all likelihood, they pulled out credit cards to buy necessities, and now they can't pay those credit cards off.

      My wife and I can afford to pay our credit card bills in full every month, but I don't look down on people who can't. If your family is bigger than ours, if you're younger (we're in our sixties), if you've ever had a stretch of unemployment or big medical bills, you have it harder than we did. If you went to college or grad school in the past twenty years, you'd be shocked at how small our student loan burden was in the 1970s.

      By economists' criteria, this is a booming economy. It's pretty sweet for people who can afford it. But I completely understand that it doesn't look so sweet if you're living paycheck to paycheck.

      I tried to run a one-person business for a while in my twenties and early thirties and got myself in debt. It sucks. It sucks to pay a partial bill and see no decrease in the debt because the interest keeps compounding and compounding. I managed to get out of that debt and never looked back, but when you're in the thick of it, it's miserable.

      If you've never been in that situation, count your blessings. If you think everyone who gets into debt is a bad person, well, I guess I was a bad person.

  • Wiley Nickel: [11-11] What should Democrats do now? Form a shadow cabinet. "The venerable British institution of the opposition would serve America well today." I've loved this idea ever since I first found out about it. It's more natural in a parliamentary democracy than it would be in America, but it could be done here, and it would give Democrats some leadership visibility in each specific area of government. Nickel is proposing drawing the cabinet from Congress members, which would make it a lot like the committee minority members. I think it would be better for the DNC to organize and raise money for a shadow government, mostly of technical experts (which could include some notables, like Pete Buttigieg in Transportation, or Robert Reich in Labor, or former members of Congress), selected by the Democratic caucus in Congress, possibly adding Democratic governors, maybe even party chairs in the underrepresented-but-still-important red states.

  • Osita Nwanevu: [11-08] The long Obama era is over: "The democrats must learn to speak to voters who don't believe in the politics of old and aren't interested in returning to it." I never thought of there being any "Obama era," probably because he made so little effort at delineating it from the "Clinton era," which he jumped the line on to little if any practical effect. The more customary term for them both, on through Biden and Harris, is "neoliberalism," except that one already lost its cachet before Biden.

    The long Obama era is over. The familiar homilies -- about how there are no red states or blue states and Americans share a set of common values and working institutions novelly and externally threatened by agents of chaos like Trump -- never described political reality. They now no longer work reliably even as political messaging. The hunt should be on for alternatives.

    The word "homilies" is striking here. Obama specialized in them, as if he had to constantly remind us that he was utterly conventional, someone who could be counted on to always say the correct thing. I remember my surprise at one point when Trump made fun of Obama for always ending his speeches with "God bless America." It's the most anodyne statement ever for an American politician, and yet it gives these yokels, who claim to put God and America above all else, an excuse to laugh at him.

  • Stephen Semler:

    • [09-10] US child poverty nearly tripled between 2021 and 2023: This seems like a possibly big deal, not just on the headline topic but on a wide range of economic issues. The key here is a chart of "several key US anti-poverty measures expired or were eliminated after 2021." As the chart makes clear, most of them started with the pandemic of 2020, while Trump was president, and ended 2021-23, while Biden was president. Only the last two items started after Biden became president (child care provider grants, WIC increase). One might read this chart and think Trump was the champion of welfare expansion, and Biden its nemesis. The truth is different: all of the items were pushed by Democrats, mostly by Pelosi and Schumer when they crafted Trump's first pandemic relief bill. To mollify Republicans, they were sold as emergency measures and they included sunset clauses. Democrats tried to extend some of them (things like the eviction and foreclosure bans were never going to be extended), but were frustrated by Republicans plus the sandbagging of a few Democrats (notably Manchin and Sinema, who held the deciding votes on many issues). Biden's support for the measures was less clear, but it's grossly simplistic to blame him for not being able to extend such useful programs.

      The child poverty figures are especially striking, dropping from 12.6% to 5.2% from 2019 to 2021, then rebounding to 12.4% immediately after ending the child tax credit. The lower figure shows what could easily be done with a bit of political will, but that's just one of many metrics here. Few people appreciated that it was the Democrats who made these remarkable changes happen, in part because Democrats who wanted to work with Trump shied away from taking credit. (Trump's subsequent bills were much weaker and less effective.) But also because Democrats didn't want to see them as a first start toward a massive expansion of social benefits, as something to build the future on. The pandemic was a very unusual period in American history -- one that deviated so far from the expectations of both political parties that neither seems to be able to deal with it. Republican delusions are expected, but seems like the Democrats can't wait to forget either, even though if they could, they might discover that they by and large behaved with the care and concern we hope for from the political system, but rarely get. Why couldn't they campaign on that?

    • [11-06] A couple charts to explain a Harris loss: The two charts are: "US food insecurity increased 40% since 2021" ("number of people living in food insecure housholds" increased from 33.8M to 47.4M), and "Poverty in the US increased 67% since 2021" ("number of people living below the poverty line" increased from 25.6M to 42.8M). Both of these charts, which measure pretty much the same thing, show 2020-21 dips before the 2022 rebound. The 2021 columns show the effects of pandemic relief programs, which had sunset clauses and were allowed to lapse, mostly due to Republican opposition (plus a couple bad Democrats). As I noted above, Democrats didn't claim much credit for the improvement, nor blame Republicans for the later pain, which allowed people who didn't know any better to flip the roles. As Semler notes:

      Why did I consider her defeat likely? Because Harris ran on an anti-populist economic agenda and an anti-antiwar foreign policy platform, and neither of those things poll well.

  • Paul Waldman: [11-10] Voters punished Biden for problems he didn't cause and effectively addressed: But for some reason couldn't talk coherently about, some of which can be attributed to age, some to his usual awkwardness, but also also to the problem that Democrats have to speak both to donors and to voters, two groups that want to hear different things, a task that even the most eloquent of Democrats have trouble pulling off. Alternate title, which I clicked on before arriving here, is "Trump is about to take credit for Biden's accomplishments."

  • Stephen Wertheim: [11-11] The Cheney-loving Democratic party needs a reckoning about war: "Election outcomes have multiple causes, of course. Yet foreign polilcy was one of the reasons Americans gave Trump the largest Republican victory in decades."

  • Matthew Yglesias: [11-12] A Common Sense Democrat manifesto: This seemed monumental enough to sneak in the day after. I was pointed here by Jonathan Chait, who tweeted: "I think (or at least hope) this will be an important reference document going forward." (Nathan Robinson heckled back: "shouldn't you probably shut up for a while," with a link to Chait's October 8 article: The race is close because Harris is running a brilliant campaign: "Stop complaining; the centrism is working.") Chait probably likes it because Yglesias's neoliberalism is showing, and because it's written in ways that signal anti-left bias. But the "principles" aren't so bad:

    Different people have different views and different priorities, and principles need to be loose enough to accommodate some differences. But I also don't want these to be total platitudes; I want some people to read them and think, "Fuck this, I don't agree." Over the next few weeks, I'll share posts elaborating on each one individually, but in the meantime, these are the principles I'd like to see the Democratic party embrace:

    1. Economic self-interest for the working class includes both robust economic growth and a robust social safety net.

    2. The government should prioritize maintaining functional public systems and spaces over tolerating anti-social behavior.

    3. Climate change -- and pollution more broadly -- is a reality to manage, not a hard limit to obey.

    4. We should, in fact, judge people by the content of their character rather than by the color of their skin, rejecting discrimination and racial profiling without embracing views that elevate anyone's identity groups over their individuality.

    5. Race is a social construct, but biological sex is not. Policy must acknowledge that reality and uphold people's basic freedom to live as they choose.

    6. Academic and nonprofit work does not occupy a unique position of virtue relative to private business or any other jobs.

    7. Politeness is a virtue, but obsessive language policing alienates most people and degrades the quality of thinking.

    8. Public services and institutions like schools deserve adequate funding, and they must prioritize the interests of their users, not their workforce or abstract ideological projects.

    9. All people have equal moral worth, but democratic self-government requires the American government to prioritize the interests of American citizens.

    Before getting to his list, Yglesias explains (and here I'll add my comments in brackets):

    Being a Democrat should mean caring more than Republicans about the lives of poor people, about equal rights and non-discrimination, about restraining big business in matters related to pollution and fraudulent practices, and about protecting social insurance for the elderly and disabled. [I'd add everyone else to "poor people," but you could just say 99% if villains are politically useful. Proper, not means-tested, social insurance becomes more valuable as you go up the income scale.]

    These are important progressive ideas, and because they are important progressive ideas, I think that anyone who identifies as a leftist or a progressive should vote for Democrats. [So why try so hard to drive us away? The charge that leftists are all-or-nothing is easily disproven.]

    But that doesn't mean that Democrats' agenda should be driven by those on the far left [or the right, or corporate neoliberalism, or identity groups, or any faction; it should be driven by problems and practical solutions]. A big-tent Democratic coalition needs leftists. But left-wing candidates are rarely winning tough elections, and too often, they're not improving governance of the solidly blue places where they're elected. [Leftists face many obstacles from entrenched forces, including donor-seeking Democrats, but even so, is this really a valid generalization?] . . .

    Most elected Democrats are not, themselves, actually that far left, and when faced with acute electoral peril, they swiftly ditch ideas like defund the police or openness to unlimited asylum claims [which are effectively caricaturs of leftist ideas, propagated to militate against the left]. But what they haven't generally done is publicly disavow the kind of simplistic disparate impact analysis that leads to conclusions like policing is bad. Similarly, the Democrats are not a degrowth party. [Degrowth is an idea that deserves consideration, but isn't a left political position.] When good GDP numbers come in, Joe Biden and his team celebrate them -- they believe in taking credit for strong growth. But even without being a degrowth party, Democrats are heavily influenced by the views of major environmentalist organizations that do have a degrowth ideology at their core.

    Critics on the right charge that Democrats are in the grips of radical ideology, but the truth is more boring: Many elected officials are just not particularly rigorous thinkers (think of how much backbench Republicans have shifted on various policies since Trump took over). Most only really understand a few issues and do a lot of going along to get along. . . .

    Winning elections is important, because if you don't win, you can't govern. [But if you win on the basis of bad ideas that don't work, your governing will have accomplished nothing, and you'll lose again -- at least until the other party reminds people of their own incompetence.]

    The Republican Party is basically just a racket: they lie, cheat, and steal, whatever it takes to ascend to power, so they can lie, cheat, and steal some more. Democrats have to run against Republicans, but they are also expected to tell the truth, to work earnestly for the public good, and to deliver tangible results. Democrats need the left, not just as reliable votes against Republicans, but because the left has useful ideas to solve or at least ameliorate problems that bedevil us. This repeated cycle of "centrist" or "neoliberal" -- Chait prefers the former term, while Yglesias is one of the few who actually embraces the latter -- blaming the left for many failures of the high-roller Democrats they favor needs to stop. Democrats need to figure out how to sell viable solutions to the people, and to deliver them once they are elected. Since most of those solutions come from the left, they need to stop demonizing the left, and start treating us as respectable and honorable.

    PS: Chait just wrote A farewell to New York, so with his new gig at The Atlantic, I guess I won't have him to kick around any more. One more reason not to subscribe.

Israel: This has been my top section ever since Oct. 7, 2023, only pushed down due to the election.

America's Israel (and Israel's America):

Israel vs. world opinion:

Ukraine and Russia:

Elsewhere in the world and/or/in spite of America's empire:

  • Lukas Scholle: [11-09] Germany's coalition collapsed, but recession is here to stay: "German chancellor Olaf Scholz has dismissed his finance minister, Christian Lindner, pitching the country toward elections. Economic woes will be at the center of the campaign -- yet proposals for a break with austerity are are conspicuously absent."

Supreme Court, legal matters, and other crimes:

Climate and environment:

  • Washington Post: [11-11] Nations gather for UN climate talks in Baku, Azerbaijan.

    As nations gather at this year's talks, which are scheduled to run until Nov. 22, delegates will also have to contend with their countries' failure so far to deliver on the central pledge of last year's negotiations. The United States, for one, is producing more oil than any country, ever -- a trajectory expected to accelerate when Trump returns to the White House.


Other stories:

  • Kyle Chayka: [10-30] The banality of online recommendation culture: "A recent surge of human-curated guidance is both a reaction against and an extension of the tyranny of algorithmic recommendations." I didn't have time to write about this piece last week, and don't have time now, but being a guy who both writes and consumers self-styled "consumer guides," this is obviously up my alley. Also as a software engineer, I might note that I was thinking about algorithmic approaches to sharing preference information before many of the better known systems for aggregating such data became available -- none of which, needless to say, I find particularly useful.

    • Ruby Justice Thelot: [09-11] In praise of gatekeeping: "Why we need gatekeepers to resist cultural hyper-optimization." I found this in an open tab next to the Chayka article, so thought I should keep it. I'm not sure that the specifics matter to me. Also, the phrase is a bit loaded. The people I know (or at least the ones I follow) are more likely to be door-openers than gatekeepers.

Obituaries

Books

Chatter

  • Joshua Frank: [10-24] I wrote a book on how John Kerry blew the 2004 election by catering to the right, ignoring the antiwar vote, and outhawking Bush. Twenty years later, Kamala Harris is following the same losing playbook.

  • Aaron Maté: [10-27] If I were the Harris campaign I'd be playing this clip of Trump refusing to support a minimum wage hike on loop. Instead they're palling around with the Cheneys and yelling "fascist" at every turn.

  • David Sirota: [10-29] This is so far beyond parody that you could convince me it's a bit. [Response to Hillary Clinton: New Yorkers: Donald Trump may have Madison Square Garden, but we have Carnegie Hall.]

  • David Klion: [10-31] I'm confused why the Harris campaign thinks it's a good idea to send Bill Clinton to Michigan days before the election to lecture Arab and Muslim voters on the ancient Jewish claim to "Judea and Samaria."

  • Matt Duss: [10-31] It's ridiculous for Trump to claim to be the anti-war candidate and it's also ridiculous that that lane has been left wide open for him.

  • Eric Levitz: [11-96] Interesting how much rightwing propaganda outperforms leftwing propaganda across formats. It's not just that Fox beats MSNBC and the right dominates radio: As Dave Rubin, Tim Pool, and Rogan illustrate, podcasters tend to discover they can maximize their audience by moving right.

  • The Onion: Breaking News: The Onion on the verge of collapse after not being able to make up stuff that is more idiotic than the current reality in our political lives in these United States!

  • Rick Perlstein: [11-12] Don't quit Twitter. Ignoring fascist spaces is bad. Silence impliles assent, shuts down witness of the lies they're devising & the plans they're hatching. Don't initiate threads; the algo will just bury them. Tell the truth in threads, like leafletting an occupied French village.

  • Jeet Heer: [11-12] [Comment in response to Wally Nowinski, who offered a chart I can't read, and said: "Old white folks moved toward Kamala. Every other group moved towards Trump."] This is exactly the result you would get if you ran a pro-system, pro-status quo, hug-the-Cheneys campaign: improvement from those most invested in the system, alienating everyone else.

    [Actually, I find this interesting, perhaps because I belong to the "old white folks" demographic. Could it be that we weren't tuned into social media, so missed a lot of the lies, while we relied on more conventional news sources? Or maybe his point is to lambast us, while blaming the groups with the largest shifts to Trump (topped by black men) on the Harris campaign?]

  • db: [11-13] [illustration is House map, showing Republicans with 218 seats, clinching the majority, vs. 208 for Democrats] We did it! Worst possible world. thank you Kamala, thank you Joe, thank you Barack, and thank you to the DNC for strangling left populism in the crib and all but assuring this outcome! Couldn't have done it without you!

  • Rick Perlstein: [11-14] I have decided that I hate the adjective "unserious" as shorthand for "evil person who is stupid and dangerous and wrong about everything." The people it is purported to describe are plenty serious.

  • Dean Baker: [11-15] It's pretty funny to hear Trump boasting about his huge mandate. No Democrats has ever been elected president with a smaller mandate. I guess we can't expect a reality TV show star to be very good with numbers.
    [Later amended: "sorry, forgot about John Kennedy."]

Allen Lowe [11-07] Facebook post that somehow I managed to see on [11-15], but worth keeping for later:

One of the most annoying results of the election are those who are now standing up and saying the Democrats are gone and corrupt and that's it. Well, I'm not going to join the party of Jill Stein. And the Democrats still have a demographic advantage and still won a large percentage of the votes, and I don't care what you think, they are the only hope. Even Bernie Sanders agrees.

So I don't want to hear about how the billionaires would've won either way. I want to hear about how Biden basically eliminated 50% of child poverty only to be rebuffed by the Republicans when the law wasn't renewed. I want to hear about this huge infrastructure bill which is employing so many people and helping to make unemployment incredibly low. I want to hear about social welfare which flourishes under the Democrats because the agencies make appointments staffed by good people who take care of poor and disabled people. The Republicans staff them with people bent on destroying them and harming people like my disabled son.

I thought we learned our lessons during the prior Trump administration, when those who had told us that Hillary and Trump were the same slunk into the corner with their tails between their legs. Now they're coming out to try to tell us this is what they predicted all along.

Ridiculous, but it does show that many of them secretly hope the United States will sink into oblivion so a revolution will rise from the ashes. More people have to suffer so they can justify their own hallucinatory politics.The only thing that will rise from the ashes is more death and destruction.

Some good comments, like this one by Brian Simontacchi:

I think this is relevant to our conversation yesterday, so I'll just chime in and rebut a couple of your points:

  1. Biden did some very good things, shockingly. My expectations weren't high initially. He exceeded them easily
  2. As long as they try to prevent this outcome, I'll be supportive of Democrats and hold their feet to the fire at the same time. I can walk and chew gum
  3. Billionaires always win. Why spend all that money for no return?
  4. I think it's clear no lessons have been learned at all

I feel like you're working backwards from the conclusion that the outcome determines the causality. I don't think that. I think people, highly susceptible to misinformation and visceral tribalism, are easily manipulated, and Trump and his echo chamber are quite good at pressing those buttons. I think people change their minds with what they think is happening in the news and to them, and they don't care as much about a global or local responsibility to stability, if they ever did. When the billionaires make the global economic trends, they determine which professions and trades are most distressed and how those people will likely respond in an election. Its all coordinated; things will get worse before they get worse.

I'm just here to diagnose trends and be honest. I have no soft spot for billionaires or politicians. I want peace for my neighbors but I have to understand what's happening. Frankly, I have no loyalty to either party, only to harm reduction which I can't even impact from a blue state. If we can't have consistent progress, I'll settle for harm reduction, even though that is not my ultimate goal, or my responsibility to successive generations.

I hope we can talk about this amicably. If we can't, I'll cease and desist.


As best I recall, I've been pretty consistent in believing that Biden, and later Harris, would defeat Trump, but I saw one scenario as particularly ominous: if the wars in Ukraine and Israel drag on through election day (as they have now done), I predicted that many voters would desperately search for an alternative, which could tip the election to Trump. I relaxed my prediction a bit when Harris replaced Biden, figuring she would be seen as less culpable, but she was in Biden's administration, was involved in much of its disastrous foreign policy, and made little if any effort to distance herself from its failures. Worse still, she started campaigning with hawks like Liz Cheney.

I figured I should go back and find the quotes. I've found several bits I wrote on a possible Trump win, so I'll include them here. The main one was from July 24 (actually quoting a July 18 letter), but we'll keep them in order, starting with this one (I'm adding bold in a couple spots):

June 22, 2024:

I find it impossible to believe that most Americans, when they are finally faced with the cold moment of decision, will endorse the increasingly transparent psychopathology of Donald Trump. Sure, the American people have been seduced by right-wing fantasy before, but Reagan and the Bushes tried to disguise their aims by spinning sunny yarns of a kinder, gentler conservatism.

Even Nixon, who still outranks Trump as a vindictive, cynical bastard, claimed to be preserving some plausible, old-fashioned normality. All Trump promises is "taking back" the nation and "making America great again": empty rhetoric lent gravity (if not plausibility) by his unbridled malice toward most Americans. Sure, he got away with it in 2016, partly because many people gave him the benefit of doubt but also because the Clinton spell wore off, leaving "crooked Hillary" exposed as a shill for the money-grubbing metro elites. But given Trump's media exposure, both as president and after, the 2024 election should mostly be a referendum on Trump. I still can't see most Americans voting for him.

That doesn't mean Trump cannot win, but in order to do so, two things have to happen: he has to make the election be all about Biden, and Biden has to come up seriously short. One can ponder a lot of possible issues that Biden might be faulted for, and come up with lots of reasons why they might but probably won't matter. (For example, the US may experience a record bad hurricane season, but will voters blame Biden for that and see Trump as better?) But we needn't speculate, because Biden already has his albatross issue: genocide in Gaza. I'm not going to relitigate his failures here, but in terms of my "optimistic view," I will simply state that if Biden loses -- and such an outcome should be viewed not as a Trump win but as a Biden loss -- it will be well deserved, as no president so involved in senseless war, let alone genocide, deserves another term.

So it looks like the net effect of my optimism is to turn what may look like a lose-lose presidential proposition into a win-win. We are currently faced with two perilous prospects: on the one hand, Biden's penchant for sinking into foreign wars, which he tries to compensate for by being occasionally helpful or often just less miserable on various domestic policies; on the other, Republicans so universally horrible we scarcely need to list out the comparisons. Given that choice, one might fervently hope for Biden to win, not because we owe him any blanket support, but because post-election opposition to Biden can be more focused on a few key issues, whereas with Trump we're back to square one on almost everything.

But if Biden loses, his loss will further discredit the centrist style that has dominated the Democratic Party at least since Carter. There are many problems with that style, most deriving from the need to serve donors in order to attract them, which lends them an air of corruption, destroying their credibility. Sure, Republicans are corrupt too, even more so, but their corruption is consistent with their values -- dog-eat-dog individualism, accepting gross inequality, using government to discipline rather than ameliorate the losers -- so it comes off as honest, maybe even courageous. But Democrats are supposed to believe in public service, government for the people, and that's hard to square with their individual pursuit of power in the service of wealth.

So, sure, a Trump win would be a disaster, but it would free the Democrats from having to defend their compromised, half-assed status quo, and it would give them a chance to pose a genuine alternative, and a really credible one at that. I'd like to think that Democrats could get their act together, and build that credible alternative on top of Biden's half-hearted accomplishments. It would be nice to not have to start with the sort of wreckage Trump left in 2021, or Bush left in 2009, or that other Bush left in 1993 (and one can only shudder at the thought of what Trump might leave us in 2029). But people rarely make major changes based on reasoned analysis. It usually takes a great shock to force that kind of change -- like what the Great Depression did to a nation previously in love with Herbert Hoover, or like utter defeat did to Germany and Japan in WWII.

If there was any chance that a Trump win in 2024 would result in a stable and prosperous America, even if only for the 51% or so it would take for Republicans to continue winning elections, we might have something to be truly fearful of. But nothing they want to do works. The only thing they know how to do is to worsen problems, which are largely driven by forces beyond their control -- business, culture, climate, war, migration -- and all their lying, cheating, and outright repression only rub salt into the wounds. When people see how bad Republican rule really is, their support will wither rapidly.

The question is what Democrats have to do to pick up the support of disaffected Trumpers. One theory is to embrace the bigotry they showed in embracing Trump. A better one would be promise the grit, integrity, independence, and vision that Trump promised by couldn't deliver on, partly because he's a crook and con man who never cared, but largely because he surrounded himself by Republicans who had their own corrupt and/or deranged agendas.

July 18, 2024:

For what little it's worth, here's my nutshell take on Biden:

  1. If he can't get control of the wars in Ukraine and Gaza by early October, he's going to lose, no matter what else happens. For people who don't understand them, they're bad vibes, so why not blame the guy who was in position to do something about them. That may be unfair, but that's what uninformed voters do. And if you do understand them (which I think I do), Biden doesn't look so good either. He sees Ukraine as a test of resolve, and Israel as a test of loyalty, and those views are not just wrong, they kick in his most primitive instincts.

  2. Otherwise, the election will go to whichever side is most effective at making the election into a referendum on the other side. That should be easy when the other side is Trump, but it gets real hard when most media cycles focus on your age and/or decrepitude. That story is locked in, and isn't going away. When your "good news" is "Biden reads from teleprompter and doesn't fumble," you've lost.

  3. Even if Trump's negatives are so overwhelming that even Biden, incapacitated as he is, beats him (and surely it wouldn't be by enough to shut Trump up), do we really want four more years of this?

September 1, 2024:

Nia Prater: [08-27] RFK Jr. and Tulsi Gabbard are joining the Trump transition team: I noted this story last week, dismissing it with "sounds like something, but probably isn't." Here I should note that while it probably isn't, it could actually be something. Kennedy and Gabbard have a lot of traits that discredit them as presidential candidates, but the one thing they do have is pretty consistent antiwar track records, which they are not just committed to, but are eager to use against Biden and Harris, who are not exactly invulnerable to such charges. Moreover, they can say that they left the Democratic Party because they opposed how hawkish the Party had become -- so hawkish that even Trump would be a safer and more sensible foreign policy option. It remains to be seen how credible they'll be, because, well, on most other issues they're nuts, but on this one, they could be more credible than Trump himself to people with real concerns. I've said all along that if Biden doesn't get his wars under control, he will lose in November. The switch to Harris gives Democrats a partial reprieve, but the one thing she is most seriously vulnerable on is the suspicion that Democrats are going to continue saddling us with senseless and hopeless foreign wars. Kennedy and Gabbard could be effective at driving that point home -- sure, not to rank-and-file Democrats, who are generally much more dovish than their leaders, and who are even more wary of Republicans on that count, but to the "undecideds," who know little, even of what little they know.

September 9, 2024:

Robert Wright: [09-26] Is Trump a peacenik? No, but if you're worried that Biden (now Harris) is a bit too fond of war, he says a vote for him will save you from WWIII. And given that American politicians of both parties have long and ignominious histories of lying about wanting peace while blundering into war, and given how little reliable information there is about either, there may be enough gullible but concerned people to tilt the election. Wright reviews some of the contradictions here, and there are much more that could be considered.

I've been worried about just this prospect all along, and I remain worried. I don't have time to explain all the nuances, but very briefly, Biden has done a very bad job of managing US foreign affairs, failing to make any progress dealing with a number of very manageable hostilities (North Korea, Venezuela, Iran, many others) while letting two crises (Ukraine, Gaza) drag into prolonged wars that he seemingly has no interest in ever resolving (at least he doesn't seem to be putting in any effort). The only good thing you can say about his handling of Afghanistan is that he dodged the worst possible option, which was to stick around and keep losing. And while he's made money for the arms and oil industries, both have made the world a much more dangerous place. And then there's China -- do we really need to go there?

One might reasonably think that anyone could have done a better job than Biden has done, but we actually know one person who had every same opportunity, and made them all worse: Donald Trump, the president before Biden. Is there any reason to think that Trump might do better with a second chance? The plus side is that he may be more wary this time of relying on the "deep state" advisers who steered him so badly. (Biden, too, was plagued by their advice, but he seemed to be more in tune with it -- the only changes Biden made in US foreign policy were to reverse Trump's occasional unorthodox lapses, especially what he viewed as softness on Russia.)

On the other hand, Trump brings a unique set of disturbing personal characteristics to the job: he cares more about perception than reality; he wants to be seen as very tough, but he's really just a whiney bitch; he's majorly ignorant, and incoherent on top of that; he's impetuous (but he can usually be talked down, because he rarely has any reasons for what he wants to do); he's vain and narcissistic; he has no empathy with people he meets, so has no idea how to relate with them (e.g., to negotiate any kind of agreement); he has no sympathy for other people, so he has no cares for anything wrong that could happen; he has a weird fascination with using nuclear weapons, so that's one of the things he often has to be talked down from; I know I already said that he's ignorant and implied that he's clueless, but he's also pretty stupid about how most things in the modern world actually work. He does, however, have a keen interest in graft, and a passing admiration for other right-wing demagogues, if only because he admires their art and sees them as his peers. About the only thing I can see as a positive is that he doesn't seem to feel any personal need for war to prove his masculinity -- for that he's satisfied abusing women.

I'm sure there are more, but these at least make the point. After Harris took over, I hoped that she might be held less responsible, and other factors would give her a chance. I also resisted all the hectoring from the left, figuring that's just what we normally do, even if it's not helpful at the moment. Besides, I knew that I couldn't really do anything about it: that the forces in motion were way too powerful for whatever I think to make any difference at all. So I just went with it.

But now I'm left with all these doubts: about my own judgment and understanding, about other people, about the whole notion of sides. I'm getting old, and tired, and frustrated. And while it's premature to say that we have no future, I can't see any viable path for me to continue working like this.

Therefore, this is my last Speaking of Which post. Probably ever, at least not for quite some well. I have a Jazz Poll to run, and that's going to be enough of a time sink to last me to January. I'll keep posting Music Week, probably as long as I'm able, possibly with a new burst of energy but more likely with diminishing returns. The political book I've contemplated for twenty-some years now is definitely dead. Much of it would have been practical advice on how Left Democrats might more effectively frame issues. Clearly, I'm in no position to do that.

I may consider writing up more "blue sky" policy ideas. I've always been very fond of Paul Goodman's Utopian Essays and Practical Proposals, which gives me the perfect subtitle. But each chunk of that would take considerable work to research and whip into shape, and I have little confidence of doing that. The more serious writing project would be to return (or restart) the memoir. I don't know that will be of any interest, but it's a subject I know, have thought about, and often find myself slipping into, and it could be a springboard for anything else I wanted to slip in.

The other obvious project would be to go back and review the several million words I've written (most collected here, from the founding of the notebook and/or blog up to some point in 2022) and see what can be packaged into something useful. A couple people have looked at this, and thrown their hands up in the air. When I look, I see lots of things that still strike me as worthwhile, but I, too, have little idea what to do with them. My ideal solution would be to find an editor willing to work on spec, but I can't imagine why anyone would want to do that.

If anyone is interested in nattering on about this life decision, you can contact me through the little-used question form.


Original count: 265 links, 26798 words (31647 total)

Current count: 320 links, 33358 words (39350 total)

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Tuesday, November 5, 2024


Music Week

November archive (in progress).

Music: Current count 43118 [43099] rated (+19), 36 [41] unrated (-5).

We got to the polls later than I expected, so I had some time early today to fiddle with, and I used it to add more links to yesterday's Speaking of Which (up to 159, from 135). Vox emailed me a couple election anxiety/guide articles, so I figured it wouldn't hurt to cite them. I sometimes imagine going back through the blog for notes to write a journal-type book, so it's nice to have a fairly competent record, even if much of it is of passing interest. My latest concept for such a book would be subtitled What I Learned During the 2024 Election. Most of what I've learned is how irrational people can be in weighing matters of politics. Main downside to developing that idea is that most of my notes are from people who are well-informed and exceptionally rational. Explaining the 40-60% of Americans who are supposed to be voting for Trump today is going to take more research, and it's not likely to be pretty.

I'm a bit surprised that the rated count this week is only 19, but we're a couple days short of a week, and in a bit of a down cycle. I am finally nearing the end of my bedroom/closet project. I did some more caulking today, around the trim (which already has one coat, but in various places needs another). I'll sand and paint tomorrow. It'll probably take another day to touch up spots where I colored outside the lines. I'm a pretty lousy painter, so that happens more often than it should. That leaves the problem with the ceiling (masking tape pulled down strips and splotches of paint), but I'm going to kick that back to the guy who plastered and painted the ceiling in the first place, and it shouldn't take him long.

I got all the paneling up in the closet, including new boards for the ceiling. I put the lights back up this afternoon. Next thing there is to cut some trim boards and screw them in place. The boards are prepped, and most of that should go pretty quickly. I don't have a plan for finishing it yet, but we don't have to do that part before moving back into the bedroom (actually, more of an office, but it has a futon, which works for a spare bed). What we will still need to do is cleaning, sorting, and reorganizing, but that's an ongoing process everywhere.

My next big project should be the Francis Davis Jazz Critics Poll. I'll try to set up the website next week, and get invites out the week after. Biggest uncertainty there is communications, as my email list last year (and mid-year) proved pretty unreliable. That probably means paying for a commercial list provider, as it's almost impossible to avoid spam blacklisting on your own -- presumably, that is doable if that's your business, otherwise you wouldn't have a business. We also need to vet new critics. I'm thinking of setting up an advisory board to help on things like that, as well as to sanity-check my own thinking and coding. If you're interested in helping, or just know of a critic we should be polling, please get in touch.

As for my own writing, the next two months should be a good time to re-evaluate what, if anything, I still might try to work on.

I've resisted checking the news all evening, which should hold out until I get this (and the Speaking of Which) updates up, around 11 PM CDT.


New records reviewed this week:

T.K. Blue: Planet Bluu (2022 [2024], Jaja): Saxophonist, mostly alto, b. 1953 in New York as Eugene Rhynie, parents Jamaican and Trinidadian, recorded several albums as Talib Kibwe (1987-96), side credits including Randy Weston and Sam Rivers, made his debut as T.K. Blue in 1999. Very spirited mainstream group here. B+(**) [cd]

John Cale: POPtical Illusion (2024, Domino): Originally from Wales, made his mark in New York as a co-founder of the Velvet Underground, playing electric violin on first two albums. Now 82, with his 18th studio album, not counting various collaborations (including notable ones with Terry Riley, Lou Reed, and Brian Eno) and many soundtracks. This reminds me much of his early 1970s albums, his baroque phase, not that he hasn't picked up a few tricks since then. B+(***) [sp]

Avishai Cohen: Ashes to Gold (2023 [2024], ECM): Israeli trumpet player (not the bassist), albums since 2002. Quartet with piano (Yonathan Avishai), bass (Barak Mori), and drums (Ziv Ravitz). This is quite nice. B+(**) [sp]

The Cure: Songs of a Lost World (2024, Fiction): English art rock band, principally Robert Smith, debut 1979, one of those 1980s bands other people seemed to like but I never developed any attachment to. Hit their commercial peak with Wish in 1992 (UK: 1, US: 2), dropped back to a record every four years after that, until 2008, then a 16-year gap until this one, which I was surprised to find well reviewed (91/29 at AOTY). I recall very little of that, but there are impressive patches here, and some not so. B+(*) [sp]

The Dare: What's Wrong With New York? (2024, Republic): New rave singer-songwriter Harrison Smith, from Los Angeles, previously known as Turtlenecked, had a 2022 single that got him noticed by Charli XCX, giving him a bit role on Brat. First album (as The Dare, anyway), 10 songs, 27:24, makes an impression. B+(*) [sp]

Joe Fahey: Andrea's Exile (2024, Rough Fish): Folkie singer-songwriter, another nice album. B+(**) [sp]

Nubya Garcia: Odyssey (2024, Concord Jazz): British tenor saxophonist, parents from Guyana and Trinidad, debut EP in 2017, various lineups here, including vocal features for Esperanza Spalding and Georgia Anne Muldrow plus her own spoken word. I'm not wild about that turn, but I'm more bothered by the soundtrack texturing. B [sp]

Rich Halley 4: Dusk and Dawn (2023 [2024], Pine Eagle): Tenor saxophonist, from Portland, has run up a string of superb albums ever since I first noticed him in 2005, about the time when he retired from his day job (as I recall, but he's 77 now, and had a couple earlier albums I still haven't heard). His last two albums were elevated by pianist Matthew Shipp. Here he's back with his old quartet: Michael Vlatkovich (trombone), Clyde Reed (bass), and Carson Halley (drums, his son). Little if any drop here, the trombone a definite plus. A- [cd]

Jazzmeia Horn: Messages (2024, Empress Legacy): Jazz singer, from Dallas, fourth album since 2017, impressive range, some scat, I'm unclear on credits. B+(**) [sp]

Randy Ingram: Aries Dance (2024, Sounderscore): Pianist, originally from Alaska, studied at USC and NEC, has a half-dozen albums since 2009, this a nice mainstream trio with Drew Gress (bass) and Billy Hart (drums), playing six originals and three standards. B+(**) [cd]

Ryan Keberle & Catharsis: Music Is Connection (2023-24 [2024], Alternate Side): Trombone player, albums since 2006, adopted the group name in 2012, has increasingly used vocals, sings some himself but mostly Camila Meza here (also on guitar). With Jorge Roeder (bass) and Eric Doob (drums), plus a spot for saxophonist Scott Robinson. I like the trombone more than the vocals, but the latter grew on me. B+(***) [cd]

Jason Keiser: Kind of Kenny (2024, OA2): Guitarist (acoustic, steel string & nylon string), from San Francisco, second album, also features John Stowell (electric guitar & baritone fretless guitar), with a tribute to Kenny Wheeler, with Erik Jekabson (trumpet/flugelhorn), Michael Zilber (tenor/soprano sax), and Danielle Wertz (vocals). B+(**) [cd]

Laura Marling: Patterns in Repeat (2024, Chrysalis/Partisan): English singer-songwriter, seventh studio album since 2008, a quiet affair of voice and acoustic guitar, against a background of dubbed-in strings. B+(**) [sp]

Thollem McDonas: Infinite-Sum Game (2023 [2024], ESP-Disk): Pianist, originally from Bay Area, many albums since 2004, often just goes as Thollem. Solo set, recorded in Dublin, pretty engaging as these things go. B+(***) [cd]

Nacka Forum: Peaceful Piano (2024, Moserobie): Swedish quartet, founded 1999, not sure whether they qualify as "all-stars," but all players you should know on their own: Goran Kajfes (trumpet), Jonas Kullhammar (reeds), Johan Berthling (bass), Kresten Osgood (drums), with a couple guest spots for Lars-Göran Ulander (alto sax, "known from the legendary '60s recordings"). No piano. None needed. A- [cd]

NLE Choppa: Slut Szn (2024, Warner, EP): Memphis rapper Bryson Potts, first singles/mixtape 2018, two albums, this is 8-song, 21:56 set is counted as his eighth mixtape. Very jumpy, but runs down fast. B+(*) [sp]

Pony Boy All-Star Big Band: This Is Now: Live at Boxley's (2024, Pony Boy): Seattle-based big band, led by drummer/arranger Greg Williamson, also exists as a 7-piece "mini big band." Seems to be their first album, the group taking its name from an independent jazz label that has several dozen other albums, but few names I'm familiar with. My promo came with a bonus CD (two tracks, 15:58, from an earlier date). B+(**) [cd]

Brandon Seabrook: Object of Unknown Function (2023 [2024], Pyroclastic): Plays banjo and guitar, solo here, supplemented by electronics/tapes. I'm impressed, but without much pleasure. B+(*) [cd]

Luke Winslow-King: Flash-a-Magic (2024, Bloodshot): Singer-songwriter, originally from Michigan, at least eight albums since 2008. B+(*) [sp]

Recent reissues, compilations, and vault discoveries:

Terry Gibbs Dream Band: Vol. 7: The Lost Tapes, 1959 (1959 [2024], Whaling City Sound): Vibraphonist, still ticking at 100 -- his first album was Good Vibes in 1951, his "last" the quite good 92 Years Young from 2017, or perhaps 2022's The Terry Gibbs Songbook, credited to Terry Gibbs Legacy Band, which he played some on, and he's still listed as producer here. He led a big band in 1959, with Mel Lewis on drums, Bill Holman on tenor sax (and arranging), and other cool jazz notables, with Marty Paich, Med Flory, Manny Albam, and Al Cohn among the arrangers. They produced four albums through 1961, starting with Launching a New Band, and since 1986's Dream Band various of their concert tapes have been released, through 2006's superb Vol. 6. This latecomer is one of the best, ferocious swing and crackling power extended over 71 minutes. A- [cd]

Old music:

  • None.


Unpacking: Found in the mail last week:

  • Lemadi Trio: Canonical Discourse (A New Wave of Jazz Axis) [10-15]
  • Tonus: Analog Deviation (A New Wave of Jazz Axis) [10-15]
  • Transition Unit: Fade Value (A New Wave of Jazz Axis) [10-15]
  • Martina Verhoeven Quintet: Indicator Light (Live at Paradox 2023) (A New Wave of Jazz Axis) [10-15]

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Monday, November 4, 2024


Speaking of Which

Draft file opened 2024-11-01 5:10 PM.

Trying to wrap this up Monday afternoon, but I keep sinking into deep comments, like the Müller entry below, to which I could easily add another 3-5 paragraphs. Now I need to take a long break and do some housework, so I'm not optimistic that I'll be able to add much before posting late this evening. We're among the seeming minority who failed to advance vote, so will trek to the polls tomorrow and do our bit. As I've noted throughout (and even more emphatically in my Top 10 Reasons to Vote for Harris vs. Trump), I'm voting for Harris. While Kansas is considered a surefire Trump state -- the silver lining here is that we're exposed to relatively little campaigning -- around my neighborhood the Harris signs outnumber the Trump signs about 10-0 (seriously, I haven't seen a single one, although I've heard of Harris signs being stolen). Not much down ballot activity either, although if I find any more Democrats, I'll vote for them (minimally, our state legislators, who are actually pretty good).

In the end, it got late and I gave up. Perhaps I'll add some more tidbits tomorrow, but my more modest plans are to go vote, stop at a restaurant we like after voting, and finish the bedroom trim paint. Presumably there'll be a Music Week before the day's done, but not really a lot to report there.

Soon as I got up Tuesday, I found myself adding a couple "chatter" items, so I guess I'm doing updates on Election Day. In which case, I might as well break my rule and include a sample of the extremely topical items that will become obsolete as soon as they start counting ballots. I'll keep them segregated here:


Top story threads:

Israel:

America's Israel (and Israel's America):

Israel vs. world opinion:

  • Juan Cole: [11-02] As UN warns entire population of Gaza is at risk of death, Bill Clinton says he's not keeping score. Here's a report on Clinton's campaign for Harris:

  • Nada Elia: [11-01] On vote shaming, and lesser evils: "I will not be shamed into voting for a candidate who supports the genocide of the Palestinian people, and no one who supports progressive issues should be either." Hers is a vote against Harris -- not sure in favor of who or what -- and I think we have to respect her conviction, even if one disagrees with her conclusion. We need people opposed to genocide more than we need voters for Harris, not that the two need be exclusive. Elections never just test one red line, so they require us to look beyond simple moral judgments and make a messy political one. Agreed that Harris fails on this red line -- as does her principal (and only practical) opponent, arguably even worse[*] -- but there are other issues at play, some where Harris is significantly preferable to Trump, none where the opposite is the case. I don't have any qualms or doubts about voting for Harris vs. Trump. But I respect people who do.

    [*] Harris, like Biden (with greater weight of responsibility), is a de facto supporter of Israel committing genocide, but she does not endorse the concept, and remains in denial as to what is happening (unaccountably and, if you insist, inexcusably, as there is little room for debating the facts). Trump, on the other hand, appears to have explicitly endorsed genocide (e.g., in his comments like "finish the job!"). Both the racism that separates out groups for collective punishment -- of which genocide is an extreme degree -- and the penchant for violent punishment are usually right-wing traits, which makes them much more likely for Trump than for Harris. And Trump's right-wing political orientation is more likely to encourage and sustain genocide in the future, as it derives from his character and core political beliefs.

    Some other pieces on the genocide voting conundrum (probably more scattered about, since I added this grouping rather late):

  • Chris Hedges: [10-31] Israel's war on journalism.

    There are some 4,000 foreign reporters accredited in Israel to cover the war. They stay in luxury hotels. They go on dog and pony shows orchestrated by the Israeli military. They can, on rare occasions, be escorted by Israeli soldiers on lightning visits to Gaza, where they are shown alleged weapons caches or tunnels the military says are used by Hamas.

    They dutifully attend daily press conferences. They are given off-the-record briefings by senior Israeli officials who feed them information that often turns out to be untrue. They are Israel's unwitting and sometimes witting propagandists, stenographers for the architects of apartheid and genocide, hotel room warriors.

    Bertolt Brecht acidly called them the spokesmen of the spokesmen.

    And how many foreign reporters are there in Gaza? None.

    The Palestinian reporters in Gaza who fill the void often pay with their lives. They are targeted, along with their families, for assassination.

    At least 134 journalists and media workers in Gaza, the West Bank and Lebanon, have been killed and 69 have been imprisoned, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists, marking the deadliest period for journalists since the organization began collecting data in 1992.

  • Jonathan Ofir: [10-30] New UN Special Rapporteur report warns Israel's genocide in Gaza could be expanding to the West Bank: "A new report by Francesca Albanese."

  • Wamona Wadi: [11-03] CNN finally covered the Gaza genocide -- from the point of view of Israeli troops with PTSD: Don't laugh. That's a real thing, a form of casualty that's rarely calculated, or for that matter even anticipated, by war planners. It should be counted as reason enough not to start wars that can possibly be avoided, which is pretty much all of them. Perhaps it pales in comparison to the other forms of trauma unleashed by war, but it should be recognized and treated the only way possible, with peace.

  • Videos: I have very little patience for watching videos on computer, but the one with Suárez came highly recommended, and the title shows us something we need to be talking about now. When I got there, I found much more, so I noted a few more promising titles (not all vetted, but most likely to be very informative).

Election notes: First of all, I'm deliberately not reporting on polling, which right or wrong will be obsolete in a couple days, and saves me from looking at most of this week's new reporting. Two more notes this week: this section has sprawled this week, as I've wound up putting many pieces that cover both candidates, or otherwise turn on the election results, here; also, I'm struck by how little I'm finding about down-ballot races (even though a lot of money is being spent there). I'm sure I could find some surveys, as well as case stories, but Trump-Harris has so totally overshadowed them that I'd have to dig. And even though for most of my life, I've done just that, I feel little compulsion to do so right now.

  • Thomas B Edsall: [10-30] Let me ask a question we never had to ask before: A survey of "a wide range of scholars and political strategists," asking not who will win, but who will blamed by the losers.

  • Saleema Gul: [10-31] A community divided: With Gaza on their minds, Muslim and Arab Americans weigh their options ahead of election day: Such as they are, which isn't much.

  • John Herrman: Democrats are massively outspending the GOP on social media: "It's not even close -- $182 million to just $45 million, according to one new estimate." As I recall, Republicans were way ahead on social media in 2016 (with or without Russian contributions), and that was seen as a big factor. (But also, as I recall, Facebook's algorithms amplified Trump's hateful lies, while Democratic memes were deemed too boring to bother with.)

  • Ben Kamisar: [11-03] Nearly $1 billion has been spent on political ads over the last week. Most of this money, staggering amounts, is being spent on down-ballot races, including state referenda.

  • Howard Lisnoff: [11-01] We're in some deep shit: Now that's a clickbait title, as you have to click to get to anything specific, of which many subjects are possibilities. Turns out it's mostly about Jill Stein: not what you'd call an endorsement -- his own view is summed up in the Emma Goldman quote, "if voting changed anything they'd make it illegal" -- but using anti-Stein hysteria as a prism for exposing the vacuousness of the Democrats, as if Trump wasn't in the race at all (his name only appears once, in a quote about 2016). Links herein:

    • Matt Flegenheimer: [10-23] Jill Stein won't stop. No matter who asks. "People in Stein's life have implored her to abandon her bid for president, lest she throw the election to Donald Trump. She's on the ballot in almost every critical state." This piece is, naturally, totally about how she might siphon votes from Harris allowing Trump to win, with nothing about her actual positions, or how they contrast with those of Harris and Trump. Even Israel only gets a single offhand mention:

      Her bid can feel precision-engineered to damage Ms. Harris with key subgroups: young voters appalled by the United States' support for Israel; former supporters of Bernie Sanders's presidential campaigns who feel abandoned by Democrats; Arab American and Muslim voters, especially in Michigan, where fury at Ms. Harris and President Biden has been conspicuous for months.

      The Sanders comment seems like a totally gratuitous dig -- he is on record as solidly for Harris even considering Israel, and few of his supporters are likely to disagree. The other two points are the same, and have been widely debated elsewhere (including several links in this post), but the key thing there is that while Stein may benefit from their disaffection, she is not the cause of it. The cause is American support for genocide, which includes Biden and Harris, but also Trump, Kennedy, and nearly everyone in Congress.

    • Glenn Greenwald: Kamala's worst answers yet? A 38:31 video with no transcript, something I have zero interest in watching, although the comments are suitably bizarre (most amusing: "Consequences of an arrogant oligarchy and descending empire").

  • Dan Mangan: [11-02] Shock poll shows Harris leading Trump in Iowa. An exception to my "no polls stories" policy. My wife mentioned this poll to me, as a possible reason to vote for Harris in Kansas where she had been planning on a write-in.

  • Parker Molloy: [11-04] We already know one big loser in this election: the mainstream media: "When your most loyal supporters start questioning your integrity, that's not just a red flag -- it's a siren blaring in the newsroom."

  • Clara Ence Morse/Luis Melgar/Maeve Reston: [10-28] Meet the megmadonors pumping over $2.5 billion into the election: The breakdown of the top 50 is $1.6B Republican, $752M Democratic, with $214M "supportive of both parties" (mostly crypto and realtor groups). The top Democratic booster is Michael Bloomberg, but his $47.4M this time is a drop in the bucket compared to the money he spent in 2020 to derail Bernie Sanders.

  • Nicole Narea: [11-01] 2024 election violence is already happening: "How much worse could it get if Trump loses?" I'm more worried about: how much worse could it get if Trump wins? It's not just frustration that drives violence. There's also the feeling that you can get away with it -- one example of which is the idea that Trump will pardon you, as he's already promised to the January 6 hoodlums. Nor should we be too sanguine in thinking that frustration violence can only come from the right. While rights are much more inclined to violence, anyone can get frustrated and feel desperate, and the right has offered us many examples of that turning violent.

  • Margaret Simons: [11-02] Can democracy work without journalism? With the US election upon us, we may be about to find out: "Most serious news organisations are not serving the politically disengaged, yet it's these voters who will decide the next president." Seems like a good question, but much depends on what you mean by journalism. Although I have many complaints about quality, quantity doesn't seem to be much of a problem -- except, as compared to the quantity of PR, which is over the top, and bleeding into everything else. As for "soon find out," I doubt that. While honest journalism should have decided this election several months ago, the commonplace that we're now facing a "toss up" suggests that an awful lot of folks have been very poorly informed. Either that, or they don't give a fuck -- (not about their votes, but about what consequences they may bring -- which is a proposition that is hard to dismiss. There are many things that I wish reporters would research better, but Donald Trump isn't one of them.

  • Jeffrey St Clair: [11-01] Notes on a phony campaign: strange days.

  • Margaret Sullivan: [11-04] The candidates' closing campaign messages could not be more different: Well, aside from automatic support for America's global war machine, extending even to genocide in Israel, and the unexamined conviction that "the business of America is business," and that government's job is to promote that business everywhere. But sure, there are differences enough to decide a vote on: "There is hateful rhetoric and threats of retribution from one side, and messages of inclusion and good will from the other." But haven't we seen this "bad cop, good cop" schtick before? Or "speak softly, but carry a big stick"? These are the sort of differences that generate a lot of heat, but very little light.

  • Zoe Williams: [10-31] An excess of billionaires is destabilising politics -- just as academics predicted: "Politicians have always courted the wealthy, but Elon Musk and co represent a new kind of donor, and an unprecedented danger to democracy."

  • Endorsements:

Trump:

  • The New Republic: [10-21] The 100 worst things Trump has done since descending that escalator: "Some were just embarrassing. Many were horrific. All of them should disqualify him from another four years in the White House." I ran this last week, but under the circumstances let's run it again. If I had the time, I'm pretty sure I'd be able to write up 20+ more, many of which would land in the top 20. For instance, Israel only merits 2 mentions, at 76 and 71, and the latter was more about him attacking George Soros: no mention of moving the embassy to Jerusalem, or many other favors that contributed to the Oct. 7 revolt and genocide. Ditching the Iran deal came in at 8, but no mention of assassinating Iranian general Qasem Soleimani (I hope I don't need to explain why). There is only one casual reference to Afghanistan (22. Escalates the drone war), none that he protracted the war four years, knowing that Biden would be blamed for his surrender deal to the Taliban. He gets chided for his being "pen pals with Kim Jong Un," but not for failing to turn his diplomacy into an actual deal. Not all of these items belong in a Trivial Pursuit game, but most would be overshadowed by real policy disasters if reporters could look beyond their Twitter feeds.

  • Zack Beauchamp: [11-02] It's not alarmist: A second Trump term really is an extinction-level threat to democracy: "Why a second Trump term is a mortal threat to democracy -- though perhaps not the way you think." Having written a recent book -- The Reactionary Spirit: How America's Most Insidious Political Tradition Swept the World (I bought a copy, but haven't gotten into it yet -- on this broad theme, he predictably offers us a rehash with a minor update. It's nice to see him dialing back the alarmism, enough to see the real longer-term erosion:

    If the first Trump term was akin to the random destruction of a toddler, a second would be more like the deliberate demolition of a saboteur. With the benefit of four years of governing experience and four more years of planning, Trump and his team have concluded that the problem with their first game of Jenga was that they simply did not remove enough of democracy's blocks.

    I do not think that, over the course of four more years, Trump could use these plans to successfully build a fascist state that would jail critics and install himself in power indefinitely. This is in part because of the size and complexity of the American state, and in part because that's not really the kind of authoritarianism that works in democracies nowadays.

    But over the course of those years, he could yank out so many of American democracy's basic building blocks that the system really could be pushed to the brink of collapse. . . .

    A second Trump term risks replacing Rawls's virtuous cycle with a vicious one. As Trump degrades government, following the Orbánist playbook with at least some success, much of the public would justifiably lose their already-battered faith in the American system of government. And whether it could long survive such a disaster is anyone's guess.

    While "toddler" is certainly apt, eight years later he hasn't changed that aspect much, and in many ways he's even regressed. His narcissistic petulance is ever more pronounced, which may be why many people dismiss the threat of a second term as hysteria. No matter how naughty he wants to be, even as president he can't do all that much damage on his own. He looks like, and sounds like, the same deranged blowhard he's always been, but one thing is very different this time: he and his activist cult have found each other. As president, he will empower them from day one, and they'll not only do things he can only dream of, but they will feed him new fantasies, carefully tailored to flatter him and his noxious notions of greatness, because they know, as we all should realize by now, that job one is stoking his ego.

    No doubt much of what they try will blow up before it causes real harm -- nobody thinks that, even with a Republican Senate, Big Pharma is going to let RFK Jr. destroy their vaccination cash cow -- and much of what does get promulgated and/or enacted will surely blow back, driving his initially record-low approval rates into the ground. But he knows better than to let GOP regulars construct "guard rails" with responsible "adults in the room." The loyalty of everyone he might hire now can be gauged by their track record -- both what they've said in the past, and how low they can bow and scrape now (Vance is an example of the latter, of how to redeem yourself in Trump's eyes, although I'd surmise that Trump's still pretty wary of him).

    PS: Here's a video of Beauchamp talking about his book: The realignment: The rise of reactionary politics.
  • Aaron Blake: [11-01] Trump's latest violent fantasy: "Trump keeps painting pictures of violence against his foes despite allegations of fascism. And Republicans keep shrugging."

  • Sidney Blumenthal: [11-02] Donald Trump's freakshow continues unabated: "Trump insists on posing as the salient question of the election: are you crazier today than you were four years ago?"

  • Kevin T Dugan: [11-01] Wall Street's big bet on a Trump win: "Gold, bitcoin, prisons, and oil are all thought to be the big moneymakers for the financial class if Trump wins another term." More compelling reasons to sink Trump.

  • Michelle Goldberg: [11-01] What I truly expect if an unconstrained Trump retakes power.

  • Steven Greenhouse: [10-30] Trump wants you to believe that the US economy is doing terribly. It's untrue: "Despite his claims to the contrary, unemployment is low, inflation is way down, and job growth is remarkably strong." But unless you're rich, can you really tell? And if you're rich, the choice comes down to: if you merely want to get richer, you'd probably be better off with the Democrats (who have consistently produced significantly higher growth rates, ever since the Roaring '20s crashed and burned), but if you really want to feel the power that comes with riches, you can go with one of your own, and risk the embarrassment. And funny thing is, once you've decided which side you're on, your view of the economy will self-confirm. From any given vantage point, you can look up or down. That's a big part of the reason why these stories, while true enough, have virtually no impact (except among the neoliberal shills that write them).

  • Arun Gupta: [11-01] Triumph of the swill: A night at the Garden with Trump and MAGA. About as good a blow-by-blow account as I've seen so far. Ends on this note:

    Eight years wiser and with four years to plan, Trump, Miller, and the rest of MAGA are telling us they plan to occupy America. They are itching to use the military to terrify, subjugate, and ethnically cleanse. The only liberation will be for their violent desires and that of their Herrenvolk who went wild at mentions of mass deportations. They loved the idea.

    Also by Gupta:

    • [10-29] Night of the Fash: "At Madison Square Garden with Trump and his lineup of third-rate grifters and bigots." An earlier, shorter draft.

    • [11-04] Kamala says she'll "end the war in Gaza": "For opponents of Israel's genocide, sticking to principles gets results. But for Harris, her flip-flop is a sign of desperation." I don't really believe her -- it's going to take more than a sound bite to stand up to the Israel lobby -- but I would welcome the sentiment, and not just make fun of her. It may be desperate, but it's also a tiny bit of timely hope, much more plausible than the magic Trump imagines.

  • Margaret Hartmann: [11-01] Trump's ties to Jeffrey Epstein: Everything we've learned: "Michael Wolff claims he has Epstein tapes about Trump, and saw compromising Trump photos."

  • Antonia Hitchens:

    • [11-03] Trump's final days on the campaign trail: "Under assault from all sides, in the last weeks of his campaign, the former President speaks often of enemies from within, including those trying to take his life."

    • [10-19] Inside the Republican National Committee's poll-watching army: "The RNC says it has recruited tens of thousands of volunteers to observe the voting process at precincts across the country. Their accounts of alleged fraud could, as one Trump campaign official put it, "establish the battlefield" for after November 5th."

  • Chris Hooks: [11-02] The brainless ideas guiding Trump's foreign policy: "Conservatives recently gathered in Washington to explain how they would rule the world in a second Trump term. The result was incoherent, occasionally frightening, and often very dumb." My first reaction was that one could just as easily write "The brainless ideas guiding Democrats' foreign policy," but then I saw that the author is referring to a specific conference, the Richard Nixon Foundation's "Grand Strategy Summit."

  • Marina Hyde: [11-01] Trump may become president again -- but he's already a useful idiot to the mega rich: "They make nice with him when it suits, ridicule him when he's not listening. Their lives are money and gossip -- with him they get both."

  • Ben Jacobs: [11-04] The evolving phenomenon of the Trump rally: "Rarely boring, always changing, and essential to his appeal."

  • Hannah Knowles/Marianne LeVine/Isaac Arnsdorf: [11-01] Trump embraces violent rhetoric, suggests Liz Cheney should have guns 'trained on her face': "The GOP nominee often describes graphic and gruesome scenes of crimes and violence, real and imagined."

  • Eric Levitz: [11-01] Elon Musk assures voters that Trump's victory would deliver "temporary hardship"; "And he's half right." Meaning the hardship, but not necessarily "temporarily":

    Now, as the race enters the homestretch, Musk is trying to clinch Trump's victory with a bracing closing argument: If our side wins, you will experience severe economic pain.

    If elected, Trump has vowed to put Musk in charge of a "government efficiency commission," which would identify supposedly wasteful programs that should be eliminated or slashed. During a telephone town hall last Friday, Musk said his commission's work would "necessarily involve some temporary hardship."

    Days later, Musk suggested that this budget cutting -- combined with Trump's mass deportation plan -- would cause a market-crashing economic "storm." . . .

    This is one of the more truthful arguments that Musk has made for Trump's election, which is to say, only half of it is false. If Trump delivers on his stated plans, Americans will indeed suffer material hardship. But such deprivation would neither be necessary for -- nor conducive to -- achieving a healthier or more sustainable economy.

    After discussing tariffs and mass deportation, Levitz offer a section on "gutting air safety, meat inspections, and food stamps will not make the economy healthier." He then offers us a silver lining:

    Trump's supporters might reasonably argue that none of this should trouble us, since he rarely fulfills his campaign promises and will surely back away from his economically ruinous agenda once in office. But "don't worry, our candidate is a huge liar" does not strike me as a much better message than "prepare for temporary hardship."

  • Nicholas Liu: [10-31] Trump nearly slips attempting to enter a garbage truck for a campaign stunt.

  • Carlos Lozada: [10-31] Donald and Melania Trump were made for each other: Basically a review of her book, Melania. The title could just as well read "deserve each other," but that suggests a measure of equality that has never been remotely true.

    Melania's relationship with Donald is among the book's haziest features. She depicts her initial attraction to him in superficial terms: She was "captivated by his charm," was "drawn to his magnetic energy" and appreciated his "polished business look." He was not "flashy or dramatic," she writes, but "down-to-earth." And though we know how he speaks about women in private, Melania writes that "in private, he revealed himself as a gentleman, displaying tenderness and thoughtfulness." The one example she offers of his thoughtfulness is a bit unnerving: "Donald to this day calls my personal doctor to check on my health, to ensure that I am OK and that they are taking perfect care of me."

  • Clarence Lusane: [10-31] The black case against Donald Trump: "Hold Trump accountable for a lifetime of anti-black racism."

  • Branko Marcetic: [10-31] 'Anti-war' Trump trying to outflank Harris at critical moment: "It may be a cynical strategy, but he seems to have read the room while she has chosen a more confused, if not hawkish, path." This has long been my greatest worry in the election.

  • Amanda Marcotte:

  • Peter McLaren: [11-03] Donald Trump versus a microphone: a head bobbing performance.

  • Jan-Werner Müller: [11-04] What if Trump's campaign is cover for a slow-motion coup? "Even if Trump can't really mobilize large numbers of people to the streets, just prolonging a sense of chaos might be enough." Why are people so pre-occupied with imagining present and future threats that have already happened? I'm sorry to have to break the news to you, especially given that you think the election tomorrow is going to be so momentous, but the "slow motion coup" has already happened. Trump, while easily the worst imaginable outcome, is just the farce that follows tragedy. The polarization isn't driven by issues, but by personality types. A lot of people will vote for Trump not because they agree with him, but because in a rigged system, he's the entertainment option. He will make the other people suffer -- his very presence drives the rest of us crazy -- and Trump voters get off on that. And a lot of people will vote against him, because they don't want to suffer, or in some rare cases, they simply don't like seeing other people suffer. Harris, actually much more than Biden or Obama or either Clinton, is a very appealing candidate for those people (I can say us here), but is still can be trusted not to try to undo the coup, to restore any measure of real democracy, let alone "power to the people."

    Here's a way to look at it: skipping past 1776-1860, there have been two eras in American history, each beginning in revolution, but which fizzled in its limited success, allowing reaction to set in, extending the power of the rich to a breaking point. The first was the Civil War and Reconstruction, which gave way to rampant corruption, the Gilded Age and Jim Crow, ultimately collapsing in the Great Depression. The second was the New Deal, which came up with the idea of countervailing powers and a mixed economy with a large public sector, mitigating the injustices of laissez-faire while channeling the energy of capitalism into building a widely shared Affluent Society.

    But, unlike the Marxist model of proletarian revolution, the New Deal left the upper crust intact, and during WWII they learned how to use government for their own means. The reaction started to gain traction after Republicans won Congress in 1946, and teamed with racist Democrats to pass Taft-Hartley and other measures, which eventually undermined union power, giving businesses a freer hand to run things. Then came the Red Scare and the Cold War, which Democrats joined as readily as Republicans, not realizing it would demolish their popular base. Dozens of similar milestones followed, each designed to concentrate wealth and power, which both parties increasingly catered to, seeing no alternative, and comforted with the perks of joining the new plutocracy.

    One key milestone was the end of the "fairness doctrine" in the 1980s, which surrendered the notion that there is a public interest as opposed to various private interests, and incentivized moguls to buy up media companies and turn them into propaganda networks (most egregiously at Fox, but really everywhere). Another was the end of limits on campaign finance, which has finally reduced electoral politics to an intramural sport of billionaires. (Someone should issue a set of billionaire trading cards, like baseball cards, with stats and stories on the back. I googled, and didn't find any evidence of someone doing this.) Aside from Bernie Sanders, no one runs for president (or much else) without first lining up a billionaire (or at least a near-wannabe). They have about as much control over who gets taken seriously and can appear on a ballot as the Ayatollah does in Iran.

    The main thing that distinguishes this system from a coup is that it's unclear who's ultimately in charge, or even if someone is. Still, that could be a feature, especially as it allows for an infinite series of scapegoats when things go wrong -- as, you may have noticed, they inevitably do.

  • Nicholas Nehamas/Erica L Green: [10-31] Trump says he'll protect women, 'like it or not,' evoking his history of misogyny.

  • Jonathan O'Connell/Leigh Ann Caldwell/Lisa Rein: [11-02] Conservative group's 'watch list' targets federal employees for firing.

  • Andrew Prokop: [09-26] The Architect: Stephen Miller's dark agenda for a second Trump term: "Miller has spent years plotting mass deportation. If Trump wins, he'll put his plans into action." I think the most important thing to understand about Miller isn't how malevolent he is, but that he's the archetype, the exemplar for all future Trump staff. He clearly has his own deep-seated agenda, but what he's really excelled at is binding it to Trump, mostly through utterly shameless flattery.

  • Aaron Regunberg: [11-01] Why is the Anti-Defamation League running cover for Trump? "Yes, it's fair to compare Trump's Madison Square Guarden spectacle to the Nazi rally of 1939."

  • Aja Romano/Anna North: [11-05] The new Jeffrey Epstein tapes and his friendship with Trump, explained.

  • Dylan Scott: [10-30] The existential campaign issue no one is discussing: "What happens if another pandemic strikes -- and Trump is the president." Mentions bird flu (H5N1) as a real possibility, but given Trump's worldview and personal quirks, one could rephrase this as: what happens if any unexpected problem strikes? I'm not one inclined to look to presidents for leadership or understanding, but the least we should expect is the third option in "lead, follow, or get the hell out of the way." Trump is almost singularly incapable of any of those three options. Moreover, where most people manage to learn things from experience, Trump jumps to the wrong conclusions. Case in point: when Trump got Covid-19 in 2016, he could have learned from the experience how severe the illness is, and how devastating it could be for others; instead, he recovered, through treatment that wasn't generally available, and came out of it feeling invincible, holding superspreader events and ridiculing masks. I've long believed that a big part of his polling bounce was due to people foolishly mistaking his idiocy for bravura.

  • Marc Steiner: [10-30] The failures of liberals and the left have helped Trump's rise: "Feckless Democrats and a disorganized Left have fed fuel to the MAGA movement's fire." Interview with Bill Fletcher Jr. and Rick Perlstein.

  • Kirk Swearingen: [11-02] Donald Trump was never qualified to be president -- or anything else: "After a lifetime of lying, failure and incompetence, this conman stands at the gates of power once again."

  • Michael Tomasky: [11-04] Donald Trump has lost his sh*t: "There is no 'context' for performing fellatio on a microphone. He's gone batty. The only remaining question is whether enough voters recognize it."

Vance, and other Republicans:

Harris:

  • Eric Levitz: [10-22] If Harris loses, expect Democrats to move right: "Even though Harris is running as a moderate, progressives are likely to get blamed for her defeat." I haven't read this, as it's locked up as a "special feature for Vox Members," but the headline is almost certainly wrong, and the subhed is very disputable -- I've already seen hundreds of pieces arguing that if Harris fails, it will be because she moved too far to the right, and in doing so risked discredit of principles that actually resonate more with voters. (And if she wins, it will be because she didn't cut corners like that on abortion, but stuck to a strong message.) No doubt, if she loses, the Democrats and "centrist" who never miss a chance to slam the left will do so again -- you can already see this in the Edsall piece, op. cit. -- but how credible will they be this time? (After, e.g., trying to blame first Sanders then Putin for Hillary Clinton's embarrassing failure in 2016.)

    If Harris loses, she will be pilloried for every fault from every angle, which may be unfair, but is really just a sign of the times, a rough measure of the stakes. But if Trump wins, the debate about who to blame is going to become academic real fast. Republicans are not going to see a divided nation they'd like to heal with conciliatory gestures. They're going to plunge the knife deeper, and twist it. And as they show us what the right really means, they will drive lots of people to the left, to the people who first grasp what was going wrong, and who first organized to defend against the right. And the more Trump and his goons fuck up (and they will fuck up, constantly and cluelessly), the more people will see the left as prescient and principled. The left has a coherent analysis of what's gone wrong, and what can and should be done about it. They've been held back by the centrists -- the faction that imagines they can win by appealing to the better natures of the rich while mollifying the masses with paltry reforms and panic over the right -- but loss by Harris, following Clinton's loss, will leave them even more discredited.

    As long-term politics, one might even argue that a Trump win would be the best possible outcome for the left. No one (at least, no one I know of) on the left is actually arguing that, largely because we are sensitive enough to acute pain we wish to avoid even the early throes of fascist dictatorship, and possibly because we don't relish natural selection winnowing our leadership down to future Lenins and Stalins. But when you see Republicans as odious as Bret Stephens and George Will endorsing Harris, you have to suspect that they suspect that what I'm saying is true.

  • Stephen Prager/Alex Skopic: [11-01] Every Kamala Harris policy, rated. This is a seriously important piece, the kind of things issues-oriented voters should be crying out for. But the platforms exists mostly to show that Harris is a serious issues-oriented candidate, and to give her things to point to when she pitches various specific groups. Anything that she wants will be further compromised when the donor/lobbyists and their hired help (aka Congress, but also most likely her Cabinet and their minions) get their hands on the actual proposals. Given that the practical voting choice is just between Harris and Trump, that seems like a lot of extra work -- especially the parts, like everything having to do with foreign policy, that will only make you more upset.

    Nathan J Robinson introduced this piece with an extended tweet, making the obvious contrasts to Trump ("a nightmare on another level"). I might as well unroll his post here:

    The differences between a Trump and Harris presidency: An unprecedented deportation program with armed ICE agents breaking down doors and tearing families from their homes in unfathomable numbers, total right-wing capture of the court system, ending every environmental protection.

    Workplace safety rules will be decimated (remember, the right doesn't believe you should have water breaks in the heat), Israel will be given a full green light to "resettle" Gaza, all federal efforts against climate change will cease, international treaties will be ripped up . . .

    There will be a war on what remains of abortion rights (if you believe the right won't try to ban it federally you're the world's biggest sucker), protests will be ruthlessly cracked down on (with the military probably, as Tom Cotton advocated), journalists might be prosecuted . . .

    Organized labor's progress will be massively set back, with Trump letting policy be dictated by billionaire psychopaths like Elon Musk who think workers are serfs. JD Vance endorsed a plan for a massive war on teachers' unions. Public health will be overseen by RFK antivaxxers . . .

    If you think things cannot be worse, I would encourage you to expand your imagination. Trump is surrounded by foaming-at-the-mouth authoritarians who believe they are in a war for the soul of civilization and want to annihilate the left. I am terrified and you should be too.

Walz, Biden, and other Democrats:

  • Ana Marie Cox: [11-01] Tim Walz has broken Tucker Carlson's brain: "The former Fox News host is so flummoxed by Kamala Harris's running mate that he's resorting to immature, homophobic schoolyard taunts."

  • Ralph Nader: [11-04] The Democratic Party still can adopt winning agendas. Obviously, the "there is still time" arguments are finally moot for 2024, not that the principles are wrong. This makes me wonder what would have happened had Nader run as a Democrat in 2000, instead of on a third party. Sure, Gore would have won most of the primaries, but he could have gotten a sizable chunk of votes, possibly nudged Gore left of Lieberman and Clinton, and if Gore still lost, set himself up for an open run in 2004.

Supreme Court, legal matters, and other crimes:

Climate and environment:

Business, labor, and Economists:

Ukraine and Russia:

Elsewhere in the world and/or/in spite of America's empire:


Other stories:

  • Victoria Chamberlin: [11-02] How Americans came to hate each other: "And how we can make it stop." Interview between Noel King and Lilliana Mason, author of Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity (2018), and Radical American Partisanship (2022, with Nathan P Kalmoe). She seems to have a fair amount of data, but not much depth. There is very little hint here that the polarization is asymmetrical. While both sides see the other as treats to their well-being, the nature of those threats are wildly different, as are the remedies (not that the promise of is in any way delivered).

  • Ezra Klein: [11-01] Are we on the cusp of a new political order? Interview with Gary Gerstle, author of The Rise and Fall of the Neoliberal Order: America and the World in the Free Market Era. I've noted him as a "big picture" historian, but I've never read him. But he makes a fair amount of sense in talking about neoliberalism here, even though I resist rooting it my beloved New Left. But I can see his point that a focus on individual freedom and a critique of the institutions of the liberal power elite could have served the reactionaries, not least by pushing some liberals (notably Charles Peters) to refashion themselves, which proved useful for Democratic politicians from Jimmy Carter on. This sort of dovetails with my argument that the New Left was a massive socio-cultural success, winning major mind share on all of its major fronts (against war and racism, for women and the environment) without ever seizing power, which was deeply distrusted. That failure, in part because working class solidarity was discarded as Old Left thinking, allowed the reactionaries to bounce back, aided by neoliberals, who helped them consolidate economic power.

    Gerstle offers this quote from Jimmy Carter's 1978 state of the union address:

    Government cannot solve our problems. It can't set our goals. It cannot define our vision. Government cannot eliminate poverty or provide a bountiful economy or reduce inflation or save our cities or cure illiteracy or provide energy. And government cannot mandate goodness.

    One thing I'm struck by here is that four of these sentences immediately strike us as plausible, given how little trust we still have in government -- a trust which, one should stress, was broken by the Vietnam War. However, the other sentence is plainly false, and Carter seems to be trying to pull a fast one on us, disguising a pretty radical curtailment of functions that government is the only remedy for: eliminating poverty (spreading wealth and power), providing a bountiful economy (organizing fair markets and making sure workers are paid enough to be consumers), reducing inflation, saving cities, curing illiteracy (schools), providing energy (TVA, for example; more privatization here, not the best of solutions, but kept in check by regulation -- until it wasn't, at which point you got Enron, which blew up).

    But once you realize you're being conned, go back and re-read the paragraph again, and ask why? It's obvious that government can solve problems, because it does so all the time. The question is why doesn't it solve more problems? And the answer is often that it's being hijacked by special interests, who pervert it for their own greed (or maybe just pride). Setting goals, defining vision, and mandating goodness are less tangible, which moves them out of the normal functioning of government. But such sentences only make sense if you assume that government is an independent entity, with its own peculiar interests, and not simply an instrument of popular will. If government works for you, why can't it promote your goals, vision, and goodness? Maybe mandates (like the "war on drugs") are a step too far, because democracies should not only reflect the will of the majority but also must respect and tolerate the freedom of others.

  • Elizabeth Kolbert: [2017-02-19] Why facts don't change our minds: An old piece, seemingly relevant again."

Obituaries

Books

  • Ta-Nehisi Coates: The Message: I'm finally reading this book, so linking it here was the easiest way to pick up the cover image. It took a while to get good, but the major section on Israel/Palestine is solid and forceful.

Music (and other arts?)

Chatter

  • Dean Baker: [11-03] quick, we need a major national political reporter to tell us Donald Trump is not suffering from dementia, otherwise people might get the wrong idea. [on post quoting Trump ("we always have huge crowds and never any empty seats") while panning camera on many empty seats.]

  • Jane Coaston: [11-04] Every white nationalist is convinced that almost every other person is also a white nationalist and that's a level of confidence in the popularity of one's views I do not understand.

    Rick Perlstein comments: I have a riff about that in my next book. I call it "epistemological narcissism": right-wingers can't imagine anyone could think differently than themselves. They, of coruse, only being different in having the courage to tell the truth . . .

  • Iris Demento: [11-05] Happy crippling anxiety day [followed by bullet list from 1972:

    • "Nixon Now" - Richard M. Nixon, 1972 (also, "Nixon Now, More than Ever" and "President Nixon. Now more than ever")
    • "Come home, America" - George McGovern, 1972
    • "Acid, Amnesty, and Abortion for All" - 1972 anti-Democratic Party slogan, from a statement made to reporter Bob Novak by Missouri Senator Thomas F. Eagleton (as related in Novak's 2007 memoir, Prince of Darkness)
    • "Dick Nixon Before He Dicks You" - Popular anti-Nixon slogan, 1972
    • "They can't lick our Dick" - Popular campaign slogan for Nixon supporters

    Remembering 1972, I contributed a comment:

    1972 was the first time I voted. I hated Nixon much more than I hate Trump today. (Not the word I would choose today; maybe I retired it after Nixon?) I voted for McGovern, and for Bill Roy, who ran a remarkable campaign against the hideous Bob Dole, and for Jim Juhnke against our dull Republican Rep. Garner Shriver. Those three were among the most decent and thoughtful people who ever ran for public office in these parts. I voted for whatever Republican ran against the horrible Vern Miller and his sidekick Johnny Darr. In a couple cases, I couldn't stand either D or R, so wasted my vote with the Prohibitionist (a minor party, but still extant in KS). Not a single person I voted for won. I was so despondent, I didn't vote again until 1996, when I couldn't resist the opportunity to vote against Dole again. (I was in MA at the time.) I've voted regularly since then. After moving back to KS in 1999, I got another opportunity to vote for whatever Republican ran against Vern Miller, and we beat him this time (although for the most part, my winning pct. remains pretty low).

  • Paul Krugman: [no link, but cited in a post called Trump could make contagion great again] I expect terrible things if Trump wins. Until recently, however, "explosive growth in infectious diseases" wasn't on my Bingo card [link to article on RFK Jr. saying "Trump promised him 'control' of HHS and USDA]


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Thursday, October 31, 2024


Music Week

October archive (final).

Music: Current count 43099 [43065] rated (+34), 41 [46] unrated (-5).

This post has been pushed back two or three days this week, mostly for reasons explained in yesterday's Speaking of Which (somewhat augmented today), which in turn was delayed by my Tuesday posting of my Top 10 Reasons to Vote for Harris vs. Trump (also posted at Notes on Everyday Life, which is currently open for comments -- although beware that all but mine are held for moderation, and I don't seem to be getting notification of pending comments, so I have to think to look for them).

I sent early links out to a dozen old friends, off the top of my head, to which I only got one reply (plus one comment, at the site, both feeling that I was overly generous to Harris, one insisting on voting for Stein, neither sowing any doubts in my mind). Maybe it's all too blindingly obvious, or just too tired, to elicit interest? At this point, what more do you need to know than this Seth Meyers A Closer Look?

As noted, I took a chunk of time out last week for my birthday dinner. More details on it in the notebook. I'll probably do a second round next week: the leftovers are pretty much gone -- I reheated the rice tonight, to go with red cooked pork cubes, but that's about all that's left. The dinner came out of the two Burmese cookbooks in the "Recent Reading" log, but I've yet to really crack' open Cradle of Flavor -- maybe next year (or maybe sooner) I'll finally see what I can do with Indonesian/Malaysian.

I have nothing much to say about this week's music. I did want to get to the NoBusiness batch, which got me looking for unheard Arthur Blythe albums, which led to some more finds on YouTube. I don't recall what got me looking at the Soul Jazz back catalog, but the label was a favorite back when I was writing Recycled Goods, so I'm inclined to check out anything I find. I also got some good tips from the latest Riotriot.

Plan now is to open a new Speaking of Which draft file tomorrow, and post whatever I can before election day, so Monday, November 4, with Music Week on Tuesday. That'll make for a short week, which will be even more limited by a combination of burnout and feeling helpless. I may just focus more on the bedroom/closet project. I had a setback yesterday when I peeled my masking tape off the ceiling and found it ripped off large patches of paint. I'm not even sure how to fix that, but it's pretty much guaranteed to be painful.

I opened up a draft file for November Streamnotes, but didn't do the indexing for October. I may be farther behind than that. I got my first 2025 release promos, so had to open up files for them. Again, I cut a few corners. Unlikely I will play any 2025 releases until after New Year's Day. Still a lot of 2024 to catch up on.

Also need to start focusing on Jazz Critics Poll. Voting for that should start mid-November. Most pressing things are to get the website prepped, and to line up a new mailing list vendor -- my own DIY efforts have proven to be inadequate, but I can see several reasons to pay for something if it would work flexibly enough.


New records reviewed this week:

Amyl and the Sniffers: Cartoon Darkness (2024, B2B/Virgin): Australian pub/punk rock band, third album since 2019, Amy Taylor the singer-songwriter. I'm not deciphering (or perhaps I mean remembering?) many words, but after multiple plays this is sounding great -- even the unnecessary change of pace. A- [sp]

Jason Anick/Jason Yeager: Sanctuary (2023 [2024], Sunnyside): Violin and piano, couple albums each since 2011, with Yeager on Annick's 2013 album. Nice postbop group with two trumpets (Jason Palmer and Billy Buss), tenor sax (Edmar Colón), cello, bass, and drums. B+(***) [cd]

The Attic & Eve Risser: La Grande Crue (2023 [2024], NoBusiness): Portuguese tenor saxophonist Rodrigo Amado's trio (Gonçalo Almeida on bass and Onno Govaert on drums), with several superb albums so far, joined here by the French pianist, for another one. A- [cd]

David Bailis: Tree of Life (2024, Create or Destroy): Guitarist, side credits back to 2007 but this seems to be his first album under his own name, a short one (27:34), four originals and one cover, with Chris Speed (tenor sax), Eric Lane (piano/synth bass), and Jason Nazary (drums), nicely done. B+(**) [cd]

Dharma Down: Owl Dreams (2023 [2024], Dharma Down): Quartet from Portland, ME, quartet of Duncan Hardy (alto sax/qanun -- an Assyrian string instrument, for a bit of Middle Eastern spice), Mike Effenberger (piano), Scott Kiefner (bass), John Meltam (drums). B+(*) [cd]

Etran De L'Aïr: 100% Saharan Guitar (2024, Sahel Sounds): "The longest running wedding band in Agadez, capital of Tuareg guitar," promises more of the same, and delivers, as usual, on what I count to be their third album, but who knows how far back they go? B+(***) [sp]

Joel Futterman: Innervoice (2024, NoBusiness): Free jazz pianist, born (1946) in Chicago, affiliated with AACM before moving to Virginia in 1972, has many records since then. This one is solo, more measured than most, but very engaging. B+(***) [cd]

Hinds: Viva Hinds (2024, Lucky Number): Spanish indie pop band, started as a duo of Carlotta Cosials and Ana Garcia Perrotte as Deers, expanded to a quartet for their 2016-20 albums, back to a duo (with touring support) now. Includes a couple songs in Spanish, which surprise me as high points. A- [sp]

Shawneci Icecold/Vernon Reid/Matthew Garrison & Grant Calvin Weston: Future Prime (2024, Underground45): Pianist, synths here, has straddled hip-hop and avant-jazz since 2021, splits the difference here with a fusion (guitar/bass/drums) quartet. Five songs (32:51), starting with "A Night in Tunisia" and "Zawinul" before blasting off into space. B+(***) [cd]

J.U.S X Squadda B: 3rd Shift (2024, Bruiser Brigade): Detroit rapper, two previous albums since 2021, with an Oakland-based producer, nothing else by him on Discogs. B+(***) [sp]

Nick Lowe & Los Straitjackets: Indoor Safari (2024, Yep Roc): Singer-songwriter, started way back in pub rock, invented power pop, faded after 1979 but never went away, with Party of One (1990) his only later album to hit A- in my book. Faint echoes here, but I can hear some. B+(*) [sp]

Michael McNeill: Barcode Poetry (2022 [2024], Infrasonic Press): Pianist, from Buffalo, impressed me totally out of the blue with his 2012 debut (Passageways), returns here with a real chamber jazz quartet, with Susan Alcorn (pedal steel guitar), Dave Ballou (trumpet), and Shelly Purdy (vibes, percussion). Sounded a bit weepy at first, and I do have trouble focusing when the going gets slow, but I found myself checking and rechecking, and the music gradually won me over. B+(***) [cd]

Yuka Mito: How Deep Is the Ocean (2024, Nana Notes): Standards singer, originally from Japan, now based in New York, has a previous album, backed here by piano, bass, and drums, offers seven very obvious songs (29:46), including two Jobims, two from Bacharach-David, a Porter, a Berlin, and "How High the Moon." All nicely, if unremarkably, done. B [cd]

Mavis Pan: Rising (2023 [2024], self-released): Pianist, sings some (just one song here), born in Taiwan, moved to New Jersey when she was 17, first album 2010, has a Master of Music degree, but also a M.A. from Westminster Theological Seminary. Original compositions, co-produced by Ted Nash, who plays tenor sax, flute, and clarinet. Also with Greg Burke (alto/soprano sax, alto flute, clarinet), bass, and drums. B+(*) [cd]

William Parker/Hugo Costa/Philipp Ernsting: Pulsar (2023 [2024], NoBusiness): Recorded in Amstmerdam, an all-improv set of bass, alto sax, and drums, with Costa getting the lead in the credits short, but Parker on the cover, presumably because you've heard of him. Parker seems to pick up a couple records like this every time he wanders off to Europe. My favorite is one called And William Danced, with Anders Gahnold, but they're all pretty good. Costa has several albums, including a duo and a group called Albatre with Ernsting. This is pretty inspired avant-thrash. A- [cd]

Pest Control: Year of the Pest (2024, Quality Control HQ, EP): Dan Weiss pegged them as "my ideal metal band," which I took as both warning and challenge, but figured I could handle 4 songs, 10:27, of anything. I wound up giving them a second spin. Note that Bandcamp page doesn't tag this as metal: their proferred terms include "uk thrash," "hardcore punk," and (first on the list) "nwobhc" (whatever that stands for; at least I can guess "ukhc"). B+(***) [sp]

Tyshawn Sorey Trio: The Suspectible Now (2024, Pi): Drummer-led trio with Aaron Diehl (piano) and Harish Raghavan (bass), "following on the heels of his masterful release Continuing, which was voted #4 release of 2023 by the Francis Davis Poll of over 150 jazz critics." Most likely another top-five contender, although I'd be hard-pressed to distinguish it from the Vijay Iyer trio that won the mid-year poll, and remains the early favorite. Sorey's arrangements of four long pieces written by others, not really standards but interesting source material. B+(***) [cd]

Ben Waltzer: The Point (2023 [2024], Calligram): Pianist, debut was a trio from 1996, only a couple records since, plus a few scattered side credits. Quartet here where Geof Bradfield (tenor sax/bass clarinet) and Clark Sommers (bass) also contribute originals, plus Dana Hall (drums), and a closing, rather delicate cover of "A Flower Is a Lovesome Thing." B+(**) [cd]

Immanuel Wilkins: Blues Blood (2024, Blue Note): Alto saxophonist, third album since 2020, all on Blue Note, first two overcame my initial caution, a couple side appearances also blew me away. Sax is also impressive here, but toned down a bit, making way for several guest vocals, which I could do without. Wilkins has polled very well since winning our debut award, and I expect this will also -- I've already seen one review touting it as the record of the year, but I'll pass. B+(**) [sp]

Recent reissues, compilations, and vault discoveries:

Arthur Blythe Quartet: Live From Studio Rivbea: July 6, 1976 (1976 [2024], NoBusiness): Alto saxophonist (1940-2017), from Los Angeles, recorded two masterpieces for Columbia in 1978, In the Tradition and Lenox Avenue Breakdown, after after a couple minor label releases in 1977. This live set, the second volume in the label's "Studio Rivbea" series, is just a bit earlier, a quartet with Juni Booth (bass), Steve Reid (drums), and Muhammad Abdullah (conga). B+(***) [cd]

Electro Throwdown: Sci-Fi Inter-Planetary Electro Attack on Planet Earth 1982-89 (1982-89 [2024], Soul Jazz): No hits here, the only artist name I recall is Jonzun Crew, but the echoes of "Planet Rock" and "Trans-Europe Express" (both mentioned in the notes) are easy to pick up, and pretty satisfying in and of themselves. B+(**) [r]

In the Beginning There Was Rhythm (1978-84 [2024, Soul Jazz): Reissue of the label's founding compilation from 2001, this captures the evolutionary moment when British punks embraced hard dance beats. Great idea for a compilation, and it starts off promisingly, but runs a little thin, just about when yoy start to wonder where New Order is. B+(***) [sp]

Old music:

George Adams-Don Pullen Quartet: Jazzbühne Berlin '88 (1988 [1991], Repertoire): Leaders play tenor sax and piano, came together under Charles Mingus circa Changes, and produced some outstanding albums over the next decade, with Cameron Brown (bass) in place of Mingus, and Lewis Nash (drums) replacing Dannie Richmond here. Three long pieces, originals (with a nod to Monk). Pullen is an absolutely unique pianist, who shines early on. Adams is hardly the only real powerhouse saxophonist, but when he hits his stride, he's undeniable. A- [yt]

Ray Anderson: Harrisburg Half Life (1980 [1981], Moers Music): Trombonist, early album recorded in Germany, with Allan Jaffe (guitar), Mark Dresser (bass), and Gerry Hemingway (drums). Good start toward the later (from 1989 on) BassDrumBone trios, where Mark Helias replaced Dresser. B+(***) [yt]

Black Arthur Blythe: Bush Baby (1977 [1978], Adelphi): The alto saxophonist's first studio album -- two earlier live sets appeared on India Navigation, one before and the other after this release -- a trio with Bob Stewart on tuba and Ahkmed Abdullah on congas. B+(***) [yt]

Boombox 3: Early Independent Hip Hop, Electro and Disco Rap 1979-83 (1979-83 [2018], Soul Jazz, 2CD): Third volume in a series that started in 2016, the previous volumes rated A- and B+(***) here, with a couple later releases breaking from the naming convention. More obscure, but sounding very typical of the early Sugarhill-dominated period. B+(***) [r]

Deutsche Elektronische Musik: Experimental German Rock and Electronic Musik 1972-83 (1972-83 [2010], Soul Jazz): Starts with Can, and hits many major groups (but no Kraftwerk). Still, not much really grabs me. Three more volumes were added later, including 3, which I previously graded B+(*). B+(*) [r]

Deutsche Elektronische Musik 2: Experimental German Rock and Electronic Musik 1971-83 (1971-83 [2013], Soul Jazz): Digital has 14 tracks, which is more than the 2-LP's 12 but way less than the 2-CD's 27 (or the later 25-track 4-LP release). B+(*) [r]

Lloyd McNeill: Elegia (1979 [2019], Soul Jazz): Perhaps better known as a painter (1935-2021), played flute and recorded several albums 1968-79, one more in 1997, this the fifth reissued by the label. B+(*) [r]

Punk 45: I'm a Mess! D-I-Y or Die! Art, Trash & Neon: Punk 45s in the UK 1977-78 (1977-78 [2022], Soul Jazz): Extending what was previously a six-CD series -- all good, the Cleveland volume (Extermination Nights in the Sixth City an A-), more obscurities: I don't recall ever hearing of these groups, much less their singles (16 on the digital, other formats vary). B+(**) [r]

Space Funk 2: Afro Futurist Electro Funk in Space 1976-84 (1976-84 [2023], Soul Jazz): More crate digging, following their previous (2019) volume, leaning into early hip-hop (choice cut: "Smurf Trek," by Chapter Three). B+(**) [r]

Wiener Art Orchester: Tango From Obango (1979 [1980], Art): Group founded 1977 by Mathias Rüegg, aka Vienna Art Ochestra, ran through 2010 wtih a couple vocal albums as Vienna Art Choir. They were especially notable for their eclectic borrowings from classical music, as well as from Americans like Gershwin, Ellington, Mingus, and Dolphy. Cover notes: "This music is dedicated to the people and the Sea of Obango," but I'm not finding any other references to that location. But the opening tango is delightful, and after that it's anyone's guess. B+(***) [yt]


Unpacking: Found in the mail last week:

  • Big Bambi: Compositions for Bass Guitar & Bassoon, Vol. I (ESP-Disk) [09-27]
  • Steve Coleman and Five Elements: PolyTropos/Of Many Turns (Pi) [10-25]
  • Day Dream: Duke & Strays Live: Works by Duke Ellington & Billy Strayhorn (Corner Store Jazz, 2CD) [11-08]
  • David Friesen: A Light Shining Through (Origin) [11-22]
  • Al Jarreau: Wow! Live at the Childe Harold (1976, Resonance) [12-06]
  • Thollem McDonas: Infinite-Sum Game (ESP-Disk) [10-18]
  • Reut Regev's R*Time: It's Now: R*Time Plays Doug Hammond (ESP-Disk) [11-15]
  • Steve Smith and Vital Information: New Perspective (Drum Legacy) [02-07]
  • Dave Stryker: Stryker With Strings Goes to the Movies (Strikezone) [01-10]
  • Friso van Wijck: Friso van Wijck's Candy Container (TryTone) [11-01]

Ask a question, or send a comment.

Wednesday, October 30, 2024


Speaking of Which

File opened 2024-10-24 01:36 AM.

I've been trying to collect my thoughts and write my up Top 10 Reasons to Vote for Harris vs. Trump. I posted an early draft -- just the top 10 list -- on Monday afternoon at Notes on Everyday Life, then blanked out and didn't get to the second part ("Top 5 Reasons Electing Harris Won't Solve Our Problems") until Tuesday afternoon (and well into evening). I updated the NOEL draft that evening, and finally posted the file in the blog. That pushes this file out until Wednesday, and Music Week until Thursday (which still fits in October).

As of Tuesday evening, this week's collection is very hit-and-miss (100 links, 6023 words), typed up during odd breaks as I juggled my life between working on my birthday dinner, writing the endorsement, and struggling with my big remodeling project.

The endorsement could do with some editing, although my initial distribution of the link has thus far generated almost no comment (one long-time friend wrote back to disagree, having decided -- "even in a battleground state" -- to vote for Jill Stein). A year ago I still imagined writing a book that might have some small influence on the election. In some ways, this piece is my way of penance for my failure, but the more I got into it, the more I thought I had some worthwhile points to make. But now it's feeling like a complete waste of time.

The birthday dinner did feel like I accomplished something. The Burmese curries were each spectacular in their own way, the coconut rice nice enough, the ginger salad and vegetable sides also interesting, and the cake (not Burmese, but spice-and-oats) was an old favorite. I should follow it up with a second round of Burmese recipes before too long, especially now that I've secured the tea leaf salad ingredients.

Slow but tangible progress on the bedroom/closet remodel. Walls are painted now, leaving trim next. Paneling is up in closet, where I still have the ceiling and quite a bit of trim. [Wednesday morning now:] I've been meaning to go out back and polyurethane the trim boards, so I can cut them as needed, first to shore up the ceiling. But it's raining, so I'll give that pass for another day, and probably just work on this straggling post. Laura's report of morning news is full of gaffes by Biden and Hillary Clinton, who seem intent on redeeming the dead weight of their own cluelessness by imposing it on Harris. With "friends" like these, who needs . . . Dick Cheney?

Posting late Wednesday night, my usual rounds still incomplete. I'll decide tomorrow whether I'll add anything here, or simply move on to next week (which really has to post before election results start coming in). For now, I'm exhausted, and finding this whole process very frustrating.


Top story threads:

Israel:

  • Mondoweiss:

  • Ruwaida Kamal Amer/Ibtisam Mahdi: [10-24] For Gaza's schoolchildren, another year of destruction, loss, and uncertainty.

  • Tareq S Hajjaj: [10-25] Survivors of north Gaza invasion report Israeli 'extermination' campaign: "Survivors of the ongoing Israeli extermination campaign in north Gaza describe how the Israeli army is separating mothers from children before forcing them south, executing civilians in ditches, and directly targeting hospitals and medical staff."

  • Shatha Hanaysha: [10-25] 'Our freedom is close': why these young Palestinian men choose armed resistance: "I met resistance fighters from the Tulkarem Brigade for an interview in the alleyways of Tulkarem refugee camp in the occupied West Bank. They talked about why they fight against Israel, and what their dreams are for the future." This is disturbing. I find it impossible to feel solidarity or even sympathy with people who would fight back against Israel, even if purely out of self-defense. But it is understandable, and has long been predicted, every time Israel has renewed its war on Gaza (going back at least to 1951): virtually all people, when oppressed, will fight back. That they should do so, why and why, is mostly a function of the people who are driving them to such desperate measures. We'd see less of this if only we were clear on who is responsible for setting the conditions that make such rebellion seem like the only recourse, especially if we made it clear that we'll hold those who control an area as the sole ones responsible for the rebellions they provoke. Sure, I can think of some cases where control was nebulous and/or revolts were fueled by external forces, but that is not the case with Israel in Gaza. Israel is solely responsible for this genocide. And if armed resistance only accelerates it, that is solely because Israel wants it that way.

  • Gideon Levy: [10-25] Beatings, humiliation and torture: The IDF's night of terror at a Palestinian refugee camp: "Israeli soldiers abused people during a raid on a remote refugee camp in the territories. During their violent rampage, the troops detained 30 inhabitants, of whom 27 were released the next day."

  • Mohammed R Mhawish/Ola Al Asi/Ibrahim Mohammad: [10-23] Inside the siege of northern Gaza, where 'death waits around every corner': "Limbs scattered on the streets, shelters set ablaze, hundreds trapped inside hospitals: Palestinians detail the apocalyptic scenes of Israel's latest campaign."

  • Qassam Muaddi:

  • Jonathan Ofir: [10-28] Israeli journalists join the live-streamed genocide: "A mainstream Israeli journalist recently blew up a house in Lebanon as part of a news report while embedded with the military. The broadcast shows how mainstream genocidal activity has become in Israeli society."

  • Meron Rapoport:

  • Christiaan Triebert/Riley Mellen/Alexander Cardia: [10-30] Israel Demolished Hundreds of Buildings in Southern Lebanon, Videos and Satellite Images Show: "At least 1,085 buildings have been destroyed or badly damaged since Israel's invasion targeting the Hezbollah militia, including many in controlled demolitions, a New York Times analysis shows." Same tactics, reflecting the same threats and intentions Israel is using on Gaza, except that you can't even pretend to be responding to an attack like Oct. 7. Hezbollah is being targeted simply because it exists, and Lebanon is being targeted because Israelis make no distinction between the "militants" they "defend" against and any other person who lives in their vicinity. The numbers in Lebanon may not amount to genocide yet, but that's the model that Israel is following.

  • Oren Ziv: [10-22] 'Copy-paste the West Bank to Gaza': Hundreds join Gaza resettlement event: "In a closed military zone near Gaza, Israeli settlers, ministers, and MKs called to ethnically cleanse and annex the Strip -- an idea that is growing mainstream."

America's Israel (and Israel's America):

  • Yaniv Cogan/Jeremy Scahill: [10-21] The Israeli-American businessman pitching a $200 million plan to deploy mercenaries to Gaza: "Moti Kahana says he's talking to the Israeli government about creating a pilot program for 'gated communities' controlled by private US security forces." By the way, the authors also (separately) wrote:

    • Yaniv Cogan: [10-06] Blinken approved policy to bomb aid trucks, Israeli cabinet members suggest.

    • Jeremy Scahill/Murtaza Hussain/Sharif Abdel Kouddous: [09-18] Israel's new campaign of "terrorism warfare" across Lebanon.

    • Ryan Grim/Murtaza Hussain: [10-29] Project 2025 creators have a plan to 'dismantle' pro-Palestine movement: "If Donald Trump wins next week, the Heritage Foundation has prepared a roadmap for him to crush dissent."

      The plan, dubbed "Project Esther," casts pro-Palestinian activists in the U.S. as members of a global conspiracy aligned with designated terrorist organizations. As part of a so-called "Hamas Support Network," these protesters receive "indispensable support of a vast network of activists and funders with a much more ambitious, insidious goal -- the destruction of capitalism and democracy," Project Esther's authors allege.

      This conspiratorial framing is part of a legal strategy to suppress speech favorable to Palestinians or critical of the U.S.-Israel relationship, by employing counterterrorism laws to suppress what would otherwise be protected speech . . .

      To achieve its goals, Project Esther proposes the use of counterterrorism and hate speech laws, as well as immigration measures, including the deportation of students and other individuals in the United States on foreign visas for taking part in pro-Palestinian activities. It also advocates deploying the Foreign Agents Registration Act, a law placing disclosure obligations on parties representing foreign interests, against organizations that the report's authors imply are funded and directed from abroad.

      In addition, the document also suggests using the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, or RICO, to help construct prosecutions against individuals and organizations in the movement. The RICO act was originally created to fight organized crime in the U.S., and particularly mafia groups.

      It occurs to me that the same laws and tactics could be used to counter Israeli political influence -- that that anyone would try that -- and that the audit trail would be much more interesting.

  • Adrian Filut: [10-24] From Iron Dome to F-15s: US provides 70% of Israel's war costs.

  • Tariq Kenney-Shawa: [10-29] Why the Democrats were Israel's perfect partners in genocide: "By masking support for Israel with hollow humanitarian gestures and empathy for Palestinians have diluted pressure to end the war."

  • Akela Lacy: [10-24] How does AIPAC shape Washington? We tracked every dollar. "The Intercept followed AIPAC's money trail to reveal how its political spending impacts the balance of power in Congress."

  • Mitchell Plitnick: [10-25] US efforts to entice Israel into minimizing its attack on Iran are only raising the chances for regional war: "The Biden administration is showering Israel with military aid and support to persuade it not to hit Iran's energy sector, but this will only increase Israeli impunity and push the region closer to war."

  • Azadeh Shahshahahani/Sofía Verónica Montez: [02-26] Complicity in genocide -- the case against the Biden administration: "Israel's mass bombardment of civilians in Gaza is being facilitated, aided and abetted by the United States government." Older article I just noticed, but figured I'd note anyway. Reminds me that the only proper response to the "genocide" charge is to stop doing it. That at least enables the argument that you never meant the complete annihilation of everyone, because you stopped and left some (most?) target people still alive. Needless to say, the argument becomes less persuasive over time, where you've repeatedly missed opportunities to say this is enough, "we've made our point."

  • Richard Silverstein:

  • Ishaan Tharoor:

    • [10-25] Is Israel carrying out de facto ethnic cleansing? "A pro-settlement Israeli group and some Israeli lawmakers gathered a couple miles from northern Gaza's blasted neighborhoods to rally around settling Gaza."

    • [10-28] The world beyond the election: Middle East in turmoil: "Whoever takes office in January will face a region being reshaped by an emboldened Israel and the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia."

    • [10-30] The world beyond the election: So much for democracy vs. autocracy. The Biden framing was mostly horseshit, mostly because America has never cared whether other countries practiced democracy, not least because we don't do a good job of it ourselves, and are certainly willing to throw it out the window if the polls look unfavorable. But also I suppose it was a subtle dig at Trump, who's always been Team Autocracy. That the ardor seems to have faded is less a change of view than acknowledgment that it hasn't worked so well. Then there is this line: "Biden once framed the successful defense of Ukraine as a rejection of a world 'where might makes right.'" But what is the US "defense" of Ukraine but an exercise in might making right? And if that case isn't clear cut enough for you, what else can you make of Israel?

Israel vs. world opinion:

Election notes:

Trump:

  • Trump's Madison Square Garden spectacle:

  • Zack Beauchamp: [10-31] Inside Trump's ominous plan to turn civil rights law against vulnerable Americans. Late-breaking but important article.

  • Jasper Craven: Trump's cronies threw the VA into chaos. Millions of veterans' lives are on the line again.

  • David French: [10-27] Four lessons from nine years of being 'Never Trump': His section heads:

    • Community is more powerful than ideology.
    • We don't know our true values until they're tested.
    • Hatred is the prime motivating force in our politics.
    • Finally, trust is tribal.
  • Susan B Glasser: [10-18] How Republican billionaires learned to love Trump again: "The former President has been fighting to win back his wealthiest donors, while actively courting new ones -- what do they expect to get in return?"

    Trump's effort to win back wealthy donors received its biggest boost on the evening of May 30th, when he was convicted in Manhattan on thirty-four criminal counts related to his efforts to conceal hush-money payments to the former adult-film actress Stormy Daniels. After the verdict, Trump walked out to the cameras in the courthouse and denounced the case brought against him as "rigged" and a "disgrace." Then he departed in a motorcade of black Suburbans. He was headed uptown for an exclusive fund-raising dinner, at the Fifth Avenue apartment of the Florida sugar magnate José (Pepe) Fanjul. . . .

    Trump was seated at the head table, between Fanjul -- a major Republican donor going back to the early nineties -- and Stephen Schwarzman, the C.E.O. of Blackstone, the world's largest private-equity fund, who had endorsed Trump the previous Friday. Securing the support of Schwarzman was a coup for the Trump campaign. . . .

    Trump was fund-raising off his conviction with small-dollar donors as well; his campaign, which portrayed him as the victim of a politicized justice system, brought in nearly $53 million in the twenty-four hours after the verdict. Several megadonors who had held back from endorsing Trump announced that they were now supporting him, including Miriam Adelson, the widow of the late casino mogul Sheldon Adelson; the Silicon Valley investor David Sacks, who said that the case against Trump was a sign of America turning into a "Banana Republic"; and the venture capitalist Shaun Maguire, who, less than an hour after the verdict, posted on X that he was donating $300,000 to Trump, calling the prosecution a "radicalizing experience." A day later, Timothy Mellon, the banking-family scion, wrote a $50-million check to the Make America Great Again super PAC.

    Many more names and dollar amounts follow.

  • Margaret Hartmann: [10-29] Melania Trump plays normal political wife for one week only: "From appearing at Donald Trump's racist MSG rally to insisting he's 'not Hitler' on Fox News, Melania is now conspicuously present."

  • Doug Henwood: [10-30] Trumponomics: "What kind of economic policy could we expect from a second Trump term?" A fairly obvious assignment for one of our more available left-wing economists, but he comes up with surprisingly little here, beyond income tax cuts and tariffs -- much-advertised themes that are unlikely to amount to very much. I suspect this is mostly because, despite the obvious importance of the economy, there isn't much of a partisan divide on how to run it. Trump would be harder on workers (especially on unions), and softer on polluters and all manner of frauds, but those are just relative shifts of focus. He would also shift public spending away from things that might be useful, like infrastructure, to "defense," including his "beautiful wall."

  • Michael Isikoff: [10-28] Trump campaign worker blows whistle on 'grift' and bugging plot: "A bombshell email claims millions were funneled from campaign to 'overcharging' firms -- and some went to a top Kamala Harris donor."

  • Robert Kuttner: [10-30] Why so much hate? "Trump has tapped into an undercurrent of crude hatred and encouraged his supporters to express it. Where does all this hate come from?"

  • Steven Levitsky/Daniel Ziblatt: [] There are four anti-Trump pathways we failed to take. There is a fifth. Authors of two books that have many liberal fans -- How Democracies Die (2018), and Tyranny of the Minority: Why American Democracy Reached the Breaking Point (2023) -- but never struck me as worth investigating, partly because their interest in democracy seems more concerned with formal elegance than with making government serve the people. The fifth path, when various legal schemes fail, is "societal mobilization" -- isn't that what we used to call "revolution"? The authors have written several "guest essays" over the years, including:

  • Nick Licata: [10-29] Trump's playbook to win regardless of election night results.

  • Nicholas Liu: [10-30] RFK Jr. claims Trump promised him "control" of CDC and federal health care agencies.

  • Amanda Marcotte:

  • Nicole Narea: [10-29] Would Trump's mass deportation plan actually work? "Here's what history tells us." Related here:

  • The New Republic: [10-21] The 100 worst things Trump has done since descending that escalator: "Some were just embarrassing. Many were horrific. All of them should disqualify him from another four years in the White House."

  • Timothy Noah:

  • Paige Oamek: [10-15] Trump's campaign manager has raked in an insane amount of money: "How in the world did Chris LaCivita make this much money from a campaign?"

  • Rick Perlstein: [10-30] What will you do? "Life-changing choices we may be forced to make if Donald Trump wins."

  • Molly Redden/Andy Kroll/Nick Surgey: [10-29] Inside a key MAGA leader's plans for a new Trump agenda: "Key Trump adviser says a Trump administration will seek to make civil servants miserable in their jobs." Spotlight here on Russell Vought, "former acting director of the Office of Management and Budget." Also on Vought:

  • James Risen:

    • [10-25] Mainstream media was afraid to compare Trump to Hitler. Now the press has no excuse. "Statements by John Kelly, Trump's former chief of staff, have made it nearly impossible for the media to avoid Hitler comparisons." Kelly's comments did pop up among the late show comics, but I wouldn't expect much more.

    • [10-22] Americans need a closing argument against Trump: "Too many Americans seem to be ignoring the risks that another Trump presidency would pose to the US. This is a warning to them." Included here because the author casually mentions: "Trump is a fascist who wants to overthrow the United States' democratic system of government." That's under the first section here, which is just one of several:

      1. Threat to democracy
      2. Imprison political opponents
      3. Eliminate reproductive rights
      4. Concentration camps and mass deportations for immigrants
      5. Create a theocracy
      6. Increase censorship and destroy the media
      7. A puppet for Putin
      8. Dictator for life

      Actually, I don't see many of these things happening, even if Republicans take Congress, and the last two are total canards. No one aspires to be a puppet, but aside from that, the rest are at least things Trump might think of and wish for. What separates Trump from the classic fascists has less to do with thought and desire than with checks and balances that make it hard for any president to get much of anything done. Still, a bad president can do a lot of damage, and any would-be fascist is certain to be a very bad president. As Trump has already proven, so we really shouldn't have to relitigate this.

    • [10-03] The reason Netanyahu and Putin both want a Trump victory: "Vladimir Putin and Benjamin Netanyahu both want Donald Trump to win so they can prolong and intensify their brutal wars."

  • Asawin Suebsaeng/Tim Dickinson: 'American death squads': Inside Trump's push to make police more violent.

  • Sean Wilentz: Trump's plot against America: "A leading historian looks back at Philip Roth's novel and how it perfectly predicts the rise of Trump and his willing collaborators."

  • No More Mr. Nice Blog:

    • [10-28] It's world-historical fascism, but it's also ordinary white-guy bigotry.

      Did yesterday's rally seem like the work of an organized, dangerous fascist party? Yes -- but the rally's rhetoric also seemed like ordinary casual conversation among bigoted white men when they think no one can hear them. Remember the cops who beat Rodney King in 1991 and sent messages to one another describing Black citizens involved in a domestic dispute as being "right out of 'Gorillas in the Mist'"? Remember the police official responsible for investigating workplace harassment in New York City being fired in 2021 after it was revealed that he'd written racist posts in a police discussion group called the Rant? . . .

      This is how bigoted men talk. Among cops, it reinforces a sense of grievance that often leads to brutality. It'll do the same thing among Trumpers if they win -- and, to a lesser extent, if they lose. This is a rising fascist movement, but it's built on ordinary hatreds that aren't new and that predate Trump's political career.

    • [10-24] Fascism and other matters.

    • [20-21] Donald Trump, relatable fuckup?

      I think young men find Trump's campaign-trail lapses relatable. It's not just that they might really believe Haitians in America are eating people's pets, or might enjoy Trump's smutty anecdotes. I think they also might notice that Trump is being accused of campaign incompetence or dementia -- and that endears him more to them.

      After all, many of them were diagnosed with ADHD because they couldn't sit still in school or stop disrupting class. They might not like Trump's taste in music, but they can relate to someone who shows up and just doesn't feel like doing the work.

      They appreciate the way Trump suggests that he not only can solve all the world's problems, but can do it quickly and easily -- he conveys a sense that he can succeed at many things without doing any hard work. That's what they want to do!Why are young men attending college at lower rates than young women? Aren't they attending the same schools as their sisters? Being good in school has always been seen as weird and unmanly by most Americans, and I think that mindset is having a greater and greater impact on young men's choices. Boys with good grades are seen as weird losers and not very masculine -- they're like girls, who are allowed to be good in school. It's much cooler to be an amusing fuckup.

      When we express horror at Trump's latest baffling act on the campaign trail, I think we sound, to these young men, like annoyingly responsible scolds. Obviously, they like Trump's offensive humor because they like offending people, but they also relate to Trump's refusal to restrain his speech because trying to avoid giving offense to people is hard work. It's almost like schoolwork, and the same people are good at it, for the same reasons -- because they're grade-grubbing goody-goodies who seem to like spoiling everyone else's fun.

    • [10-29] No, Trump is still not "a spent and exhausted force": Disputes the Jamelle Bouie piece I cited above.

    • [10-30] A war at home is still a war, guys:

      This is a reminder of one reason Donald Trump is winning over some young men, apart from the bro-ishness and misogyny of his campaign: Trump and his surrogates have young men convinced that a vote for Harris is a vote for war. Trump regularly says that a Harris presidency will lead to World War III, while he'll instantly, magically, and single-handedly end all the major wars taking place right now and prevent future wars by means of a slogan, "Peace Through Strength." Harris, regrettably, has welcomed the support not only of Liz Cheney (who has stood up for the rule of law in recent years) but also of her father, whom nobody admires these days and who was unquestionably a warmonger.

  • Seth Meyers: [10-31] A Closer Look: Trump's embarrassing garbage stunt might be his most surreal photo op ever.

Vance, and other Republicans:

Harris:

  • James Carville: [10-23] Three reasons I'm certain Kamala Harris will win: Spoken like the hack-consultant he's always been:

    1. Trump is a repeat electoral loser. This time will be no different.
    2. Money matters, and Harris has it in droves.
    3. It's just a feeling.

    His feeling?

    For the past decade, Trump has infected American life with a malignant political sickness, one that would have wiped out many other global democracies. On Jan. 6, 2021, our democracy itself nearly succumbed to it. But Trump has stated clearly that this will be the last time he runs for president. That is exactly why we should be exhilarated by what comes next: Trump is a loser; he is going to lose again. And it is highly likely that there will be no other who can carry the MAGA mantle in his wake -- certainly not his running mate.

  • Lydie Lake: [10-30] Harris's final push before election day: "Kamala Harris delivered her closing argument in a charged pre-election rally near the White House."

  • Colleen Long/Darlene Superville/Nadia Lathan: [10-25] Beyoncé and Kamala Harris team up for Houston rally. One big thing they talked about was abortion, including how in Texas "the infant death rate has increased, more babies have died of birth defects and maternal mortality has risen.

  • Chris Megerian/Colleen Long/Steve Karnowski: [10-17] Following death of Hamas leader, Harris says it's 'time for the day after to begin' in Gaza. If by "day after" you mean the day after the killing ends, that's been overdue since Oct. 8, 2023 (and really many years before), but the statement would seem to reject the idea that the war has to go on until there are no Palestiniains left to kill, which seems to be Netanyahu's agenda.

  • Christian Paz: [10-24] How "Trump is a fascist" became Kamala's closing argument: "Brat summer is over; 'Trump is a fascist' fall is in." I chased this piece down after Nathan J Robinson tweeted:

    One of the main mistakes Hillary Clinton made was making her central message "Trump is bad" without offering a positive case for why she would be a good president. The error is being repeated.

    A quick search reveals more complaints about this as a strategy, along with much consternation that Harris is blowing the campaign, possibly letting Trump win. I get that the "Trump is a fascist" jab is suddenly fashionable thanks to the Kelly quote, although it's been commonplace for years among people who know much about the history of fascism, and are willing to define it broadly enough that a 78-year-old American might qualify. I'd say that Trump is a bit more complicated and peculiar than simply being a generic fascist, although sure, if you formulated a generic F-scale, he would pass as a fascist, and it wouldn't be a close call. But I have two worries here: one is that most Americans don't know or care much about fascism -- other than that it's a generic slur, which judging from his use of the word (e.g., to slam "radical leftists") seems to be his understanding; the other is that there are lots of other adjectives and epithets that get more surely and much quicker to the point of why Trump is bad: even fancy words like sociopath, narcissist, oligarch, and misanthrope work better; as well as more common ones like racist, sexist, elitist, demagogue; you could point out that he's both a blowhard and a buffoon; or you could settle for something a bit more colorful, like "flaming asshole." Or rather than just using labels/names, you could expand on how he talks and acts, about his scams and delusions -- sorry if I haven't mentioned lies before, but they come in so many flavors and variations you could do a whole taxonomy, like the list of fallacies (many of which he exemplifies -- at least the ones that don't demand much logic).

    As for Robinson's complaint, I think that's typical of left intellectuals, who've spent all their lives trying to win people over on issues. Politicians have to be more practical, especially because they have to win majorities, while all activists can hope for are incremental gains. Harris has a lot of planks in her platform, and if you're seriously interested in policy, there's a lot to talk about there (and not all good, even if, like most leftists, you're willing to settle for small increments). But to win an election, she needs to focus on the elements that can get her majority support.

    And the one key thing that should put her over the top is that he's Donald Trump, and she isn't: that the only chance we voters have of getting rid of Trump is to vote for her. To do this, she needs to focus relentlessly on his negatives. She doesn't need to toot her own horn much, as every negative she exposes him for is an implicit contrast: to say "Trump is a fascist" implies that "I am not." That may not be saying much, but it's something, and it should be enough. And Robinson, at least, should know better. I find it hard -- I mean, he's just co-authored a book with Noam Chomsky -- seriously expects any Democrat to offer "a positive case for why she would be a good president." All any voter can do is pick one item from a limited, pre-arranged menu. Sometimes you do get a chance to vote for someone you really like or at least respect, but quite often the best you can do is to vote against the candidate you most despise.

    That choice seems awfully clear to me this year. Unfortunately, it appears that many people are still confused and/or misguided. At this point, I don't see any value in second-guessing the Harris campaign. I have no reason to think they don't want to win this as badly as I want them to win. They have lots of money, lots of research, and lots of organization. They think they're doing the right things, and I hope and pray they're right. It's endgame now, so let them run their last plays. And if they do lose, that will be the time to be merciless in your criticism. (That'll be about the only fun you'll have in the next four years. By the way, if you want a head start, check out this book.)

  • Jennifer Rubin: [10-27] To understand the US economic success is to love Harris's plan: "Kamala Harris's economic proposals would build on the remarkable US comeback since the pandemic."

Walz, Biden, and other Democrats:

Supreme Court, legal matters, and other crimes:

Climate and environment:

Business, labor, and Economists:

Ukraine and Russia:

Elsewhere in the world and/or/in spite of America's empire:


Other stories:

  • Ross Rosenfeld: [10-30] How America's craven plutocrats busted the myth of the business hero: "The members of the billionaire executive class have billed themselves as great men of history beyond scrutiny and reproach. his is the year that shattered that illusion." Sorry to break this, but that illusion has been pretty thoroughly debunked at least since Ida B. Wells. And while I appreciate the occasional Harris supporter in their ranks, she isn't really that much of a reach: arguably she'll do better by them than their culturally simpatico golf cheat buddy.

  • Jeffrey St Clair: [10-25] Roaming Charges: Antic dispositions: Some tidbits:

    • More than half of Trump's supporters don't believe he'll actually do many of the things he claims he'll do (mass deportations, siccing the military on domestic protesters and political rivals), while more than half of Harris's supporters hope she'll implement many of the policies (end the genocide/single-payer) she claims she won't. And that pretty much sums up this election.

    • Barnett R. Rubin, former US diplomat: "Why do people keep saying that US politics is polarized? Look at the big picture. Genocide enjoys broad bipartisan support."

    • Fox News' Brian Kilmeade defended Trump's statement that he wants the "kind of generals that Hitler had." Kilmeade: "I can absolutely see him go, it'd be great to have German generals that actually do what we ask them to do, maybe not fully being cognizant of the third rail of German generals who were Nazis or whatever." Kilmeade and Trump may not be "cognizant" of the fact that several "German generals" (von Stauffenberg, Friedrich Olbricht, and Ludwig Beck) tried to blow Hitler to bits and Germany's most famous General, Rommel, was forced to kill himself after being implicated in the plot.

    • Hours after the Washington Post announced its decision not to endorse [Kamala Harris, directed by Post owner Jeff Bezos], the Associated Press reported that Donald Trump met with executives from Blue Origin, the space company owned by Bezos that has a $3.4 billion NASA contract to build a spacecraft to take astronauts to the moon and back.

    • Eugene Debs: "I'd rather vote for something I want and don't get it, than vote for something I don't want and get it."

    • Trump: "I worked a shift at McDonalds yesterday." A McDonalds shift is eight hours, not 18 minutes . . . Dukakis in a tank looked less ridiculous.

    • Sounds familiar . . . [followed by a tweet which reads: "In 1938, Benito Mussolini closed off a wheat field & did a photo shoot showing him harvesting hay in order to portray himself as a common working man. He was surrounded by workers who had been vetted as loyal to the party." Includes a picture of the shirtless Fascist with cap and aviator goggles.]

    • Since 2001, forest fires have shifted north and grown more intense. According to a new study in Science, global CO2 emissions from forest fires have increased by 60% in the last two decades.

    • Christian nationalist pastor Joel Webbon called for the public execution of women who falsely claim to have been sexually assaulted: "MeToo would end real fast . . . All you have to do is publicly execute a few women who have lied."

    • Montana Senate candidate Tim Sheehy, on why he wants to abolish the Dept. of Education: "We formed that department so little Black girls could go to school down South, and we could have integrated schooling. We don't need that anymore."

    • Edward Luce, associate editor of the Financial Times: "Hard to overstate what a sinister figure Elon Musk is. Never seen one oligarch in a Western democracy intervene on anything like this scale with unending Goebbels-grade lies." Musk is the most obnoxious kid in middle school who is running the campaign of the school bully for student council without even being asked because even the school bully doesn't want to be around him . . .

Obituaries

Books

Music (and other arts?)

  • Rick Lopez: [10-24] Update.01 to The Sam Rivers Sessionography: A Work in Progress: Fulfilling his subtitle, with a very substantial addition, on top of a "magnificent" and "gorgeous" (to quote my own blurb) 764-page book that already seemed definitive. By the way, those words were written in advance of this "press release" quoted on page 3:

    Michael Hull's Fifth Column Films has begun work on a feature-length documentary about Sam Rivers through the lens of The Sam Rivers Sessionography, a book by Rick Lopez. Rivers was a musical genius who spent his life obsessed with creating intricate compositions that pushed music to places no one else could conceive of. It's only fitting that his biographer has invented an entirely new way to understand the life of an artist through a minutely detailed portrait that could only flower from the uniquely focused mind of Lopez. Rivers was a massive talent who has been mostly forgotten by the American jazz scene and is rarely included in the conversation about great masters of the art. Lopez's book and this film aim to correct that oversight, and make the case that Sam Rivers should take his place in the pantheon of the 20th century.

    Full disclosure: Michael Hull is my nephew. He started in Jason Bailey's Wichita-based film crew (e.g., My Day in the Barrel), produced a film Smokers no one has heard of, wrote a novel that hasn't been published and, most relevant here, made the superb documentary Betrayal at Attica. I've admired Lopez since I first discovered him twenty-some years ago, so the idea of introducing him and Mike was blindingly obvious. (I was also the person who introduced Mike and Liz Fink, although the gestation period on that project took much longer.) We have some money invested in this project, which you can take as a caveat if you wish, but I regard more as a vote of confidence. Still some ways to go, but here's a preliminary trailer and more information.

  • John McWhorter: [10-24] It sounded like dancing, drinking and sex. It blew people's minds. I only noticed this piece on "the long, syncopated journey from Scott Joplin to Beyoncé" because Allen Lowe complained about it: "his views of ragime are just bizarre and beneath even the most minimal amount of knowledge, full of stereotypes and really thirdhand historiography"; Phil Dyess-Nugent added: "Having made his name writing about some things he seemed to understand, John McWhorter has since demonstrated his cluelessness on a vast array of subjects." That's my general impression of the few columns I've read, especially since his ridiculous Woke Racism book. This I'm less sure about, maybe because I don't know or chare that much about ragtime (or, I might as well admit, Beyoncé), so I'm mostly just noting a lot of name-dropping and connect-the-dots that favors obvious over interesting.

  • Riotriot: [10-30] Takes by the ocean: Zambian nightlife and spongian jawbox.

Chatter

  • Peter Daou [10-27]

    QUESTION: Who is worse for Palestinians, Trump or Harris?

    ANSWER: Harris is worse for Palestinians.

    WHY?

    1. Harris and Biden are already culpable for a year-long genocide.
    2. Like Trump, Harris vows to keep giving Israel unconditional support.
    3. Therefore, Trump can never match Harris's death toll.
    4. Rewarding Harris's war crimes with a vote emboldens Netanyahu and opens the floodgates for future tyrants.
    5. If Trump wins and Democrats suddenly decide massacring children is wrong, Trump will face much greater resistance to letting Israel commit atrocities.

    Bottom line: Voting third party is the only moral choice, but if liberals insist on comparing Trump to Harris, Harris is worse for Palestinians.

    I found this immediately after posting my preliminary draft on who to vote for president and why, so I've already explained why I disagree with Daou's conclusion so strongly. But perhaps I should stress one very important point, which is that voting is not a moral choice; it is a political choice. I'm not going to write a disquisition on the difference, but will insist that it is a category error to vote based on morality. As for Daou's five points:

    1. True, but the order is wrong, like saying "Speer and Hitler are already culpable," where the clearest charge against Speer (and Harris) is not breaking with their leader. By the way, Biden is more like Speer than to Hitler -- in playing follow-the-leader, but also given their critical position in the arms pipeline.
    2. Not false, but Harris (unlike Trump and Graham) has never said "finish the job," and she's not unaware of the human toll Israel's "self-defense" is taking, so I'd say that continued "unconditional support" is slightly less likely from her. Admittedly, that's a thin reed she has often taken pains to cover up.
    3. No way of predicting, but no reason to underestimate Trump's capacity for getting people killed. His general contempt for most of the world suggests quite the opposite.
    4. Clearly, massively false. Netanyahu's preference for Trump is widely known, not only through his own words and acts but through mutual donors like Myriam Adelson.
    5. Hard to know where to begin with this variation on "if the fascists win, the revolution will hasten." Ever hear of "moral hazard"? Sure, some Democrats may learn to blame the genocide on Trump -- as some Democrats came to blame Nixon for Vietnam -- but most will simply be shocked and search for scapegoats to blame, especially "pro-Palestinians" like Daou.

    Daou's conclusion that "Harris is worse for Palestinians" is horribly wrong, even if "Harris is no good for Palestinians" may well be true. But I wouldn't be much swayed if one could argue that one candidate would be good or better, because I've never looked at this conflict through that prism. I never quite bought the argument that "Palestinians have dug their own graves," but I did have sympathies for Israel at one point, which may be why I still wish to emphasize that genocide is bad (and I mean really bad) for Israel (and for America, which is implicated not just due to recent arms support but via longstanding cultural and political mores), and that in itself is reason enough to oppose it. (And sure, it's even worse for the killed than the killers, and that's another reason to oppose it, but it doesn't have to be the only one.)

    Some more comments on Daou's tweet:

    • Nathan J Robinson: Peter, this doesn't make sense. It could absolutely get worse under Trump. Any pressure to provide any aid whatsoever to Gaza will disappear. Greater pressure may be brought on Egypt to let Israel fully ethnically cleanse Gaza. Don't assume this is as bad as it can get.

    • Andrew Revkin: I sense @RudyGiuliani would disagree with you, @peterdaou, on who's worse for Palestinians. Here's how he explained the Trump plan at the #MSGRally tonight in his own words.

    • Films For Action: When we think of Trump in power again, we recall that even a genocide can get much worse. Trump just said that Netanyahu must "go further" in Gaza while criticizing Biden for "trying to hold him back." The full statement is highly worth reading: [link to Arizona Palestinian, Arab, Muslim, and Progressive Democrats Statement on Presidential Election].

    • Shadowblade: Who moved the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem?

    • Jonathan Blank Films: [Link to 'Trump would be the worst': Palestinians react to US presidential race.]

  • Nathan J Robinson: [12-27] [comment attached to a clip of Tucker Carlson's MSG rally rant] The level of uncontrolled rage is terrifying, but I think if Trump is elected you will see it get far worse. The amount of overt racism will increase, the view of Democrats, leftists, migrants being scum in need of elimination. JD Vance has made clear that Pinochet is the model.

  • Mehdi Hasan: [10-30] Donald Trump is going around telling Michigan Muslims he'll end the war, be the peace president, and how pro-Muslim (!) he is.

    Meanwhile, Dems sent Bill Clinton to lecture Michigan Muslims on how it's all Hamas's fault that Israel is massacring kids and killing civilians holding white flags.

    Whether or not they end up losing Michigan, at this point the Dems deserve to lose Michigan. Sheesh.

  • Aaron Rupar: [10-31] Trump on Liz Cheney: "Let's put her with a rifle standing there with 9 barrels shooting at her. Let's see how she feels about it. You know, when the cuns are trained on her face."


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Tuesday, October 29, 2024


Speaking of Which: Top 10 Reasons to Vote for Harris vs. Trump

Note: This piece is also cross-posted at Notes on Everyday Life. I originally posted it there first, in hopes of generating some preliminary discussion. If keeping them in sync proves difficult, this one should probably be authoritative.

Two questions need to be addressed before we get down to detailed arguments. The first is why vote at all? I'd say first, because it is your right as a citizen, but must be secured by your exercise of it. People in America may have a very limited say in how the country is organized and run, but you do have the vote, and using it shows your willingness to engage in the responsibility for setting the nation's direction.

The second question is whether you should limit your vote choice to the two major political parties, or consider voting for a third party should you prefer that candidate's platform? History shows us that America gravitated into a two-party system almost immediately after the Constitution was ratified, and quickly returned to a two party system on the two instances where one major party disbanded (replacing the Federalists with the Whigs, and replacing the Whigs with the Republicans). No subsequent third party has been able to sustain significant followings, with third-party votes often dropping to under 5% in recent elections.

So from a practical standpoint, third parties are ineffective and unpromising.One might nonetheless consider voting for a third party candidate if: neither major party nominated a candidate you can stand, and there is no significant difference between the two candidates that can direct your choice. I can understand if you feel that both Trump and Harris should be shunned for their rote support of Israeli genocide, although I suspect that even there the nature of their positions differs enough to favor a vote for Harris.

One other possible consideration is whether one party offers a better chance for future improvement, based on the composition of the party, how open-minded its members are, and how democratic its processes are. The current two-party system is quite possibly the most polarized ever, which has led most people to select one party or the other. Moreover, both major parties have primaries that are open to all members, and as such are amenable to reform. If, like me, you are primarily concerned with "left" issues of peace and equal rights, you may have noticed that most of the people most likely to agree with you are currently Democrats. If your goal is to build a majority around your ideals, you need to establish a bond of solidarity with the Democrats, which often means voting for a candidate you don't totally agree with. You are, after all, hoping that other Democrats, even ones that disagree with you, will vote for your candidate should that person win a primary.

The last third party candidate I voted for was Ralph Nader in 2000. I don't feel bad about that vote, especially as I'm convinced that the Gore-Lieberman ticket would have been as gung-ho starting the "war on terror" after 9/11 as Bush-Cheney was. But I did learn one lesson from that election, which is that even in Kansas, where the Gore campaign was practically non-existent, 90% of the anti-Bush votes cast went to the Democrat. Since then, I vowed to work within the Democratic Party, such as it as, as best I could. (I did lapse once since, to vote against a particular Democrat I've hated what seems like all of my life, but there I went with the Republican, as I really wanted that Democrat to lose.)


Having narrowed the choice down to Harris vs. Trump, arguments that one candidate is better and/or one candidate is worse are equally valid. This being American politics, "one candidate is worse" arguments predominate. Lest you imagine there might be any suspense here, Harris is the better option, while Trump is much the worse.

And while the future is impossible to predict, the margins overwhelm any imaginable uncertainty. Trump is especially known, as we've actually experienced him as President. This doesn't mean a second term will be just like his first: it could easily be worse, for reasons we'll get into. Harris is harder to read. Although she has much relevant experience, presidency offers powers and temptations that she's never faced before, as well as situations she's never had to deal with. This raises doubts, which I will deal with in a separate list, following the "top ten."

So, here are my top ten reasons to vote for Harris vs. Trump:

  1. Donald Trump is a truly odious human being. That's a personal, not a political judgment: sure, virtually all of his political views stink, but most of the people who share his political views have personal traits one can relate to, respect, even appreciate. As far as I can tell -- and while I only know what's been reported, I've been exposed to a lot of that -- he has none. He seems totally miserable. If he's ever laughed, it's been at someone else's expense. He lacks even the slightest pretense of caring for anyone, even for his wives or children (the prenups should have been a clue). He's not unique in this regard, but most similar people are easily ignored. The only way to free ourselves from Trump's ever-present unpleasantness is to vote him off (like in the "reality TV" shows he's a creature of).

    Harris, on the other hand, can listen, and respond appropriately. She has a generous and infectious laugh. And while I've never seen her cry, she is at least cognizant of situations that call for a show of concern and empathy. I don't particularly like the idea of president as "handholder-in-chief," but it's better to have someone who can feign that than someone who utterly cannot.

  2. Such personal failings drive most people to despair, which at least could be pitied, but Trump's inherited wealth has provided him with an armor of callousness, which has long elicited the warm glow of supplicants and sycophants. From this, he has constructed his own mental universe where he is adored and exalted. This has produced extraordinary hubris -- another of his distasteful traits -- but more importantly, his narcissism has left him singularly unprepared to deal with reality when it so rudely intrudes on his fantasy life (as happens all too often when you're President).

    I should note here that the collective embarrassment we so often felt when witnessing Trump's failed attempts at addressing events has dulled somewhat since he left office (need I remind you of Hurricane Maria? -- just one of dozens of examples, ranging from his staring into the eclipse to the pandemic). The only things that have affected him that way since have been his indictments, but even there he's been sheltered like no one else ever. There is no reason to think that Harris wouldn't respond to events at least as well as a normal politician, which is to say, by showing palpable concern and deliberation. Trump's disconnect from reality is unprecedented. (Good place to mention his election denialism.)

  3. There is some debate as to whether Trump's wealth is real, but even as it seems, that should be reason enough to disqualify him. Only a few Presidents have come from the ranks of the rich, and those who did -- like Washington, Kennedy, and the Roosevelts -- took pains to distance themselves from their business interests. Back in 2016, Trump suggested he would give up his business ties, insisting that his wealth made him more independent of corrupt influences, but after he won, he backtracked completely, and ran an administration that was outrageously corrupt -- especially at the top, where his son-in-law's diplomacy netted him a billion-dollar private equity fund, but his administration hired lobbyists to peddle influence everywhere. One might argue that Trump's business was so large that he couldn't possibly disentangle himself, but that's just part of the reason why people like him shouldn't be allowed in politics. Their inability to relate to ordinary Americans is another.

  4. Aside from his abuse of executive power to staff government with corporate agents, pack with courts with right-wing cronies, and pardon numerous criminals in his circle, his record for delivering on his 2016 campaign promises is remarkably thin: he lost interest in things that might have been popular (like building infrastructure, or "draining the swamp"). He also lucked out, when a couple Republican defections saved the ACA, and then when Democrats took Congress back in 2018. The only positive bill he signed was the pandemic relief act, which he wanted desperately to save a flagging stock market, but had to accept a mostly Democratic bill that helped pretty much everyone.

    Also, the full impact of many policies can take years before it is felt. The repeal of Taft-Hartley in 1947 took decades before it started to do serious damage to unions and workers (although it had the immediate impact of ending a campaign to unionize in the South, which would have been a big advance for civil rights). Deregulation of savings & loans in the 1980s and larger banks in the 1990s took most of a decade before triggering recessions. Much of what Trump did during his term didn't blow up until after the 2020 election, including his killing of the Iran nuclear deal, his agreement to give Afghanistan to the Taliban, and his Supreme Court's overturn of Roe v. Wade.

    Harris's ability to deliver on campaign promises will, as Biden's has, depend much on the balance of power in Congress, but at least Democrats have a track record of trying to pass laws to help most Americans, and not just those favored by Republicans with their tax and benefit cuts. Harris will be further hampered by the Republican packing of the courts, but that's one reason why it matters not just that Democrats win elections, but win big.

  5. On the other hand, if Trump were more dedicated in pursuit of the policy positions he espouses, or if he's just given more power by a Republican Congress, he could (and probably would) do much more harm in a second term, way beyond the still not fully accounted for harm of his first. For starters, he has a much more developed idea of what he wants to do -- not because he understands policy any better, but because he has more specific goals in areas that especially interest him -- and will hire more loyal operatives, eager to carry out his wishes. This will be easier, because he's already bent the party to his will, especially promoting its most crazed cadres, while he himself has become further radicalized. Moreover, he now has a long list of enemies to punish, while his minions will be free to pursue their own grafts and obsessions. We've already seen how he's turned the presidency into a cult of personality. Give him more power -- not just in Congress but the Supreme Court is ready to enshrine the "unitary executive theory" -- and he will only grow more monstrous.

  6. Donald Trump is a shit stain on the face of America. They say that wealth is power, and that power corrupts, absolute power absolutely. America emerged from WWII with half of the world's wealth, with troops spread to Europe and East Asia, and corporations everywhere. America has been "breaking bad" ever since, starting in the 1940s rigging elections in Italy, fighting communists in Greece and Korea, overthrowing democratic governments in Guatemala and Iran, replacing them with corporate-friendly autocrats. Still, even Reagan expected good guys in white hats to win out, so he pretended to be one, while the Bushes hid their conservatism behind fake compassion. Trump is the first US president to give up all pretense. His fans may mistake his contempt for candor, but the result is a much more brutal world. He demands tribute from allies, lest they fall into the ranks of enemies, who are expected to cower when faced with overwhelming American might, and face escalating threats when they refuse to fall in line. His is a recipe for neverending war, as we've already seen with Russia and Iran, with Korea and China waiting for the next break.

    Nor are we only talking about foreign policy. The conservative solution to domestic matters is also to rely on force, starting with mass incarceration, eroding/stripping rights, smashing unions, purging the civil service, quelling demonstrations, stifling free speech, book bans, censoring the press, turning education into indoctrination, rigging elections, even going so far as to incite mobs and promise them immunity. While these impulses have long been endemic to Republicans, Trump is unique in he wants you to see and smell the feces, and that seems to be the basis for his popularity among his hardcore constituency. This, with its embrace of sheer power and rampant criminality, is what's so reminiscent of the fascist movements of the 1930s.

  7. Still, as bad as Trump is personally, the real danger is that his election will bring a tidal wave of Republicans into power all throughout the federal and local governments they have pledged to debilitate and reduce, as Grover Norquist put it, "to the size where I can drown it in the bathtub." (The less often discussed ancillary idea is to hack off functions done by government and give them away to the private sector. This almost never works. When attempted, it almost always makes the functions more expensive and/or less useful.) This is just one of many deranged and dysfunctional ideas prevalent in the Republican Party. Like most of their ideas, it's appealing as rhetoric, but unworkable in practice. Republicans have repeatedly tried to reduce government spending by cutting taxes on their donor class, but have found little to actually cut -- even when they had the power to write budgets -- so all they've produced is greater deficits, and an inflated oligarchy.

    They've had more luck at poisoning benefits, trying to make government appear to be worthless. The idea is to convince voters that voting is hopeless, because government will only take from them, and never give back. The idea that the purpose of government is to "provide for the general welfare" (that's in the Preamble to the US Constitution) is inimical to them. The idea of "government of, by, and for the people" (that's in Lincoln's Gettysburg Address) is alien to those who hate most American people. Republicans created a death spiral of democracy, which they hope will leave them in permanent power, not to serve the public, but to prevent people from using government for their own improvement.

    Trump has added his own authoritarian quirks to the Republican agenda, but the big risk to democracy has always come from money, which Republicans have made sure selects candidates and drives elections. Trump is less a cause of oligarchy than evidence of how far it has progressed.

  8. Two important concepts in economics are externality (public costs that are not factored into product costs, such as pollution) and opportunity costs (other things that we could spend money on if we weren't preoccupied with given expenses). Republicans, driven exclusively by their desire to help the rich get richer in the here and now, and blind to the future, have no interest in these concepts. Democrats are subject to the same donor pressures, but at least recognize that such side effects are real and important. This is because they try to recognize and balance everyone's welfare, and not just that of their donors and voters.

    Climate change is a good example of both: it is largely caused by the waste products of fossil fuels, and can only be remedied by major investment sooner rather than later. But people only see what gasoline costs when they fill up, while the climate change they're contributing to only manifests later, and mostly to other people. This gives them little reason to spend now to avert future costs, so they don't. Even as climate change has become a very tangible problem, Trump and the Republicans have wrapped themselves ever deeper into a cocoon of denial and ignorance, which ensures that as long as they're in power we will never invest what we need to in sustainable infrastructure. While a second Trump term could do a lot of immediate damage, its long-term cost will largely be opportunity costs, as we belatedly realize we didn't invest what we should have when it would have been more effective.

  9. It's impossible to overstate how completely Donald Trump has taken over and perverted our culture, what philosophers call our noosphere -- the mental universe, our ability to reason. This may seem paradoxical given that few people on Earth are as disengaged from and contemptuous of reason as Donald Trump, but that may well be the source of his power. He has effectively given his followers permission to disengage from other people, to eschew reason and argument and indulge their own prejudices and fantasies, because that's what he does, and he's so fabulously successful. Moreover, it has the added benefit of driving crazy all those who still worry about real problems (both their own and those of other people), which they expect to deal with through science and reason. (Such people often project their own mania back onto the Trumpers, and reckon them to be saddled with problems, when they actually seem to be quite blissfully serene in their obliviousness and/or ignorance.)

    Political scientists have a concept known as the Overton window, which describes "the range of policies politically acceptable to the mainstream population at a given time." Ideas outside the window are dismissed as radical or even unthinkable, making it very hard to get any sort of coverage, as the media limits itself to more widely acceptable ideas. Events may push some ideas into the mainstream, while discarding others. For instance, there was a time when eugenics was all the rage, but no more. Climate change has become increasingly mainstream, although there are still political interests out to kill any such discussion. A big part of politics is fighting over what we can and cannot talk about. What Trump has done has been to expand the Overton window to the far right, legitimizing clusters of issues that were previously regarded as baseless (like QAnon, antivax claims, election denial). Perhaps the most disturbing of all has been Trump's own criminal enterprises. These subjects, which at best distract from real problems and often create more, would only grow under a second Trump term.

    I have no doubt that the bad policies advanced by Trump will blow up and wind up discredited, but at a great waste of effort to stop them, and a huge opportunity cost as we ignore constructive ideas from the left. Even where Harris does not have good programs, which certainly includes her continued fealty to Bush-Obama-Trump-Biden (and Cheney?) foreign policy, her election would provide a much healthier window for debate than what we'd be stuck with under Trump.

  10. It's time to turn the page on Trump and the era of Fox Republicanism. Cloture on Trump is easy to imagine, as he's way past his prime, increasingly doddering at 78, unlikely to ever run again. Vote him out, and that's one problem America will never have to deal with again. Not only would it give us a chance to heal, to move on, to deal with our self-protracted problems, but it could be the kindest result for Trump and even for his Party. Trump could cut his plea deals and escape most of the legal jeopardy he's landed in. The Party could finally recalculate, trying to find a way to compete in the real world instead of trying to scam the rhetorical madness that Fox created to profit from fear and rage. Moreover, by cutting their losses, they'd escape much of the blame for the disasters their preferred policies would inevitably lead to. Progress is inexorable, so those who would resist it only have two choices: bend or break. The Republicans' forty-year (1980-2020) era has done much damage to the social and economic fabric of the nation. Some things have broken, and many more are creaking. We might survive four more years of Trump, but time is running out. And when things do break under Trump, beware that no one will be more ill-prepared and incompetent at dealing with them.

    On the other hand, Harris, like most Democrats (even the nominally left-wing of the party), doesn't represent visionary change, but she is perceptive, analytical, and pragmatic, which suggests that she will adapt to changing circumstances, and endeavor to make the best out of them. She will be sorely tested by the influence of wealthy lobbyists, by the superficial and sensationalist press, by the still powerful remains of Republican power -- which while incapable of governing competently let alone responsibly, is still a formidable machine for amplifying grievances -- and by new challenges we haven't even been able to think of yet (so mired are we in the ruins of bad Republican politics, from Nixon and Reagan through the Bushes to their ultimate self-parody in Trump, tempered ever so slightly by interim Democrats who never got beyond patchwork repairs).

Of course, one can think of many more reasons, especially if you tried to work from policies outward. I may do a separate document where I read through Trump's "Agenda 47" and comment line-by-line. Presumably there's a comparable Harris document somewhere, which could also be scrutinized. From them, I might be able to come up with a scorecard, but there's no chance of a different result. As it is, I've concentrated less on issues and more on personalities and political dynamics: Trump is at best muddled on issues, but his shortcomings as noted are extremely clear.

Harris, as I noted, is harder to read, especially because for tactical campaign purposes she has adopted a set of views that aim to win over not just undecided/centrist voters but any Republicans that Trump hasn't totally stripped of their decency yet. She's had some success at that, although it remains to be seen how many actual votes follow her celebrity endorsements. At this point, I don't see any point in second-guessing her campaign strategy. Presumably she has researched the electorate and knows much better than I do just how to pitch them. If she loses, we'll have a field day dissecting her mistakes -- which, for all the reasons mentioned above and many more, may be the only fun we can have in the next four years.

But for now, let's assume she wins, and she runs her administration along lines it is reasonable to expect. In that case, the left will still have work to do and things to protest. So here are my:

Top 5 Reasons Electing Harris Won't Solve Our Problems

I ran across this synopsis recently: "There are converging political, economic, and ecological crises, and yet our politics is dominated by either business as usual or nostalgia for a mythical past." Harris represents the party of "business as usual," where "change" is acknowledged as inevitable, but is guarded so as not to upset the status quo -- which may include reforms to make it more tolerable, as not doing so would risk more disruptive change.

While it didn't occur to me in listing the "top ten reasons" above, one more strong reason is that Trump's "nostalgia for a mythical past" -- the once-great America he aims to restore and protect -- is not just incoherent but impossible, so much so that his efforts to force the world back into his ideal alignment are more likely to break it than to fix anything. Reducing America to his chosen few would breed chaos and resentment, and collapse the economy, destroying the wealth he meant to protect. Moreover, his instinct to use force would only compound the damage.

It is ironic that while most of us on the left have grown wary of revolution, many on the right, perhaps due to their embrace of violence, have been seduced by the notion that might makes right. If conservatism means wishing to keep things as they are, it is the Democrats who are the true conservatives, while Republicans have turned into flaming radicals, with Trump emerging as their leader given his flamboyance and utter disregard for conventional political thinking. As with the fascist movements of the 1930s, many people are enthralled by this radicalism. Why such movements have always failed, sometimes spectacularly, has yet to sink in -- although the connection does at long last seem to be entering the mainstream media.

Democrats are still uncomfortable being the party of the status quo. Many are nostalgic for the days when Republicans filled that role, providing foils against which they could propose their modest reforms -- which they've long needed to attract struggling voters. The problem that Harris faces in 2024 is that the Trumpian romance of reactionary revolution has become so attractive -- the backdrop is the unprecedented extension of inequality over the last fifty years, which has left most people feeling left behind -- and so terrifying that she's fallen into the trap of defending the status quo, making her seem insensitive to the real problems that we look to candidates to help solve. Trump at least has answers to all the problems -- wrong ones, but many people don't understand the details, they're just attraction to his show of conviction, while they note that Harris seems wary of pushing even the weak reforms popular in her party.

She's banking on the status quo to save America from Trump and the Republicans. If she wins her bet, she will win the election. But then she'll have to face the more difficult task of governing, where her limits could be her undoing. These five questions loom large on the post-election agenda:

  1. Perhaps most immediately, US foreign policy needs a total rethink. US foreign policy took a radical turn shortly after WWII, renouncing the "isolationist" past and assuming a militarily as well as an economically interventionist stance. This was partly a matter of filling the vacuum left by the war's global destruction, and partly ambition. Beyond the battlefields, Europe's colonial empires had become untenable, opening the door for businesses as the hidden powers behind local rulers. As the alternatives were communist-leaning national liberation movement, this soon turned into the Cold War -- which was great news for the arms industry, which along with oil and finance became a pillar of American foreign policy. When the cold war receded, neocons came up with more rationales for more conflicts, to keep their graft going. Efforts at building international institutions (like the UN) increasingly gave way to unilateral dictates: America First, before Trump, who basically thinks of foreign policy as some kind of protection racket, latched onto the term. There hadn't been significant partisan differences in foreign policy since the advent of the Cold War: all the Democrats who followed Republican hawks (Reagan, the Bushes, even Trump in his own peculiar way) did was to normalize their aggressiveness. Thus Biden reaffirmed his support for Ukraine and Israel, as well as his opposition to Russia, China, and the usual suspects in the Middle East, which has (so far) blown up into two catastrophic wars, while at the same time the US has made sure that world organizations (like the UN) are powerless to intervene.

    Harris seems to be fully on board with this: not only does she support the current wars, she has gone out of her way to ostracize so-called autocrats -- not the ones counted as allies because they buy American arms but the others, the ones who make their own (or buy from each other). This conventional thinking, based on the notion that force projection (and sanctions) can and will dictate terms for resolving conflicts, has a very poor track record: it polarizes and militarizes conflicts, stokes resentments, stimulates asymmetric responses (like terrorism), while driving its targets into each others' clutches. Meanwhile, the reputation the US once had for fairness is in tatters.

    A new foreign policy needs first of all to prioritize peace, cooperation, and equitable economic development. It should also, where possible, favor social justice (albeit not through force, which is more likely to make matters worse).

  2. Restricting immigration is the one issue where neo-fascist politicians seem to be gaining significant popular support, in Europe as well as the US. Harris has chosen to lean into the issue rather than oppose the Republicans, as had Biden and Obama before her, not that any of their harsh enforcement efforts have gotten any cooperation or compromise from Republicans, who would rather milk this as a grievance issue than treat it as a practical issue. Part of the problem here is that while many voters will support Republicans just to vent rage, other voters expect results from Democrats, and no matter what results they hoped for, few are satisfied. The issue is complex and messy, and Congress is unable or unwilling to pass any legislation to help clear the mess. Which makes this an issue that will haunt Harris indefinitely, no matter what she tries to do.

    Personally, this is an issue I care little about either way. What concerns me more is that the system be seen as fair and just, that it is neither exploitative of immigrants nor that it hurts the domestic labor market. I could see arguments for limiting or for expanding immigration numbers. I do think that the current backlog of non-documented immigrants needs to be cleared up, which could involve clearing the path toward naturalization and/or paying them to leave, but it needs to be done in an orderly and humane manner, with clear rules and due process. I've generally opposed "guest worker" programs (like the one Bush tried to push through), but could see issuing green cards as a stopgap measure. Harris will find it difficult to navigate through this maze, but what would help is having some clear principles about how citizenship should work -- as opposed to just responding to Republican demagoguery.

    I should also note that the biggest determinant of immigration is foreign policy. Most people emigrate because they are dislodged by war or ecological and/or economic distress, and those are things that American foreign policy as presently practiced exacerbates. Policies that resolve (or better still, prevent) conflicts, that limit climate change, and/or that extend economic opportunities would significantly reduce the pressures driving emigration.

  3. Democrats under Biden made the first serious legislative effort at addressing climate change ever, but the structure of American politics makes it much easier to promote the development of new technologies and products than it is to do things like changing habits of fossil fuel use. Democrats are so wedded to the idea of economic growth as the panacea for all problems that they can't conceive of better lives lived differently. How one can ever get to zero emissions isn't on any agenda. Meanwhile, Republicans keep digging themselves ever deeper into their tunnel of ignorance, so they have nothing to offer but obstruction.

    While prevention seems to be too much to ask of any Democratic politician, they do still have a big advantage on disaster care. Reagan's joke -- "The nine most terrifying words in the English language are 'I'm from the government and I'm here to help'" -- is easily disproven every hurricane season, yet remains as sacred dogma. Given that climate change has already happened, and is playing out in cycles of increasingly uninsurable "natural" disasters, it becomes imperative to elect a government that cares about such problems, and regards it as its duty to help people out. Harris will be tested on this, repeatedly.

    Meanwhile, if you want to try out nine really terrifying words, try these: "I'm a Republican, and Donald Trump is my President."

  4. There is one political issue that close to 90% of all Americans could agree on, but it has no leadership and little support in either major party, and that is the thoroughly corrupt influence of money on politics. The situation has always been bad, but got much worse in 2010 when the Supreme Court ruled in favor of unlimited corporate spending in Citizens United v. FEC. Obama spoke out against the ruling, but did nothing to overturn it. Rather, he easily outraised his opponents in 2008 and 2012, winning twice. Biden and Harris have also raised much more money than Trump, so while Republicans are the most steadfast supporters of campaign graft, top Democrats also benefit from the system -- especially against their real competition, which is other Democrats, who might be tempted to campaign on issues that appeal to voters, as opposed to having to spend all their time catering to the whims of rich donors. The 2024 presidential election is by far the most ridiculously expensive in history, which also makes it the most tainted by special interests and their peculiar obsessions (like Israel, which has kept both candidates from expressing any concern about ongoing genocide). Breaking this mold is a golden opportunity for some aspiring politician. Harris can't do it while she's still campaigning, but it's not only wasteful, it diminishes trust in everyone involved, and as such discredits the whole system.

  5. The worst offenders, of course, are the billionaires, many of whom -- starting with Elon Musk, the kind of immigrant that even Trump can love -- has been especially conspicuous this year. They are the beneficiaries of a wide range of laws and breaks that allow a tiny number of individuals to accumulate obscene amounts of wealth. And they use that wealth to steer government away from any notion of public interest, to do their own bidding, and to indulge their own fantasies. This extraordinary inequality -- far beyond the historic highs of the Gilded Age and the Roaring '20s (both, you may recall, ill-fated bubbles) -- is the single biggest problem facing the world today. It may seem hypothetical, but it lies beneath so many other problems, starting with the dysfunction of government and politics, which is largely influenced by the distortions of wealth. It extends worldwide, with inequality of nations mirroring the inequality of individuals.

    The problem with inequality isn't that some people have a bit more than others. It's that such wide variations corrupt and pervert justice. It's often hard to say just what justice is, but it's much easier to identify injustice when you see it. In highly stratified societies, such as ours, you see injustice everywhere. It eats at our ability to trust institutions and people. It diminishes our expectation of fair treatment and opportunity. It raises questions about cooperation and even generosity. It makes us paranoid. And once lost, trust and security is all that much harder to restore.

    There is no simple answer here. It needs to be dealt with piecemeal, one step at a time, each and every day. It helps to reduce gross inequality (which can be done by taxation). It helps to reduce sources of inequality (which can be done by regulation of business, by limiting rents, by promoting countervailing powers, like unions). It also helps to reduce the impact of inequality (which can be done by raising basic support levels, by removing prices from services, by ending means testing, by providing universal insurance, and when no better solution is possible, by rationing). I don't expect any politician, especially one who has proven successful in the current system of extraordinary inequality, to go far along these lines, but most people are at least aware of the problem, and many proposals for small improvements are in common discourse. Even if Harris doesn't rise to the occasion, we should work to make sure her successors do.


While I think that Harris comes up short on all five of these really important points, they in no way argue for Donald Trump, even as a "lesser evil." He personifies modern inequality, Back in 2016, he tried arguing that his wealth would allow him to run a truly independent campaign, but that was just another lie. No one in recent memory has been more obvious about selling favors for financing. He is a climate change denier, and has shown nothing but contempt for the victims of natural disasters. His signature issue is his hatred of immigrants (excepting, presumably, two wives and his sugar daddy, Elon Musk), where he puts even more emphasis on performative cruelty than on effectiveness.

His take on foreign policy is slightly more . . . well, "nuanced" isn't exactly right, more like "befuddled." It's hard to make a credible case that he's anti-war when he puts such emphasis on what a tough guy he is, on how no opponent would dare challenge him. He has shown remarkably poor judgment in defense staffing, which is only likely to get worse now that two of his former generals have called him a fascist. He has no dealmaking skills, nor would he hire someone who could negotiate (any such person would be dismissed as a wuss). His "America First" schemes are designed to strain alliances, and are more likely to break than not. He delayed his deal to get out of Afghanistan so Biden would get the blame. His handling of Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Iran-Saudi Arabia directly contributed to the outbreak of war and genocide. As I said, foreign policy needs a complete rethink. He's already failed on several counts, starting with the need to think.


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Tuesday, October 22, 2024


Music Week

October archive (in progress).

Music: Current count 43065 [43039] rated (+26), 46 [41] unrated (+5).

Published another abbreviated Speaking of Which yesterday. Came to 212 links, 12063 words, but I added some more stuff this morning, and may add even more before this is posted. My computer time (listening and writing) was limited last week, mostly by a home repair project that drags on and on, with little hope of winding up soon. Well, maybe a little hope: the collapsed ceiling is repaired, old wallpaper removed, walls patched up, the bedroom walls primed, half of the closet paneling put up, and we just got back from buying finish paint. If I can muster the time, the paint and paneling should be doable in 2-3 days, but I haven't been able to get many good working shifts in, and I've repeatedly been snagged by Murphy's law.

Plus, I have another project this week, which is being pushed ahead by a deadline, plus the thought that it might be a lot more fun to do. That's my annual birthday dinner, scheduled for Friday, with at present nothing more than a concept: my first ever stab at making Burmese cuisine. I've often picked out exotic locales for past birthday dinners, and in my peak years managed to make twenty-some dishes.

But I've never picked one I had so little experience with and knew so little about. My experience is one take-out meal in New York at least 12 years ago. The reason I can date it is because I bought a Burmese cookbook shortly after, but it didn't have the dish that most delighted me from the restaurant, and nothing else really caught my eye, so I've never cooked anything from it. The concept came from seeing that cookbook on the shelf, and thinking maybe I should finally do something with it.

I may have made a dish or two from broader area cookbooks -- Charmaine Solomon's The Complete Asian Cookbook introduced me to all hot spots from India through Indonesia and China to Japan -- and I've gone deep on Indian (although not necessarily Bengali), Thai, and Chinese, which border old Burma (now Myanmar), so I expect to be working within those parameters. But as of Tuesday afternoon, I still don't have a menu, much less any shopping or prep done. My only move so far has been to buy a second Burmese cookbook, plus one that's more generically southeast Asian. (I haven't generally been listing cookbooks in my "recent reading" roll, but added my old Burma: Rivers of Flavor last week, so I figured I might as well spotlight the new books as well.) Generic southeast Asian may well be what I wind up with -- especially given that the local grocers are mostly Vietnamese, plus a couple Indian.

I'm torn between working on the room and on the menu next, but either option seems more enticing that diddling further on this post. Should be enough here for any decent week.


New records reviewed this week:

Nick Adema: Urban Chaos (2023 [2024], ZenneZ): Trombonist from Canada, based in Amsterdam, has a previous 2022 album as Adema Manouikas Octet but effectively his debut, mostly a quartet with piano/electric bass/drums, but includes a patch of string quartet, some guest guitar and horns, most prominently Noah Preminger (tenor sax) on 7 (of 12) tracks, and one vocal -- a surplus of ideas, held together with some fine trombone. B+(***) [cd]

JD Allen: The Dark, the Light, the Grey and the Colorful (2024, Savant): Tenor saxophonist, many impressive albums since 1998, mostly trios with bass (here Gregg August and/or Ian Kenselaar) and drums (Nic Cacioppo). Seems rather restrained. B+(**) [sp]

Andy Baker: From Here, From There (2018 [2024], Calligram): Trombonist, originally from London but based in Chicago, has side credits going back to National Youth Jazz Orchestra in 1996 but this seems to be his first album as leader. With Russ Johnson (trumpet), Clark Sommers (bass), and Dana Hall (drums). B+(**) [cd]

Basic: This Is Basic (2024, No Quarter): Trio of Chris Forsyth (guitar), Nick Millevoi (baritone guitar & drum machine), and Mikel Patrick Avery (percussion & electronics). Forsyth has albums going back to 1998, seems to be more rooted in rock than in jazz (where I have a previous album filed), cites Manzanera, Fripp, and Frith in his notes, as well as Robert Quine, who's 1984 duo album with Fred Maher is taken as the name of this group. No vocals, all jagged rhythms too insistent to decay into drone. B+(***) [sp]

Big Freedia With the Louisiana Philharmonic Orchestra: Live at the Orpheum Theater (2023 [2024], Queen Diva): New Orleans rapper Freddie Ross Jr., influenced by drag queens, released a single in 1999 and a mixtape in 2003, counts two studio albums, gets full orchestra backing for this live party. B+(***) [sp]

Anne Burnell & Mark Burnell: This Could Be the Start of Something Big (2024, Spectrum Music): Both sing, Mark plays piano, some originals mixed in with the standards, backed by bass and drums, plus sax (Pat Mallinger) on six tracks, guitar (Fareed Haque) on five (four others). B [cd]

Chris Corsano/Joe Baiza/Mike Watt: Corsano Baiza Watt Trio (2023 [2024], Yucca Alta): Drums, guitar, bass, only the group name on the cover. Discogs credits the drummer with 81 albums since 2002, mostly shared headlines, plus at least as many side-credits (going back to 1996). The others came out of rock groups: Baiza from Saccharine Trust, Watt (much more famously) from Minutemen. B+(*) [bc]

Doug Ferony With His Swingin Big Band: Alright Okay You Win (2024, Ferony Enterprizes Music): Singer, handful of albums going back to 1994, leads a big band (as advertised) through fourteen standards, all done better in the past, most by Frank Sinatra. B [cd]

Ingebrigt Håker Flaten/(Exit) Knarr: Breezy (2024, Sonic Transmissions): Norwegian bassist, very active since 1994 -- Discogs credits him on 260 albums, second album with this group, which includes trumpet, two saxophonists, piano, and drums, with spots of guitar or synth. B+(**) [sp]

Floating Points: Cascade (2024, Ninja Tune): British electronica producer Sam Shepherd, fifth album since 2015, threw everyone a curve last time when he mixed in Pharoah Sanders and the London Symphony Orchestra. I'd say this is a return to form, but it's much better than that: a relentless stream of dance beats that keeps you moving through thick and thin. A- [sp]

Darius Jones: Legend of e'Boi (The Hypervigilant Eye) (2024, AUM Fidelity): Alto saxophonist, burst onto the scene with a 2009 album called Man'ish Boy (A Raw & Beautiful Thing), to which this is at least nominally a "Chapter VII" (of a planned nine). This is a trio, with Chris Lightcap (bass) and Gerald Cleaver (drums), bristling with energy, but paced with well-measured spots of reflective calm. A- [cd]

Doug MacDonald and the Coachella Valley Trio: Live at the Rancho Mirage Library (2024, DMAC Music): Jazz guitarist, many albums, finds a nice groove in a set backed by bass and drums, with special guest Big Black on djembe. B+(**) [cd]

Mark Masters Ensemble: Sui Generis (2023 [2024], Capri): Big band arranger, has a regular stream of albums since 1984, dubs this "a jazz concerto for chamber orchestra," featuring trumpet player Tim Hagans. B+(**) [cd]

Gurf Morlix: In Love at Zero Degrees (2024, Rootball): Alt-country singer-songwriter, originally from Buffalo, moved to Texas in 1975, best known for his associations with Blaze Foley and Lucinda Williams, and maybe as a producer, but has a steady series of own albums since 2000. This one is toned down, but steady and solid. B+(**) [sp]

Eric Person: Rhythm Edge (2024, Distinction): Saxophonist (soprano, alto, tenor, flute), ten or so albums since 1993, notable side credits with Ronald Shannon Jackson, Chico Hamilton and Dave Holland, and a fling with World Saxophone Quartet. He's joined here by Ingrid Jensen (trumpet), Robin Eubanks (trombone), and a fusion-oriented rhythm section that includes organ, piano/keyboards, guitar, bass, and drums, and offers no edge that I can discern, although when uncluttered he remains a very respectable saxophonist. B [cd]

Jason Robinson: Ancestral Numbers II (2023 [2024], Playscape): Might as well recycle my review of the previous album, released back in May: Saxophonist (tenor/soprano here, also alto flute), albums since 1998, composed everything here, thinking about his ancestors. Quintet with Michael Dessen (trombone), Joshua White (piano), Drew Gress (bass), and Ches Smith (drums). Interesting throughout, and this time connected even quicker. A- [cd]

Snotty Nose Rez Kids: Red Future (2024, Savage Mob): First Nations rappers from Canada, sixth album since 2017. B+(***) [sp]

Moses Sumney: Sophcore (2024, Tuntum, EP): Born in California, "grew up on a goat farm in Accra [Ghana]," moved to Los Angeles after high school, has two albums, several EPs -- this one six songs, 20:37. B+(*) [sp]

Ohad Talmor/Chris Tordini/Eric McPherson: Back to the Land (2023 [2024], Intakt, 2CD): French tenor saxophonist, mostly associated with Lee Konitz, also plays bass clarinet and some electronics here, second credit tier line plays bass and drums, but there are seven more names in smaller print, most pretty notable ones at that, and then at the bottom of the cover you see "Ornette Coleman" -- the new pieces are mostly variations on old Coleman pieces, with some mention of Dewey Redman. B+(***) [sp]

Fred Thomas: Window in the Rhythm (2024, Polyvinyl): Indie rock singer-songwriter from Michigan, started in 1994 math rock band Chore, then joined His Name Is Alive, before his solo debut in 2002, with a dozen more up to this one. Sometimes hits an interesting vibe, but I can't quite peg it, or maybe just can't be bothered. B+(*) [sp]

Tropical Fuck Storm: Tropical Fuck Storm's Inflatable Graveyard (2024, Three Lobed): Australian art-punk band, formed by two members of the Drones (Gareth Liddiard and Fiona Kitschin), two others, with three studio albums since 2018, back here with a live double. Seems a bit much. B+(*) [sp]

Jack Wood & Nichaud Fitzgibbon: Movie Magic: Great Songs From the Movies (2024, Jazz Hang): Wood was billed as "a classic crooner," based in southern California, released a "best of" (with no recording dates) early in the year which proved surprisingly engaging, and featured the Australian Fitzgibbon as a guest. She's definitely his better half, which helps on this collection of classic movie schmaltz, backed tastefully by a long list of musician credits, from a half-dozen studios, also undated. B+(**) [cd]

Jamie xx: In Waves (2024, Young): British electropop producer James Smith, name from his group (The xx) with Oliver Sim and Romy Madley (three albums 2009-17), second solo album after a 2015 side-project. Dance beats illuminate the world. A- [sp]

Dann Zinn: Two Roads (2024, Ridgeway): Tenor saxophonist, based in Bay Area, sixth album, postbop quintet with Rachel Z (piano), Jeff Denson (bass), Omar Hakim (drums), and Brian Rice (percussion). B+(**) [cd]

Recent reissues, compilations, and vault discoveries:

William Basinski: September 23rd (1982 [2024], Temporary Residence): Classically-trained electronic composer, many albums since 2001 but reaches back into his early archives for this 40:11 ambient-meets-drone piece. B+(*) [bc]

Old music:

Adema Manoukas Octet: New Roots (2021 [2022], self-released): Canadian group, met at University of Toronto, led by composer/arrangers Nick Adema (trombone) and Alex Manoukas (baritone sax), with trumpet, two more saxophones, and unidentified rhythm. B+(***) [bc]

Sister Rosetta Tharpe: The Swinging Gospel Queen 1939-1947 (1937-47 [1998], Blues Collection): Gospel singer (1915-73), at least due to her subject matter, but she strums a mean guitar, and with half the voice and no backup singers she could pass for a folksinger, and a rocking one at that. I was surprised to find no graded albums in my database (despite seven albums, including a 4-CD Properbox, on the "shopping" list) -- "Up Above My Head I Hear Music in the Air" is one of my most persistent earworms -- so when I noticed a new Acrobat collection (The Singles Collection As & Bs 1939-1950), I was first tempted to buy it, then considered the Christgau-recommended The Absolutely Essential 3CD Collection, but came to my senses and checked out what I could stream. This one may be out of print, but comes from their generally reliable "Historic Recordings" series, with twenty songs, including my earworm and many more contenders (like "Everybody's Gonna Have a Wonderful Time Up Here"). Also named on the cover: Lucky Millinder, Sammy Price, Marie Knight. A- [sp]

Sister Rosetta Tharpe: Live in 1960 (1960 [1991], ORG Music): A solo set, so just her voice and guitar with the voice worked extra hard, a dozen songs, mostly standards but not necessarily hers ("Precious Lord," "Down by the Riverside," "Peace in the Valley"). B+(**) [sp]

Sister Rosetta Tharpe: Sister on Tour (1961, Verve): Another live set, from New York, with a hard-swinging band, identified only as "arranged and conducted by Teacho Wiltshire." B+(***) [sp]


Unpacking: Found in the mail last week:

  • The Attic & Eve Risser: La Grande Crue (NoBusiness) [10-04]
  • Arthur Blythe Quartet: Live From Studio Rivbea: July 6, 1976 (NoBusiness) [10-04]
  • Bill Evans: In Norway: The Kongsberg Concert (1970, Elemental Music, 2CD) [11-29]
  • Joe Fonda Quartet: Eyes on the Horizon (Long Song) [11-15]
  • Joel Futterman: Innervoice (NoBusiness) [10-04]
  • Andrew Hill: A Beautiful Day Revisited (2002, Palmetto, 2CD) [11-01]
  • B.B. King: In France: Live at the 1977 Nancy Jazz Pulsations Festival (Deep Digs/Elemental Music) [11-29]
  • Michael McNeill: Barcode Poetry (Infrasonic Press) [10-01]
  • William Parker/Hugo Costa/Philipp Emsting: Pulsar (NoBusiness) [10-04]
  • Emily Remler: Cookin' at the Queens (1984-88, Resonance, 2CD) [11-29]
  • Sara Serpa: Encounters & Collisions (Biophilia) [11-15]
  • Spinifex: Undrilling the Hole (TryTone) [11-22]
  • Sun Ra: Lights on a Satellite: Live at the Left Bank (1978, Resonance, 2CD) [11-29]

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